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The aim of this sludy was to explore the inten·elationship between economic development 
and the impact of industrialization on Newfoundland's constmction workers. My starting 
assumption was that the economic and political had a strong impact on the social. A 
qualitative case study methodology was used wherein three mega-projects were subjected 
to examinations to determine what impact the quest for economic development and its 
resulting industrialization had on workers. A combination of archival research, newspaper 
a.Tld other docmnentary research was backed up by interviews of by informants, 
particularly i11 the third case study. 
The empirical work focused on explaining the structure ofNewfotmdland's economy and 
the impact of the complex intertwinings of the social, political and economic environment 
on Newfoundland workers. The key shuctura1 dynamics to understanding the impacts of 
economic development were found to be the degree and effectiveness of employer 
support for good labour relations (which often played out in initial support for a union 
site), the state of the economy, and the role of the goverm11ent in the project. As the case 
studies demonstrate, structural properties of class and gender were crucial to 
understanding the ways in which economic development influenced workers and 
workplaces. 
This study is also one of the first to provide an intimate portrait of the life of construction 
workers in Newfoundland. Examining the daily life on three d:Jferent construction 
projects allows the study to determine change over time; and also provides a lens through 
which we can examine gender relations, occupational health and safety, and labour 
relations on the projects. This thesis, in providing a theoretically informed discussion of 
detailed case study material, contributes towards the debate on the role of the govemmcnt 
in economic development. Because two of three case studies were legislated within a new 
set of legal parametres, by special collective bargaining provisions as special projects, the 
study may also aid our understanding of the relationship between economic devek;pment, 
collective bargaining and the role of the govenLment. It also infcnms the debate on the 
role of workers/unions and employers in fostering better labour relations. 
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t One. "Construction Workers, Capital and the Government in Chap er · , 
Newfoundland, 1949-1997 
Introduction 
John Hickey was a carpenter. In his first 20 years in the construction industry he 
spent eight years working in Labrador City, several years in Churchill Falls, a few more 
in Come by Chance, and five more in St. John's. Hickey did not initially set out to he a 
constmction worker. When he was looking for work in 1960 he heard there were 
opportunities in Labrador City at the IOC. There he met up with a journeyman carpenter 
who taught him the trade. At the time trades were just moving into apprenticeship 
programs, and most workers received training on the job from more experienced >vorkers. 
Workers put in 60-hour weeks for $1.90 an hour, with no overtime, on the non-w1ionized 
IOC expansion. By the time of the Churchill Falls project, unionized workers earned 
higher wages and received oveliime. When the Churchill Falls project ended, Hickey was 
hired on by Lundrigan Contractors, one of the largest contractors in the province. 
Initially hired to work on the Come by Chance refinery, after two years Hickey was 
transfened to St. Jolm's to work on the highway overpass construction project. 
Hickey's v;ork experience was typical of heavy constn1ction workers; he moved 
from job to job, leaving his family behind while he went off to work. Hickey was not 
enthusiastic about travelling to work, stating "I mind working away. But there's no work 
in Southern Harbour, so you have to go elsewhere." Unlike mnny others, Hickey' s 
fami ly travelled with him to some of the longer tem1 jobs, such as the ones in Labrador -
the Iron Ore Company (IOC) expansion and Churchill Falls. But most months of the year 
Hickey's family only saw him on weekends and holidays. While working on the overpass 
project, Hickey was unemployed during the winter and stayed home to care for his 
2 
children and work on repairs to his house. Despite construction's reputation for high 
es in 1980 Hickey made $9 hour; by the time he drove from his home in Southern wag , 
Harbour to St. John's, an 80-mile trip, or paid room and board, little money remained to 
cover the winter unemployment. To help make ends meet his wife worked as a nursing 
. t I 
ass1stan . 
In the 1960s Andy Coady walked into Clouston Company's office in St. John's 
and asked for a job. Five years later he completed his tinsmith apprenticeship and 
became a journeyman. Not long into his journeyman days, mass production signalled the 
end of his trade, the making and repairing of pots and pans. Coady was fortunate enough 
to switch over to a different aspect of his trade, namely sheet metal work in the 
construction field. Primarily involved in installing heating and ventilation systems in 
buildings, Coady worked all over Newfoundland and as far away as Greenland. His jobs 
included the new federal Department of Fisheries and Oceans building in the \Vbite Hills, 
a new the telephone building in St. John's, and the new Queen Elizabeth II library at 
Memorial University.2 Unlike many sheet metal workers, he had enough seniority to 
keep employed throughout much of the year dming the booming 1960s and early 1970s. 
By the 1980s Coady joined thousands of other construcbon workers in the unemployment 
line. Some trades faced over 50 per cent unemployment, with only 100 out of 176 sheet 
metal workers employed even at peak season. 3 
~''John Hickey, Carpenter," Decks Awash, 9, 3 (June 1980), 9. 
·"Andy Coady, Sheet-Metal Worker," Decks Awash, 9, 3 (June 1980), 15. 
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'Tinsmiths Looking for Rainbows," Decks Awash, 9, 3 (June 1980), 14. L1 1979, unemployment 
was so high that sheet metal business agent Pat McCormick went on unemployment insurance 
when dues did not cover his salary. High unemployment remained a serious problem in the 1980s 
and in many areas it was compounded by the practice of double breasting, where unionized 
contractors operated non-union firms to win bids. 
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These two stories demonstrate many of the idiosyncrasies of the construction 
industry, including technological change, seasonal employment, frequent changes in 
employers and projects, and a male-dominated workforce. This thesis focuses on the 
construction industry in Newfoundland, particularly heavy construction, and its workers. 
Heavy construction involves the act of building a major structure - hydroelectric clams, 
oil refineries, and other large-scale industrial projects. Construction workers encompass 
any full and part-time employees who work on the payrolls of constmction firms up to 
the working foreperson level, ar1d who are engaged in construction operations, including 
painters, plumbers, equipment operators, ironworkers, electricians, carpenters, labourers, 
bricklayers, and others.4 
Main Argument 
This thesis studies three major construction projects m Newfoundland: the 
Churchill Falls hydroelectric generating station, the Come by Chance oil refinery, and the 
Hibernia offshore oil platform. I have chosen these three projects as in their time each 
was seen as central to Newfoundland's economic development plans and as key to 
generating new secondary industries. These projects were important not j ust because they 
employed a large number of workers but because they were central to government plans 
to trigger economic development.5 My work examines economic development in terms of 
4 The Centre to Protect Workers' Rights (CPWR), The Constntction Chart Book: The u'S 
Construction Industry and Its Workers (Washington, DC: CPWR, 1998), 56. 
5 While I chose the Churchill Falls hydroelectric generating station, a case could have been made 
inslead for rhe Bay d'Espoir generating station. Ultimately I opted to go with Churchill Falls as 
there was a wealth of data on its construction at the National Archives of Canada. Unlike 
Churchill Falls whose power was ultimately exported, power from Bay d'Espoir remained within 
the province to be used on the Come by Chance and other development projects. For more on Bay 
d'Espoir, see Melvin Baker, "Rural Electrfication in Newfoundland in the 1950s and the Origins 
of the Newfoundland Power Commission," Newfoundland Studies, 6, 2 (1990), 190-209. 
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its human consequences, not simply its conceptualization. Examining the human 
consequences of development places my work in the social history camp. To examine the 
human consequences of the government's modernization program, my work focuses on 
construction workers, their workplace behaviour, and worker-management interaction 
(labour relations) within the three projects. 
Much of Newfoundland's economic development occurred under the label of 
modernization. By modernization I am •refetTing to deliberate government development 
policies to mimic economic, political and social systems of mainland Canada and the 
United States. Under modernization, government and industry support export-led grov1th 
as the way to develop. A large component to modernization was building a modern 
capitalistic labour market, one divorced from the subsistence living familiar to many 
Newfoundland iishery workers. Workers were strongly encouraged to give up their 
subsistence lifestyle and become "professionals" in their field. Moving mvay from a 
subsistence living made workers particularly vulnerable to economic fluctuations. 
Surplus labour had no where to go. This was a particular problem in Newfoundland 
where small production and mega-projects went hand--in-hand, without a robust middle 
sector to hire the surplus labour when the mega-projects ended. 
Structure of the Thesis 
My thesis exan1mes the human consequences cf the province's ecor:om1c 
development program on its construction workers. I chose the construction industry as I 
viewed construction as the starting point to any industrial development Construction 
workers were on the front line in modernization programs. Before a single manufacturing 
plant could be built, before roads could link the province, and before hydro-electric 
5 
projects could provide the power neces.sary to attract outside industrialists, a construction 
workforce had to be put in place and taught the rhythms of industrial work. How did 
workers react to these new industrial work sites? Vlhat avenues did they pursue to cope 
with industrial employers? 
I chose the Churchill Falls, Come by Chance, and Hibernia projects becaus.e the 
government accorded each of these projects a c1iticai importance to the province's 
industrial development. 6 Each of the three case studies involves a relatively dosed, 
company-run community, particularly Churchill Falls, which was constructed in an 
isolated part of Labrador. All three case studies involved workers living in construction 
camps for a long duration (the projects lasted three, four and six years respectively). 
Workers were housed in bunkhouses or dormitories, ate all of their meals on site, and, 
despite residing in a more populous area in two of the cases (Come by Chance and 
Hibernia), spent much of their leisure time in activities planned or offered by the 
company. While workers on all three projects worked shift schedules that allowed them 
time off to spend with their families (every few weeks at Come by Chance and Hibernia, 
after six months at Churchill Falls), the distance made travel difficult for many workers. 
Tn all three cases the company dictated who had access to the site and to the living 
quarters. 
6 
Like Claus Offe, I view the government as an institution made up of diverse groups of 
administrative and political units that play a coordinating role in managing the structures of 
socialization and the capitalist state. Ofte views the democratic state as enmeshed in 
contradictions that arose out of its dual role of maintaining the process of capital accumulation 
while still upholding its position as operating as a neutral arbiter of class interests. According to 
Ofte, state pla1mers were caught in the contradictory position of trying to organize an 
accumulation process that was largely outside state control, yet upon which they depended for 
revenues. Offe' s work was unique, as it asked why regulatory systems were not vvorking, rather 
than how to make the system \vork. Offe, Contradiction of the Welfare State (Bos!on: MIT Press, 
1984), 12-13. 0 
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Before we can understand the human consequences of modernization, it is 
ry to understand how (and why) modernization was adopted in Newfoundland. 11ecessa 
Hence in chapter two, I explore how the governinent's modernization program developed 
and what its key tenets were. Two of the factors affecting workers were the government's 
deveiopment of trades and technical. coll-:ges to help "professionalize" vmrkers and its 
use of growth centres to pool labour. Chapter three examines the political and economic 
significance of three specific case studies in Newfoundland's development trajectory. It 
provides a bridge between the general economic development literan1rc of chapter two 
and the more thematic approach of the remaining chapters. Why hydro development in 
the 1960s? Why an oil refinery in the 1970s? Why oil and gas development in the 1980s 
and 1990s? What has made these projects the ones pursued by industrialists and the 
Newfoundland government? 
After examining the modernization theoty and its application in Newfoandlau.d, 
chapters four through nine explore the human consequences of modemization on 
construction workers. Chapter four introduces the world of industrial construcrion 
workers, including their living and working conditions, and the incentives needed to draw 
them to constmction. Chapter five examines worker-management interaction on the 
Churchill Falls and Come by Chance construction sites with a foGus on strikes and 
lockouts. It also explores the factors that underlay projects with more successful labour 
relations climates. As such chapter five explores how each site both operated as an 
individual microcosm and was representative ofthe wider labour relations climate. 
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In chapter six I examine management and the provincial government's reactions 
to the labour relations crisis of the 1970s, and how both sides used the economic 
downturn to their advantage over workers. In the case of the provincial goverrnnent, the 
reactions included the appointment of royal commissions and advisory committees. 
Industry on the other hand reacted by banding together to demand concessions from both 
aovernment and unions. Chapter seven focuses on how workers reacted on an in eli vidual 
b 
basis to perceived problems on the shop floor. \Vhile most workers were happy to 
exchange their labour for a good paycheck, others found it difficult to follow the myriad 
of rules covering their work and camp lives. The central issue this chapter discusses is the 
methods workers used to assert their own interests and demands. A small minority of 
workers came up with innovative ways to control their work processes and their rate of 
production including pilfering time and company property. 
In chapter eight the issue of the gendered nature of construction is discussed, 
including how the social constructs of masculine and feminine established specific jobs 
on construction sites as male and female. It examines the experiences of vvomen in 
traditional jobs on construction sites and examines the pioneering women who tried to 
overcome prejudices and harassment to become construction workers. Chapter nine 
explores the consequences of modernization on the occupational health and safety of 
Newfoundland's construction workers. This chapter concludes with an examination of 
what impact masculinity and the gendered nature of construction has had on occupational 
health and safety. Studying occupational health and safety is important as many of 
Newfoundland's core industries, including mining, fishing, logging, constmction, 
8 
offshore oil extraction, are occupations with high rates of accidents, injuries, and 
occupational illnesses. Regulation of occupational health and safety in Newfouildland has 
often been held in check by governments desperate to be seen to be bringing in economic 
development. My thesis concludes with a chapter examining what the overall human 
consequences of the government's modernization programs have been on workers. 
Methodology 
In answering "how" and "why" questions such as those introduced in my thesis, a 
case study methodology offers several advantages. By using case studies much is gaiaed 
in detail and specificity. Approaching more than one case study allows opportunities for 
comparisons on a geographic, temporal, and spatial basis. Case studies are particularly 
valuable in examining what impact a process, such as rnodemization, has had on events 
and individuals. One drawback of the case study approach is much can be lost in the pre-
case study time frame and in terms of events occtming outside the geographic boundaries 
of the study. I have tried to address these problems through an analysis of the larger 
economic transfonnations wrenched by the expansion of industrial capita1ism and 
through attention to the role of the government in the entire process. Hence chapter two 
and ti'..ree focus on the government's role in economic development in Newfoundland. 
This allows the inclusion of events which had an impact on each of my case studies but 
which were difficult to incorporate into the case study approach. 
Under traditional case study methodology it is standard for histmiar1s to approach 
the sources for each case with a set list of questions and then to account for similarities 
and differences. This proved impossible for my purposes because the available data for 
each case was di±Ierent. For Churchill Falls I had access to company records and a 
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company newspaper, both of whjch provided management's view of events. No records 
were found representing the unions' views. For Come by Chance the refinery's 
bankruptcy in the mid-1970s meant that few of the papers - either management or union 
- survived. In that case I was forced to rely on newspapers and other government records. 
For Hibernia, the most readily available documents were from the Oil Development 
Council, the super-tmion on site. The employer was less open with its documents, but 
interviews 'vith the Hibernia Employer's Association representative, James Kenny, the 
company-sponsored newspaper, and public documents shed light on the owners' 
perspective. 
The disparate nature of each record set made it difficult to ask the same questions 
of the data. Instead I opted to use each case study to demonstrate a different aspect of the 
industry using thematic chapters, each one using examples from at least one of the case 
studies. Jettisoning a more structured case studies approach also allowed me to make use 
of different types of sources for each chapter. Churchill Falls, with ils company records, 
allowed me to examine the benefits offered to attract workers to industrial com;truclian 
and the efforts to keep them there. Using newspapers in the Come by Chance case 
allowed me to trace the events that were deemed impmtant by the media, generally 
negative events such as strikes, lockouts and productivity slow-dovms. The union files 
available for Hibemia allowed me to trace activities on the "shop floor" itself, including 
the system of discipline. In all three case studies, government records -- where available -
- were also used. When combined with thematic chapters on the gendered nature and the 
dangers of working in construction, this approach allowed a detailed examination of the 
Newfoundland constmction industry. 
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This study occurs largely at the provincial level, as resource development is a 
provincial responsibility. Many of the issues, however, transcended provincial 
boundaries. On the Churchill Falls project an agreement with Quebec was necessary to 
transmit electricity to American markets. In the case of Hibernia a jurisdictional battle 
resulted in several court battles and only ended after the election of Brian Mulroney led 
to ioint federai-provincial control (the Atlantic Accord). At these points the research goes 
j 
beyond the provincial level. I have also limited the time frame to the post-Confederation 
period (post-1949). My terminal point is relatively recent, 1997, and was chosen to allow 
an examination of the completion of the Hibemia on-shore construction project. 
Sources 
Data on the three case studies was gathered from 1997-2000. Much of the data is 
archival in nature, with key information gathered from the Centre for Newfoundland 
Studies (CNS) :md its Archives (CNSA), the Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and 
Labrador (PANL), and the National Archives of Canada (NAC). The Newfoundland and 
Labrador Building and Construction Trades Council (l~BCTC) made additional arc hi val 
material available. I was also given access to Oil Development Council (ODC) records by 
former president, and IUOE leader, Derm Cain. These records proved invaluable in their 
scope. Mike Powers of the IBEW also provided access to his considerable Hibernia 
records. My trip to the Centre for the Protection of Workers Rights in Washington DC 
was key to helping me conceptualize the issues of occupational health and safety. Given 
the contemporary nature of the three projects, archival data was not always easy to come 
by. In the Come by Chance case study, newspaper research and secondary data have been 
used to make up for a shortage of archival material. In all three cases newspapers proved 
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an invaluable source. The Churchill Falls News and the Hibernia News, both company 
sponsored community newspapers, provided in-depth coverage of life on each project. 
Needless to say, neither newspaper can be considered unbiased as little was published 
that did not meet company approval. In neither case were accidents, fatalities, or labour 
strife noted in the papers. 
Archival records -were primarily government documents, employer and umon 
records, including memoranda, minutes of meetings, and press releases. Detailed records 
for the Churchill Falls Labrador Corporation (CFLCo) are housed at the National 
Archives of Canada in Ottawa and included the collective bargaining agreement, accident 
rep01is, and detailed financial statements. Interviews were also used but to a much lesser 
extent than archival materials. In part this was due to the large numbers of constn.tction 
\vorkers on each project. While interviews with construction workers from the tlu·ce 
projects would have provided additional information, time and space constraints made 
that difficult. Time-wise, in-depth interviews would have necessitated focussing on only 
one project. In addition, the transitory nature of construction meant that many of the 
constmction workers were no longer in the province or even still in construction. 
Interviews on the Hibernia case study were conducted with key participants, union and 
management officials, in the project. Interviews were designed to be responsive and 
flexible and followed no set questions. This fonnat _allowed the establishment of rapport 
with the interviewee and allowed the intervie'Vvee to put forward issues they felt were 
important. Interviews generally began with a general, open-ended question. While none 
of the interviews were taped, extensive notes were taken during each interview; 
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something made easier by having two people conducting the interviews. 7 Interview and 
archival documents were not treated as factual reports of actual events but were treated as 
evidence of different perspectives. Wherever possible information gathered from one 
source was corr-oborated from other sources. 
In cases where individual workers' names were part of the public record, I have 
used them here. The only exception was the Hibefilia arbitration files. \Vhile the records 
were open to the public, given the contemporary nature of the project and the nahtre of 
many of the grievances (theft, sleeping on the job), I have chosen not to include workers' 
names or other personal details (including home towns). I have also left om names and 
other identifiers in documents such as letters written by workers or their families to the 
premier's office or their unions detailing personal or job-related problems, as the authors 
of such letters likely did not intend for their correspondence to become prui of the public 
domain. In newspaper sources where names were given they have been used here. 
Literature Review 
To examine the hurnan consequences of the government's modernization program on 
construction workers, I draw on concepts, methods, and approaches developed within 
political economy and labour history. This section begins with a brief overview of the 
early labour history and political economy literatures ru1d how each developed. Following 
the overview, my primary focus is on the left-nationalist political economy, 
modernization, and Newfoundland labour history literatures. 
Labour Histor_y 
Early labour history focused on the workplace, primarily on organized craft 
workers and on trade unions. Canada's first labour "historians" had their interest sparked 
;------------------------
Several of the interviews were conducted by Dr. Gregory Kealey and myself. 
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in the "labour problems" of the period from the 1890s to 1919 as workers stmggled to 
resist industrial capitalism. One of the early labour "historians" in Canada was William 
Lyon Mackenzie King whose Industry and Humanity encapsulated his 20 years' 
experience as a labour relations expert and his belief in industrial ha.tlllony. 8 Following 
in the liberal progressive footsteps of King, in the 1920s a second generation of scholars 
undertook research into Canadia..'1 iabom topics, including Bryce Stewart, Edmund 
Bradwin, and Harold Logan.9 ~1Iany of these early works, including Bradwin, were aimed 
at reforming conditions of work. Logan's HistOIJ' of Trade Union Organization in 
Canada and subsequent Trade Unions in Canada are representative of a focus on 
establishing an institutional framework in which to place Canadian labour. Following 
Logan's institutional focus was Eugene Forsey. Forsey, a political scientist a..'1d an activist 
in the CCF, wrote an exhaustive study, History ofTrade Unions in Canada, 1812-1902.10 
During the 1930s, the social problems engendered by mass unemployment led to 
a surge of academic interest in workers. Following the example of their American 
colleagues, many of the Canadian studies in the 1930s concentrated on unemployment, 
western settlement, and ethnicity. 11 Other works such as Harold Innis, The Cod Fisheries 
undertook to explain the differences between Canadian and AmeJican economic 
development. Innis's work was one of the first, along with that of W.A. Mackintosh, to 
8 William Lyon Mackenzie King, Industry and Humanity (Toronto: Allen, 1918). 
9 Bryce Stewart, Canadian Labor Laws and the Treaty (Ne\V York: M1S, 1926); Edmund 
Bradwin, The Bunkhouse Man: A Study of Work and Pay in the Camps of Canada, 1903-1914 
(New York: Columbia University Press, 1928); Harold Logan, History of Trade Union 
Organization in Canada (Chicago 1928); and Logan, Trade Unions in Canada (Toronto: 
MacMilian 1948). 
10 ~ ' 
Eugene Forsey, History ofTrade Unions in Canada, 1812-1902 (Toronto: UTP, 1982). For 
more on the early literature, see Gregory S. Kealey, "Writing about Labour," Workers and 
Canadian History (Montreal: McGill-Que~n's Press, 1995), 9. 
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expound the staples theory which explained Canada's economic and political 
development as resulting from the extraction of raw resources (cod, fur, minerals, and 
wheat to name only a few), which dominated settlement pattems and the local 
economy. 12 Innis argued "concentration on the production of staples for exports to more 
highly industialised areas in Europe and later in the United States has broad implications 
for the Canadian economic, political, and social stmcture."13 
Staples theory offered the premise that Canada's disadvantaged regions had once 
been prosperous but once the staple declined in importance -- either through over 
exploitation, changes in demand, or lower cost production elsewhere - the area declined. 
Innis argued that each staple left its mark on Canadian development, and the shift to ne\v 
staples produced periods of c1isis as the economy and society adjusted to the new staples 
production. Staples literature put forward the idea that once a marketable resource was 
discovered, capital would flow in. To remain a viable region, it became necessary to 
diversify away from a reliance on staples. While the masters - Innis, Lower, and 
Creighton - focused on how staple production affected politics and the development of 
the nation, others focused on resource development and its impact on provincial 
economies, on foreign investment, or on govemment plmming. 14 
--------
11 See for instance Harold Innis on the mining frontier, Arthur Lower on the lumber industry, and 
Carl Dawson on immigration. 
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Donald Creighton, Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence (Toronto: Ryerson Press, 1937); 
Harold Innis, The Cod Fisheries (Toronto: University ofToronto Press [UTP], 1954); and hmis, 
Essays in Canadian Economic History (Toronto: UTP, 1956). 
13 .H 
arold ln11is, The Fur Trade in Canada: An Introduction to Canadian Economic History 
(Toronto: UTP, 1956) 358. 
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After a period of dormancy, the work of Innis was reincarnated in the 1970s (Watkins and 
Nelles) and 1980s (Clement, Marchak, Drache) by authors intent on explaini11g US dominance of 
Canadian industry. See for instance, ILV. Nelles, The Polirics of Development: Forests, }dines 
and Hydro-Electric Povver in Ontario, 1849-1941 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1974) and Nelles and 
Christopher Armstrong, Monopoly's Moment: the Organization and Regulation of Canadian 
Utilities. 1830-1930 (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986); Jorge Niosi, Canadian 
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In the late 1940s pioneering works in labour history from a "peoples' perspective" 
were started by Communist Party members Stanley Ryerson and Charles Lipton. 15 The 
period from the 1940s-1960s was more known for institutional labour histmy, including 
studies of labour economics, labour legislation, and trade unions.16 In the 1950s and 
1960s labour relations and biographies dominated the field. Stuart Jamieson's Industrial 
Relations in Canada and Times of Trouble became the standard texts for labour 
relations. 17 Biographies included Kem1eth McNaught's work on CCF fotmder and 
Winnipeg General Strike participant J.S. Woodswotih, and Hany Ferns and Bernard 
Ostry's critical The Age of Mackenzie King which decimated King's Image as a pro-
Multinationals (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1985). Translated by Robert Chodos; Patricia 
Marchak, In Whose Interests: An Essay of Multinational Corporations in a Canadian Comext 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979) and Marchak, Uncommon Property (Toronto: Methuen, 
1987), 3-4; Daniel Drache, ed., Staples, Markets, and Cultural Change: selected essays ofHarold 
A. Innis (Monu-eal: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1995); Wallace Clement, Continental 
Corporate Povver: economic elite linkages between Canada and the United States (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1977); and Clement and Drache, A Practical Guide to Canadian 
Political Economy, (Toronto: J. Lorimer, ] 978). These new staples theorists focused on the 
economic and political consequences of staples extraction, and were heavily tinged with a left-
wing nationalism. Authors such as Levitt and Watkins argued that by continuing to rely on staples 
for economic growth, Canada was allowing its surplus profits to flow to the United States and 
limiting its own development as a mature industrial economy. Kari Levitt, The Silent Surrender 
(Toronto: MacMillan, 1970); and Mel Watkins, "The Staples Theory Revisited," Journal of 
Canadian Studies, 12, 5 (Winter 1977), 83-95. Little ofthe staples work, old orne\v, paid 
?ufficient attention to the historical development of the working class. 
'
5 Stanley Ryerson, The Founding of Canada: Beginnings to 1815 (Toronto: Progress Books, 
1960); Ryerson, Unequal Union: Confederation and the Roots of Conflict on the Canadas, 1815-
187 3 (Toronto: Progress, 1973); and Charles Lipton, Trade Union Movemenr of Canada, 192?-(?59 (Montreal: Canadian Social Publications, 1966). 
o See for instance, R.L. Elliott, "The Canadian Labour Press from 1867," Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science, 14 (1948), 220-45; J.T. Montague, "Trade Unionism in the 
Canadian Meat Packing Industry," PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 1950; and Egil Schonning, 
"Union-Management Relations in the Pulp and Paper Industry of Ontario and Quebec, 1914-
1?50," PhD lhesis, University ofToronto, 1955. Kealey, "Writing about Labour," 12-3. 
Stuart Jamieson, industrial Relations in Canada (Toronto: MacMillan, 1957); Jamieson, Times 
of Trouble: Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict in Canada 1900-66 (Ottawa: Task Force on 
Labour Relations, 1968). 
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labour reformer. 18 An exception to this institutional focus was the work of H. Clare 
Pentland whose early works addressed the role of labour in the staples economy of the 
. 1 19 
coloma era. 
Dissatisfaction with the current approaches to history was welling up within 
historical ranks by the mid-to-late 1960s. Many historians began calling for a 
consideration of what was labelled the "totality" of the \Vorking-class experience, not 
simply trade union organization, the economic struggles, and political activities of 
workers but also issues such as tbe tensions between organized and unorganized workers 
and between the paid and unpaid work forces. Intellectual and political ferment greatly 
influenced the topics of many young academics, as did the resurgence of working-class 
militancy in the late 1960s. 20 A trend towards social history also sparked interest in 
\Vomen's history as many academics turned to historical topics that allowed them to 
connect their political ideology with their intellectual curiosity. 21 
18 Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics (Toronto: UTP, 1959) and Harry Ferns and Bemarcl 
Ostry, The Age of Mackenzie King (London: Heinemann, 1955). 
19 H. Clare Pentland, "The Role of Capital in Canadian Economic Development b~:ore 1875," 
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 16 (1950), 457-74; "The Development of 
a Capitalistic Labour Market in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 
25 (1959), 450-61; and Labour and Capital in Canada 1650-1860 (Toronto: J. Lorimer, 1981). 
20 See for instance, Kealey, "Preface," Workers and Canadian Histmy, xiv. 
2 1 More recently, labour history has branched out to become more inclusive of the role of women 
in working class survival. Many of these works identified areas of women's waged labour, 
pointed out the existence of job ghettos for females, and discussed the conditions under which 
women worked. See Suzanne Cross, "The Neglected Majority: the Changing Role of Women in 
Nineteenth Centuty Montreal," Histoire sociale/Social History, 6 (1973); and Veron:ca Strong-
Beag, "The Girl of the New Day: Canadian Working Women in the 1920's," Labour/Le 
Travailleur, 4 (1979), 131-164. For more on the early intersections of women's and labour 
histor; see Bettina Bradbury, "Women's History and Working Class History," Labour/Le Travail 
(LIL1), 19 (Spring 1987), 23-43. Later studies discussed who these women workers were, why 
they were in the labour force, and what role they played in the family. One of the best works in 
this area was Bradbur;, Working Families: Age, Gender, and Daily Survival in Industrializing 
Montr~al (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1993). Working Families focused on each family 
member 's role in the paid and unpaid economies, examining how women provided the sustenance 
for their families to go out to 'Nork by tending the home, gardening, and taking in boarders. Other 
17 
Many of the new approaches - and much of the rhetoric - of the late 1960s 
sparked debates among labour historians. Initially debates in the late 1960s and 1970s 
centred on who was to be studied and what approaches were approp1iate. On one side of 
the debate were those approaching labour history from a liberal tradition, including David 
Bercuson, Irving Abella, and Desmond Morton, while on the other side were those 
approaching labour history from a Marxist perspective including Bryan Palmer and Greg 
Keaiey. Canadian Marxist historians were greatly influenced by the work of British 
Marxists (E.P. Thompson and E.J. Hobsbawm) and American labour historians (Herbert 
Gutman and David Montgomery). As the debate is laid out elsewhere, I will not go into 
its roots here.22 Marxists such as Kealey and Palmer attempted to place their work within 
a social history framework. Ultimately Palmer, Kealey and others were trying to show 
how industrialization created a distinct working class and a working-class consciousness 
using a community study approach. 23 Like their earlier counterparts, however, labour 
--------------·------------------------------------------------------------
writers have examined what effect gender had on '..VOrkplace relations. See Mark Rosenfeld, "'It 
was a hard iife': Class and Gender in the Work and Family Rhythms of a Railway To,vn 1920-
1950," Canadian Historical Association, Hiswrical Papers (1988); and Joy Pan, ihe Gender of 
Breadwinners: Women, j'vfen and Change in Two Industrial Towns, 1880-1950 (Toronto: UTP, 
1990); and Gillian Creese, Contracting Masculinity. Gender, Class. and Race in a White-Collar 
Union, 1944-1994 (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 1999). One article important to my ov.·n 
thinking on gender and women's roles within a masculine culture was Franca Iacovetta, 
"Defending Honour, Dema:1ding Respect: Manly Discourse and Gendered Practice in Two 
Constmction Strikes, Toronto, 1960-1 ," in Kathryn McPhers0n, Cecilia Morgan, and Nancy 
Forestell, eds., Gendered Pasts (Don Milis: Oxford University Press, 1999), 199-222. Iacovetta's 
article examined 'NOmen's roles in construction strikes. Iacovetta argued that the early 1960s 
strikes coalesced around the image of the "honourable family man whose proven capacity for 
hard work" entitied him to respect and better treatment. 
22 
Kenneth McNaught, "E.P. Thompson vs. Harold Logan," Canadian Historical Review, 62 
(1981), 141-68; Desmond Morton, "E.P. Thompson dans des arpcnts de neige," Revue d'histoire 
de l'Amerique franc;aise, 37 (1982), 165-84; David Bercuson, "Through the Looking Glass of 
Culture," Labour/Le Travailleur, 7 (1981), 95-112; and Carl Berger, The Writing ofCanadian 
-f[is;ory (Toronto: UTP, 1986, 2nd edition). 
J.ea~ey, Toronto Workers Respond to b:zdustrial Capitalism, 1867-!892 (Toronto: UTP, 1991, 
2 ed.J and Bryan Palmer, .4 Culture in Conflict: Skilled Workers and Industrial Capitalism in 
Hamilton, 1860-1914 (1\'lontreal: MeGill-Queen's Press, 1979). 
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historians writing in the 1970s remained largely focused on male workers, on production, 
and on the workplace, particularly writers focusing on the 20111 century.24 
Newfoundland Historiography 
As my thesis focuses on three major construction projects in Newfoundland, each 
seen as the central element in Newfoundland's economic development, it is important to 
review the literatures on modernization and labour histmy. Newfoundland historiography 
is dominated by the question of why it has failed to develop along the Nmih American 
model. Early efforts to explain Newfoundland's underdevelopment include D.\V. Prowse 
and J.D. Rogers, each of whom fostered a different explanation for Newfoundland's 
economic stagnation. 25 Prowse believed that the English West County merchants who 
dominated Nev..-foundland's economy, prevented agricultural development and local 
settlement. Rogers, by contrast, believed that, while the merchants were partially 
responsible for the lack of economic growth, NewfoUJ.idland's poor soil a..11d climate \vere 
ultimately responsible for retarding alternatives to the fishery. From Prowse and Rogers, 
the field turned to staples theory to explain Newfoundland's underdevelopment.26 
In the 1960s modemization theory dominated examinations of NewfOundland's 
development. Modernization was based on the concept that cultural factors intrinsic to 
each region were at the root of economic disparities and to blame for impediments to 
economic advancement. The modernization approach viewed Newfoundland's uneven 
development pattern as the result of Newfoundland's great distance from the markets, its 
24 
Craig Heron, Working in Steel (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1988) and Ian Radforth, 
fsus!nvorkers and Bosses: Logging in northern Ontario, 1900-1980 (Toronto: UTP, 1987). 
D.W. Prowse, A History ofNewfoundlandji-om the English, Colonial and Foreign Records 
(London: l'v1acMillan and Company, 1895) and J.D. Rogers, New.foundland: Historical and 
~eographic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1911). 
- See for instance, the work of Harold Innis, The Cod Fisheries . 
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sparse population and its dependency on resources. Many modernization proponents 
blamed a supposed over-reliance on the fishery for Newfoundland's underdevelopment. 
David Alexru.1der, whose work was influential on the next generation of Newfoundland 
scholars, disagreed. He argued that Newfoundland's elite with an interest in the fisheries 
demonstrated limited general economic leadership while politicians focused on a policy 
of landward diversification, refusing to admit that the colony depended on marine 
resources. Rather than focusing on an over-reliance on the fisheries, Aiexander suggested 
that scholars examine how fisheries neglect contributed to Newfoundland's economic 
decline in the early 201h century. 27 
Alexander's work sparked new research into economic development. In his 
examination ofthe seal fishery, Shannon Ryan argued that the roots ofunderdevelopment 
lay in the international arena, not with local elites. Ryan found that the saltfish trade was 
under attack from producers outside Newfoundland, teche.ological advances, and 
changing market conditions. According to Ryan, the root of the political and economic 
crisis wreaking havoc with Newfoundland in the 1920s and 1930s was the saJ.t fish trades 
collapse. Bill Reeves reconstructed the trade relationship between Newfoundland and the 
United States, and found that Newfoundland merchants actively pursued fisheries 
modemization. He argued that Alexander and others placed too great an emphasis on 
merchants and their ability to manoeuvre as a group. Work by Bob Hong demonsu·ated 
that the Board of Trade attempted to modernize the fishery and work for reforms, but 
only through voluntary self-regulation.28 
27 David Alexander, "Development and Dependence in Newfoundland 1880-1970," Acadiensis, 4, 
1 (Autumn 1974). 
28 Shannon Ryan, Fish Out of Water (St. .John's: Breakwater Books, 1986); Wil1iam Reeves, 
'"Our Yankee Cousins': Modernization and the Newfoundland-American Relationship, 1898-
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Other authors also focused on the role of local elites in the fishery, including 
Henry Veltmeyer, Steven Antler, Gerald Sider and Sean Cadigan. In the 1970s Veltmeyer 
and Antler set out to apply a Marxist analysis to Newfoundland economic development. 
Both V eltmeyer and Antler used the dependency theory developed for Latin America by 
Andre Gunder Frank and others to analyze Newfoundland underdevelopment.29 
According to Antler, class, not geography was to blame for Newfoundland's failure to 
develop along the North American model. 30 Other authors \vho used dependency theory 
to explain Newfoundland included J.D. House and Valerie Summers. House viewed 
Newfoundland's underdevelopment as a combination of outside factors and internal 
mistakes. Newfoundland, in his view, had been in a struggle to avoid having its resources 
'captured' by multinarional corporations, but had yet to find an alternate means of 
maximizing benefits for the province.31 Summers' Regime Change in a Resource 
Economy explores the inter-connections between a resource economy and 
transfom1ations in political regime in Newfoundland. 32 
1910," PhD thesis, University of Maine at Orono, 1987; Reeves, "Alexander's Conundrum 
Revisited," Ne'r'.!foundland Studies, 5, 1 (1989); Robert Hong, '"An Agency for the Common 
Weal': the Newfoundland Board ofTrade, 1909-1915," W..A thesis, Memorial University of 
Newfoundland (MUN), 1998. 
29 Their theory was based on the work of Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and 
Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review, 1969, revised edition). 
30 Henry Veltmeyer, "The Capitalist Underdevelopment of Atlantic Canada," in Robe1i Dryul and 
R. James Saccouman, eds., Underdevelopment and Social Movements in Atlantic Canada 
(Toronto: New Hogtown Press, 1979); Steven Antler, "The Capitalist Underdevelopment of 
Nineteenth-Century Newfoundland," in Brym and Sacouman, Underdevelopment and Social 
Movements in Atiantic Canada, 179-202; and Antler, "Colonial Exploitation and Economic 
~tagnation in Nineteenth-Century Newfoundland," PhD thesis, University of Connecticut, 1975. 
J.D. House, "The Mouse that Roars: New Directions in Canadian Political Economy," in Robert 
Brym, ed., Regionalism in Canada (Toronto: Irwin Publishers Inc., 1986); and House, The 
~hallenge of Oil (St. John's: ISER, 1985), 27-29. 
~-Valerie Summers, Regime Change in a Resource Economy: The Politics of Underdevelopment 
111 Newfoundland since 1825 (St. John's: Breakwater Press, 1994). Summers traced 
Newfoundland's underdevelopment back to the early 19u' century where she found local 
development was stymied by a lack of investment capital, a weak investment br.nking sector, and 
21 
In his attempt to explain the relationship behveen the "unique" cultural practices 
ofmral Newfoundlanders and the truck system by which workers exchanged their labour 
for goods, Sider also blamed merchants for underdevelopment. Merchants, Sider claimed, 
perpetuated a system maintaining their personal economic dominance at the cost of 
overall development. He claimed a combination of the inability of subsistence production 
to meet needs, and the contradictions bet'.veen the social relations of commodity and 
. 
subsistence production forced local com:nmnities to tum to the state for aid anu to 
individualize experience, thus undermining the political assertiveness of outport culture.33 
Many authors criticized Sider for failing to account for geographical factors, for 
neglecting political dimensions, and for being a-historic.al.34 Sean Cadigan disagreed. His 
work posited that it was necessary to examine class relationships more fully. Rather than 
take as a given that merchants were a conservative force, Cadigan argued the credit 
system had to be examined historically as an accommodation between fish merchants and 
fisher families as both attempted to advance their O\Vn interests. He argued that the credit 
system developed within a society and economy shaped by not only limited resources, 
but also by the political and legal infrastmcture of a region and an industry marked by 
antagonistic capitalist and imperial interests.35 
a government which focused predominantly on the fishery and represented the English mercantile 
system. Summers also examines resource depletion and the complicated nature of dealing with 
resources in a federal context. 
33 Gerald Sider, Culture and Class in Anthropology and Hist01y: A Newfoundland Illustration 
(Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1986). 
34 J.K. Hiller, Robert Paine and J. Overton, "A Comment on Gerald Sider's Culture and Class in 
Anthropology and History," in Nigel Rapport, ed. Roundtable discussion, St. John's, 1987. In 
CNS. 
35 Scan C2digan, "Economic and Social Relations ofProduction of the Northeast-Coast of 
Ne\:vfoundlanc.l, with special reference to Conception Bay 1785-1855," PhD thesis, MUN, 1991. 
3; and Cadigan, Hop e and Deception in Conception Bay: Merchant Settler Relations in 
Newfoundland (Toronto: UTP, 1995) . 
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More recent works viewed dependency theory as a good stariing point to examine 
Newfoundland's development, but criticized it for failing to take into account the 
political envirmm1ent. Miria111 Wright's work has provided a good counter to those 
authors who failed to look at the impact of politics. \Vright focused on the state and the 
fishery, examining the state's use of the modernization theory in the fishery.36 i\nother 
author to examine the political thrust behind underdevelopment 'vas William Lmvton. 
Lawton examined provincial and federal development policies and found that 1vhile 
internal factors \Verc an important factor in fommlating responses to underdevelopment, 
they were not the cause. According to him, the Newfoundland economy was structurally 
underdeveloped and could not be directed at will by governments and policy makers, 
especially given the contradictions behveen stated policy and policy implementation. 
Lawton determined there were three reasons for policy failures: inherent inconsistencies 
in the theory the policy was based on; incompetent policy implementation grom1cled in 
good theory; deliberate misrepresentation of reasons for which policy was introduced. 37 
Much of this literature focused on the failure of domestic capital to flourish, the 
dominance of American capital, or the failure of the Newfoundland govemment to 
safeguard local interests. Rather than examining Newfoundland development on its own 
terms within capitalist society, it started from the question of why Newfoundland failed 
to develop along Ontario's lines. 
36 Miriam Wright, '"The Smile of Modernity': The St.ate and the Modernization of the Canadian 
Atlantic Fishery 1945-1970," MA thesis, Queen's University, 1990; Wright, "Newfoundland n:nd 
Canada: the Evolution of Fisheries Development Policies, 1940-1966,'' PhD thesis, Ml.TN, 1997; 
Wright, A Fishel}for Modern Times: the State and the Irzdustrialization of !he Nevfoundland 
Fishery, 1934-1968 (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
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Labour Historv/Historiqgraphy 
Newfoundland labour history developed more slowly and in different ways than 
Canadian labour history. As great debates were beginning to divide the study of Canadian 
labour history, Newfoundland scholars were only sta..'iing to put forward their 0\\-'11labour 
history. Before debates could occur scholars needed to establish an institutional 
framework of labour history. Newfoundland labour history dates to the late 1960s and 
early 1970s. It is not surprising that it was this period when many scholars turned to 
labour history; in the late 1960s and early 1970s the Newf.:n.u1dland labour movement 
experienced a strike wave drawing considerable attention to workers as a field of study. 38 
Studying Newfoundland labour history received a boost in 1966 when Mu .. rlicipal 
Affairs Minister John Crosbie suggested that it was time for an official history of 
organized labour. After consultations between the Federation of Labour and the 
govenunent, the new Institme for Social and Economic Research (ISER) at Memorial 
University agreed to take on the task.39 The Department of Labour .agreed to provide 
37 William Lawton, "Contrary Agendas: Political Culture and Economic Development Policies in 
Newfoundland," PhD thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1994. 
38 The early 1970s were a period of great upheaval for NewfOLmdland workers; pablic sector 
\Vorkers were fighting for changes in their legal position as \Vere many in the fishing industry. 
Royal commissions on labour legislation (1968) and illegal work stoppages (1973) also sparked 
scholarly interest. Royal Commission on Labour Legislation (St. John's 1972), Maxwell Cohen, 
chair. Reporr of the Royal Commission on Illegal Work Stoppages (St. John's 1973), Edward 
Neary, chair. 
39 Much ofNewfoundland' s early labour history was \vritten under the ;mspices of the Federation 
of Labour or the Institute of Social and Economic Research (ISER) at Memorial ·university. See 
Newfoundland Federation of Labour, "Brief to the Government ofNewfoundland concerning 
labour legislation," (St. John's 1962), CNSA, Collection 075 (Smallwood Collection). Created in 
1961 to support social and economic research in Newfoundland, ISER promoted intensive 
research Lmder the assumption that Newfoundland was "on the cusp of massive social and 
economic change." At the time, Memorial had few doctoral programs in the humanities or social 
sciences alh.Ying ISER to play an important role in attracting scholars to the study of 
Newfoundland. While ISER's mandate was not labour history, it financed several community 
studies that included significant labour pc1rtions, including Tom Philb:-ook" Fisherman, Logger, 
Merchant, },liner: Social Change and Industrialism in Three Newfoundland Communities (St. 
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funding for the project. Rolfe Hattenhauer, a professor in the business school, agreed to 
undertake the study. Hattenhauer examined Newfoundland's economic development, 
looking at the fishery, the truck system, economic diversification and industrialization, 
and examined labour legislation, foreign influences, and the historical roots of collective 
action in Newfoundland. ·while the Hattenhauer manuscript wa.s never published, 
scholars have found his archival collection useful.40 
During the 1970s and 1980s many historians began to turn their attention to 
studying individual umons. For instance, Ian McDonald wrote one of the first case 
studies of an individual union, with his thesis and later book on the Fisherman's 
Protective Union.41 Other union histories were to follow, including Bill Gillespie's 
histor; of the Newfoundland Federation of Labour, Gordon Inglis' study of the 
NFF A WU, Landon Ladd on the IW A strike, Harry Cuff on the N ewfow1.dland Teachers' 
Association, and Rob Greenwood on NAPE.42 These remained largely institutional 
John's 1966) and Louis Chiaramonte, Craftsmen-Client Contracts: Interpersonal Relations in a 
Ne\-tfoundland Fishing Community (St. John's 1970). See J.D. House, "ISER: Retrospect and 
Prospect," in ISER Research Policy .Papers, no. 15 (St. John 's: ISER, 1992) and Ingrid Botting, 
Robert Hong, Rick Rennie, and Miriam Wright, "Evolutions in Research on Resource 
Development in Newfoundland, 1960 to the Present," Paper presented to the Atlantic Canada 
Workshop, 14-16 October 1999, 2. 
40 The manuscript is now in the hands of Dr John Scott (MUN, Philosophy department) who 
graciously made it available to me with the approval of the Hattenhauer family. Hattenhauer 
published a shorter version of his manuscript as part of the Royal Commission on Labour 
Legislation. Rolfe Hattenhauer, A Brief Labour History ofNewfoundland (St. John' s: Royal 
Commission on Labour Legislation in Newfoundland, 1970). 
41 Ian McDonald, "To Each His Own": William F. Coaker and the Fishermen's Protective [hion 
in Ne>vfoundland Politics, 1908-1925 (St. John's 1987). McDonald's book was published after 
his death and was based on his MA thesis written in the 1970s. 
42 William Gillespie, "A History of the Newfoundland Federation of Labour, 1936-1963," MA 
thesis, MUN, 1980; Gillespie, A Class Act: an Illustrated History of the Labour Movement in 
Newfoundland and Labrador (St. John's: Newfoundland Federation of Labour, 1986); Gordon 
Inglis, A-fore Than Just a Union: the Story of the ,\TFFA"ftV (St. John's: Jesperson .Press, 1985); H. 
Landon Ladd, "The Newfoundland Loggers' Strike of 1959," in W.J. Cherwinski and G.S. 
Kealey, eds., Lectures in Canadian History (St. John's: CCLH, 1985), Harry Cuff, A History of 
the Newfoundland Teachers' Association (St. John's: Creative Publishers, 1985), and Robert 
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histories. Works on labour in the fisheries were more common, including studies by 
Barbara Neis, Rosemary Ommer, Eric Sager, and Shannon Ryan. Ommer's work, for 
instance, included several community studies that examined Newfoundland merchants in 
considerable detail. Her work placed the Newfoundland fishery in the larger Canadian 
context.43 
In the early 1980s Greg Kealey, a prominent Canadian labour historian moved to 
Memorial University.44 While Kealey undertook some work on Newfoundland labour 
history, including a broad overview of the labour movement for the Royal Commission 
on Employment and Unemployment, his most important role was in fostering the study of 
labour history.45 The addition of a doctoral program in history in 1986 at MUN also 
promoted this agenda. The first graduates completed theses in the early 1990s. Many of 
these early theses attempted to provide an empirically grounded base for labour history. 
Most works focused on Newfoundland's resource base, the social relations of production, 
or technological changes. Their works have focused have focused on the government's 
Greenwood, "The Newfoundland Association ofPublic Employees, 1936-1973: the transition 
from civil servants to trade unionists," Honours Dissertation, MUN, 1984. Another book which 
examined the Newfoundland Federation of Labour was Cyril Strong, My Life as a Newfoundland 
Union Organizer (St. Jolm's: Canadian Committee on Labour History, 1987), edited by Gregory 
Kealey. Gillespie and John Joy both wrote their Masters theses under David Alexander, an early 
pioneer in Newfoundland economic history. 
43 Barbara Neis, "From Cod Block to Fish Food: the Crisis and Restructuring in the 
Newfoundland Fishing Industry, 1968-1986," PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 1988; Rosemary 
Ommer, ed., Aferchant Credit and Labour Strategies in Historical Perspective (Fredericton: 
Acacliensis Press, 1990); Eric Sager, Seafaring Labour: the Merchant Marine in Atlantic Canada 
1820-1914 (Montreal: McGill-Queen 's University Press, 1989); Shannon Ryan, The Ice Huniers: 
A Hist01y ofNevvfozmdland Sealing to 1914 (St. John's 1994). 
4~ Kealey's arrival also brought the joumal Labour/Le Travail to MUN. In 1990 LILT published a 
special issue on labour in Newfoundland, including articles by many Memorial alunmi. Included 
in LILT were articles on the Reid Newfoundland railway strike by Mcinnis, on longshoremen in 
St. John' s by Jessie Chisolm, and on the fishery by Cadigan. Labour!Le Travail, 26 (Fall1990). 
45 Kealey, The Histmy and the Structure of the Newfoundland Labour Alovement (St. John' s: 
Royal Commission on Employment and Unemployment in Newfoundland and Labrador, 1986). 
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and industry's attempts at land-based industrialization, including work on agriculture, 
forestry, mining, a.'1d the railway.46 
As work by Sean Cadigan demonstrated, early attempts at economic development 
beyond the fisheries started around 1855 when Newfoundland bega.Tl to formulate some 
its own economic policies. Cadigan's work demonstrated how the government promoted 
agriculture and began to develop the necessary infrastmcture to foster economic 
development. To encourage agricultural settlement, the government passed a se1ies of 
laws, the Homestead Act (1873, 1884), an act to facilitate licences to settle farm families 
(1880), an act to promote agriculture (1886), and established a Board of Agiiculture 
(1889). While poor soil and climate hampered commercial agiicul.tural development, 
supplementary farming was cmcial to fishing economies.47 To foster industrial 
development the government set up a legal framework for liability (1873), passed an act 
to encourage local manufacturing (1877), and established tariff protection on many goods 
(1870s-1890s ). 48 It also attempted to stimulate manufacturing and land settlement by 
building a railway (started in 1896) across the island. 
By the tum of the century the railway was seen as the way to open the interior to 
develop new resources, including mining, lumbering, and fmming. As work by Rick 
46 Peter Crabb, "Agriculture in Newfoundland: A Study in Development," Pl:-,:0 thesis, University 
ofHull, 1975; Cadigan, "The Staple Model Reconsidered," Acadiensis, 21,2 (Spring 1992), 48-
71; John Mumo, "Public Timber Allocation Policy in Newfoundland," PhD thesis, Universit'; of 
British Columbia, 1978; James Hiller, "The Origins of the Pulp and Paper Industry in 
Newfotmdland," Acadiensis, 11 , 2 (Spring 1982); and Hiller, "The Politics ofNewsprir:.t: The 
Newfoundland Pulp and Paper Industry, 1915-1939," Acadiensis, 19, 2 (Spring 1990). 
47 The household economy was a vital part of outport survival, with any goods not developed in-
house or bartered having to be bought from the market economy. Many of those employed in the 
fisheries worked for credit or a share of the catch, while family members providt;d (unpaid) 
household production, including supplementing their incomes with gardening, berry picking, 
sealing, woods work, making their own clothes, hunting and trapping, and other means. 
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Rennie shows, mineral development was seen as a key to industrialization. Mining 
provided industrial employment to hundreds of Newfoundland workers and followed the 
continental model of resource development. Early mining projects included iron ore 
mines in Bell Island (1895), lead and zinc mines in Buchans (1927), and flurospar mines 
in St. Lawrence (1930s). Rennie's thesis fou..'ld that pre-existing social, economic and 
cultural factors played a key role in the way the mining industry was established in St. 
Lawrence. His work examined how desperation for jobs allowed the mining industry, 
with government cooperation, to establish and maintain unsafe worbng conditions.49 
As work by Cadigan, Ingrid Botting and Duff.;:rin Sutherland has shO\vn, forestry 
was also seen as a key landward resource to be exploited. While early uses of lumber 
were for domestic use and sawmilling, pulp and paper has dominated the forestry 
industry in the 201h century. Pulp and paper mills at Grand F·alls (1909) a.'ld Corner Brook 
(1925), each provided industrial employment to over 1000 workers. Jobs in the pulp and 
paper mills were steady and relatively well-paid, especially compared to work in the 
woods or in the fisheries, and allowed for luxuries rarely found elsewhere in 
Newfoundland. Work by Cadigan examined the impact of forest fires \Vtille Botting's 
48 Cadigan, "Agriculture," Newfoundland and Labrador Heritage Website, 
http://www.heritage.nf.ca; and Report of the Royal Commission on Employment and 
Unemployment, Building on Our Strengths (St. John's: Queen's Printer, 1986), 41. 
49 One of the leading sources for iron ore at the turn of the 20th century, the Bell Island mines, 
operated by the Nova Scotia Steel and Coal Company and Dominion Steel Corporation, fed steel 
mills in Sydney, Nova Scotia and in Germany. Labrador was also home to many mineral deposits, 
including iron ore deposits, which began development in the 1950s. Flurospar mining was 
undertaken to meet United States chemical, manufacturing and military requirements. While 
flurospar and asbestos mining (started in the 1950s in Baie Verte) brought industrial employment 
to economically depressed areas they also brought serious occupational health and safety hazards. 
See Rick Rennie, "l'vfining and Industrial Disease in St. Lawrenc~, Newfoundland, 1921-1935," 
Pb.D thesis, MUN, 200 I and Rennie, "The Historical Origins of an Industrial Disaster: Mining, 
Working Conditions, and Government Policy in St. Lawrence, Newfoundland 1933-1939," Paper 
to the Canadian Historical Association Conference, Congress of Social Sciencc;s and Humanities, 
Sherbrooke, 1999. 
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work examined the relationship between paid and unpaid domestic work in the company 
pulp and paper town of Grand Falls. She found factors such as migration patterns, 
ideology over the gendered division of labour, and social stratification all played a role in 
shaping and reshaping class and gender relationships. 50 
Sutherland's work focused on the woods labour force of the two pulp and paper 
mills in Newfoundland. He found that many of the workers were inshore fishennen who 
turned to logging to supplement their incomes. He argued that having workers move 
between logging and the fishery prevented the development of a working class by 
dispersing protests against poor conditions in either industry. He also found that 
simmering grievances were often prevented from becoming strikes, as workers feared 
employers would simply close operations in the face of protests. With a declining market 
for newsprint in the early 1930s, both the Anglo-Development Newfoundland Co. (Al\TD) 
and International Power and Paper halted their cutti..1g operations in many regions and the 
workers who managed to hang on to their jobs barely covered room and board. Hundreds 
of Joggers simply walked out of the woods and returned to their families while others 
banded together, organized and struck for better conditions, especially in 1934, via the 
new the Newfoundland Lumbermen's Association.51 
50 See Cadigan, "A Smoke in the Woods: The Moral Economy of Forest Fires in Outport 
Newfoundland, 1875-1946"' paper presented to the Canadian Historical Association, Sherbrooke, 
1999, and Ingrid Bottmg, '"Getting a Grand Falls Job': Migration, Labour Mark~ts and Paid 
Domestic Work in the Pulp and Paper Town of Grand Falls, Newfmmdland, 1905-1939," PhD 
thesis, MUN, 2000. 
5 1 Dufferin Sutherland, "'We are only Loggers': Loggers and the Struggle for Development in 
Newfoundland, 1929-1959," PhD thesis, SFU, 1995 and Sutherland, "Newfou11dland Loggers 
Respond," 85. For more on the 1930s see Peter Neary, Newfoundland in the North Atlaniic 
World, 1929-1949 (Montreal: McGiJ!-Queen's Press 1988) and James Overton, "Economic Crisis 
and the End of Democracy: Politics in Newfoundland During the Great Depression," LILT, 26 
(Fall 1990), 85-124. 
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Prior to the 1940s these railway, pulp and paper and mining towns were among 
the few isolated industrial enclaves across Newfoundland. Large factories were the 
exception in manufacturing rather than the norm, and handicraft forms of production, 
particularly in the fishery, predominated. As work by John Joy has demonstrated, St. 
John's in the pre-\Vorld Vvar I period was host to a number of machine shops and small-
scale manufactming projects.52 Workers in St. Jolm's, Comer Brook, Grand Falls, 
Buchans, St. Lawrence, and along the railway line were more likely to receive wages for 
their work than workers in rural areas. 53 This began to change during World War TI; 
Malcolm MacLeod's work showed that increasing numbers of workers began engaging in 
wage labour, including 20,000 workers hired to U.S and Canadian military bases. 54 These 
new large-scale projects marked the first time many workers were employed in industrial 
jobs. Along with these new jobs came many workers' first introductions to trade unions . 
Two works which examined Newfoundland workers and their organizations were 
MA theses by Peter Mcinnis and Nancy Forestell. Mcinnis's work examined the 
founding of the Newfoundla..'1d Industrial Workers Association (NI\VA) in 1917. The 
l\:1\V A attempted to give a broader voice to workers' conm1on interests and identity but 
foundered in the post-war recessionary period as weak primary product prices prevailed 
52 Jolli'l Joy, "The Growth and Development of Trades and Manufacturing in St. Jolm's, 1870-
1914," MA thesis, MUN, 1977. 
53 In many families, one member worked outside the area in a cash economy and sent money back 
to the family in the outport, combining hibour in the fishery -- or mine, farm, forest --with labour 
on board ships or in manufacturing plants. While some of this was done within iocal 
con1..'1mnities, a great number ofNewfoundlanders worked in St. John's or outside Newfoundland 
altogether. Such occupational pluralism was a necessity for survival, especially in years when the 
fisheries were in crisis. Ron Crawley, "Off to Sydney: Newfoundlanders Emigrate to Industrial 
Cape Breton, 1890-1914," Acadiensis, 17,2 (Spring 1988), 27-51; Peter Neary, '"Traditional ' 
and 'Modem' Elements in the Social and Economic History of Bell Island and Conception Bay," 
Hisiorical Papers (1973). 
54 Malcolm MacLeod, Peace of the Continent: The Impact uf Second World fVar Canadian and 
American Bases in Newfoundland (St. John's: Harry Cuff, 1986). 
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and competition increased, leaving fishing, lumbering, mining and much local 
manufacturing in a crisis throughout the 1920s. Forestell's work on wage-eaming 
women in St. John's remains one of the few historical works to explore women's paid 
labour outside of the fishery. Not surprisingly, Forestell found age, marital status, and 
class played a role in women's decision to work outside the home for wages and in what 
capacity. Domestic and factory work were lwo ofthe most common jobs outport women 
took once they arrived in St. John's.55 Others have examined how workers moved 
between jobs in industrial enclaves and seasonal employment in fishing or logging.56 
Neary, for instance, examined the Bell Island mining workforce and found that many 
were fishermen from Conception Bay who worked in the mine in the off season while 
Ron Crawley discussed how a crisis in the fishery led many workers to migrate to Cape 
Breton for industrial employment. 57 
Labour history has not only been the purview of labour historians. FoL1<:l01ists, 
sociologists, and geographers have also examined various aspects of Newfoundland 
labour history. Folklore students have explored topics ranging from an oral history of the 
1979 Evening Telegram strike (Jane Burns) to occupational nanatives of pulp and paper 
workers in Comer Brook (Contessa Small). 58 Sociologists have also played a key role in 
55 Peter Mcinnis, "Newfoundland Labour and World War I," .MA thesis, MUN, 1987; Nancy 
Forestell, "Women's Paid Labour in St. John's between two world wars," MA, MUN, 1987. 
56 See Daniel Samson, ed., Contested Countryside: Rural Workers and Modern Society in Atlantic 
Canada, 1800-1950 (Fredericton: Acadiensis Press, 1994) 'vvhich examines farming, fishing and 
logging in the Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Newfoundland. 
57 Peter Neary, '"Traditional' and 'Modem' Elements in the Social and Economic History of Bell 
Island and Conception Bay," Historical Papers (1973) and Ron Crawley, "Off to Sydney: 
Newfoundlanders Emigrate to Industrial Cape Breton, 1890-1914,'' Acadiensis, 17, 2 (Spring 
1988), 27-51. 
58 Jane Burns, "An Oral History of the 1979 Strike at the St. John's Evening Telegram," MA 
thesis, MUN, 1982; Contessa Small, "Occupational Narratives ofPulp and Paper Mill Workers in 
Comer Brook, Newfoundland," MA thesis, MUN, 1999. See also Gail Weir, "The Wabana Iron 
Ore Miners of Bell Island," MA thesis, MUN, 1986; John Ashton, "A StuJ.y of the Lumbercamp 
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uncovenng workers and uruons m Newfoundland. For instance, work by sociologist 
Barbara Neis has examined topics such as the development of the Fisheries Protective 
Union, the occupational health and safety risks women face in fish plants, lost-time rates 
for trawler workers, and the impact of restructuring on the fisheries.59 James Overton, 
Larry Felt and Peter Sinclair have also added to the literature with studies on poverty, lhe 
myth of the reluctant worker, unpaid labour and household reproduction.60 
Sociology students have also produced theses on labour topics, including Tanya 
Chapman's examination of the fishery crisis on the domestic division of labour in 
Trepassey, Nicole Power's thesis on the local ecological knowledge of women fish plant 
workers, and Linda Parsons' work on the lives of women in Labrador City.61 The work of 
Parsons was particularly interesting as it examined how the Iron Ore Company of Canada 
Song Tradition in Newfoundland," PhD thesis, MUN, 1985; and Mark Ferguson, "Making Fish: 
Salt -Cod Processing on the east coast ofNewfoundland," J\.-1A thesis, MU'N, 1996. 
59 Barbara Neis, "Work-Related Risk Factors for Female Fish and Crab Processing Workers in 
Newfoundland and Labrador," Paper presented to the Research Round Table on Gender and 
Workplace Health, 22-3 June 1992; Neis and Susan Williams, Occupational Healrh in 
Nel~joundland's Deepsea Fishing Industly (St. John's: ISER, 1990); Neis, "From Cod Block to 
Fish Food," PhD thesis, University of Toronto, 1988; and Neis, "Trends in Fatahty Rates and 
Lost Time Accidents among Newfoundland Trawler Workers, 1980-88," Paper presented to the 
International Symposium on Safety and Working Conditions Aboard Fishing Vessels, Universite 
du Quebec a Rimouski, 22-24 August 1989. 
60 James Overton, "Poverty, Dependence and Self-Reliance: Politics, Newfoundland History and 
the A.mulree Report of 1933," Paper presented to the Newfoundland Historical Society, 
Amulree's Legacy, St. John's, 24-5 March 2000; Overton, "Myth of the Reluctant Worker: 
Attitudes to Work and Unemployment in Newfoundland," in Robert Chateloup, ed., Labour in 
Atlantic Canada (Saint John: UN13, 1981); Peter Sinclair and Lawrence Felt, '"Everyone Does 
It': Unpaid Work in a Rural Peripheral Region," in G. Lowe, ed., Work in Canada: Readings in 
the Sociology of Work and Industry (Scarborough: Nelson Canada, 1993); Sinclair and Felt, 
"Gender Work and Household Reproduction: Married Men and Women in an Isolated Fishing 
Region," Paper presented to Rural Sociological Society A.'1.I1ual Meeting, 6 August 1989; and 
Sinclair, From Traps to Draggers: Domestic Commodity Production in Northwest NeYvfoundland, 
1850-1982 (St. John's: ISER, 1985). 
61 Ta.Tlya Chapman, "The Effects of the Fishery Crisis on the Domestic Division of Labour in 
Trepassey, Newfoundland," MA thesis, MUN, 1997; Nicole Power, ''Women, Processing 
Industries and the Environment: a Sociological Analysis of Women Fish and Crab Processing 
Worken' Local Ecological Knmvledge," MA thesis, MUN, 1997; Linda Parsons, "Passing the 
Time: the Lives of Women in a Northern Industrial Town," MA thesis, MC'N, 1987. 
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attempted to create a "community" around the mine. Parsons examined the lengths the 
company went to in trying to attract families to the community, including higher wages, 
overtime, and vocational training for male workers and subsidized housing, shopping 
facilities, schools, and health services for the wives. Parsons' work was important to my 
own study as in many ways it mirrored my Churchill Falls case study. Other \Vorks that 
proved informative to my work included Suzanne Ottenheimer, "Fish and Oil Don't Mix" 
and Pamela Jones, "Offshore Oil Development and Community Impacts." Both examined 
co:rr..munity reactions and interactions with the onshore Hibernia construction site. 
Ottenheimer explored the power relationship between inshore fishers and Mobil Oil and 
Jones explored local residents' changing perceptions of the oil industry over a period 
from pre- to post-construction. Neither examined the actual construction site; both 
provide useful information about the surrounding communities. 62 
While the more recent historiography has become more worker-centred (for 
instance, Sutherland, Botting, and Rennie), my work stands somewhat unique in its focus 
on the human consequences of the govern.r-nent's modernization program. It is also 
uruque for its focus on construction workers. Few books in Newfoundland have 
examined the construction industry with any depth. In addition, while several other 
authors have noted the importance of large-scale projects, my work is one of the first to 
examine how central these particular projects have been to the gov(;:rnment's 
development agendas. 
62 Susanne Ottenheimer, "'Fish and Oil don ' t Mix': Power Relations at the Bull Ann 
Construction Site, Trinity Bay, Newfoundland," MA thesis, MUN, 1993; and Pamela Jones, 
"OtTshore Oil Development and Community Impacts: Changes in Attitudes and Perceptions in 
Communities Affected by Onshore Activities, MA thesis, MUN, 1998. 
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Chapter 2: History of Modernization in Post-Confederation Newfoundland 
My work exammes modernization in terms of the impact its policies had on 
workers, rather than its theoretical underpinnings. Part and parcel of modernization was 
the development of a capitalist labour market, one quite divorced from the subsistence 
living familiar to many Newfotmdland fishery workers. Moving away from a subsistence 
living made workers particularly vulnerable to economic fluctuations. As part of 
modernization the government wanted to pool surplus labour in growth areas to be 
available for development. In economic downhrrns, surplus labour had no where to go. 
This was a particular problem in Newfoundland where small production and mega-
projects went hand-in-hand, without a robust middle sector to hire surplus labour when 
the mega-projects ended. Modernization also entailed creating a workforce that was both 
skilled in particular fields but also taught social habits conducive to industry. 
Before we can understand modernization's human consequences, however, it is 
necessary to understand what modemization is, and how (and why) the modernization 
theory was applied in Ne\vfoundland. Much of Newfoundland's development occuned 
under the label of modernization. By modernization I am referring to govenunent 
development policies which promoted industrialization, including investment in 
technology, education, and the local economy. By defining underdevelopment in terms of 
the quantitative differences between "rich" and "poor" cotmtries, it offered a road map for 
poor countries to follow to become rich. This is a road map the Smallwood government 
was quick to follow. 
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As a theory, modernization grew out of the post-World War IT period as western 
governments, predominantly the United States, looked to develop "underdeveloped" 
regions and prevent the spread of communism. 1 Modernization carried with it a certain 
set of assumptions about the required impetus for social and economic change and the 
nature of capitalism. One of these assumptions was that western industrial patterns had 
universal applicability. A second assumption was that growth was a linear, and 
unidirectional, progression. A third assumption was that there was a dichotomy bet<.veen 
traditional and modem societies and that when a society modernizes it must drop all of its 
traditional ways of thinking, its traditional stmctures and values. Modernization places a 
strong emphasis on psycho-cultural factors necessary for development including having 
the right values and individual motivation to succeed. 
According to Walt Rostow, one of the chief proponents of modernization theory, 
there were five basic stages of economic growth? Societies started out in the traditional 
stage with relatively limited productive capacity and were largely agricultural (or fishing 
as in the case of Newfoundland), and hierarchical societies. Societies then began to 
develop the necessary preconditions for take-off, often triggered by an extemal stimuli 
1 Robinson Rojas argues that modernization theory is the historical product of three main events: 
the rise of the United States as a superpower, the growth of the world-wide communist 
movement (USSR, China, Vietnam, Cuba), and the process of decolinization in African and Asia. 
"Modernization Theory and the Laws of Social Change," 1996. 
www.rrojasdatabank.ondcanital8.htm. 
2 W.W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communisi Jy[anifesto (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960, 3'd Edition 1991). See also Bert Huselitz, Theories of 
Economic Growth (Glencoe, Til.: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960). For Newfoundland references see 
David Alexander, "Development and Dependence in Newfoundland, 1880-1970," in Atlantic 
Canada and Confederation (Toronto: UTP, 1983), Gerhard Bassler, Alfred Valdmanis and the 
Politics of Survival (Toronto: UTP, 2000), and Miriam Wright, "'The Smile of Modernity': The 
State and the Modernization of the Canadian Atlantic Fishery, 1945-1970," MA thesis, Queen's 
University, 1990; and Wright, "Newfoundland and Canada: the Evolution of Fisheries 
Development Policies, 1940-1966." PhD thesis, MUN, 1997. 
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and the development of a local elite. During preconditioning, entrepreneurs are 
encouraged to invest in new enterprises, banks were encouraged to mobilize capital, and 
increasing investment was needed for social capital (transportation, communications, 
health and education). In the third stage, take-off, investment as a proportion of national 
income rises and political and social institutions are reshaped to encourage development. 
Under the fourth stage, the drive to maturity stage, science and technology use expands 
outside the core industry as the economy switches from industries involving resource 
extraction to more refmed and technologically more complex processes. In the fifth and 
final stage, societies were expected to reach the stage of mass consumption where the 
leading sectors of the economy shifted towards durable goods and services and the 
general public benefits from the economic growth.3 
The government has played a central role in economic development since 1949, 
but its vision of what economic development should look like developed in the late 19th 
century when the government began promoting roads, raihvay, industry and land-based 
resource extraction. 4 Industrialization was the cornerstone of Newfoundland's economic 
policy despite changes in political status from responsible govew.ment to a British-
3 There is a considerable literature detailing the problems with Rostow's modernization theory, 
particularly how modernization was applied to Asia and Africa. Dependency theorists have 
attempted to counter Rostow's work by taking a more historical approach and by examining 
issues such as the role colonialism and imperialism has played in development. See for instance, 
A. G. Frank, Capitalism and underdevelopment in Latin America; historical studies o_(Chile and 
Brazil (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1967). World systems theorists also attacked 
modernization theorists by pointing out development occurred on a much larger scale than the 
nation state. For more on this see Imman.Liel Wallerstein, The Rise and Future Demise of the 
World Capitalist System: Concepts for Comparative Analysis (1974) and Wallerstein, The 
Modem World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World Economy 
in the Sixteenrh Century (1976). 
4 Michelle McBride, Gregory Kealey, and Sean Cadigan, "Jobs at Any Cost: The Political 
Economy of Development in 20th Century Newfoundland," in R. Ommer, ed., The Resilient 
Outport, Ecology, Economy and Society in Rural Newfoundland (St. John's: ISER, 2001). 
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controlled Commission of Govemment (1934), to a province of Canada (1949). While 
many identify this push to modemize with Joseph R. Smallwood, Cadigan and others 
have shown its roots are much deeper.5 
In the 1950s and 1960s the Smallwood government, albeit often using federal 
dollars, began ensuring Newfoundland had the necessary infrastmcture to industrialize-
railway, roads, airports, communications, and an educated workforce. Seeing opportunity 
in post-war political realignments, and relying on the advice of provincial Director of 
Economic Development Alfred Valdmanis, Smallwood courted a series of Gennan 
entrepreneurs. While Smallwood initially courted German corporations including Krupp, 
Volkswagen, I.G. Farben, and Siemens, none of these companies wanted to invest in 
Newfoundland. Instead Smallwood tumed to smaller companies looking for an escape 
from Ge1many. Coming from war-ravaged countries, many of the smaller entrepreneurs 
were long on ideas but short on funds. The shortness of funds did not bother Smallwood 
who had a surplus of $46 million accumulated under the Commission of Govemment. 
From 1949-1953 the government subsidized 20 new secondary industries through its Nev; 
Industries program. New industries included heavy machinery piants, tarmeries, a rubber 
compru.1y, textile, boot and shoe factories, and a chocolate factory, knitting mills, and 
gypsum, hardwood and cement plants. To attract as many new industries as possible in 
the shortest time, Smallv.rood relaxed screening procedures and increased assistance to 
5 See Sean Cadigan, Hope and Deception in Conception Bay: Merchant-Settler Relations in 
Newfoundland, 1785-1855 (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1995) and Cadigan, "The 
l\!Ierging of Farm, Fishery and Wage Labour in Rural Newfoundland: A Long-term Perspective," 
paper presented to the Social Science History Association, Chicago, November 1995; "A Shift in 
Economic Culture: The hnpact of Enclave Industrialization on N,~wfoundland, 1855- l SSO," 
Paper presented to the Atlantic Canada Studies Conference, Moncton, 1996. 
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investors. The results were not always successful. Few factories materialized, and fewer 
survived the decade. 6 
The Newfoundland government also massively extended services such as 
education and health care. Premier Joseph Smallwood liked modernization because it 
offered him a solution to Newfoundland's economic woes. By infhsing enough capital 
into the economy, introducing new teclmologies, rationalizing the fisheries, promoting 
productivity and the entrepreneurial .5pirit, and by reshaping Newfoundlanders attitudes 
through the education system, Newfoundland was sure to develop. According to 
modernization theory Newfoundland's economy at the time of Confederation lay between 
traditional society and the preconditions for the take-off stage. The fisheries were viewed 
as having limited productive capacity, with a ceiling on output levels that could only be 
overcome by modernization. Under Rostow's modernization theory, in the take-off stage, 
new technology and production processes would be applied to the core industry (in 
Ne-.\'foundland ' s case fishing) as well as to industry. 
Be-tween 1940 and 1969 the fisheries undenvent industrialization as frozen cod, 
not the traditional salt-cod, came to dominate the market, creating a new type of fisheries 
employment - waged labour in fish processing plants.7 The government alao offered aid 
to the industry, including loans to companies willing to buy fish plants and factorj 
trawlers. Fishers received provincial subsidies to purchase longliners and new ban'esting 
gear. With increased fisheries capitalization, employment levels \vere expected to 
6 Smallwood, I Chose Canada, 361; Bassler, Alfred Valdmanis, B::~ssler, "Develop or Perish," 
111, and Doug Letto, Chocolate Bars and Rubber Boots: the Sma!hvood hzdustriaUzation Plan 
(Paradise, NF: Blue Hill Publishers, 1998). 
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decrease in the fisheries, making industrial diversification even more important. To meet 
the demands of the new fishery, Smallwood encouraged the professionalization of the 
fisher;, including new technologies and training for offshore fishing. 8 As Newfoundland 
moved more towards a waged· economy, workers had less time for earlier survival 
techniques such as occupational pluralism and household production.9 
Smallwood had long felt that Ne,.vfound1and's productivity vvas limited by its lack 
of modem technology and the experts to run it. Smallwood did not believe Newfoundland 
entrepreneurs had the determination to lead development. He argued, "It was useless to 
turn to the businessmen of Newfoundland. Most of them were scrambling around, like 
henhawks eyeing a chicken coop, for their share of the millions of family allowances and 
other cash pouring in from Ottawa ... It would be useless to talk to them about investing 
money in new industries, so I would have to search outside, and I did.'' 10 To remedy this 
7 Saltfish was largely processed by fishing families. Fish plants required a more regular catch to 
keep the processing plants in operation and led to the extension of offshore fishing trawlers. With 
the fish plants, inshore and offshore fishers were paid in cash for their product. 
8 Wright, A Fishery for Modem Times; Wright and Danny Samson, "The State and the 
Newfoundland Fishery, 1930-1966: Logics of Society, Economy, and Environment," I'aper 
presented at Eco-Research Conference, May 26-28, 1997. 
9 Fishing families had long relied on a wide variety of activities for their survival, from growing 
their own vegetables and keeping lifestock, to cutting firewood for lumber and [uel, and hunting 
and trapping. As Sean Cadigan stated Newfoundland and Labrador's climate and soil have not 
been conducive to agriculture, but outport isolation and poor incomes in the fishery have made 
supplementary farming crucial. Fishing families raised root crops, some hay ami oats, and 
livestock for their own use." Cadigan, "Agriculture," Newfoundland and Labrador H~ritage Web 
Site Project, 1998. 
10 Smallwood, I Chose Canada, 27. He turned to outside experts for advice on how to 
industrialize, including the International Basic Economic Corporation (Nelson Rockefeller) and 
World Enterprises Inc. (William Stephenson). Both preached caution. When none of the 
entrepreneurs approached was willing to meet Newfoundland's timetable, the government funded 
three projects on its O\vn. The plan \vas to start industries and later privatize them, using the 
funds from their sale to start new industries. When the government ran into difficulties selling 
two of the initial plants (cement and gypsum), it decided that instead of financing proJects 
directly, it would provide secured loans and match private investments. Centre of Newfoundland 
Studies .Archives (CNSA), Collection 075 (Smaliwood), box 101, Economic Development, files 
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he set out to hire "the best tec1mical people we could tind anywhere (and that almost 
invariably was anywhere outside Newfoundland itself) to drill, survey, measure, delineate 
and blueprint specific resources."11 Simply by infusing a traditional society with capital, 
technology, entrepreneurial leadership, and the "right" attitude, modernization assumed 
the traditional society would transform itself into a diversified economy. Smallwood was 
not alone in accepting modernization theory. Modernization also became an accepted part 
of the federal government's attempts to deal with the regional disparity in Atlantic 
Canada during the 1950s.12 
In his quest to bring industry to Newfoundland, Smallwood undertook to supply 
not only capital and resources but also a cheap and ready labour force. They did this in 
two ways which were to prove pivotal to workers: the creation of growth centers a.TJ.d the 
promotion of resettlement. In the 1960s the Newfoundland govermnent's economic goal 
was to remove obstacles to growth and to rationalize production structures. Plans were 
mad-e to consolidate, to focus on a few growth centres and to improve existing services. 
New public expenditures were to facilitate wealth-producing activities. 13 By the 1960s 
modernization theories encompassed the work of Franc;:ois Perroux, who argued on a 
theoretical level that innovation should be concentrated in "growih centTes" spreading 
3.08.336-3.11-082 and box 134, "Economic Development Correspondence," A.L. Graudins toM. 
Green, 21 March 1952. 
11 Joseph Smallwood, I Chose Canada, volume JI: The Premiership (Toronto: Macmillan, 1973), 
18. Parentheses in original. 
12 See Wright, "'The Smile of Modernity'," for an example of how the federal department of 
fisheries embraced the modernization concept. 
13 Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Stare and Prospects oj1Vewfoundlan.d and 
Labrador (St. John 's: Creative Printers and & Publishers, 1967), chaired by Gordon Pu:shie, 1. 
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economic development out to the surrounding areas.14 Growth centres were production 
centres located around key industries. Growth, according to Perroux, "reveals itself in 
certain points or poles, with different degrees of intensity; it spreads through diverse 
channels."15 Perroux argued that concentrating certain industries (petroleum, coal, 
electlicity, steel and aluminum among others) in select growth areas \Vould propel 
economic development that would spread out to the sunmmding areas, helping modern 
culture diffuse into more remote areas. 16 Growth centres were established around 
Newfoundland to serve as service centres for the surrounding smaller communities. 
In combination with the creation of new growth centres the government encouraged 
a policy of resettlement whereby people from more isolated fishing outports were offered 
financial incentives to move to these growth centres. 17 The government created two 
resettlement programs, the Centralization Program and the Fisheries Household 
Resettlement Program. Both programs encouraged outports to relocate to areas with more 
services. People from the outports were offered financial subsidies to move ami once the 
majority on an outport agreed to the resettlement, government services were withdrawn 
from the area. In total between 1954 and 1972, 220 communities were resettied for a 
14 The Report oftlze Royal Commission on the Economic State and Prospects of Newfoundland 
and Labrador (St. John's 1967), 2-3 defined economic development as embra~;ing "the whole 
so<.;io-economic precess whereby an economy's real income increases at a rate faster than its 
population &'TO\vth. It means more than simply extra output: extra output may merely imply more 
inputs and more efficiency. Development goes beyond these to imply changes in the very 
structure of output and in the allocation of inputs .. . Economic development thus denotes a rising 
standard of living for the people of a country as measured in real tenns." 
15 Cited in Benjamin I-Iiggins and Donald Savoie, "Introduction: the Economics and Politics of 
Regional Development," in Higgins and Donald Savoie, Regional Economic Development: 
Essays in Honour ofFranrois Perroux (London: Unwin Press, 1988), 3-47. 
16 Fran,;ois Perroux, A Ne¥v Concept of Development (Paris: UNESCO, 1983); Ducamel Bocage, 
The General Economic Theory of Fram;ois Perroux (London: University Press of America, 
1935). Perroux's French language writings dated to 1941 with Le Neo-Marginalisme, Les 
Comptes de !CL Nation ( 1949), and Economie et Socidte (1960). 
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total of 27,000 people. Not everyone agreed to the move and many corrunurJties were 
divided over the issue. The area of Fogo resisted resettlement entirely. 18 
In addition to reducing the costs of providing services to outports, resettlement 
and growth centres were intended to mobilize surplus labour for employment in new 
industries. Thousands of workers were employed in the construction phases of each new 
large scale project, and many Newt!)undland families moved to Labrador to tq.ke 
advantage of well-paying industrial jobs. Resettlement would also help with another part 
of the modernization platfonn, changing cultural values to be more accepting of the 
modem way of life. Under Rostow's traditional society, social relationships were on a 
one-to-one level which was viewed as a constraint to developing efficient capitalist 
relations of production. A much more efficient market relationship could be developed 
with more neutral social relationships. By removing people from familiar surroundings 
and their existing social relations, it became easier to put relations of production on a 
more indirect level. Removing families from their traditional societies also loosened their 
bonds to traditional subsistence activities such as hunting, fishing and berry picking. 
Under Rostow's traditional society model, families were responsible for production (farrn 
or fishery) and reproduction, much of the education (informal) a..Tld welfare of their 
17 Matthews, The Creation of Regional Dependency, 118 
18 Jeff Webb, "Outports," Newfoundland and Labrador Heritage Website, 2000. As Webb states 
"It is also worth noting that before and after the government program, rural communities in 
Newfoundland, as elsewhere in the world, continued to lose people to urban centres. Many 
unsettled outporls would not have continued to exist even if no program had existed." In the face 
of almost 60 per cent male unemployment after a slump in the inshore fishery, the government 
suggested that the 5000 Fogo residents resettle to a more economically viable area. Islanders 
refused to move and fanned an island-wide producer's cooperative which handled and processed 
fishery catches locally. Wendy Quarry, "The Fogo Process: An Experiment in Participatory 
Corrmlt.~nication," MA Thesis, University of Cuelph, 1994. 
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family. Smallwood wanted his new modem families to concentrate more on production, 
with the state tal<ing over the education and welfare functions. 19 
Growth centre theories made regional development seem relatively simple. By 
pushing or pulling some industries into an urban area and by providing the area with 
incentives for private development, the resulting infrastructure construction would spread 
through the surrounding area. Penoux's ideas gained currency throughout Atlcmtic 
Canada.20 New growth centres would also provide better access to education (including 
the government's new vocational and technical schools) and health services and pool the 
labour required for new industrial projects in central locations. Pooling surplus labour 
also kept down wage costs and often left labour v-ulnerable to large corporations. 
., 
Newfoundland established growth centres around the provmce m the 1960s.~ · 
Iv1any of the growth centres were built around the province's new infrastructure projects . 
19 For more on this seeR. Rojas, Laws of Social Change cited in 
http :1/v;ww .noj asdatabank.org/capital8. htm. 
20 Benjamin Higgins and Donald Savoie, Regional Development fl!eories (:;,zd their Application 
(London: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 89 and Savoie, Regional Economic Development: 
Canada's Search for Solutions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1986), 5-8. 
21 Newfoundland was not alone in following the grov.rth centre model. ln 1963 the federal 
government introduced the Area Development Incentives Act (ADIA), providing monetary 
incentives, including capital grants and improved tax incentives, to encourage private sector 
investment in economically depressed areas, including most of Newfoundland. Five years later 
Prime Minister Trudeau created a new departi-ctent with n!sponsibility for regional development, 
the Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE). DREE's mandate was to promote 
economic development in regionally depressed areas. Its approach was two-fold. It offered a 
special areas program and a regional industrial incentives program, encouraging manufacturing 
and processing industries in slow growth areas. Twenty··three areas across Canada '.Vere 
designated as growth centres. In Newfoundland DREE funds were used to build a new industrial 
park, water and sewer systems, a new arterial highway, high school, and engineering building at 
Memorial University. Higgins and Savoie, Regional Economic Development, 7; Higgins, Femand 
Martin, and Andre Raynauld, Les orientations due developpement econornique regional de la 
province du Quebec (Ottaw·a: DREE, 1970); and Andrew Crichton, "An Overview of 
Newfoundland's lndustrial Activity 1969-1977 and Future Prospects," unpublished paper, 1977, 
7. Deposited in Centre for Newfoundland Studies. 
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Infrastructure projects were deemed necessary to make Newfoundland more attractive to 
outside industrialists. New projects in the 1960s and 1970s included hydro-electric 
generating plants in Bay d'Espoir (1964) and Churchill Falls (1967), an Electric 
Reduction Plant in Long Harbour (1967), a linerboard mill in Stephenville (1970), an oil 
refinery in Come by Cha:nce (1971), and expansions to the iron ore mines in Wabush and 
Labrador City (1970s), each identified as a growth centre.22 The government also labelled 
the towns around several secondary manufacturing projects, including Marystmvn 
(shipyard) as growth centres. Snaring these new industries, however, required government 
incentives including increased investment in infrastructure and in some cases partnerships 
with private pariners. Even with the incentives, however, the anticipated effects did not 
spread to peripheral regions. While Perroux had always been clear that his themies were 
not tenable as regional development policy, governments and planners desperate to 
develop attempted to apply them anyway.23 
22 Smallwood was not alone in his push towards hydro development; Robert Bourassa and Rene 
Levesque in Quebec, W.A.C. Bennett in BC, and Edward Schreyer in Manitoba ali began tuming 
towards large hydro electric projects to feed US power demands and to entice U .S. multinationals 
into setting up manufacturing plans. John T. Saywell, One More River: an Essay on the HisttJJ}' 
r.{Hydro-Electric Construction (Ottawa: Economic Council ofCanada, 1975), 55. 
23 Nova Scotia and New Brunswick also jumped on the infrastrJcture bandwagon, building hydro 
electric and themul electric generating stations, pulp and paper mills , a heavy water plant (Nova 
Scotia), and manufacturing facilities including tires, ships, and chemicais (Nova Scotia). Cost-
overruns and bankruptcies were also not unique to Newfoundland, New Brunswick's Point 
Lepreau nuclear station had a cost over-run of 150 per cent. Within two years the first of these 
projects failed (Come by Chance refinery) and within 15 years, the heavy water plant (Glace 
Bay) and the Gulf refinery (Port Hawkesbury) were closed. Gardner Pinfold Consulting 
Economists Ltd and Atlantic Consulting Economists Ltd., Compan·son ofMajor Construction 
Projects and Offshore Hydrocarbon Developments in Atlantic Canada (Calgary: Environmental 
Studies Revolving Funds Report, 1986), 12-25. 
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In the late 1960s Smallwood promoted the development of a petro-chemical 
industrial complex at Come by Chance. 24 Whiie it is unclear if Smallwood or his advisors 
read Rostow, this followed Rostow's maturity stage wherein economies switched from 
industries involving resource extraction to more refined and technologically more 
complex processes like chemical production. Smallwood loved the idea of a petro-
chemical complex with its high spin-off potential. The industrial complex \Vas to contain 
the elusive third pulp and paper mill Smallwood had dreamed of for years, a hydrous 
ammonia plant, and an oil refinery. Only the oil refinery was ever built and that, as we 
shall see in chapter five, was beset by problems. Smallwood's willingness to make 
concessions to outside entrepreneurs brought him into conflict with members of his own 
Cabinet (John Crosbie, Clyde Wells, and Alex Hickman) over how projects were being 
funded and run. 25 
In theory, when an economy reached maturation it could apply its entrepreneurial 
and technical skills Lo the production of almost anything, not just the industries that had 
powered its take-off. To plan, build, and staffthese new industrial workplaces required a 
trained workforce. Newfoundlanders, according to Smallwood, needed to undergo a 
revolution in thinking to help an industrial take-off. Hence, he decided to use the 
24 Rostow, The Stages of Economic GrOlvth, 1-11 . In "Develop or Perish," 102, n. 47, Bassier 
claimed that given Smalhvood 's background as journalist and broadcaster and his search for 
advice from U.S. development agencies, he likely came across modernization theory. 
25 John Crosbie described Smallwood as a ' one-man government' who "hated feasibility smdies, 
becm1se he didn't want something to be shown to be not feasible.'' John Crosbie, No Holds 
Barred: My Life in Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1997), 110-21. See also Claire 
Hoy, Cly de Wells: a Political Biography (Toronto: Stoddart, 1992); J.R. Thoms, ed. , Call Me 
JoEy (St. John's: Harry CufiPublications, 1990); R. Gwyn, Smallwood: the Unlikely 
Revolutionwy (Toromo: McClelland and Stewart, 1968); H. Horwood, Joey (Toronto: Stoddart, 
1989); and R. Matthews, "The Smallwood Legacy: the Development ofUnderdevelopment i.n 
Newfoundland 1949-1972," Journal ofCanadian Studies 13, 4 (1979), 89-108. 
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education system not only to meet the skills requirements for new industries, but also to 
help to create an entrepreneurial attitude. As the 1967 Royal Commission on the State of 
the Economy recognized, economic development: 
. . . means a dismption of the old ways of doing things and a break with 
existing institutions and relationships. The most important factor in the 
process of growth is the speed witl-t which people adapt themselves - rather 
than things - to changing conditions. A bulldozer can move trees and earth 
but not ideas and habits. Development will not take place unless enough 
people and their leaders are prepared to make changes in their habits, 
attitudes and thinking necessary to achieve the cnd.26 
Smallwood's belief that an attitudinal ('.hange was necessary was backed up by the work 
of Perroux who stated, "beliefs and values, inequality among individuals and social 
groups, and social institutions, all affect the production, distribution and consumption of 
goods and services in an essentially human environment."27 Behind the push for 
vocational education lay the faith that technology and trained workers could solve any 
problem. In recognition that many workers, especially the older ones, were unprepared for 
industrial workplaces, the provincial and federal governments began promoting 
widespread changes to Newfoundland's education system in the post-war period.28 
Little vocational training existed in Newfoundland before World War ll.29 The ';var 
created an unprecedented importance t-:> science and technology and created a push for 
vocational training, including ir1creasing the demand for engineers and managers. The 
26 Original quote from International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, The Economic 
Development of Kenya (Baltimon~ : John Hopkins University Press, 1962), cited in Report of the 
Royal Commission on the State of the Economy (St. John's 1967), 2. 
27 It is unclear if Smallwood or his advisors read Perroux. Bocage, The General Economic Theory 
of Fram;ois Perroux , 11. 
28 My thinking anJ some of this research on training was spurred by my involvement (with Greg 
Kealey) in York University' s Centre for Work and Society project "Training Matters." 
29 The exceptions were in-house training programs at the railway and the pulp and paper mills. 
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war led to a trahsformation of the employment situation for many Newfoundlanders, 
including creating a pressing demand for workers with craft and technical sblls. The need 
for vocational education was brought forcibly to u~e Commission of Govemn1.ent's 
attention by the lack of skilled workers available for defence works. Commissioners 
believed that hlmdreds of men employed on these jobs had been handicapped by a lack of 
proper trades training. 30 
The war's end also provided the manpower (and it was men) who needed retraining. 
Industrialization was seen as a way to prevent a return to depression by ending the almost 
complete reliance on primary exports, and skilled workers were seen as a necessary 
precondition to full-scale industrialization. Plans for reconstruction began as early as 
1941 as the Commission began to explore the need to retrain not only ex-servicemen but 
also civilians so they could play a "useful" role in the post-war world. Although 
vocational training was initially for ex-servicemen, by 1950 civilians were also being 
encouraged to undertake vocational training ia skilled trades.31 
Studying the post-World War I United States, David Noble fmmd that technical 
education was used to prepare, mobilize and habituate workers for new types of 
productive activity, to reorient the pattern of sociai investment, and to restructure social 
30 PANL, GN 38, S3-2-1, Vocational Education and Civil Re-establishment. Minutes. 5th 
Meeting of the General Committee on Demohilization, Civil Re-cs~ablishment and Post-War 
Planning, Department of Public Health and Welfare, 17 December 1942, 4. 
3 1 Courses included diesel engineering, auto mechanics, plumbing and pipefitting, carpentry, 
bricklaying, refrigeration, sheet metal work, general machine shop, and electrical work. P ANL, 
GN 66,7-5-4-3, vol. 1, Reports-- Vocational Education. Secretary for Education, "Draft: l\1emo 
to the Honourable Commissioner for Home Affairs and Education: Vocational Education," 24 
April 1948; Newfound1and, Department of Education, Annual Report, 1950, 150 and Frank 
Templeman, "Vocational Training," Newfoundland Teachers Association Journal (February 
1956), 10. 
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institutions.32 This held true m post-Confederation Newfoundland when:! a consc1ous 
decision was made to create an industrial workforce. Using federal funds, the Smallwood 
government promoted education as key to the crealion of a "prosperous, progressive 
Province."33 Vocational and technical training encouraged workers to work within the 
capitalist system for a "better life", taught them the social habits demanded by industry -
punctuality, discipline, loyalty, adaptability- and provided them with the skills needed by 
industrialists. 34 It also severed their connection to the sea and the land for their 
subsistence and made them wholly dependent on their wages labour for survival. 
Workers were trained to be flexible and to adapt to the increasing rise of science-
based/technological changes. Initially, the government wanted to establish vocational 
high schools, a trade school, and regional composite schools to meet the :needs of primary 
industries but Newfoundland's relatively small population (300,000), its isolated 
communities, lack of existing facilities, and a poor communication system made the 
program extremely expensive. 35 Instead the govenunent started with a vocational school 
in St. John's capable of boarding students from the outports. Not coincidentally, a 
vocational school was what the federal government was willing to help pay to construct. 
Enmeshed in this technology cult was the ideal that Newfoui1dland needed trained 
workers for both "brain" and "hand-work". Vocational and technical training was to 
"develop the greatest economic asset of the Province ... , the latent talents, abilities, and 
32 David Noble, America By Design: Science, Technology and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), xxii. 
33 Smallwood, I Chose Canada, 343 . 
34 The idea that vocational programs needed to emphasize civics and good citizenship was 
included in all draft plans for vocational education. P ANL, GN 66-2-E, Vocational and Technical 
Training, "Notes on Education in Newfoundland," ll; and "Proposed Vocational fnstitute," 1. 
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energies of our people." This would "enable them to make a fuller contribution towards 
the solution of political, social, and economic and industrial problems of the Province and 
the Dominion." To achieve these goals a Vocational School was established in St. 
John's. 36 To meet the needs of "brain" workers Newfoundland's Memorial University 
College was transfom1ed into a degree granting university in 1949 and expanded greatly 
in the 1960s. 37 
Vocational education's focus was trades training, predominantly apprenticeships. In 
the 1950s employers pushed for Canada-wide uniform apprenticeship standards, 
including developing nationally recognized core skills. Standardization was seen as 
important not just in the production of machinery and goods, but also workers. Initially 
standardization was concerned with ensuring equipment and machinerj performed to 
standard specifications and that parts were interchangeable. All of this was necessary to 
promote large-scale consumption. Uniformity of materials, machinery and parts was 
followed by the rationalization of production on the administrative side, accounting and 
distribution , and on the production process, the workers. Education, through in--~1ouse 
training, apprenticeships, and vocational training, became one-way industries attempting 
to standardize workers. A similar movement was underway to professionalize the so-
called experts, engineers, business administrators, also through education, albeit at the 
35 PA.NL, GN 66, 7-5-4-3, volume 1, Reports-- Vocational Education. Minutes ofthe 13th 
Meeting of the Vocational Trade Advisory Council, 15 November 1949. Ottawa. 10-11. 
36 PANL, GN 66, 7-5-4-3, vol. 1, Reports-- Vocational Education. G.A. Frecker, "Memorandum 
to Honourable Minister of Education: Subject: Vocational Education for Newfoundland," 9 
November 1949, 1-2 and GN 66-2-E, 3-4-3-1 , volume 3, "Memorandum . .. ," 2-3. 
37 See Malcolm MacLeod, A Bridge Built Halfimy: a lfistmy of Memorial University College. 
1925-1950 (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1990). Bursaries were established to 
allow students to attend both the Vocational Institutes and MUN. 
49 
university level. Workers were trained for a life of labour, while engineers and business 
administrators were trained to manage labour.38 
Vocational training was largely a male preserve. The emphasis on training young 
men was not unusual in the 1950s and 1960s. Technology, like apprentice and vocational 
training, had long been a "masculine" domain, with women given only limited access, 
and generally on.ly to specific areas.39 vVith ]ow literacy levels and older workers judged 
as "w·edded" to "'traditional" forms of knowledge, the ideal students for vocational 
training were seen as young men. As the foundation of the future work force, young men 
were targeted because they were viewed as more adaptable to new ways and more likely 
to adopt the new "entrepreneurial" spirit demanded if indust1ialization was to succeed.40 
Technology could be used to increase employment in the fishe1ies and to make other 
fields more attractive. In 1962 Smallwood stated: "If they're going back into the fishery, 
that fishery has to be a far more up-to-date trung, a far more modem trung."41 This 
mant1a applied to all facets of the economy. .An industrial economy demanded the 
transformation of Ne"vfoundland's traditional p1i mary industries and the construction of 
ne1.v industries that, in tum, demanded the creation of new workers. 
During the late 1950s the federal govem ... lllent placed increasing importance on 
technical education. A specialist in technical training was added to the Training Branch 
38 Noble, America By D esign, 69-83, 167-8 and Braverman, Labor and Monopoly Cap ital. 
39 For more on the gendered nature ofteclmology see chapter eight and see Ava Baron, ed., Work 
Engendered: Toward a New Hist01y ofA.merican Labor (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991 ). 
40 Wright found that the idea that young men vtould "have to be flli·ldamentally different from 
their fathers. In fact, the Planners believed that teclmical training in an institution would soon 
replace the traditional forms of fisheries knowledge passed dow:ll from fathers to sons" was 
pervasive . Wright, "Young Men and Technology: Government Attempts to Create a 'Modem' 
Fisheries Workforce in Newfoundland, 1949-1 970," Labour!Le Travuil, 42 (Fa111 998), 143-59. 
4 1 PANL, MG 644, tile 287, "Proceedings, Fisheries Convention, September 1962," 5. 
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and the federal government passed a second Vocational and Technical Training 
Agreement, providing $25 million over seven years for capital costs of constructing 
vocational and, for the first time, techrical institutes. In 1959 the federal Department of 
Labour's Centre for Vocational Training (CVT) reported that "through team work more 
than through independent individual effort modem industry has reached its high level of 
production. The members of this team are the engineer, the tecl1..11ician and the craftsmen.'' 
[emphasis in original] . The report described the work of professional engineers as mental, 
studying, reasoning, visualizing and planning how knowledge can be fommlated into 
practical use. The technician was "required to know basic theories and to apply them in 
helping to solve the complex problems of modem industry; in other words, the technician 
can apply, in a responsible manner, proven tecl:uuques which are commonly understood 
by those who are expert in a branch of engineering."42 Skilled craftsmen vvere needed to 
build the tools designed by engineer and detailed by the 'lechnician. The report 
recommended technicians be trained in post-secondary schools, Instit'.ltes of Technology, 
in 2 or 3 year programs. 43 
In the early 1960s, the federal government pushed the provinces to concentrate 
training effmis on unemployed workers. To convince the provinces the federal 
government increased its share of funding for unemployed training to 75 per cent, up 
from 50 per cent.44 The federal government was willing to pay much of the costs of 
42 PANL, GN 66-2-E, volume 16, Vocational and Tech..nical Training. 'The Engineering Team," 
CVT.59.T.l, 1. Emphasis in original. 
4
) Technicians included graduates from j oumalism courses, secretarial science, drafting, land 
surveying, instrumentation, machine shop and construction technicians, as well as engineering, 
science and medical technicians. PANL, GN 66-2-E, volume 16, "The Engineering Team," 
CVT.59.T.l, 3. 
44 
"Twenty Years Work," 3. 
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vocational education because it believed only with the creation of a skilled workforce 
could the country develop. Reports by the federal Department of Manpower helped the 
federal government decide to transition from training trades workers to training 
technicians. One report's findings that from 1951-1961 the fastest growing occupations 
were professional, service, clerical, and commercial/financial (in the numbers employed), 
had a profound impact on training as the federal government pushed tor decreased trades 
training, and increased technical training. With a decline in the primary labour forces the 
need to train craft workers was questioned.45 
In Newfoundland two new tech..'lical institutes were created, the College of Trades 
and Technology (COTT) .and the College of Fisheries, Navigation, Marine Engineering 
and Electronics, both built in the early 1960s. COTT was built to centralize training and 
to provide adequate facilities for larger numbers and more technically based courses.46 
The new College of Fisheries offered five streams of study, all focusing on the 
partnership of young men and technology as the key to a mod•;:m fishery, '.Vith three 
directly related to offshore fishing (nautical science, mechanical eng}Ittering, electrical 
engineering), one to shipbuilding and design (Naval Architecture), and the other offering 
in-plant training programs for employees in fish processing plants (Depariment of Food 
Technology). Training young men to work as trawler crews, essential to developing a 
. 4~ frozen fish mdustry, was a central part of the new College. ' 
45 
"Review of Manpower Training R~search," 10-11. 
46 COTT was equipped with 30 standard classrooms and 32 special classrooms outfitted for 
clerical and secretarial classes, mathematics, chemistry, physics, drafting, surveying, electronics, 
art, metallurgy, them1odynamics, machine shops (welding, auto and diesel mechanics), as well as 
a printing press. Enrolment capacity was 1000 for day use, and tuition fees were nominal. 
Harrington, "Vocational Education in Nevvfoundland," 41 . 
47 Wright, "Young Men and Technology," 152. 
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While the new concentration was on technical training, craft training remained 
important. District vocational schools were built to ensure that technicians would have 
qualified workers to implement their plans. New vocational schools were located around 
the province strategically "so that all young men and women in Newfoundland desiring to 
equip themselves for efficient living in this modern age would have the opportunity to do 
so." Minister of Education G.A. Frecker defended the decision to build district vocational 
schools to federal Labour Minister, Michael Starr, stating: 
.. . we are not only faced with the problem of providing training for the 
young people who will be leaving or graduating from our schools and 
not going on to upjversity, but we are also confronted with a bigger 
problem, proportionately, than any other province in Canada, namely 
that of providing training opportunities for many intelligent, capable 
people who left school years ago when no programme was available . . . 
\Ve feel our programme, though it may be expensive to bring into 
existence over a relatively short period of time, will be cheaper in the 
long run for both Newfoundland and Canada than allowing our people to 
go untrained, and that it will ultimately pay high dividends.48 
V!hen constmcting vocational schools and technical co11eges failed to help end 
m1employment, the govenunent began to search for someone to blame. As in the past the 
workers provided an easy target. In 1966 the Deputy Education Minister wrote: "The fact 
that a great many of our people are out of work is that they do not have the skills required 
to obtain such work in today's industry and too often these skills cannot be obtained 
because the individual hasn't the necessaJ.y education required to acqui.re them ."49 
Vocational schools were soon to come under attack fer not meeting the changing needs of 
Newfoundlanders. Before we discuss the criticisms levelled against vocational education, 
48 PM'L, GN 66-2-E, 7-5-6-1, volume Ill. Letter from Frecker, Minister of Education to 
Starr, federal Minister of Labour, 25 September 1961, 1-2. 
49 PM'L GN 66-2-E, 7-5-4- 1, volume 20. Letter from P.J. Hanley, Deputy 1-'linister of 
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it is necessary to first understa.'l.d the economic and political situation in Newfoundland in 
the 1970s and early 1980s. 
By the early 1970s protests over resettlement, labour unrest in the fishery, and the 
failure of several industrial projects resulted in Conservative Frank Moores being elected 
premier. When Moores was elected, most of Newfoundland's resource sectors were under 
external control. From 1972-1989, Moores and his successor B1ian Peckford identified 
gaining control over Newfoundland's resources as the best way to develop the province. 
The focus on regaining control of Newfoundland's raw resources was in part a reaction to 
the Churchill Falis Project, which saw financial benefits accrue to Quebec. Under Moores 
and Peckford, the Newfoundland government set out to attract an oil industry, to capture 
revenue, and to assert provincial control over resources, including oil, hydro and the 
fisheries. To this end, Moores nationalized the Churchill Falls Development Corporation 
. 
soon after its construction. Not all resource projects were so easy to gain control of; 
dependency on outside capital for financing, contractual obligations, and jurisdictional 
limitations all played a role in preventing Moores and Peckford from achieving their 
goals. Only after a decade of jurisdictional wrangling, did the govemment get joint 
control over the offshore oil industry.50 Both Moores and Peckford benefited from a 
growing cultural nationalism in Newfoundland, including a desire to assert 
Newfoundland's independence from Ottawa and, to a lesser extent, foreign investors. 
Both premiers believed that only by gaining as many economic benefits from 
Education to St. A.'1drew's resident. 7 February 1966. 
sc In 1984 Prime Minister Brian Mulroney agreed to joint manag·~ment of the offshore resources 
and in 1985 signed the Atlantic Accord spelling out what benefits would accrue to the province. 
House, The Challenge of Oil, 303-312. 
54 
development as possible m the fom1 of jobs and business ·opportunities - could 
'\] Newfoundland prosper.-
By the mid-1970s modernization theories were falling out of favour as 
governments began looking to spend less money on social and infrastructure programs. 
Federal politicians wonied that DREE and its successor the General Development 
Agreement (GDA) promoted the profile of provincial politicians despite being paid for by 
federal funds. 52 The federal government suggested direct federal delivery of regional 
development initiatives instead of programs admi..r1istered by the provinces. \Vith 
modernization theory in decline, the search began for another economic solution. 
Federally, the government established the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency 
(ACOA) in 1987 to provide financing to a wide range of manufacturing, processing and 
repair and maintenance facilities. 53 ACOA's mandate was to assess a project's 
. 
commercial viability; and if it looked like the project would result ir1 economic benefit for 
the region, to provide financial assistance. ProvinciaJ.ly, the Peckford government turned 
to trade theory that sought to take advantage of the province's comparative advantage. 
Under trade theory, each region maximized its economic potential by concentrating its 
efforts on its economic stTengths. In Newfoundland this meant turning away from 
industrial complexes dependent on imported raw materials and re-focusing on resources 
51 See Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, Managing All Our Resources: A 
Development Plan for Newfoundland and Labrador, 1980-85 (St. Joh..n's: Government of 
Newfoundland and Labrador, 1980); and Building on Our Strengths. 
;
2 Higgins and Savoie, Regional Development Theories and their Application, 280. 
53 With federal government subsidies of 35 per cent of the costs of all ships build in Canadian 
shipyards for Canadian owners and 50 per cent of construction of any new steel fishing vessels 
over 100 feet, Smallwood convinced Canadian Vickers Limited to run a st·~e! ship construction 
and repair facility in Marystown which would be built and o\\>ned by the provincial govemment. 
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within the province (offshore oil). Oil was seen as a way to r.nake Newfoundland self-
sustaining. No longer would Newfoundland attempt to reproduce Ontario's industrial 
structures; rather it would concentrate on its own areas of strength. 54 
While employment grew fairly steadily throughout the 1970s, unemployment 
increased in the early 1980s. The worldwide recession (1981-2) had a profound impact on 
Newfoundland, halting employment gmwth for the next five years. High tmemployment 
in construction and increased mechanization in logging added to workers' worries. 
Employment opportunities in the fishing industry, rejuvenated by the 200-mile exclusive 
economic zone on Canada's east coast, local make-work projects, and out-migration to 
Ontario and Alberta prevented mass unemployment.5s Up until1981, growth in full-time 
employment exceeded gro'Nth in part-time employment. -with the 1982 recession full-
time job losses were only partially offset by an increase in part-time employment. Full-
time job growth did not begin to recover until 1988-9, and then barely sufficient to restore 
full-time employment to pre-recession levels.56 Just as improvements were beginning to 
pem1eate through the economy, especially with Hibernia-related construction jobs, the 
cod stocks collapsed and the resuiting moratorium brought high unemployment back to 
the province. 
The shipyard has been plagued with troubles from the start. Economic Council of Canada, 
Newfoundland: from Dependency to Self-Reliance, 10. 
54 Higgins and Savoie, "Introduction," Regional Economic Development, 9. 
55 In many cases the government fostered a return to the fisheries by providing grants and loans 
to both harvesters and processors. The number of registered fish~rs went from 15,802 in. 1975 to 
35,271 in 1980 (not all of these were actively fishing), while plant workers doubled from 10,000 
to just over 21,000. Fish plants grew from 110 in 1975 to 175 in 1980. Report of the Royal 
Commission, Building on Our Strengths, 49-50. 
56 Government ofNewfoundland, Labour Bulletin, third quarter 1989, 21. 
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By the early 1980s the neo-classical model of economics was more in favour in 
explaining Canada's regional disparities.57 As explained by Thomas Courchene, earlier 
regional development policies were seen to have interfered with the market, hence 
"natural economic adjustments" were needed. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s federal 
politicians espoused the view that reliance on government subsidies increased regional 
dependency by allowing people to continue to live in marginal areas. To return a region 
to its natural balance, neo-classical economists on the federal level promoted out-
migration and a reduction in the minimum wage to promote new industries. After the 
federal government cut transfer payments and downloaded services onto the provinces, 
the provincial government responded with its own cuts to services. It also reorgani7ed its 
training system to make it more "responsive" to changing labour market needs.58 In the 
process the public colleges underwent almost continuous review. Starting in 1985 the 
. 
government began to download the costs of training onto those being trained. 59 
The need to transform training was highlighted in the Royal Commission on. 
Employment and Unemployment's report Building on Our Strengths, Education for Self-
Reliance, and other reports. Such documents promoted the idea that the education system 
had to be re-designed to prepare for the new 'global' market. Vocational and technical 
colleges were called "antiquated and out of touch with the needs of the 1980s in 
Newfoundland. The vocational school system, locked into training trades people for the 
industrial expansion of the 1960s, continues to teach for occupations which are now 
57 Higgins and Savoie, Regional Development Theories and their Applications, 274. 
58 Government of Ne\vfoundland and Labrador, White Paper: Reogranization of the Vocation 
School ~)'stem (St. John's: Department of Education 1985), 7-8. 
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oversupplied. "60 Graduating students from vocational schools in 1982-1983 only had a 
rate of 19 per cent in their chosen profession and only a 41 per cent employment rate. 
According to the Royal Commission, vocational schools were inflexible, under funded, 
offered outmoded training, had obsolete equipment and staff who were unable to meet 
new demands.61 
To be more competitive, one report stated, the education system " ... must become 
more responsive to changing labour market demands for a highly-skilled, i1movative and 
adaptable workforce."62 Under these proposals education, especially at the college level, 
had to be closely linked with private industry. To be more flexible, and efficient, 
vocational training was transfonned into a community college system in the mid-1980s. 
With the change, trades courses were reduced; for instance, carpentry courses decreased 
by 30 per cent while construction worker courses dropped by 40 per cent. In their place, 
courses in Basic Offshore Survival Training, Oil Spill Prevention, and Radio Operation 
were set up at the College of Fisheries, and Petroleum Engineering was added to the 
College of Trades and Technology. This was in keeping with the Peckford govemment's 
attempts to concentrate on Newfoundland's strategic resources. Trjs, the government 
argued, would allo\v the colleges to be more responsive to changes in the economy and to 
labour market demands. 63 
59 McBride and Kealey, "The Impact of Privatization on Newfoundland College Students: the 
Case of the Career Academy," York University, Centre for Research on Work and Society, 
Training Matters: Working Paper Series #2000-04. 
60 Report of the Royal Commission, Building on Our Strengths, 222. 
61 Report of the Royal Commission, BuiLding on Our Strengths, 226. 
62Govemment ofNewfot:ndland and Labrador, Change and Challenge: a strategic economic 
plan for Ne>vfoundland and Labrador (St. John's: Queen's Printer, 1992). 
63 Department of Career Development and Advanced Studies, White Paper on the Reorganization 
of the Vocational School System (June 1985), 12. 
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In its desire to create a more flexible, productive workforce, familiar with new 
technologies including electronics, computers, and telecommunications at a time when it 
wanted to spend less on the education system, the government agreed to open the 
educational system to private enterprise. Behind this change was the idea that training 
must change its 111andate to face increasing international competition and to meet 
requirements m communication, technological and infom1ation industries. Private 
colleges were seen as capable of adapting faster to market needs. When the public college 
' 
system failed to meet expectations, the government responded by providing funding to 
private colleges. With the massive student influx due to the moratorium and increased 
federal training money, the public colleges were hard pressed to meet demands. The costs 
of retrenchment and privatization were bome by Newfoundland students who were forced 
to pay higher tuition costs at private colleges but were less likely to find well-paying full-
time employment than their public school cmmterparts. Students at several private 
schools have also borne the brunt of privatization when their institutions went bankrupt.64 
Along \Vith a focus on privatizing and downsizing, the provincial government 
began to focus on regional development. 65 In the mid-1980s the Royal Commission on 
64 See McBride and Kealey, "The Impact of Privatization on Newfoundland College Students"; 
Review of Privare Training Institutions Act and Regulations (St. John's: Department of 
Education, 1999), chaired by Phillip Warren; Government ofNewfoundland and Labrador, 
Postsecondary Indicators '95 (St. John's: Department of Education, 1995); Postsecondmy 
Indicators '98 (St. John's: Department of Education, 1998); Career Search: Employment 
Experience and Earnings of Recent Graduates (St. John 's: Depanment of Education, 1999). 
65 Rural development was not a new idea. The Commission of Government, individual 
communities, and provincial premiers have all turned to mral development to help diversify local 
economies, particularly in the 1970s with resettlement and in the mid-1990s after the collapse of 
the cod fisheries. In the wake of resettlement, many grassroots rural development groups were 
given government financial support resulting in regional development associations being formed 
across the province. Regional development associations spread from 17 in 1974 to 54 by 1985, 
representing over 500 conununities. Fisheries projects predominated, but crafts, tourism, 
aquaculture, and agriculture projects were also promoted by regional deveiopment associations. 
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Employment and Unemployment gave an added boost to regional development, claiming 
large scale developments alone would not solve Newfoundland's tmemployment woes. 
Building on Our Strengths suggested large projects be paired with increased rural or 
regional development. It recommended creating five new Regional Development Boards 
to take the lead in promoting development initiatives. These boards were to work \Vith 
mu~11icipalities, fisheries workers, cooperatives, businesses, and local colleges to foster 
development. Predating the ''new economies" thrust by almost a decade, Building on Our 
Strengths also recognized that cunent thinking on "post-industrial societie envision a 
future of decentralized populations, appropriate technologies and sophisticated small 
communities."66 
\Vith the collapse of the groundfishery (the maJor employer in rural areas), 
alternative employment became essential. A federal govem..ment program, the Northern 
Cod Recovery Program (NCARP) and its sucessor, the Atiantic Groundfish Strategy 
(TAGS) provided income suppmi, labour market adjustment and training funds for 
displaced harvesting and processing workers.67 ·while training courses providing basic 
adult education were a considerable success, other retraining did not meet commmlity 
Many regional development associations became deflected from their original mandate when 
they were incorporated into the Unemployment Insurance system and started providing short-
tem1 employment projects. Rural development, however, was not given a high priority from the 
provincial government; the Department of Rural, Agricultural and Northern Development 
remained poorly funded and enjoyed reiatively low status. Report of the Roya! Commission, 
Building on Our Strengths, 364-386 and House, "Strategies of Diversification," Newfoundland 
and Labrador Heritage Website. 
6
: Report of the Royal Com1nission, Building on Our Strengths , 365. 
6
' Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, The Atlantic Groundfish Strategy: An Analysis of 
the Programs on a Regional Basi.> (St. John 's 1996), l. 
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expectations. 68 By providing i....11come support and funds for retraining, TAGS delayed any 
long-term decisions on what to do with the outports and gave the provincial government 
some leeway in impleme:ating its rural development program. 
In 1992 the provincial government released its Strategic Economic Plan 
recommending creating economic development zones. In 1995 the provincial government 
created 20 economic development zones. Economic zone boards embodied the 
govenm1ent' s new emphasis on regional development. Each zone board was to apply a 
more business-like approach to economic develpoment and to act as a coordinating body 
between business, labour, local development groups, and communities to facilitate 
economic development. Boards spent a year developing five-year strategic economic 
development plans for their regions.69 The government also created a new Depart1nent of 
Development and Rural Renewal (DDRR) to administer the zone beards. DDRR 
combined portions of Enterprise Newfoundland and Labrador, the Economic Recovery 
Commission's research arm, and employment programs previously offered by the 
Department of Employment and Labour Relations. 70 While it is too soon to know if the 
63 Over 7000 former fisheries workers underwent retraining, 70 per cent in skills training, 30 per 
cent in adult basic education. HRDC, TAGS: Background Paper (January 1996). 
69 Government of Canada/Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, Community lvfatters: The 
New Regional Economic Development (St. John's: Atlantic Canada Opporhmities Agency, 
1995); Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, The Report on Community Economic 
Development in Newfoundland and Labrador and Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, 
"The Link Project: Background on Regional Economic Development Boards," 
http://www.linkproiect.nf.ca/link/redb.htm. Accessed 10 April2001. 
70 Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, "Address by Minister of Development and Rural 
Renewal, Judy Foote, to Newfoundland and Labrador Employer's Council," 19 July 1996. 
http://vf'.:vw.gov.nf.ca/releases/ 1996/drr/0719n08.htm. 
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economic zone boards will be successful, in .March 2001 the government signalled its 
commitment to mral development by providing $60 million to mral development.7 1 
Most recently, the government has promoted the "new" or "knowledge based" 
economy. Based on the "Irish model" of economic development, the "new" economy 
focuses on telec01mnunications and infom1ation technology growth. Ireland used a grants 
and loans program, in part funded by the European Union, to promote regional 
development.72 The idea is that computer and telec01mnunications advances have opened 
up international markets to Newfoundland goods and services in ways they never were 
before. From 1989-1996 the Newfoundland Economic Recovery Commission examined 
what was needed to develop these new sectors and partnered with private sector 
companies and educational institutes to promote them. This approach focuses on so--
called innovative technologies, information industries, manufacturing, health services, 
aquaculture, adventure tourism and secondary food processing as the new economic 
growih areas.73 Much of this approach is reminiscent of Rostow's fifth stage, where 
societies shifted towards goods and services. 
The rationalization behind the "knowledge economy'' is that economies and 
companies need to adapt to the internationalization of business and the demand for new 
71 Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, "Substantial resources for new development," 
News Releases, 22 March 2001. http://www.gov.nf.ca/releases/20001/itt/0322n48.htrn. 
n 
- Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency, "Comparative Perspectives on Regional 
Development," Paper prepared by North American Policy Group, 31 March 1998, 63. 
73 
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, Change and Challenge: a strategic economic 
plan for Newfoundland and Labrador (St. John 's: Queen's Printer, 1992); Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Nevv Opportunities for Growth (St. John's: Economic Recove1y Corn.rnission, 1992); 
and Government of Canada/Gc>vemment of Newfoundland and Labrador, Community Matters. 
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knowledge under the global economy.74 The knowledge-based economy includes research 
and development intensive industries and the increasingly technological resource sectors 
such as oil and gas. From the outset the oil and gas industry has placed much emphasis 
on training and skills.75 Newfoundland has also promoted marine technologies and 
information technology (IT) industries. The govem.ment claims the IT sector alone 
averaged over 10 per cent annual growth from 1992 to 1997, and 25 per cent growth from 
1998 to 2000.76 Knowledge work is also not tied to resources and can operate in marginal 
areas. It is unclear at this stage what impact this approach wW have on the economy. 
Many of these jobs (for example the creation of call centres) have come in the form of 
low-waged, non-unionized employment which does not bode well for Newfoundland's 
workers. 
Con.clusions 
Newfoundland governments have tried a variety of methods to modernize, 
including a focus on growth centres, large-scale resource development projects, and 
various training programs. Vfith the failure of large-scale projects to jump-start mass 
74 Surendra Gera, "The Knowledge-based Economy," Paper presented to the Skills Development 
in the Knowledge-based Economy Conference, Sununary Report, 22-3 June 1999. Policy 
Reports and Studies, ACOA, http:W\\'W.acoa.ca/e/library/reports/skills_development.shtml. 
Accessed 9 April 200 1. 
75 InnovaQuest "Skills Needs in the Resource-Based Sectors in Atlantic Canada," Final Report 
prepared for the Conference on Skills Development in the Knowledge Based Economy (ACOA), 
Moncton, June 1999. http://www.acoa.ca/eilibrary/repmts/skills __ needs.shtml. 
76 In March 2001 the Newfoundland govemment released Securing Our Future Together. In it 
the govemment committed to maintaining a strategic focus on industries where Newfoundland 
has or can develop a strategic advantage; to helping residents acquire the skills needed for the 
increasingly knowledge-based economy; diversifying the economy to produce internationally 
competitive goods and services; supporting the enterprising spirit of the private sector; fostering 
innovation and technological progression to enhance productivity and competitiveness; 
encouraging entrepreneurship; and revitalizing ru.ral communities. Govemmenl of Newfoundland 
and Labrador, Securing Our Future Together: Final Report on the Renewal Strategy for Jobs 
and Growth, March 2001 . httn://w\\'\Y.,g_ov.nf.caliobsandgrowthlfinalreport.html. 
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industrialization, the government tried to take increasing control of resources, including 
nationalizing Churchill Falls and fighting for jurisdictional control of its offshore oil and 
fisheries resources. In the 1980s and 1990s, with high unemployment and the collapse of 
the fisheries, the government promoted regional economic development and the growth 
of a "knowledge based economy". Given the fraJne of reference that Newfoundland 
governments, particularly the Smalhvood government, were operating in, and the pre-
eminence of modernization theories, it is not surprising that this was the option pursued. 
Newfoundland governments should not be criticized for choosing this development path; 
it was the dominant approach. It is certainly fair, however, to criticize how these 
approaches worked in practice and what impact these approaches had on workers. 
To modernize, the government attempted to sell the public the idea that 
Newfoundland needed to join the "North American" way of life. Newfoundlanders were 
sold the promise of job~ and a better way of life if only the province industrialized. 
Workers were also told they needed to become "professional" in one area of work. To 
help meet employers needs, the vocational education system was ov;;:rhauled to teach not 
only skills but also the demeanour and attitude needed for industrialization. For much of 
the 1950s and 1960s workers attempted to conform to these expectations and to adapt to 
waged work. In increasing numbers they trained for trades or the new fishery, and 
thousands moved to new growth centres to find work. As we will see in later chapters, by 
the 1970s, however, workers increasingly began to assert their own concerns, concems 
bubbling just below the surface, only coming to the fore when high employment levels 
allowed workers to gain a measure of control over their workplace. 
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In the next chapter I explore the political and economic significance of three 
specific case studies in Newfoundland's development, construction of the Churchill Falls 
hydro generating project, the Come by Chance oil refinery, and the Hibernia offshore oil 
project. Chapter three provides a bridge between the general economic development 
theory of this chapter and the more thematic approach of the remajning chapters. Chapter 
three examines why the emphasis was put in tu...rn on hydro-generation, refined oil, and 
offshore oil, what linkages the government anticipated from these developments, a11d 
what role the government played in the project::>. 
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Chapter Three: The Political and Economic Signiticance of the Case Studies 
This chapter examines the political and economic significance of three specific 
case studies in Newfoundland's development. It provides a bridge between the general 
economic development theory of the last chapter and the more thematic approach of the 
remaining chapters. An introduction to the three case studies, it provides the reader \Vith 
each project's significance. It examines v,rhy the emphasis was put in tum on hydro-
generation, refined oil, and offshore oil, what linkages the govemment anticipated from 
these developments, and what role the govemment played in the projects. 
Since the 1960s Newfoundland economic development has focused on a series of 
large-scale projects, most seen as having tremendous spin-off potential. Large-scale 
projects involving the exploitation of natural resources were equated with progress. 
Projects with high spin-off potential were promoted in the hopes of creating new demand 
through industrial development. 1 For instance, a hydro industry was seen as a necessary 
pre-condition to economic development. Offeri~TJ.g "cheap" hydro power was seen as a 
way to attract new investors while having a supply of refined oil could be used to create a 
petroleum products industry. In its time each project (Churchill Falls, Corne by Chance 
and Hibemia) was the central element in Newfoundland's economic development and key · 
to generating new secondary industries and economic policy. 
Churchill Falls and the Policy of Cheap Power, 
Govemments have viewed hydro as an essential ingredient to development for 
over 100 years. Europe's industrial revolution was fostered by a combination of new 
energy somces (the steam engine), new technologies, and the factory system, which 
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concurred with the development of a capitalist class and the availability of labour. In the 
United States, the Tennessee Valley Authority and the Colorado River developments 
during the New Deal period further demonstrated the potential of hydro-electricity to 
transform an area from a relatively backward area to an economically productive region. 
Hydro-electricity \Vas also essential to Canadian economic development. Hydroelectric 
power was used in general manufacturing and allowed for the rapid expansion of minjng 
and chet11ical industries. As early as 1899 T.C. Keefer, a Canadian engineer atJ.d head of 
the Royal Society, foresaw the transforming power of hydro-electricity.2 Developing the 
Niagara River in Ontario and the St. Maurice River in Quebec in the first decade of the 
201h century allowed the modem industry to be bom .. 3 
Hydro-electricity has played a.11 important role m Newfoundland's industrial 
development. Newfoundland's first power stations were constructed to meet the needs of 
other resource developments. The power stations on the Exploits (1909) and Humber 
Rivers (1925) provided power to the pulp and paper mills at Comer Brook and Grand 
Falls, and a hydro plant was built to meet the needs of the Buchans base metal mine 
(1927).4 Speaking before the Newfoundland Board of Trade, Canadian businessmen 
---------------------------------------
1 James Hornig, ed., Social and Environmental Impacts of the James Bay Hydroelectric Prc~iea 
(Montreal: MeGill-Queen's Press, 1999), 3, 15. 
2 T.C. Keefer, "Presidential Address," Royal Society of Canada, Proceedings and Transactions 
(Ottawa: Second Series, V, 1899). 
3 Karl Froschauer, White Gold: Hydroelectric Power in Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1999), 
15; Oran Young, "Introduction to the Issues," in Hornig, Social and Environmental Impacts, 3; 
and John SaY\vell, OnP. More River: an Essay on the History of Hydro-Electric Construction 
(Ottawa: Economic Council of Canada, 1975), 9-37. 
4 The first power stations in Labrador were constructed in the mid-1950s and early 1960s on the 
Twin Falls River by private companies to meet the needs of iron ore mines in Labrador City and 
Wabush, and on the Menihek River to meet the needs of iron ore mines in Schefferviile, Quebec. 
Peter Crabb, "Cheap Power - An Expensive Failure: Hydro-Electric Power and lndustrial 
Development in Newfoundland," Water Resources Bulletin, 10, 1 (February 1974), 44-5. 
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Ha..'Ty Crowe reported in 1924 that '\vater power is today the greatest asset of any 
country." Crowe was in Newfoundland to assess the feasibility of a 160,000 horse power 
hydro development in Bay d'Espoir. Harnessing the power would allow them to establish 
a third paper mill in Newfoundland, using timber harvested locally and from Han1ilton 
Inlet, Labrador. Crowe did not manage to get his project off the ground and hydro 
development in Bay d'Espoir was not made a reality until the 1960s.5 
Interest in Labrador's hydro resources peaked early. In May 1894 Albert Low of 
the Dominion Geological Survey visited Labrador and predicted Churchill Falls would 
yield several million horse power of electricity if it could be harnessed. The first proposal 
to develop Churchill Falls was put forth in 1907 dming a series of Canadian Senate 
debates but was rejected as too costly. In 1915 a French-Canadian engineer, Wilfred 
Thibaudeau surveyed the Labrador Plateau, and recorrunended diverting the river above 
the Falls to a point downstream where a height of over 1000 _feet was available. As the 
Labrador Plateau formed a natural basin this scheme would have negated the need to 
build a large concrete dam to hold the water, reducing costs substantia1Jy.6 
Until the early 1950s the isolation of Churchill Falls, the climate, and the 
problems associated with shipping in the workers, machines and materials necessary for 
the project seemed Uih"'llanageable, despite interest in the 1940s from the Aluminium 
5 Provincial Archives of Newfoundland and Labrador (PANL), GN 2/5, file 196 A, Harry Crowe 
to vVilliam Halfyard, 16 November 1917; Crowe to Alexander Campbell, 31 October 1922 and 7 
November 1922. For information on the bids to develop Bay d 'Espoir in the late 1920s and 
1930s see P.I\.NL, GN 2/5, file 507, W.J. Walsh to John Puddester, 31 October 1933 . Cited in M. 
Baker, J. Miller Pitt, and R.D.W. Pitt, The fllustrated Histmy of Newfoundland Light and Power 
(St. John's: Creative Publishers, 1990), 257-8. 
6 Churchill Falls (Labrador) Corporation (CFLCo), An J:,'nergy Giant: the Churchill Falis Pow·er 
Development, http://-.,.vwvv.kl2.nf.ca/eglambertlenergy.htn1. Accessed 5 October 2000. 
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Company of Canada (Alcan).7 European deveiopment of transmission lines capable of 
carrying higher voltages of electricity in the 1950s made it more economical to convey 
power over long distances.8 The opening of iron ore mines in western Labrador and north-
eastern Quebec and the construction of the Quebec North Shore and Labrador Railway 
(1954) demonstrated it 1-vas possible to house a workforce and bring in supplies. 
Joseph Smallwood advoca·'ed hydro development in 1931.9 In the 1949 elr~ction 
campaign Smallwood told voters that "cheap power is the foundation of any ~J.dU3try. 
Grand Falls and Comer Brook would never have amounted to anything without lots of 
cheap power. Newfoundland has been blesseu with great water pmver. Most of it is 
running to waste. The Liberal Party will develop it."10 Upon. becoming prem1er 
Smallwood continued his focus on hydro, usmg the lure of cheap power to woo 
industrialists. From 1950 to 1953 Alfred Valdmanis, Newfoundland's director-general of 
Economic Development, attempted to attract outside teclwical expertise and capital to 
develop Newfoundland's hydro potential. Smallwood wanted to build two nevv pulp ar;d 
paper mills, and needed the timber and power froo the Churchill River to make the 
projects economically feasible. 11 
- ------- - -- -
7 CFLCo, The Churchill Falls Power Development Management and Construction Equipment, 3. 
Presented to the Earth Moving Industry Conference of the Society of Automotive Engineers, 
1972, Central illinois by H.L Snyder, executive vice president CFLCo and R.D. Boivin, vice 
president and project manager, CFLCo. Deposited in CNS. 
8 For genera! overviews of the project, see Philip Smith, Brinco: The StOIJ' of Churchill Falls 
(Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975), 50-1 and Jason Churchill, "Political Pragmatism and 
the Failure of Confederation: Newfoundland's Struggle to Develop its Hydro Resources in 
Labrador, 1952-1988," MA thesis, University of Ottawa, 1997. 
9 Joseph Smallwood, The New Newfoundland (New York: l\1acMillan, 1931), 94. 
10 Evening Telegram, 16 May 1949. 
11 Gerhard Bassler, Alfred Vafdmanis and the Politics of Survival (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2000), 259. 
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Failing to find Canadian or American investors to facilitate the development of 
Labrador, Smallwood approached British investors. In 1952 Srnallwood offered English 
industrialists "the biggest real estate deal of the present century" which could be " the 
beginning of England staging a very great industrial comeback" Smallwood persuaded a 
group of leading bankers and industrialists that Newfoundland needed help to develop 
those natural resources with potential. Envisioned along the lines of the Hudson' s Bay 
Company, the British Newfoundland Corporation (Brinco) was formed by a consortium 
of investors led by the de Rothschild merchant barLk. The de Rothschild's ·were 
joined by several other prominent businessmen renowned i11 their fields, including chair 
of mining company Rio Tinto (Vere Bessborough), the chair of diamond mine co.mpany 
Anglo-American CorporatiO!l of South Africa, chair of the Anglo Newfoundland 
Development Corporation (Lord Rothmere), chair of Bo-v-v·aters (Eric Bowaters), a.11d th~~ 
chairs of English Electric ;md .Frobisher Mining (the exploration rum of Ventures Ltd 
which owned Falconbridge Nickel). 12 
Brinco was granted exclusive timber, mineral and water rights for a 20--year period 
over almost 130,000 square kilometres in Newfoundland and Labrador. Brinco's 
concession included the right to develop the river systems in both areas. Under the tem1s 
of its agreement, Brinco agreed to carry out extensive exploration; should Brinco fail to 
12 Rio Tinto was a London-based mining company, one of the largest in the 'Nor1d, known for its 
copper and uranium mining. Richard West, River of Tears: the Rise of Rio Tinto-Zinc A1ining Co. 
(London: Earth Island, 1972); Edmund de Rothschild, A Gilt-Edged Life (London: John Murray 
Publishers, l998). In 1953 additi'.mal investors were added representing banking (Morgan 
Grenfell, Kleinworts, Hambros, M. Samuel, Schoders, Robert Beson Lonsdale, \N.C. Pitfield and 
the Bank of Montreal), insurance companies, and industrialists (Imperial ChemicaL Sogemines, 
and C.T. Bowring and Company). Each of the 24 ;;harcholders pledged $52,100 to defray the first 
five years exploration costs. Brinco's first chair was Bertie Gardiner, a former chancellor of 
70 
develop the land, it would revert back to the government. Brinco also had an obligation to 
proceed with due diligence to develop any resomces that proved economical. In return 
Brinco promised to pay the government royalties on any project brought to fruition.13 In 
1958 Brinco formed a subsidiary, the Churchill Falls Labrador Corporation to develop 
Churchill Falls. The initial shareholders were Brinco (70 per cent), Sbawinigan 
Engineering (20 per cent), the Newfoundland government (5 per cent) and Rio Tinto 
subsidiary Rio Algam (5 per cent).14 
With high tmernployrnent, by the early 1960s the proviL""Icial govemment was 
desperate to use "cheap" hydro power to encourage secondary industries. "Cheap power" 
from Bay d'Espoir and Churchill Falls was to create jobs and foster spin-otT deveiopment. 
Churchill Falls was initially viewed as capable of meeting the industrial needs of not only 
Newfoundland but also Quebec and Ontario, wr.Jch in the early 1950s were begin;:ling to 
run out of easily accessible hydro power. Power retained in Newfoundland could be used 
to produce alutninum and other light metals, or to increase mining and pulp and p aper 
production.15 Despite the offer of cheap electricity few new manufacturing plants moved 
into Newfoundland. Instead the power was used to expand existing mining and £) restry 
operations, including the two pulp and paper mills whose own power stations 'Here unable 
to meet their needs. In his examination of the Bay d 'Espoir hydro project, Peter Crabb 
----··-·-- ---
McGill University and chair of the Bank of Montreal. See Centre for Newfoundland Studies 
Archives (CNSA), Smallwood Papers, Collection 075, 3.23.004, Churchill Falls 1965. 
13 CFLCo, "The Origins ofBrinco," 1970. On deposit in CNS and Froschauer, W71ite Gold, 112. 
14 Sha\vinigan Engineering was a subsidiary of the Shawinigan Water and Power Company, the 
largest privately owned utility company in Quebec. With the buy-out of Shawinigan Water and 
Power by Hydro Quebec after the 1962 provincial eiection, its share pas::,ed to ~he government. 
15 !1-.ll three industries required large amounts of power. Producing aluminum required eight times 
more pov;rer than refining a ton of iron ore. Establishing an aluminum smelter in Sept-Ties was 
discussed, but by 1957 a surplus of aluminum capacity made a new smelter unfeasible. 
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found that the govemment's "cheap power" policy only attracted one new company to 
Newfoundland, the Electric Reduction Company of Canada (ERC0). 16 While the 
government anticipated receiving more in taxes and other benefits than it paid in power 
subsidies, returns from the ERCO development were relatively small given the amount of 
public funding provided to the project. : 7 
To finance the billion-dollar Chw-chill Falls project, CFLCo needed a guaranteed 
market for the power. While several buyers were interested, Newfoundland needed to mn 
transmission lines through Quebec to reach them, something that required the consent of 
the Quebec govemment. 18 Quebec insisted that the power be sold to Hydro-Quebec 
before travelling through its territory. It wanted to use Churchill Falls and James Bay 
power to attract outside industrial development, while its other hydro projects would be 
16 Crabb, "Cheap Power,'' 42-53. 
17 ERCO received power at two and a half mills per kv\fh, roughly half of its cost at the time, for 
a period of 25 years in exchange for agreeing to locate on the A val on Peninsula. From 1968 to 
1971 ERCO received over $10 million in electrical subsidies, and by 1973-7 4 the power 
subsidies for ERCO and the two pulp and paper companies was up to $6.5 million per annum. 
The provincial government also provided a $15 1nil1ion bond issue while the federal government 
providi:::d $2 million for the road between the mill and local community. The federal govemment 
also provided the wharf facilities, and an additional $5 million grant through the Area 
Development Incentives Act. Provincial budget speeches in 1969 and 1970 anticipated that from 
1967 to 1986 seven new industries (including CbC oil refinery and proposed pulp and paper mill, 
the lincrboard mill, saw mill and hockey stick plant in Stephenville, the forest products plant at 
Hawkes Bay and the elemental phosphorus plant at Long Harbour) would benefit from the cheap 
power subsidies and would net the Treasury over $180 million. Newfoundland and Labrador, 
Ne ... foundland and Labrador Budget (St. John 's: Department ofFinance, 1969 and 1970). By 
1980 the Newfoundland finance minister was protesting that subsidies to the tbJee companies 
amounted to $18 million per year and were hwiing Newfoundland's credit rating. He also noted 
that unless ERCO was willing to share costs more reasonably, the Newfoundland government 
would have to introduce legislation requiring subsidized users to increase their share of 
electrici.ty costs. Newfoundland and Labrador, Nevvfoundland and Labrador Budget 1980 (St. 
John's: Department ofFinance, 1930), 15. 
8 
Negotiations did not begin auspiciously as many Quebecers viewed Labrador as a part of 
Quebec. Ovmership of Labrador had long been in conflict, one that appeared settled after the 
Judicial Cornmittr.c of the Privy Councii awarded Labrador to Newfoundland in 1927. In 1971, a 
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used to develop francophone industries within Quebec. With no agreement in sight, in 
1964 Smallwood explored the possibility of running the transmission lines through 
Newfoundland and the Maritimes in order to bypass Quebec; the ultimate costs, however, 
were deemed too expensive. Smalhvood also considered (and rejected) appealing to 
Prime Minister Lester Pearson to declare the project in the national interest. This would 
allow Newfoundland to n.m the lines through Quebec without selling it the power. 
In 1966 Hydro-Quebec and CFLCo signed a letter of intent, outlining the deal 
under which Quebec would purchase Churchill Falls power. This enabled CFLCo to 
arrange interim financing and start laying the groundwork for the largest civilian 
construction project in North America. CFLCo and Hydro-Quebec signed the formal 
power contract in 1969, selling the majority of the power to Hydro-Quebec for 65 years at 
a fixed price. 19 Once Brinco signed the contract guaranteeing 90 per cent of the power to 
Hydro-Quebec, power was no longer available to promote Newfoundland development. 
This was not what Smallwood originally had in mind when he origi..'lally attempted to lure 
in outside developers. Worth an estimated $5 billion, at the time not eve1yone was 
convinced Quebec had received the better end ofthe deal. Hydro-Quebec arra...'1ged to sell 
the power to both Ontario and New York and to reap whatever profits, or losses, from the 
sales. 
Hydro power was to twn Newfoundland from a resource dependent economy to an 
economy based on secondary manufacturing. In this it largely failed. Jacobs Engineering, 
conunissioned to examine factors for new industry location in Newfoundland, recognized 
Quebec Royal Commission decided it \vas futile to reopen the boundary decision. Froschauer, 
White Gold, l i5 . 
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that "with few exceptions, the availability of low cost power is not going to be the single 
controlling point of competition for modern processing industries."20 Hydro's promoters 
anticipated that hydro development would advance industrial diversification through 
forward and backward linkages. Backward linkages were to lead to new investments in 
input supplying facilities (such as the turbines, generators, and manufacturing needed to 
build the plant) whi1e forward linkages were to lead to the increased use of electricity to 
manufacture finished products . 
. 
While Newfoundland tried to create many of the requirements for backward 
linkages with its small-scale secondary manufacturing program in the 1950s, little of the 
heavy construction equipment or other materials required were available \Vithin the 
province. While all Churchiil Falls contracts had a _preference clause wTitten into them 
favouring materials manufactured, distributed or serviced in 1\ ewfotmdland, by the end of 
construction, less than $20 million of the total $946 million in project costs (2 per cent) 
was spent in Newfoundland. Quebec, with its more advanced technological capabilities, 
including the capability to manufacture the generators and tLu·bines, won most of the 
bids.21 
19 National Archives ofCar,ada (NAC), CFLCo Files (MG 28), III, vol. 1, file 7. "PO\ver contract 
Hydro-Quebec and CFLCo," 12 ~'fay 1969. 
20 Jacobs Engineering, "Pre liminal)' Comment on Guideline Factors for New Industry Location in 
Newfoundland," (August 1967); and cover letter Stanley Kurgman, vice-president and General 
Manager, Jacobs Engineering to Marcel Goldenberg, Continental Ore Company, 11 August 1967. 
21 CFLCo purchased aluminum conductors from Alcan 's Stephenville plant totalling $11 million, 
cement from North Star cement totalling $2.5 million, and rebar from the 1\ev,:foundland Steel 
Company totalling $2.3 million. NAC, MG 28, Ill, vol. 1, file 7. CFLCo, "Brinco in 
Newfoundland: A Summa1y," nd. NAC, MG 28, ill, 73, vol. 59, file 7. CFLCo, Minutes of 
Meeting, "Confidential Turbine and Generators,'' 9 June 1967; CFLCo, "Turbine and Generator 
Contract, Press Release Churchill Falls,'.' 30 June 1967; Letter of intent signed by CFLCo 
President Donald McParland, re: "Churchill Falls (Labrador) Power Projec t and Supply of 
Turbines and Generators." 
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Not long after the Churchill Falls constmction project was finished, the 
Newfoundland govern-'-'11ent began to entertain thoughts of developing the Lower 
Churchill River. To control t.1.e negotiation process, in 1974 the Newfow1dland 
government purchased a controlling interest in Brinco.22 Newfoundland was detem1ined 
that an agreement to develop the Lower Churchill would improve upon the conditions of 
the Upper Churchill agreement. The government was beginning to realize that as export 
prices rose, Quebec reaped the rewards.23 New premier Frank Moores also wanted a 
comprehensive approach to developing all the province's resources. He stated "indeed 
we are of the firm opinion that government ownership of Brinco is a necessary and 
fundamental step toward ensuring that this province \Vill continue to be able to attract 
private enterprise in the future."24 
While the provincial government formed the L:.llver Churchill Development 
Corporation in November 1978, the project remained on hold until the mid-1990s. 
Newfoundland was unwilling to sign another agreement wi.th Quebec until the Upper 
Churchill agreement was renegotiated. Negotiations only resumed in the 1990s when the 
continentalization of electricity under free trade forced Canadian provinces tc comply 
with American regulations to export electricity to the U.S. U.S. regulati•)ns mandated 
that utilities had to open their transmission grids to competi.tors at raks set by regulators. 
As most of Hydro-Quebec's portion of the Churchill Falls electricity 'Nas transmitted to 
22 Controversy continued to plague the Upper Churchill Falls co;Jtract. ¥\Then the govermnent 
arLempted to buy power to meet its growing industrial needs, it learned that the Hydro-Quebec 
contract remained paramount, despite its new ownership. Newfoundland was only eligible to 
perchase the electricity produced that was surplus to the Hydro-Quebec commitn1ent. 
23 Quebec's share of the Upper Churchill has amounted to $800 million per annum; 96 per cent of 
profits. "Power Struggle," Canadian Geographic, http://wvvw.cang_eo.ca/ND98/churchill.l]tml. 
At;cessed 20 February 2001. 
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the U.S., this meant that Hydro-Quebec had to allow other provinces to transmit power 
through Quebec. Newfoundland at last could export power through Quebec without first 
selling it to tht:m. In response premiers Lucien Bouchard and Brian Tobin met to 
negotiate an agreement to develop the Lower Churchill. While initially it looked as if 
these negotiatio11s ·vvould prove successful, Quebec withdrew from the project in 2000. 
A Petrochemical Industrial Complex: Come bv Chance 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s Newfoundland promoted itself to industrialists as 
having all the ingredients for industrial expansion: "great natural resources in fish, 
forestry and minerals, including offshore oil and gas potential, ample supplies of low cost 
electricity, magnificent spacious harbours and port facilities, a strategic position in the 
Atlantic basin within easy reach of great world markets, hard working people and 
facilities to train them, and people to help in planning and establishment; [and] a stable 
Govemment ever ready and willing to assist in any way it can, including generous 
inducement prograrnmes."25 One area identified for development was Come by Ch<mce 
on the Avalon Peninsula. Come by Chance's accessibility by rail (the Canadian National 
Railway), by road (the Trans Canada Highway) and by water (deep ice-free harbom) 
made it an ideal location for Smallwood's proposed third pulp and paper mill. Come by 
Chance had been home to several sawmills during the late l91h century and was part of a 
forested tract of land that spread from Bay d'Espoir to Gai'1der which was thought to offer 
some of the timber needed for the pulp and paper mill. 26 
24 Cited in Smith, Brinco, 375. 
25 Advertisement, Newfoundland and Labrador Government, in "Report on the Atlantic 
Provinces," Financial Post, 19 June 1971. 
16 A.K. Dyer, and A.W. Robertson, "Forestry," in Ency clopedia ofNewfoundland and Labrador, 
vol. Two (St. Johr1's: J .R. Smallwood Heritage Foundation, 1984), 303 . 
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From 1950 on, Smallwood viewed the construction of a third pulp and paper min 
as the crown jewel in his development pla..11s. Pulp and paper had long maintained a 
special status in Newfoundland's development policies. After earlier development 
programs failed, Smallwood wrote that his determination to build a third mill only 
increased.27 In 1959 Smallwood proposed that American fim1 Crown Zellerback build a 
pulp and paper mill in Come by Chance, a proposal that failed to materialize. ThroughoLit 
the 1960s Come by Chance's strategic location and natural harbour led the government to 
promote the site as viable for a pulp and paper mi11.28 The deep water harbour was a plus 
as it would allow for transportation of products to markets in the American Eastern 
Seaboard. In 1961 Smallwood began negotiations with a second U.S. company, Shaheen 
Natural Resources, to build a pulp and paper mill in the area. In 1962 Newfoundland Pulp 
and Chemical Company, a subsidiary of Shaheen Natural Resources (Sl'.ffi.), aw.J.ounced it 
was spending $52 million to build a pulp and paper mill, a project that also failed to 
materialize. 
A 1965 consultants' report suggested that Come by Chance was a good location 
for Newfoundland's third mill. It argued that: 
experience throughout Canada has shown that industries tlli"ive best in 
relatively large urban centres where agglomeration economies occur. Such 
urban centres form concentrations of available labour from which industries 
can draw their workers, and, when urban centres contain a number of 
different industries, they offer reasonable economic security in that the 
workers of an enterprise which is failing have an opportunity to find 
alternative employment in a local enterprise which is expanding.29 
27 Joseph Smallwood, I Chose Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1973), 438. 
28 See, for instance, the report by Sandweil and Company, Come-By-Chance Newsprint },;Jill 
Technical and Economic Stud).', 1968, 1-8. 
29 Project Planning Associate~ Ltd., "Come-By-Chance Area Development Study, Preliminary 
Report," December 1965, 5. On deposit in CNS. 
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The consultants' report fit in with the government proposal to build strategic growth 
centres around Ne~foundland and Labrador.30 In response, the govenunent purchased 
3000 acres of land around Come by Chance in 1965 and announced that United Paper 
Mills of Finland would be operating the pulp and paper mill. After the Finnish deal was 
cancelled in 1966, Shaheen Natural Resources announced it would build the paper rnill.31 
The Newfoundland government agreed to give John Shaheen financial support to 
build the mill in 1966. Shaheen was an American industriaiist whose company, Shaheen 
Industries, had built the Golden Eagle oil refinery in Holyrood. Alongside the mill 
Shaheen suggested building a petrochemical complex, including a 100,000 barrel per/day 
oil refinery and an ammonia plant. The timing behind the Shaheen proposal \vas 
impeccable as with the closure of the Han·non Air Force base in Stephenville, the 
announced closure of the Bell Island mine, and the end of construction projects at Bay 
d'Espoir, Churchill Falls and Long Harbour, Smallwood was desperate to create new 
jobs.32 
30 By 1968 the region around Come by Chance had already succeeded in attracting a phosphorous 
plant to Long Harbour in addition to the proposed mill. Another growth centre, Stephenville 
attracted a magnesium hydroxide plant (1968), a linerboard mill ( 1972), a brewery ( 1968), 
fishmeal plant (1969), and a dairy ( 1968) by providing buildings, formerly part of the U.S. Air 
Force base at Harmon Field, at nominal rents. Industries locati.ng in both Stephenville and Come 
by Chance were given provincial tax exemptions, reduced electricity rates, and guaranteed bo::1d 
issues. In addition, the provincial government floated loans to help raise operating costs for 
industrialists in both areas. Wells, "Regional Econorrjc Impact ofTwo Grm.vth Centres," 3. 
31 Anhydrous am.monia was the basic nitrogen ingredient of most chemical fertilizers. Lawrence 
Felt and Roger Carter, "The Impa•::t of the Provincial Refining Company (PRC) Oil Refinery at 
Come-By-Chance, Newfoundland Upon its Environment: A Social and Economic Assessment," 
unpublished report, October 1980, 17. Feit and Carter were hired as consultants to Petro-Canada 
as part of the decision whether or not to reactivate the refinery in the earlv 1980s. 
32 Michelle McBride, Gregory Kealey, a~1d Sean Cadiga;1, "Jobs at any C~st," in R. Ommer, The 
Resilient Outport (St. John's: ISER, 2002). 
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Representatives from the government met with the upper echelon of Shaheen 
Resources to discuss building a petrochemical complex. The government's first priority 
was to ensure employment opportunities for Newfoundlanders. To provide a iarge 
number of jobs meant developing not just the core petrochemical plant but also satellite 
plants that would use manufactured chemicals or raw n;aterials to produce cor1sumer 
goods. 33 Both the government and S:!,.,TR recognized that satellite plants \vould only 
develop if the core industry were large enough to supply the intem1ecliate products \vith 
enough of a volume to make it profitable to locate in that area. A 1967 Boni, Watkins, 
Jason and Co. report found that "the building of a new petrochemical complex is almost 
invariably followed by the contiguous construction of similar type process lmits. The 
concentration of process units enables the initial effort to yield greater value, making the 
most of the duplication of efforts it entails."34 lf the refinety, as the core industry, 
provided a large enough volume of feedstock, it could provide an attractive incentive f.Jr 
satellite plants to locate nearby. 
The consultants' reported "the basic concept is to consider Come by Chance and 
its surrounding area as an industrial park utilizing the refinery as the principal raw 
material supplier."35 For instance, phosphorus from the proposed elemental phosphorus 
plant could then be turned into phosphoric acid, used in fertilizers and detergents. 
33 Labour force requirements for the satellite plants were estimated at 1300 permanent jobs, while 
the paper mill and timber cutting would need 1200 and the refinery 600. An additional5000 
workers were projected for any consumer goods processing plants, which 'vvere thought likely to 
develop after the satellite plants. Constructing the petrochemical complex required an aggregate 
of 10-13 million person hours. Boni, Watkins, Jason and Co., Labor Force Requirement: 
Petrochemical and Industrial Complex, Come by Chance, Newfoun.dland. 8 January 1968, 18-21. 
On deposit in CNS. 
34 Boni, Watkins, Jason and Co., Labor Force Requirement, 18. 
35 Boni, \Vatkins, Jason and Co., Labor Force Requirement, l. 
....... 
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Fertilizers and natural gas (from the refinery) could then be used to partially support an 
ammonia plant. The oil refinery would also provide the raw resources (ethane, propane or 
naphtha) for the ethylene and polyethylene facility. 
The initial plan for the construction called for the government to establish a series 
of crovm corporations to build the refinery (Newfoundiand Refining Co.), the pulp and 
paper mill (Newfoundland Pulp and CheiDical Co.), and the ammonia plant 
(Newfoundland Ammonia and Refining Co.). Shaheen and Smallwood hoped that 
satellite industries, service and maintenance companies, would move in once the 
petrochemical park was constructed. Newfoundland Refining Company vice-president 
Otto Lessing reported that once operational, the refinery (at 35 million banels per yea.r) 
and pulp and paper mill (at 200,000 tons newsprint production) \Vould increase the value 
of the output of Newfoundland's resources by 25 per cent or $125 million.36 Another 
benefit to the petrochemical complex was that the industry in the late 1960s was 
continually growing. Petroleum products accounted for over 60 per cent of the value of all 
chemical products in the U.S. in 1967. One drawback was its high costs. The Boni, 
Watkins and Jason report claimed the initial investment was among the highest of any 
industry in the world. Each new job created in the production phase was estimated to 
require between $50,000 and $100,000.37 
Smallwood loved the idea of a starting a petrochemical industry with high spin-off 
potential, particularly after the proposed pulp and paper mill was put on the back burner. 
36 Mineral production was valued at $400 million, forestry at $60 million, and fishing at $40 
million. Otto Lessing, "The Effect ofNewfoundland Refining Company' s Come by Chance 
Development on the Canadian Petroleum Industry," Speech to the Conference of Propane Gas 
Association of Canada, Calgary. 17 April 1969, 1-2. On deposit in CNS. 
37 Boni, Watkins, Jason and Co., Labor Force Requirement, 2-3 . 
80 
After completing some of the mill buildings, the paper mill was largely abandoned, due in 
part to insecure wood supplies and government reluctance to subsidize road construction. 
The ammonia mill was also largely abandoned in 1969, but as late as 1973 bolh projects 
were still being discussed. 38 Smallwood was impressed by Shaheen, including his 
vvartime service in the Office of Strategic Services and his friendship with prominent 
American politicians. He later wrote: "bringing John Shaheen and his team of fine men to 
Newfoundland was one of my proudest triumphs."39 Shaheen was equally impressed with 
Smallwood and Newfoundland. He described Newfoundland: 
under Premier Smallwood's dyna..rnic leadership, [as having] instituted many 
programs of betterment, including greatly improved educational facilities, a 
network of new roads and strong governmental suppmi of the development 
of the natural resources of the province and the encouragement of industiy 
As a consequence, ... many f01mer Newfmmdlanders who had migrated are 
returning to fill the job opportunities opened by the rapidly increasing 
industrialization ofNewfoundland.40 
The SNR report also praised "the enormous strides made m the educational system 
[which] ensures a good supply of intelligent and eff1cient workers." The report continued: 
"a new trade and tecr.u"'l.ical college is available close by and ... will provide a trained work 
force to meet the growing industri.al needs of the province. In fact, the government has 
agreed to provide free training schools for any new industry." SNR described the various 
38 S.S. Peters, "Memo to the Honourable Aidan Maloney re: Meeting held February 21, 1968, to 
discuss the Sandwell Report and other Industrial proposals at Come by Chance and 
Stephenville." 27 February 1968; and Anon., "Draft Memo to JMS." 8 March 1968 (both on 
deposit in CNS). In July 1971 the House of Assembly gave the Newfoundland Pulp and 
Chemical Co. a year's grace for completing the paper mill. "Newfoundland News Highlights," 
Newfoundland Quarterly, 24 July 1971, LXVIII, 1 (Spring 1971 ). In August 1971 Small wood 
announced that Shaheen would build two pulp and paper mills at Come by Chance, each ';<,ith a 
daily capacity of 2000 tons. "Newfoundland News Highlights," Newfoundland Quarterly, 
LXVID, 2 (Summer 1971). 
39 Smallwood, l Chose Canada. 
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provincial government depmtments as "at all times ready to assist in every way possible 
to further projects leading to an improvement in the economy."41 
The province delegated responsibility for supervising construction and managing · 
the refinery to the Newfoundland Refining Company (NRC). Headed up by Shaheen, 
NRC \Vas a subsidiary of Shaheen Natural Resources Co., based in Il!inois. S:t'-~R was a 
leveraged holding company with holdings in 36 separate companies.42 Site preparation t~Jr 
the refinery began in 1968. Construction of the oil tanks, capable of holding seven million 
barrels of crude, was started in spring 1969. Work on the construction camp began early 
in 1969, with the hopes that some of the housing planned for operating staff would be 
ready for management personnel during construction. By October 1971 nine tanks were 
under construction, as were the pipes, whjch would carry oil to the tanks.43 
To help get the project off the ground, the prov:ncial govemment promised the 
refinery power at a rate of two and one half mills, a rate half the production costs. It also 
40 Shaheen Natural Resources Company, Inc., "Newfoundland," cited in Harvard University, 
"Manufacturing Policy," 14. 
41 Shaheen Natural Resources Company, Inc., "Newfoundland," 15. 
42 Shaheen later sold the company, including the Holyrood refinery, to Ultramar. He also 
controlled the Macmillan Ring-Free Oil Co., a refiner and marketer of gas, jet fuel, asphalt, and 
lubricaiing oils in Canada and the United States. Macmillan owned two refineries in the United 
States, one on the West Coast, the other in Eldorado, Arkansas. SN"R also 0\Vned radio and 
television stations in Honolulu, Syracuse, and New Orleans; Can-Amera Export Refining Co., a 
development company with oil reserves in the Athabasca tar sands of northern Alberta and 
offshore oil rights off Newfoundland; the Max Waller Co., a Baltimore heating oil marketer; and 
the Canadian-Caribbean Oil Co., a holding company with stock, real estate and mortgages which 
operated as the chiefbon-owing agent for S1\j"R. Shaheen was in the news in 1965 when Octane 
Oil, an SNR subsidiary, unsuccessfuily attempted to purchase part of J. Paul Getty's company, 
Tidewater Oil. See "Shaheen: a m;m of action and thrust," The Daily New~', 10 October 1973 and 
Harvard University, Graduate School of Business Administration, Final Examination, 
"Manufacturing Policy," 4 January 1968. 
43 Otto Lessing (VP Newfoundland Refining Company), "The Effect of Newfoundland Refining 
Company's Come by Chance Development on the Canadian Petroleum Industry,'' Speech to the 
Confen::nce of Propane Gas Association of Canada, Calga1y, Alberta. 17 1-\pril 1969, 3 and 
"Construction right on schedule at Come by Chance refinery," ET, 21 October 1971, 3. 
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provided a $5 million loan to Shaheen, leading to the resignations of John Crosbie and 
Clyde Wells from cabinet.44 Further controversy erupted over the provincial 
government's use of crown corporation status. To help fund the project and provide it 
with federal tax exempt status, the Newfoundland government formed a crown 
corporation through which it provided a 15-year loan of $30 million. Once SN"R repaid 
the loans the government gave it the option of purchasing the refinery for $1,000 (later 
increased to $10 million after protests empted).45 In February 1970 the Federal Public 
Works Minister Arthur Laing added to worries when he stated that the federal 
government would like to see SNR invest a greater percentage of the capital necessary for 
the refinery before the federal government would pay for the docking facilities.46 
After several years of wrangling, the federal Department of Public Works paid to 
build the $20 million wharf. The Newfoundland government was to repay the federal 
govemment by levying user charges. In July 1971 provincial opposition members gave 
the Come by Chance financing legislation a rough ride when they realized that the 
44 John Crosbie, No Holds Barred (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1997); Michael Harris, 
Rare Ambition: the Crosbies of Newfoundland (Toronto: Penguin, 1993); and Claire Hoy, Clyde 
Wells: a Political Biography (Toronto: Stoddart, 1992). 
45 After Canadian oil companies protested the Newfoundland government's usc of crown 
corporation status, the federal government changed the legislation over cro"vn corporation status 
to forbid its usage when a private company holds the purchase option from the start. '1-,Jotes and 
Comments on Come by Chance," Broadcast over CBC Radio, Febmary 1976, reprinted in 
Nev~foundland Quarter~v, LXXII, 3 (1976), 3, Harold Horwood, Joey (Toronto: Stoddart, 1989), 
273 and Smallwood, I Chose Canada, 477. 
46 SNR also took advantage of the federal Area Development Incentives Act that provided grants 
to manufacturing and processing firms installing new facilities in designated areas across 
Canada, including large portions of Newfoundland. Under the Area Development Incentives Act, 
SNR could receive a cash deveiopment grant and tax deferrals in the initial years by way of 
accelerated depreciation rates on new machinery, equipment and buildings. The Development 
Grant would provide 33 per cent of the first $250,000 worth of new machinery, equipment and 
buildings, 25 per cent of the next $750,000 of such costs, and 20 per cent of any additional costs 
for machinery, equipment and buildings, up to a total or· $5 million. Government of Canada, Area 
Development Incentives Act. PC 1965-1395 (Ottawa 1965). 
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financing agreement with the British banks necessitated materials and food used in the 
construction phase be purchased from England and shipped to the site. Hence, Procon of 
Great Britain was given the $155 million contract to build the refinery in August 1970.47 
Further problems arose in February 1972 when Federal Fisheries and Environment 
Minister Jack Davies rang almm bells by stating that the plans submitted by Come by 
Chance developers did not contain sufficient safeguards against pollution. Environmental 
protection was a particularly sensitive question in the area. h1 February 1969 thousands of 
dead fish washed ashore on t.~e beaches of Arnold's Cove after a spill at the nearby 
ERCO phosphorous plant in Long Harbour.48 
The petrochemical complex marked one of the first attempts to develop an 
industry in Newfoundland that was not dependent on local resources (crude oil was 
shipped in from Venezu~la and the Persian Gulf). In the end only the refinery was built 
and it went on to have a troubled operational history, including labour problems and 
shutdowns. Upon completion of the refinery, the newly elected Frank :Moores goveroJnent 
offered Shaheen a second refinery deal, with an additional 200,000 barrel capacity.49 
With the new agreement Shaheen assumed responsibility for the government guarantees 
on the first refinety. When the refinerj declared bankruptcy in 1976, this proved to be a 
blessing. 50 
47 
"Newfoundland News Highlights," Newfoundland Quarterly, 2 February 1970, LXVII, 4, 
(Spring 1970) and "Newfoundland News Highlights," 21 July 1971, Newfoundland Quarterly, 
LXVill, 1 (Spring 1971). 
48 
"Newfoundland News Highlights," 12 February 1969, Newfoundland Quarterly, LXVII, 1 
(Spring 1969). 
49 The October 1971 election saw the defeat of the Smallwood government after over 20 years in 
power. Interview with the premier, The. Daily News, 10 October 1973. 
50 By February 1976 the refinery was in severe financial straits, with the company on the verge of 
ban..lcruptcy. The bankruptcy was caused by a series of factors: the massive fluctuations in crude 
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After the shutdown, Petro-Canada purchased the mothballed refinery and 
maintained it until its sale in 1986 to Newfoundland Processing Ltd. (NPL) for $1 and a 
limited competition clause. NPL immediately began to prepare the refinery for 
reopening, with help from the provincial government who agreed to pay for the pollution 
clean-up of two on-site areas. Problems continued to plague the refinery; during NPL's 
refit the contractor refused to recognize the union's successor rights, leading to protests 
outside the refinery. 51 While the refinery was operational once again in September 1987, 
a fire and explosion in the first month caused the refinery to shut temporarily. Another 
explosion and fire in April 1994 led to the refinery being shut for three months. In August 
1994, NPL sold the refinery to Vitol Holding BV subsidiary Vitol Refining S.A. With the 
purchase, the refinery was renamed North Atlantic Refining Ltd. (NARL). Under Vitol 
the refinery was overhauled and reopened in November 1994. Despite subsequent labour, 
environmental and safety problems and yet another change in ownership, the refinery 
remains operational. 
oil prices brought on by the .Arab-Israeli war and its after-effects; the imposition of U.S. 
government import restrictions on all non-U.S. refiners; the cancellation of U.S. airline contracts; 
the British Petroleum contracts which had the refinery purchasing cmde oil for $1 more per 
barrel than they could sell the refined product; technical problems which prevcti.ted the refinery 
from producing higher end products, and repeated labour relations problems. Gardiner-Pinfold 
Consulting Economists, Comparison of Major Construction Projects and Ojfshore Hydrocarbon 
J?evelapments in Atlantic Canada (Calgary: Infopall, 1985), 60. 
)J Problems arose almost immediately as the main contract for repairs to the refinery was 
awarded to Marco Ltd, a non-union company, which refused to honour collective agreements 
negotiated by previous owners. Union trades workers responded by blocking the entrance to the 
refinery on 13 January 1987 and demanding unionized workers be hired. Over 1000 construction 
and building trades workers held a one-day protest across the province in a show of support. The 
IBEW and the OCWU claimed they maintained successor rights with each sale since the closing 
in 1976. The issue went before the Labour Relations Board who agreed that the union agreement 
with Petro-Canada was binding on Newfoundland Processing; however, it only covered 
maintenance workers. An employee vote was ordered with certification rights granted in 1991. 
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The refinery's failure did little to douse the provincial government's enthusiasm 
for large-scale projects. While the 1986 Royal Commission on Employment and 
Unemployment stated mega-projects alone would not solve the province's economic 
woes, the government continued to look to mega-projects as the engine of economic 
development.52 In the 1980s and 1990s it was offshore oil and nickel mining. Much like 
earlier mega-projects, offshore oil was viewed as "having the potential to cure un- and 
underemployment, to stem out-migration, to bail out cash-strapped governments, and to 
provide new business opportunities fi)r local people."53 
Creating an Offshore Oil Industry 
Petroleum became an important energy source after the discovery of vast new supplies in 
the early 20th century. By the early 1920s petroleum was the fuel of choice for much of 
the North American economy. 54 While many consider the oil industry in Newfoundland a 
recent phenomenon, it dates back to the late 19th century. John Silver undertook initial oil 
exploration on the west coast of Newfoundiand, in the Parson's Pond area (near Gros 
Mome).55 Three other men held claims in the area over the next 20 years but little was 
developed until 1894 when the Newfoundland Oil Company, composed of a group of St. 
52 The Royal Commission recommended a more integrated approach to social and economic 
development, combining a modified 'small is beautiful' approach with the more traditional mega-
projects approach. See J.D. House, Against the Tide: Battling for Economic Renewal in 
Newfoundland and Labrador (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1999), 6. 
53 House, The Challenge ofOil: Ne-y,foundland's Quest for Controlled Development (St. John's: 
ISER, 1985), 1. 
54 Joseph Pratt, "The Ascent of Oil: the Transition from Coal to Oil in Early Twentieth Century 
America," in Lewis Perelam, Gus Giebelhaus, and Michael Yokell, eds., Energy Transitions: 
Long-Term Perspectives (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1980) and Pratt, "Letting the 
Grandchildren do it: Environmental Planning during the Ascent of Oil as a Major Energy 
Source," The Public Historian, 2, 4 (Summer 1980), 28-61. 
55 Brian Bursey, "Petroleum Exploration and Development," in J. Smallwood, ed., Encyclopaedia 
ofNewfowzdland and Labrador (St. John's: Harry Cuff, 1993), 267-272. 
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John's merchants, staked claim to the area. One developer after another attempted to 
develop the stake but each was plagued with problems.56 From 1919 to 1926 an English 
company, General Oil Fields Ltd. operated the site, including an on-site refinery. This 
refinery supplied residents along the west coast with kerosene and gasoline. 
Unfortunately, low quantities caused them to abandon production. Since 1926 
entrepreneurs have searched the West Coast for oil, including in the 1960s and the 1990s, 
so far with limited results. In the 1930s the search for oil turned to the offshore. 
Since the late 1930s, various U.S. government departments and multinational 
corporations have dominated the development of Canada's offshore resources. American 
interest in mineral resources off Eastern Canada dates back to 1878 when the U.S. 
Fisheries Commission asked fishermen from Gloucester, Maine to bring back rock 
samples picked up during trawls off the east coast. From 1878 to 1936 the 'fishing stage' 
of research was quite successful and geologists concluded that the Eastern Canadian 
continental shelf was a submerged extension of the American Atlantic coastal plain. 
When the U.S.-based Woods Hole Oceanographic Institute determined in 1936 that the 
Eastern Canadian continental shelf contained oil-bearing sediments, the U.S. government 
became increasingly interested in Canadian waters.57 From 1948 to 1961 the American 
Lamont Geological Observatory conducted sedimentary surveys across the Georges 
Banks, the Scotian Shelf, the Laurentian channel, and the Grand Banks. These surveys 
56 Wendy Martin, Once Upon a Mine: the Story of Pre-Confederation Mines on the Island of 
Nevvfoundland (Montreal: Canadian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, 1983), 42-43. Local 
legend has it that Parson's Pond got its name from a local known for using lhe oil that seeped out 
of the rocks to ease his rheumatism. These stories attracted the first drillin2: in the area. 
57 Robert Nishman, "Through the Portlights of the Ocean Ranger: Federal~m, Energy, and the 
American Development of the Canadian Eastern Offshore, 1955-1985," MA thesis, Queen's 
University, 1991, 76. 
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confirn1ed that the sediments were similar in composition to those found in the oil rich 
Gulf of Mexico. Throughout the 1960s the U.S. Geological Survey, the Woods Hole 
Oceanographic fustitute, the University of Massachusetts, the U.S. Naval Oceanographic 
Office, and the U.S. Joint Oceanic Institutions for Deep Earth Sampling (JOIDES) 
explored the Grand Banks, the Scotian Shelf, and the Laurentian channel.58 The JOIDES 
program began drilling on Orphan Knoll (roughly 320 miles northeast ofNewfoundland) 
in 1970 and was the first to demonstrate the feasibility of drilling off Newfoundland. 
Data from U.S. governmental agencies provided both geological and technical knowledge 
that U.S. multinationals, with their large capital bases, were quick to exploit. 
Corporate offshore oil exploration began in Eastern Canada in 1942 when :r-.1obil 
Oil began drilling in the Maritime Basin off Prince Edward Island. Soon aftenvard, 
Mobil abandoned tlus site to explore the Scotian Shelf. Mobil was the mai..'1 company 
. 
involved in East Coast exploration during the 1940s and 1950s. Development of the 
eastern offshore remained slow until the early 1960s when Shell's request to the federal 
government to lease 20 million acres around the Scotian Shelf prompted an exploration 
flurry. By the end of the 1960s much of the Scotian Shelf, Grand Banks, and Georges 
Bank were under lease, largely to U.S. multinationals. 59 
58 D.F. Sherwin, "Scotian Shelf and the Grand Banks," in R.G. McCrossan, ed., Future 
Petroleum Provinces of Canada (Calgary: Canadian Society of Petroleum Geologists, 1973 ), 
521-22. 
59 Within a few years of the initial discovery of petroleum reserves in Albe1ta (1947) 1:he oii 
industry was largely foreign-controlled, predominantly by American companies. In 1980, 70 per 
cent of Canadian oil production was carried out by foreign companies (49 per cent American, 21 
per cent other foreign) including Mobil Oil, Imperial Oil (a subsidiary of Exxon), Texaco, Shell, 
and Gulf. These oil companies were the key landholders, explorers, producers, marketers, and 
o\\<ners and operators ofboth refineries ·and pipelines across Canada. Multinationals were able to 
maintain their dominance over the energy industry because they controlled much of the 
technology and research and development; they already controlled the market (an oligopoly); and 
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Disputing the federal government's jurisdiction, the Newfoundland government 
began issuing its own permits for offshore exploration in June 1963. In February 1965 
Newfoundland granted a 30 million-acre concession to Octane Oil. This large land grant 
heightened the federal-provincial jurisdictional dispute as the provincial permit to Octane 
overlapped federally claimed areas. The federal government also worried that one of the 
permits would raise jurisdictional problems with France as it was in an area potentially 
under the jurisdiction of St. Pierre and Miquelon. From 1964 to 1972 pe1mits were issued 
by both governments at such a rapid rate that by 1972 leases covered the continental 
margin as far as 425 miles off Newfoundland's eastern coast.60 Before the issue was 
settled, BC and Newfoundland both ended up in court fighting the federal government, 
supported by Quebec, Manitoba, and Nova Scotia.61 
Canada was quite slow to recognize its offshore hydrocarbon potential. Only in 
1955 did the Dominion Observatory and Nova Scotia Research Foundation undertake a 
geological study of Sable Island and not until 1958 did the Geological Survey of Canada 
begin investigating Eastern Canada's continental shelf. Pressure:d by U.S. multinationals, 
in 1969 the Canadian goverr.:111ent began its own studies on the Scotian Shelf, Grand 
because of the huge financial barriers to entering the industry. Wallace Clement, "Debates and 
Directions," in Clement and Glen Williams, eds., The New Political Economy (Montreal: 
MeGill-Queen's Press, 1989), 47 and Jorge Niosi, Canadian Multinationals (Toronto: Between 
the Lines, 1985), 35-42. 
60 In April 1965 the Newfoundland government passed the Petroleum and Natural Gas Act which 
gave the Lieutenant-Governor the power to prohibit any drilling offshore Newfoundland without 
a provincial permit, license or lease. For oil companies this necessitated obtaining both federal 
and provincial leases. Nishman, "Through the Portlights of the Ocean Ranger," 157-8. 
6! 
The federal govemment referred the BC case to the Supreme Court of Canada. The federal 
government was worried that the provinces were attempting to carve up Canada to suit their ovvn 
interests. They also worried about the border implications provincial ownership of the offshore 
might create, including rewriting provincial boundaries, boundaries with the US, and native 
claims. 
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Banks, and Labrador Shelf. In the early stages of offshore oil exploration, federal policy 
development and regulatory powers were fragmented, with the federal Department of 
Northern Affairs and Natural Resources responsible for much of the duties. Northern 
Affairs, however, appeared more concerned with asserting federal claims over the 
offshore and in hastening development than in regulating the offshore. In addition to 
Northern Affairs and Natural Resources, the Department of Mines, Energy and Resources 
(MER), the Department of National Defence (DND), the Canadian Coast Guard, the 
Department of Transport, and the Department of Fisheries all had some say. In 1966 the 
federal government attempted to rationalize energy policy into one department, Mines, 
Energy and Resources. 
Until the early 1960s all regulatory initiatives originated with requests from 
industry. In 1960 the federal government set up the Canada Oil and Gas Regulations, 
establishing an administrative struchrre for the offshore. The early 1960s were pivotal as 
they marked the beginnings of Canada's offshore regulations, tmder Prime Minister 
Diefenbaker's National Oil Policy. As the Canadian government's strategy was to 
encourage rapid growth of the offshore, it attempted to make investment in the offshore 
as attractive as possible. The government felt the industry might languish without these 
incentives, given the inhospitable climate, the oil glut on the world market, and the 
federal government's inadequate geological knowledge of the offshore resources. The 
Canadian offshore pennit system differed greatly from its ..A.Jllerican counterpart. In the 
United Statt:s oil companies n,.'l.derwent a sealed competitive bidding process to lease 
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relatively small portions of lands (on average 25 square kilometres). In Canada, permits 
were granted on a non-competitive basis with few requirements for Canadian content.62 
Throughout the 1970s provincial and federal goals became increasingly divergent. 
Newfoundland wanted a slower pace of development than either Ottawa or the industry to 
allow Newfoundland companies an opportunity to ready for job opportunities. The 1973-
197 4 international oil crisis marked a turning point for federal and provincial government 
involvement in the offshore. As oil prices skyrocketed, the federal government became 
increasingly interested in ensuring Canadian energy self-sufficiency. With the energy 
crisis of 1973-197 4 and the subsequent push for energy self-sufficiency, the federal 
government began the push to "Canadianize" the industry through price freezes, financial 
incentives, the constmction of a pipeline, and the creation of Petro-Canada.63 The 1973-4 
oil crisis also encouraged the Newfoundland Department of Mines and Energy to 
undertake an economic analysis of the potential profitability from offshore oil, the results 
of which encouraged development of an offshore oil industry. 
In 1977 Newfoundland established a more comprehensive provinciai regulatory 
regime, the Newfoundland-Labrador Petroleum Regulations (NLPD) under An Act 
62 To get around the Canadian participation clause in the new regulations, which included 
restricting leasing to Canadian-owned firms or foreign-owned firms in which Canadians were 
given the opportunity to invest, US multinationals established Canadian sub.sidiaties. Canadian 
leases for much larger parcels ofland, averaging 2000 square kilometres, were significantly 
cheaper (in Canada companies paid $0.20 per acre per annum while in Norway companies paid 
$9 per acre), and were for much longer initial periods, 21 years up to the mid-1970s (when it was 
reduced to 5 years). 
63 Petro-Canada owed its existence to Ottawa's frustration that frontier resources were not 
developing fast enough, to the OPEC crisis (1973-1974), and to the realization that US 
multinationals were dominating the industry. Economic Council of Canada, Petro-Canada: Its 
Role, Control and Operations (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1988), 1-4 and John 
Fossum, Oil, the State, and Federalism: the Rise and Demise ofPetro-Canada as a Statist 
Impulse (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 152. 
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Respecting Petroleum Regulations, when it became clear that political negotiation would 
not solve the jurisdictional dispute over offshore resources. Economic motivations and 
the desire to give Newfoundland the majority of benefits from offshore oil production 
fueled the 1977 regulations. The Newfoundla'ld Act was predominantly concerned with 
funding and leasing issues with the tmderlying purpose to assert the provincial claim over 
the offshore.64 Newfoundland's regulatory regime was patterned on the North Sea model, 
which was a clear rejection of proposed federal regulations that favoured an American 
system of regulations (following the example set in Alberta). Neither Ottawa nor industry 
was pleased with Newfoundland's regulations; Ottawa wanted a more rapid extraction 
system to help it meet its federal supply objectives.65 
The Newfoundland regulations stalled activity off the province's coastline. 
Companies already uncertain over jurisdictional disputes were increasingly unhappy with 
the new regulations and the power they allotted the province. Two projects were 
suspended, Eastcan's exploration off Labrador and the Shell-Petro-Canada Scotian Shelf 
exploration. When drilling resumed in 1978 it was under increasing federal 
subsidization. In the 1978 budget Ottawa announced its super-depletion policy that 
granted corporate tax incentives, including the ability to write-off up to two-thirds of 
offshore exploration costs in their federal taxes.66 The federal government also began to 
allow farm-ins, wherein a lease-holder could lease their lands to another company. The 
other company would assume the drilling costs for a percentage in future returns. The 
64 Nishman, "Through the Portlights of the Ocean Ranger," 162. 
65 Fossum, Oil, the State, and Federalism, 174. 
66 Fossum, Oil, the State, and Federalism, 98-99. 
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Canadian government promoted these measures in an attempt to have offshore resources 
developed as quickly as possible. 
From 1978 to 1982 the Eastern Canadian offshore was influenced by federal 
government efforts (U.S. and Canada) to promote the development of continental shelf 
resources. The U.S. developed a continental energy policy to ensure that an adequate 
energy supply was available to fight the Cold War. During the 1979-80 international oil 
market upheaval, the Canadian government again intervened in the oil industry, 
regulating prices, introducing the National Energy Program, and attempting to decrease 
the influence of both the provincial governments and multinational corporations.67 The 
1979-1980 crisis was precipitated by the Iranian Revolution (1978-1979) and the 
subsequent Iran-Iraq war which hastened the breakdown of the oil industry's vertical 
integration structure, and caused the relationship between oil-exploiting states, 
multinationals, and oil-importing states to change dramatically. In effect, the role of 
multinationals was reduced as several oil-exporting states began to deal directly with (or 
to choose not to deal with) oil-importing states. Oil supplies were reduced drastically, 
67 The National Energy Program (NEP) was introduced in 1980. Trudeau opposed efforts to 
consolidate North America's energy reserves into a continental pool, and wanted to assert federal 
control over energy resources. The NEP represented a challenge to both provincial governments 
and multinational oil companies as it revoked established industry rights and encroached on areas 
under provincial jurisdiction. It aimed to achieve self-sufficiency in oil production and 50 per 
cent Canadian ownership levels in offshore resources by 1990. It included a Petroleum Incentive 
Program which gave incentives to Canadian-controlled firms in lieu of the old depletion 
allowances, and a "back-in" clause which would allow the Crown to take a 25 per cent stake in 
oil and gas discoveries on Crown lands without compensating the corporations involved. 
Ironically, Petro-Canada's push to open frontier access allowed joint-partnerships with the 
multinationals whose power the federal government was attempting to mitigate. The NEP faced 
problems in 1981 after the price of oil failed to rise as anticipated and the government was forced 
to lower some of the tax and price regulations. A combination of intergovernmental competition, 
the power of the oil multinationals, and the 1984 election victory of Brian Mulroney resulted in 
the dismantling of the NEP. Petro-Canada was later privatized. See Fossum, Oil, the State, and 
Federalism and Economic Council of Canada, Petro-Canada, 19-21. 
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causing prices to spiral upwards. In Canada and the U.S. this sparked an increased 
demand for state-sponsored searches for oil. The 1979 Hibernia discovery intensified 
American interest in Newfoundland's offshore, but it simultaneously increased concerns 
in the Trudeau government over U.S. domination. 
American corporate expertise, capital, technology, geological knowledge and a 
weak regulatory regime (both federal and provincial) allowed the multinationals to set the 
development pace. Both the federal and provincial govemments were forced to scramble 
to set up regulatory systems in response to American pressure to open the offshore. These 
issues combined to create a weak offshore regulatory regime that resulted in tragedy. 
After the Hibernia discovery in 1979 a consortium of American multinationals (Gulf, 
Chevron, Columbia Oil and Gas, and Mobil) initiated an extensive drilling program to 
delineate the size of the reservoir. Three drilling platforms were in the area, including the 
Ocean Ranger. Launched in 1976, the Ocean Ranger was the largest self-propelled 
mobile offshore drilling unit in the world. On 14-15 February 1982 during a winter storm, 
the Ocean Ranger sunk, with all 84 crew on board lost. Inquiries into the tragedy 
determined that despite being in Canadian waters, few safety regulations were in place 
and even fewer were monitored. The platforn1 was not under certification in Canada (it 
was certified by the U.S. Coast Guard), nor did the Canadian or Newfoundland 
governments attempt to inspect it.68 
Newfoundland was desperate to develop its offshore as it looked to the offshore as 
the mega-project to help it escape its "have-not" status. A 1980 federal government report 
68 For more on the tragedy see Sue Hart, "Safety and Industrial Relations in the Newfoundland 
Offshore Oil Industry Since the Ocean Ranger Disaster in 1982," ]\lew Solutions: A Journal of 
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described the discovery and development of oil and gas off Newfoundland's shore as 
carrying with it the possibility of tu..ming Newfoundland into a "have" province. Despite 
these hopes, the first major project (Hibernia) did not get underway for another decade 
due to jurisdictional wrangling and falling oil prices. 
In July 1988 Brian Mulroney, Brian Peckford, and members of the Hibemia 
consmtium signed a statement of principles to proceed with the development of the 
Hibernia project. Announcing the deal, Peckford stated: 
to the life of every generation there comes a turning point - that before ru.1d 
after- that everyone marks as a great watershed. For our ancestors, those 
great turning points would have been the gaining of representative 
government in 1832 and responsible government in 1855. For our parents 
those great turning points would have been the two great wars and 
Confederation ... I believe that in normal times the signing of the Atlantic 
Accord on Febmary 11111, 1985, would have been for tllis generation a great 
before and after point. 69 
Peckford described the other governments in the western world as standing transfixed by 
the benefits of cheap oil, "like a rabbit in the headlights of a car" with himself and P1ime 
Minister Brian Mulroney attempting to develop an insurance policy for depleting oil 
reserves. According to Peckford, the offshore meant a whole new economic chapter for 
not only Newfoundland but for Canada as a whole, much as the Leduc discovery in 
Alberta was in 194 7. He went on to predict that "the next generation of Newfoundlanders 
and Labradorians will be free once and for all; free fi:om that agonizing choice to stay in 
poverty or to leave for prosperity; free from having to leave home, leave family and go off 
to live in another part of this world to earn a living." While Peckford realized this would 
Environmental and Occupational Health Policy, 10, 1-2 (2000); and Nishman, "Through the 
Portlights of the Ocean Ranger". 
69 Statement by Honourable A. Brian Peckford, "The Hibernia Agreement," St. John's, 18 July 
1988. On deposit in CNS. 
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not happen overnight, he claimed it would start in the months ahead as Hibernia got 
underway.70 To help get the project underway and to ensure that most of the jobs and 
benefits accrued to Newfoundland, the provincial and federal governments gave 
numerous financial concessions to the project owners.71 
Conclusions 
The main purpose of this chapter was to introduce the political and economic 
significance of the three case studies that make up the evidentiary backbone of my thesis. 
In tum, each project was promoted as the way to modernize. With high unemployment 
levels, the provincial government promoted using "cheap" hydro power to encourage the 
development of secondary industries. Exploiting Newfoundland and Labrador's water 
potential, "cheap power" from Churchill Falls was to create jobs, foster spin-off 
development, and to tum Newfoundland from a resource dependent economy to an 
. 
economy based on secondary manufacturing. In the early 1970s, the provincial 
govenunent switched its focus to creating a petrochemical industrial complex in 
Newfoundland. It hoped that by building a petrochemical base, vertical integration from 
industries requiring oil and its by-products would result. In the 1980s and 1990s offshore 
70 Peckford, "The Hibernia Agreement," 6. 
71 The federal government agreed to contribute up to $1.04 billion in financing, a grant equal to 
the lesser of 25 per cent of pre-production capital expenditures and $1.7 billion in loan 
guarantees to the Project owners. If in the repayment period of the loan guaranteed by the federal 
government the price of oil dropped beneath $25 US/barrel, the federal government also 
promised an interest free loan of up to 50 per cent of the monthly interest payments to the 
consortium, not exceeding an overall total of $300 million. The provincial govemment waived 
the PST on production start-up expenditures attributable to the project. They also agreed that the 
PST would be levied at 4 per cent, instead of 12 per cent, on remaining project operating costs. 
As -.veil, the provincial government provided a tax credit on corporate income tax payable to the 
province. It also waived royalties on the initial stages of the project. Joint government funding of 
$95 million was also provided by the Canada Newfoundland Offshore Development fund 
towards the construction facilities at Bull Arm. Wade Locke, Economic Issues Related to 
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oil was to become the engine of economic growth. With the creation of an offshore oil 
industry, the government envisioned becoming the Alberta of eastern Canada and 
anticipated a reduction in unemployment and out-migration. While none of these projects 
brought the desired results, each one created thousands of jobs in their construction 
phases and did add a considerable boost to the province's economy, although in the case 
of Come by Chance, it took several decades for this to become apparent. In chapter four 
we will turn our interest to the types of jobs created in the construction ofthese projects. 
Taxation of Offshore Oil Projects: Hibernia as a Case Study (St. John's: ISER, 1992), 20 and 
Statement of Principle, Hibernia Development Project, 1988. 
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Chapter 4: The Lure of Industrial Construction 
Introduction 
To examine the human consequences of the government's modernization program, this 
chapter focuses on the work lives of construction workers. In the late 1960s thousands of 
construction workers moved to central Labrador to begin work on the largest construct ion 
project of its time in Canada, the Churchill Falls hydro project. Employees on site worked 
in over 200 different job classifications from construction worker to engineer, from 
teacher to traffic officer. 1 After five years of non-stop fieldwork, at a peak of 6000 
workers on site, on 6 December 1971 the first two generating units delivered power. With 
all the generators operational, Churchill Falls ceased to be a construction site.2 Only a few 
years later, many of the same construction workers, joined by local workers, gathered 
outside of St. John's to begin construction on the Come by Chance oil refinery. Building 
the refinery resulted in 4000 person years of employment over three-years. Twenty years 
later in the sa..'lle area, thousands more construction workers gathered to start work on the 
Hibernia offshore oil production platfonn. Hibernia required 7000 workers over seven 
years.3 These three projects rank among the largest construction projects 111 
Newfoundland and offer us a windovv into Newfoundland's construction workers. 
Construction projects in Newfoundland often meant poor weather, long hours of 
work, seasonal unemployment, isolation from friends and family, and dirty, often 
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dangerous work.4 And yet workers entered constmction in droves, making them the first 
line on Newfoundland's modemization front. Workers were drawn to construction by 
extemal factors such as high unemployment levels and a lack of other job options, 
aovemment promotion of construction, and the increasing provision of training programs. 
0 
Workers were also attracted by relatively high wages and the provision of corporate 
welfare programs on many of the larger projects.5 
Part 1: Overview of Industrial Construction Industry 
The construction industry was (and still is) faced with seasonal fluctuations and a 
cyclical business cycle, which lead to demand instabilities in the industry. Having a 
smaller volume of construction than other mainland centres, Newfoundland contractors 
rarely offered year-round employment to workers. Each site was a constantly changing 
mix of firms and employees. Unlike the traditional labour relations model where a 
relatively stable group of employees worked for one employer in one location, in 
construction a shifting collection of workers moved from employer to employer and from 
3 Hibernia Management Development Company, Economic Benefits from the Hibernia 
Constmction Project: Summary (January 1996), 3. As of April1996 Newfoundland had garnered 
a 63 per cent share of direct employment, which equated to 18,100 person years of work. 
4 
·weather played a large role in construction's seasonal nature and added to the sense of isolation 
in remote areas. Churchill Falls also faced extremely cold temperatures that made winter work 
difficult. The Falls are located 650 miles north west of St. John's, and 700 miles north east of 
Montreal. CFLCo, Churchili Falls Power Development Management and Construction 
F.nuinmP.nt. 1 R. 
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job to job.6 In any given year workers were employed by several contractors. Workers 
were hired on a per-project basis. Industrial construction projects were undertaken by a 
contractor who contracted out work to a number of subcontractors, each with their own 
workers. Subcontractors were forced to specialize to compete in the type of construction 
(industrial, commercial or residential) and at the trade level in one trade.7 
\Vorkers in industrial construction had to be mobile, willing to move wherever 
the next project was. Given the short construction season in Newfoundland, and the short 
life of most projects, many workers were forced to leave the province for work. One 
author described the job uncertainty workers faced, "any one job for the construction 
worker is short and t1eeting and he must be prepared to be highly mobile, shifting from 
project to project across a wide geographic area."8 Hence, each project necessitated 
assembling a new labour force. Unemployed construction workers were constantly 
engaged in job negotiations with their local manpower offices, their unions or contractors 
to fir:.d new employment. Given its relatively small workforce, skilled workers in 
Nevvfoundland knew and were known by most of the contractors, foremen and 
supervisors, and traditionally, hiring was based on personal relationships. Workers 
entered the construction industry through family and friendship networks. 
6 In 1968, the Royal Commission on Labour Legislation \Vas appointed to examine the effectiveness 
nf existimr l:Jhonr leP"isl:Jtion :Jncl tn nrnnnse new lr.visl>Jtinn tn meet the neecls ofth~ nrnvin~e with 
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Table 4-1: Numbers of Workers Engaged in Construction 
Place of Residence All Industries # Construction # Construction % 
Canada 
1951 5,286,407 321,245 6.1 
Male 4,123,270 315,669 7.7 
Female 1,163,137 5576 0.5 
1961 6,471,850 438,554 6.8 
Male 4,705,518 427,679 9.1 
Female 1,766,332 10,875 0.6 
1971 8,626,925 538,220 6.2 
Male 5,665,715 511,940 9 
Female 2,961,210 26,280 0.9 
Newfoundland 
1951 106,411 5,472 5.1 
Male 89,384 5,426 I 6.1 
Female 17,027 46 0.3 
1961 112,310 9,588 8.5 I 
Male 88,702 19,489 110.7 
Female 23,608 199 0.4 
I 1971 147,990 15,535 I 1 10.5 I 
i 
Male 107,175 15,165 114.1 
i 
·---· 
Female 40,815 370 0.9 I 
Source: Statistics Canada, Labour Force 15 Years and Over by Industry Divisions and 
Sex for Canada and the Provinces, 1971 Census ofCanada, 94-739, Table 1. 
Considerable monthly variations occuned in construction emplo;ment, with peak 
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months, 9 per cent from 10-11 months, the remaining 55 per cent for less than 9 months 
of the year. Despite a winter employment scheme, employment was down from 1966 
when 40 per cent of carpenters worked less than 9-10 months. Electricians and plumbers, 
with lower rates of unemployment, faced rates of over 25 per cent unemployment for four 
or more months in 1968.10 To cope with unemployment and other problems, many 
Newfoundland construction workers organized into trade unions early on, bricklayers and 
plasterers in 1896 and others in the first decade of the 201h century. Most of 
Newfoundland's building trades unions were affiliated with the American Federation of 
Labor (AFL). 11 
After a downturn in organizing in the mid-1920s ru.~d 1930s, construction unions 
underwent a renaissance in the late 1930s when bricklayers, masons, carpenters, painters, 
plumbers and pipefitters all increased their membership. 12 Membership growth continued 
throughout 'World War !I and into the post-Confederation surge of industrial 
development. 13 In 1949 construction union membership Vias 1200, a figure that rose to 
3000 by 1958 and to 3500 by 1968. By 1968 roughly 40 per cent of the industry was 
-----------------------
10 Maxwell Cohen, Report of the Royal Commission on Labour Legislation in Newfoundland and 
Labrador (St. John's 1972), 129. While the total federal employment levels varied by 11.5 per 
cent between the low anJ high employment periods, in the construction industr; employment 
v~riecl hv ~" 1111J(~h ~.<; 'i'i ner cent 
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unionized, the majority in industrial construction.14 Twelve unions - ten international, 
and two independent unions the Electrical Workers Union and the Newfoundland 
Painters Protective Union - represented Newfoundland construction workers. Many 
construction unions also represented other workers, including the carpenters (loggers), 
ironworkers (machine fabricators), and the electrical workers (light and pmver \Vorkers). 15 
To deal with organizing on a project-by-project basis, Newfoundland construction 
unions attempted to obtain bargaining rights for geographic locations, not just individual 
projects. Geographic bargaining was one way to stabilize terms of employment, including 
wage rates, and to remove wages from the competitive bidding process. 16 By the late 
1960s only three unions had provincial jurisdiction: the Intemational Association of 
Bridge, Structural, and Ornamental Iron Workers (lAB), the International Brotherhood of 
Electrical Workers (IBEW), and the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices 
of the Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry (UAPP). Other building trades unions had 
vatying jurisdictions, some in St. John's only, others in the Avalon Peninsula, Comer 
Brook, Grand Falls, and Stephenville. 
Workers in industrial construction had pem1anent relationships with their unions, 
not their employers. Unions often played the role of employment brokers, collected 
employment infonnation, and distributed work. In many parts of Canada, unions handled 
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hiring on larger sites. Under such closed shop provisions, umons dispatched workers 
upon demand to contractors.17 Closed shop hiring, however, was not prevalent in 
Newfoundland. Where skill level or experience were in question, as contractors believed 
they were in Newfoundland, closed shops were strongly resisted. In two of the larger 
projects in the late 1960s and early 1970s, Churchill Falls and Come by Chance, hiring 
was handled through on-site contractors and Canada Manpower. Despite not regulating 
hiring, unions in Newfoundland still played an important role. They ensured minimum 
wage rates were paid and prevented contractors from cutting wages to lower their bids, 
both of which had a stabilizing effect on the industry. Unions, especially in the electrical 
and mechanical trades, also set up "industry funds" where, under the collective 
agreement, money was set aside for training and safety. 18 
Construction unions faced considerable challenges m orgamzmg workers, 
including the short-term nature of construction sites. By the time many unions succeeded 
in an organizing drive, projects were in the finishing stages. Given the large numbers of 
contractors and subcontractors, unions were not always clem whom to target in their 
organization attempts. The constant turnover in workers also made organizing 
problematic. Workers who signed union cards might no longer be on site by the time of a 
ratification vote. Craft lines also meant that several different unions were att empting to 
unionize one site. Such jurisdictional disputes have played an enduring role in the 
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construction industry. The application of new materials and technology often increased 
the number of jurisdictional disputes as one craft lost work to another union. 19 
In the mid-1960s both building trades unions and contractors formed their own 
organizations to give their members a more united voice. Building trades unions formed 
the Newfoundland and Labrador Building and Construction Trades Council (NLBCTC) 
while contractors formed the Newfoundland-Labrador Construction Association (NLCA). 
Composed of thirteen unions, the NLBCTC affiliated with building trades unions across 
Canada and the U.S.20 Its principal aims were to improve workers wages a..nd working 
conditions and to advance the construction industry through lobbying for improvements 
to the Labour Relations Act, the Industrial Standards Act, workers compensation, and 
health and safety legislation. The NLCA was created in reaction to a dramatic increase in 
construction certification applications in the late 1960s as many unions that had 
19 
"Huff and Puff, but the Houses Won't Blow Down," Decks Awash, 9, 3 (June 1980), 10. As 
reinfcrced steel and concrete replaced wood as the dominant construction material, ironworkers 
and others have replaced carpenters causing a shift in power among unions. From 1951. to 1961 
carpenters in Canada dropped from 24.6 to 19.7 per cent of the construction workforce. 
20 After leaving the Canadian Labor Congress, in 1982 the NLBCTC joined with other dissident 
building trades unions to form the Canadian Federation of Labor. Problems between the 
building trades unions and the CLC erupted in the iate 1970s as 13000 IDEW linesmen and 
electricians seceded from the IDEW to form an independent union after being told contributions 
to the international pension fund would be compulsory. Despite rules that affiliates of building 
h·ades councils must be members of international unions, the independent locals continued to sit 
em the r.T r: Rnilclin !7 Tracles r.nnnc.il. De~Yener;Jtin !Y into a nro- anclanti-WashinPtCtn cl f:hat~ . in 
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previously operated under voluntary recognition pushed for certification.21 The NLCA 
aims were to negotiate on behalf of individual fi1ms in a trade and to synchronize 
collective bargaining to have agreements end on the same date. When agreements ended 
on different dates collective bargaining was continuous and as one union garnered 
concessions, other unions used that settlement to leverage more favourable terms. By the 
early 1970s seven of the building trades unions signed contracts with the NLCA.22 
Two firms accounted for one-third of all construction activity in Newfoundland in 
the 1960s, while another 10 medium-sized firms accounted for another one-third of 
construction activity.23 Small firms canied out the final third, most in residential 
construction. Mainland contractors were often used in larger projects, in part because of 
their ability to arrange financing, their familiarity with technical needs, and their 
possession of equipment. In peak periods in the 1950s and 1960s demand for contractors 
was high and there were few barriers to establishing a construction firm. In the early 
1960s local firms began taking an increasing share of projects as the govemment issued 
an edict that construction companies from outside the province had to use local labour 
and materials wherever available and of suitable quality.24 
During the 1960s and 1970s construction workers gained experience at projects in 
Churchill Falls (1967), Wabush, Labrador City, Come by Chance (1970), and 
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Stephenville (1970). Combined, these projects constituted an abnormally large volume of 
construction.25 On large-scale projects, most owners turned to international contractors. 
To provide engineering and construction management, the Churchill Falls Labrador 
Company (CFLCo) hired Acres Canadian Bechtel (ACB) in 1964. Acres was an 
engineering firm based in Niagara Fa.lls, which had undertaken Alcan's initial survey of 
Churchill Falls and had worked on many of Canada's hydro-electric projects. Bechtel had 
experience in constructing oil refineries and pipelines across Canada and had worked on 
the Iron Ore Company's mining operations in Labrador.26 
Part II: External Factors Which Drew Workers to Construction 
Starting in the 1960s the government advocated that workers tum to construction for 
employment. With the start of Churchill Falls, the Newfoundland government released 
radio ads suggesting that workers consider constmction as an occupation, and work at 
. 
Churchill Falls in particular. As Newfoundland's industrial construction workforc.e was 
relatively small, project managers envisioned many workers from the mining and fishing 
industries could be transformed into construction workers. Vv110 were the workers 
employed on Newfoundland's large-scale projects? Most were men between 20 and 50 in 
age. Many were Newfoundlanders. On the Come by Chance project, many of those hired 
2~ R. Hayward, "Construction Industry," in R.I. McAllister, ed., Newfoundland and Labrador, 
ThP First Fi{;ppn YP.nrs nfr.nnfP.rf.P.rntinn (Sr. John's: Dicks llnc1 C:o .. 1 91111). 1 S'i . 
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as labourers had previously worked as casual labourers in construction, cartage, or on 
. 27 government proJects. 
The government ensured that many of the new construction jobs were filled by 
Newfoundland workers. As the Newfoundland government owned much of the land the 
large-scale projects were built on, it had the authority to insist that companies implement 
local hiring provisions. In the case of Chmchill Falls, CFLCo agreed to a Newfoundland 
hiring provision that required the "provision of employment opportunity for 
Newfoundland residents to a ma,ximum extent compatible with their qualifications with 
the aim of providing a broader base for future economic development of the area."28 The 
New-foundland government kept a careful eye on hiring at Churchill Falls, set up 
provincial recruitment centres to compile lists of workers available for work, and 
regularly contacted CFLCo to find out why workers were being hired outside of 
Newfoundland.29 Contractors were required to submit labour requisitions to the St. John's 
CFLCo office to find qualified Newfoundland workers, which in tum contacted 
provincial recruitment centres and Canada Manpower Offices arotmd the province to 
27 Labourers performed any work not assigned to trades workers, including loading or unloading 
materials, pouring concrete, shovelling snow, and digging trenches. Unlike other trades, 
labourers were not required to have a certificate of competence or any tools. CNSA, Collection 
075, 3.23.009. "Trade Specifications and Job Descriptions," 3-5. In October 1971, Horner 
White, president of the Newfoundland Refining Company (NRC) claimed that 94 per cent of the 
worlc.force was Newfoundlanders. ·white worried that it would be difficult to get enough skilled 
labour for the next phase. To meet its needs, NRC trained local workers. L. Felt and R. Carter, 
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furnish workers.30 When workers were not available in Newfoundland, contractors were 
free to hire them from elsewhere, with next priority to residents of Quebec. 
Local labourers did much of the work on all three projects. On the Churchill Falls 
project, 70 per cent of the trades workers were drawn from Newfoundland and Labrador, 
26 per cent from Quebec and 4 per cent from elsewhere. Only 37 per cent of non-manual 
labour was recmited from within the province, the rest were brought in, especially 
engineering and construction supervisors, from Quebec and the U.S. Workers complained 
that jobs unfilled in Newfoundland were being tilled in Quebec by workers without the 
appropriate skill level. CFLCo promised to investigate the situation, and, if confu.liled, to 
end it. CFLCo president, Donald McParland ordered confidential spot checks on workers 
qualifications to ascertain if different standards were being accepted.31 
The provincial government also played a role in promoting hi1ing of 
Newfoundland workers for Hibernia. It pushed for a gravity-based system (GBS) for the 
offshore p latforrn, as it would entail a larger number of jobs in the construction phase. In 
exchange for the GBS, both levels of government offered project owners considerable 
29 CNSA, Collection 075, 3.23.009, Letter from Franklin Colbourne to Smallwood, 26 September 
1967; 3.23.007, Memorandum, "Re: Churchill Falls Hiring," from Gordon Pushie to Smallwood, 
24 Febmary 1969; Memo, Minister of Labour Keough to Smallwood, 26 February 1969. 
3
° Canada Manpower referred workers to the provincial recruitment centre which then referred 
them to the site. Not everyone was happy with the use of recruitment centres. :NIP John 
Lundrigan (PC) charged that the recruitment centres were open to political interference and 
decried their use of name hiring. (Name hiring was when the contractors asked for specific 
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financial concess10ns. Under the Atlantic Accord and the site collective agreement, 
Newfoundland workers received preference for both project-related training and hiring.32 
Bringing in outsiders, however, continued to be a problem at Hibernia. The Oil 
Development Council (ODC) charged that management maintained the attitude that 
locals were incapable of completing the more skilled work required. In one case, sub-
contractor Kenonic Controls hired outside workers to do work the IBEW thought local 
electricians were qualified for. \Vhen the grievance went to arbitration, the HMDC 
claimed the grievance was a non-issue as they had already met all local labour 
requirements and could hire anyone they wanted. Kenonic Controls claimed that there 
were no qualified locai workers available and that it was now too late to include local 
electricians.33 'While the IThiDC suggested bringing in outside workers led to an increase 
31 CNSA, Collection 075, 3.23.009 and Newfoundland Statistical Agency, Total Persons Hired, 
1967-1974. (June 1980). CNSA, Collection 075, 3.23.007. Memo from W . .T. Keough to the 
Premier, 26 February 1969 and Letter from Donald McParland to Smallwood, 28 April1969. 
32 Unlike earlier projects, Hibernia employed a union hiring hall. Hiring took place through the 
local union offices, where members in good standing prior to 5 July 1990 received work priority. 
Anyone who joined the union after that was given seniority after they attained two years work 
within the union. Many local residents complained that uncertainty about the project's future 
meant they had not joined the union by the deadline and were put at the bottom of the hiring list. 
Others complained they could not afford union fees, which ranged up to several hundred dollars. 
Others complained of nepotism in union referrals, charging that only family members of existing 
union members were gaining access to the jobs. The unions denied this, claiming their hiring 
was done on a first-come, first-serve basis. "Row erupts over Labour deal," Globe and Mail, 10 
August 1988; "Thousands scramble for few Hibernia Jobs," Globe and Mail, 4 October 1990; 
"Hibernia Hiring Hurdles," ET, 9 January 1991; "No guarantee of local jobs on GBS work, Wells 
states," ET, 17 January 1991; Chris Flanagan, "Too late for Hibernia work," ET, 17 March 1996. 
D P.snite: the: nnions' clP.ni~ ls . ~ stnclv hv \V omen in Tr~cle:s :mel TP.~hno1op-v (WTTI) re:norte:cl that 
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in technology transfer, the IBEW was sceptical as it believed the Newfoundland workers 
were more skilled than the so-called specialists. Several other trades also complained of 
problems with the hiring of outside experts.34 
The specific requirements of each site required different balances of trades. At 
Churchill Falls, heavy equipment operators and electricians were among the most sought 
after workers. Ironworkers, particularly riggers and scaffolders, boilermakers, pipefitters, 
welders, and insulators were the main trades needed at the refinerj. Ironworkers and 
operating engineers were among the trades in highest demand at Hibernia. 35 Many of the 
jobs involved in industrial construction were outside the norm of "typical" construction. 
At Churchill Falls, workers were as likely to have mining backgrounds as construction.36 
Mining techniques were required t·J build a mile long tunnel 1000 feet below the surface 
to give access to the power station. Sinking the shaft, for instance, involved workers 
Bernie Bennett, "Local workers ' robbed' of Hibernia jobs," ET, 19 October 1996; Bennett, 
"Hibernia hiring practices under the gun again," ET, 2 November 1996 ~ "Hibernia boss insists 
local labour getting fair share," ET, 28 November 1996; John Murphy, "Hibernia Hiring report 
doesn't satisfy union," ET, 12 December 1996; and Gary Hebbard, "IBEW counters Hibernia 
defence: Technology Transfer not happening," ET, 23 October 1996. 
3~ Canadian divers were upset when an aH-Italian dive tearn was hired to install Hibernia's 
pipeline system. Local divers and others pressured both the provincial and federal governments 
and Immigration Canada initially refused to issue work permits. In an effort to prevent delays, 
Hibernia management offered to hire one Canadian diver in an observation role. After three 
weeks of negotiations, however, the HMDC was forced to hire ten Canadian divers for surface 
jobs to get the work visas for the Italian divers. Chris Flanagan, "Divers won't take the bait," ET, 
10 June 1997; and Flanagan, "Hibernia diver dispute solved," ET, 26 June 1997. 
35 Tn the: first Vf:llr of c.onstmction W<Clcler.<; w ere needecl to welcl nve:r snoo tons of stee:l into the 
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drilling holes vertically, loading them with dynamite and blasting them. In a typical day 
building the penstock tunnels, workers would drill pilot holes upward from access drifts, 
using platforms on monorails bolted into the rock to reach the site. Workers on the 
hydraulic platfonn completed scaling, while other work crevvs laid rail behind the drills.37 
Charlie Anfossi was one of the earliest workers at Churchill Falls, aniving in 
Labrador from Montreal for the conshuction of the railway and staying for the 
construction of the Twin Falls hydro project. Anfossi was at Churchill Falls for the start 
of the Bridge Camp. He recalled that the ca..111p was over-crowded, often with five to six 
men to a two-person room. Overcrowding resulted in new workers staying in the 
"honeymoon hotel,'' a plywood surveyor's shack. Problems quickly motmted at the early 
camps, including losing water, light or heat. He claimed "it wasn' t unusual then to have 
the first man up in the morning go down to the Churchill River and cut a hole in the ice 
so we would have water for coffee."38 Many of the miners saw work at Churchill Falls as 
a way to gel ahead financially, to provide for their families. 39 
37 
"Churchill Falls Hydroelectric Project is a Record-Breaker Above and Below Ground," 
Construction Methods, LIT, 5 (May 1970), 65-7 and "How's Business, Mr. Scarabelli,'' Churchill 
Falls News, 20 September 1969. 
38 
"Meet Charlie Anfossi," Churchill Falls News, 21 March 1970. For more on the early days at 
Churchill Falls see National Archives of Canada (NAC), MG 28, Churchill Falls Collection, III, 
73, vol. 49. Acres Canadian Bechtel, "Weekly Field Progress Reports," December 1963-April 
19fi4. See ::~l so H.T .. Snvcler. " r.onstmc.tion Snmm~rv." 19 Anri1 19fi4 
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Professionalization of Skills/Training Programs 
To help attract workers and to ensure they met required skill levels, government-
run vocational schools offered construction trades training. Initially apprenticeship 
training was only conducted at the St. John's Vocational Institute but by the early 1960s 
the program spread to Stephenville, Deer Lake, Comer Brook, Argentia and Bell Island.40 
In 1961 the provincial government announced plans to build tweive new vocational 
schools, aided in part by the signing of an extended federal Technical and Vocational 
Training Assistance Act (1960). Each school had a slightly different curriculum; for 
instance, Gander was given aircraft maintenance by dint of having the internatioiJ.al 
airport and Burin was given refrigeration as it was home to a major fish plant. Due to the 
closing of the Stephenville Air Force Base (U.S.) and to the need for trained workers 
for Churchill Falls, Stephenville became home to an Adult Education program (literacy 
and basic education) and a Heavy Equipment schoo1.41 
40 The Vocational Institute offered training in construction, auto mechanics, and marine and 
navigational engineering. Day classes in trades training (9 months), evening classes, 
apprenticeship training, and training in navigation and marine engineering were all offered. 
Workers attempting to upgrade their skills attended evening classes. Vocational training 
programs were quite popular with students desperate to find work and by 1959 over 6000 
workers had received some form of training from the Institute. Provincial Archives of 
Newfoundland and Labrador (PANL), GN 66-2-E (Department of Career Development). 7 -5-4-3, 
volume 2, Reports-- Vocational Education. General Comments on Vocational Education 1958-
9; Anderson, "Vocational Education in Newfoundland," 81; and Frank Templeman, "Vocational 
- - --
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Apprenticeship training \Vas key to landing a skilled position in construction. 
Apprenticeships lasted four years, and during each year - often in the winter when work 
was scarce - apprentices spent six weeks in the classroom. Once the classroom portion 
was complete, apprentices wrote a journeyman's exam (up until the mid-1970s 
journeymen were men).42 Over 70 per cent on the exam meant they were eligible to 
practice in all provinces, 60-69 per cent enabled them only to practice in Newfoundland. 
Each union maintained its own ratio of apprentices to journeymen, with carpenters and 
bricklayers using low apprenticeship ratios to restrict membership. Not surprisingly, 
many unions were opposed to having an oversupply of trained workers available, as it 
would potentially diive do\\11 wage rates. With high demand for workers in the late 1960s 
and early 1970s many companies hired apprentices who had not yet finished their training 
and other workers of unknown skill as journeymen to solve their short-term staffing 
problems. Once paid journey wages workers became part of the union, making it difficult 
to entice workers to take pay cuts to return to apprenticeship programs.43 
Part of the push for training was industry's deman.ds for workers and apprentices 
to labour on the construction of several large-scale projects, including Churchill Falls. 
The government feared that industrialists would not invest in Newfoundland unless there 
were trained workers to build and run new i..'l.dustries. Prior to the start of Churchill Falls, 
_;1:+ .... --~ 1... .. .. :1....1:- - .... ... nl .... ... ., .... - + ... . : t1 .... + ..... - - ..... - .-.-..... +1.... ..... - C ..... - ..... .. ..-.. -lr ,.... _ +1.... .... _ ..... .c-.; _ ,.._... .. ''T._, , 1... ..... ,.....; __ ;_ ...., + ..... 
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the government worried it could not supply the required trades workers. "While a large 
number were being trained, the Minister of Labour was concerned that CFLCo would 
refuse to accept applications from Newfoundlanders still in training. He suggested that to 
entice CFLCo to accept the trainees, the government should consider establishing in-
school training a1•1d on-the-job supervision of apprentices on the project.44 ·while CFLCo 
was also worried about a lack of skilled workers, the recent increase in vocational and 
technical education in Newfoundland was seen as a plus, as was the ensuing completion 
of the Bay d'Espoir hydroelectric project.45 
Despite the increase iil training programs, many contractors continued to complain 
about workers' low skill levels, even among those who completed government training.46 
Contractors complained of carpenters unable to carry out rough work, and of masons who 
were really labourers. A lack of qualified supervisors exacerbated the problem and led to 
strained relationships on many projects.47 Productivity rates were deceptive as some 
companies maintained a small cadre of skilled workers on payroll year round to prevent 
them being hired away. In slack times companies paid a small number of vvorkers for 
43 Report on the Construction Industry, 133-43. 
4~ CNSA, Collection 075, 3.23.009. Labour Minister C. Wells to Smallwood, 8 November 1966. 
4
) CNSA, Collection 075, 3.23.004, Churchill Falls 1965. Donald McParland, Churchill Falls 
Power Project: An Address to the Professional Engineers Association of Newfoundland, 19 
November 1965 25. 
46 ' One contractor claimed that it took workers in northern Newfoundland 1.8 hours to complete a 
t::~sk it took ::1 worker elsewhere onlv :m honr to flo . (;ontrllctors rene::~terllv m entioneci fo11r mllin 
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non-productive time, lowering productivity rates. Many contractors claimed 
Newfoundland construction workers lacked initiative with one report complaining "there 
is a Iendency to resist the tempo and pressures of activity that are common in many other . 
parts of Canada."48 Some contractors blamed the attitude on more senior men who 
worked on wartime projects where work was often stretched as long as possible. As 
James Overton pointed out, such explanations were ideologically derived. Overton argued 
that claiming attitudes towards work were different in Newfoundland allowed 
. 49 government and business to blame workers for 1mderdevelopment. 
In an effort to improve skill levels, in 1963-4 the College of Trades a11d 
Technology began offering constmction technician training progran1s. Unions too 
recognized the need for increased skill levels and began offering upgrading courses for 
journeymen in the early 1970s, with the carpenters and the plumbers and pipefitters 
leading the way. At the same time, MUN's Engineering department included a 
cooperative constmction engineering program. Post-graduate degrees were also offered in 
the Engineering department for a Masters of Engineering in Construction Project 
Management, a program started in January 1970.50 
Lack of Other Job Options 
'li.. T- .L -11 _.£' ""h. T ____ .r ..... .... ..ll .... .... ..J) .... ; .... ...l . . .... .L • ..: .... l - - ·--•---- •~- -- ---- --1---- - . ... 1 ..... ... . ... .... ...1 • -· ----1- - _ 
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work. In many cases, wives attempted to help their husbands with their job searches. Part 
of the job search included approaching premier Smallwood or other officials for help. As 
early as January 1965 letters started arriving at the Premier's office asking for work at 
Churchill Falls. Newfoundland workers who had moved to Ontario to find work and 
wanted to return home wrote many of the other letters. All implored the premier to help 
them obtain work on the project. By 1967 the government had received over 1500 
applications for employment at Churchill Falls. 51 Others, needing employment, converged 
on new projects in hopes of being hired. At Come by Chance this included two high 
school students who had decided not to return to school after Easter break in hopes of 
landing jobs on the site. The two 17 year olds wanted to make sure they were among the 
first in line when hiring began. Only day hiring was done on site, longer-term hiring was 
done through the Canada Manpower offices. That diu not stop 50 men, and two lines of 
cars extending from the camp gate to the Trans Canada highway, two miles away, from 
waiting in line to till out applications. 52 
Other workers, desperate to obtain employment, claimed expertise contractors did 
not believe they possessed. Problems arose at Churchill Falls when several workers 
anived for skilled positions but appeared not to have the prerequisite skills. 53 Other 
51 See CNSA, Collection 075, 3.23.009, Re: Churchill Fall Labour, for copies of the letters. 
52 M :mnower P"l'!Ve nrioritv to workers livinP" within l'l 2 'i-mile rl'lrlius ofthe s ite. With the 
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employees bore the brunt of management suspicions over skill levels as management 
began to test workers' skills as soon as they anived on site. Workers were upset at having 
to retake competency tests in Churchill Falls that they had passed in St. John's. Those 
that failed the second test were offered work as labourers or were sent home at their own 
expense. As many who failed the test had passed courses in heavy equipment operation 
at the vocational schools, there was considerable resentment against both the company 
1 54 and the schoo s. 
To get on the Churchill Falls site many workers accepted jobs in lower trade 
classifications than they occupied, hoping that on site they would be in a better position to 
take more advanced jobs. Once on site many insisted they be transferred to jobs in their 
field, and as laying them off and paying their expenses home was costly, in some 
instances they succeeded. In a case that went before the site's Select Committee on 
Labour, one worker accepted a position as a labourer but upon arrival at the site started 
looking for work as a linesman. Upon finding an opening with another subcontractor, he 
indicated to the subcontractor that they could expect little useful work from him and 
asked for a transfer. While the subcontractor agreed to the transfer, the site authorities 
refused to allow it. While job-hopping was expected on site, taking employment without 
118 
intending to engage in it was not. 55 Other workers responded to poor working conditions 
and isolation by simply walking away from their jobs. Given Churchill Falls' isolation-
only accessible by air- management was determined to lessen labour turnover as much as 
possible. Hence when workers insisted on leaving the site to find other work, the 
company brought it to the government's attention. In a letter to the premier's special 
assistant Max Button, one contractor reported that several workers were "voting with 
their feet" and demanding to return home. 56 
Part III: Internal Factors which Drew \Vorkers to Construction 
!Jigher Wages 
Many workers chose constmction work as it paid higher wages than other jobs 
available in the area. Construction wages across Canada rose rapidly in the 1950s and 
1960s. Wage rates for labourers' rose from 87 cents an hour in 1952 to $1.35 in 1959. 
Crane operators' rates rise from $1.45 to $1.92 over the same period. By 1959 shuctural 
steel workers were the highest paid constmction workers at $2.22 an hour, followed by 
bricklayers and plumbers $2.1 0, and electricians $2.05, reflecting the changing needs of 
55 CNSA, Collection 075, 3.23.007. Letter from D.J. McParland to Smallwood, 8 May 1969. At 
Hibernia, employers implemented a 30-day waiting period before an employee could leave one 
contractor and be hired by another. When the policy failed to act as a deterrent, the period was 
changed to six months. Newfoundland and Labrador, Department of Environment and Labour, 
Arbitration Files, Arbitration 96-112, Subject: Wrongful Dismissal, 31 December 1996, 13. 
56 The letter reported that four truck drivers had walked off the job, abandoning their vehicles, 
when thev ci e:cicie:ci the:v w:mte:cl to n~h•m home:. The: workers r e:fiJse:cl r e1111e:sts ::~skin P" them tn 
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construction and the demand for certain trades. In 1960 labourers were the lowest paid 
construction workers in Newfoundland, making $1.45 an hour. Structural steel workers 
were the highest paid construction workers at $2.30 an hour, followed by bricklayers, 
plumbers, and electricians at $2.15. By 1969 labourers wages had risen to $1.99, 
bricklayers to $3.11, plumbers to $3.31 and electricians to $3.33. Overall constmction 
wages rose by 67 per cent from 1961 to 1969.57 
Wages were divided into apprenticeship and journeyman rates. The carpenters' 
union initially had a wage classification scale based on skill but discontinued it 
supposedly because "the majority of workers fell into the lowest category and they [the 
carpenters union] thus dictated a change in policy."58 Despite the increases, wage rates in 
Newfoundland were significantly lower, and increased at a slower rate, than in Halifax, 
Quebec City, and Toronto. Wage rates for bricklayers, carpenters, painters, plasterers, 
plumbers, sheet metal workers, tmck drivers and labourers were lower in St. John's than 
Halifax, the second lowest paying city surveyed. Only electricians in St. John's maue 
more than their Halifax counterparts, in 1964 electricians in St. John's made $2.57 an 
hour compared to $2.53 in Halifax. In Montreal and Fort 'William prevailing wage rates 
for electricians were $3.05, a sum that rose to $3.88 an hour in Toronto.59 
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Strong demand for new construction projects, increased skill and training levels, 
and cyclical unemployment all increased wage demands. In peak construction periods in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s many trades faced a scarcity of skilled workers. Scarcity of 
labour allowed unions to demand higher wages. Skills shortages were a problem at Come 
by Chance where a welder shortage delayed construction on several occasions. Employers 
were also worried about a potential loss of workers to the Stephenville Linerboard Mill 
which offered scheduled overtime.60 Some contractors responded to the skills shortages 
by bringing in workers from outside the province. One contractor brought in masons from 
Scotland. Masonry workers were in high demand in the early 1970s, with apprentices 
being promoted to journeymen before their training was completed. The high demand 
resulted in masons being paid higher than union wages. 
As a large part of the Come by Chance project consisted of mechanical work, 
comprising electricians, ironworkers, and pipefitters, all trades with low unemployment, 
workers at Come by Chance were able to demand higher wages.61 Using occupational 
histories from 282 workers employed in both the construction and operation of the 
refinery, Felt and Carter found that the average wage paid prior to working at Come by 
Chance was $4600, a figure that rose to $7100 in the construction phase. The increase in 
wages led to an increased consumer purchasing power as evidenced by new cars and 
coloured televisions that appeared in the town.62 
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Work Schedules 
Another way the main Churchill Falls contractor (ACB) helped prevent labour 
turnover and shortage problems was to formulate construction schedules in such a way as 
to spread out manpower demands. To help reduce the numbers of workers needed -
saving on transportation and living costs- and to help maximize production, management 
implemented a standard ten-hour shift on site.63 Longer shifts also offered management 
another way to conh·ol workers. Workers who worked ten-hour days, six days a week 
before overtime were often too tired to do much other but sleep. Being tired also made 
workers less of a discipline problem in the car.np. vVorkers themselves favoured the 
longer shifts and overtime, preferring to take time off in a block to return to their horne 
towns to visit their families or to travel to St. John's or Montreal for some down time.64 
Workers also wanted to earn as much money as possible. 
Employers also used a variety of means to ensure that workers remained 
productive throughout their shifts. Churchill Falls employers turned to new equipment to 
help keep workers productive and to reduce reliance on workers' physicallabour.65 Using 
new equipment freed up labour for other tasks and gave skilled workers additional 
bargaining power, as skilled workers were required to operate it. Operating the cranes, 
tmcks, diggers, and other constmction equipment critical to setting the production pace 
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allowed workers to maintain a limited control over the speed of work, but close 
erv·ision by foremen and supervisors ensured that workers did not stretch work out too sup 
far. Churchill Falls and Hibernia employers also used computers to keep track of the 
movement of equipment (and the workers who operated them) on site. At Churchill 
Falls, the movement of each piece of equipment was fed into the computer, making it 
easy to track the whereabouts of a needed machine and to determine exactly where a 
worker with any equipment should be at any particular time. 66 
Corporate Welfare Programs 
In addition to higher wages and favourable shift scheduling, many contractors 
found they had to offer corporate welfare programs to workers. In the 19th century, under 
paternalism, employers attempted to equate the job site with the image of a family in an 
attempt to avoid labour unrest and to preserve managerial authority. In the 20th century 
paternalism evolved into welfare capitalism. Welfare capitalism used benefit programs 
(and other material rewards) and human resource specialists to create a culture of 
consensus and to maintain a stable, preferably non-unionized workforce.67 Lung-term 
employment was key, as were higher wages and pension plans. Unlike more traditional 
factory employment, however, construction employers could not overcome poor working 
LIT, 5 (May 1970), 65-7; and CFLCo, Churchill Falls Power Development Management and 
rnnstrurtinn F.nuinmPnt. R. 
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conditions by offering long-term employment. Given the short-term, and often seasonal, 
nature of construction projects, employers had to find alternatives to attract and keep 
workers. Employers subsequently patched together an industrial management system 
somewhat reminiscent of woods workers but specifically geared to the needs of 
construction that included higher wages, housing, spmts and recreation programs, and 
company newspapers. Churchill Falls, for instance, offered a steady and longer (for 
construction) than usual employment, low living costs in company housing (camp 
accommodations cost $2 per day), and recreational facilities. 68 
Companv Housing 
From the late 1960s on, construction camps offered workers not only a place to 
sleep but also provided meals, laundry, and a community setting. Churchill Falls, for 
instance, built an entire town to attract a stable workforce for its construction and 
operating phases. Without the project a settlement would likely not have occurred. To 
house operational workers, a permanent tO\vn site, a main camp and nine out-camps were 
built. 69 During construction, the site consisted of trailers and metal bunkhouses designed 
to meet the needs of construction workers. Unlike other company towns like Grand Falls, 
68 CFLCo, Churchill Falls Power Project Master Labour Agreement, 4. 
69 The Main camp housed 3500 men and 115 women, with the women housed in interconnected 
trailers. Nine additional out-camps were built to temporarily house between 500 and 800 
workers. As the families of supervisory personnel arrived, additional amenities such as schools 
:mel rec.re::~ tion ::~ l f::~c.ilities were huilt. The m::~ in c.::~mn inc.lnclecl ::1 c.ommi .~;s::~rv . nost office. h::~ nk. 
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which had a sister city where less skilled workers congregated, in Churchill Falls there 
were no alternative living arrangements. Workers could only stay in Churchill Falls as 
long as they were employed on site. The only jobs available in Churchill Falls were the 
ones working for the contractor or subcontractors on site. Company housing was a 
potential disciplinary tool in management hands; to live on site one had to have the 
authorization of the town's "mayor" who during the constmction period was the highest 
ranking CFLCo member in town.70 
' 
Both the Churchill Falls constmction and the permanent site were planned, 
constmcted and operated by the private owners. As part of its welfare capitalist program, 
the company provided several amenities. To make the town more attractive to operations 
workers, houses in the permanent town site were built along suburban models, either one 
or two storey with three to four bedrooms and a full basement. The pemmnent town site 
included several features of a more urban community, including a 21 room hotel 
complete with dining room and two lounges and revolved around a unique town centre 
complex, the Donald Gordon Centre. The centre housed the hotel, theatre, library, bank, 
beauty salon, post office, recreational and com.'Tiercial facilities, all under one roof. The 
company also· provided policing, a fire station, streets, sewers, power, landscaping, stores, 
a church, school, and hospital. The company was willing to pay these costs to attract a 
stable and productive workforce. 
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Come by Chance and Hibernia. Both projects were located on the isthmus connecting the 
Avalon Peninsula with the rest of Newfoundland, about an hour and a half from St. 
John's. Given the size of the Come by Chance construction workforce, estimated at 1200 
workers, it was decided that the existing small towns surrounding the complex were 
inadequate to house constmct ion workers. 71 
Workers at Come by Chance were housed in closely monitored bunkhouses. 72 
Bunkhouses were used to accommodate workers from away or local employees working 
overtime or double shift. Eleven bunkhouses were constructed; each designed to house up 
to eighty workers but often housi11g more as needed. By April 1972 over 1000 construction 
workers lived on site.73 Similar style bunkhouses were built for Hibernia, which provided 
housing for workers who lived outside a 50-km radius. Hibernia accommodated 3500 
workers. In 1995 to meet the increasing numbers on site, HMDC added ninety-six trailers 
and built six additional t'.vo-story complexes to house additional workers. 74 
Another factor that attracted workers to large industrial projects was that most of 
their material needs could be met on site. As the majority of workers on all three sites 
7 1 Local residents were worried about an influx of transient workers and the strains they would 
place on local communities. (In 1965 Come by Chance had a population of250, Sunnyside 600, 
Arnold's Cove 340). Little rental housing, for instance, was available in the area outside of 
Clarenville (population 2000). Housing largely consisted of owner occupied, single detached 
homes. With the announcement of the proposed pulp and paper mill in 1965 an influx of workers 
arrived from the out-ports around Placentia Bay. Project Pla1ming Associates, Come by Chance 
A rPn DPvPlnnmPnt St1J.dv. PrPliminnrv RPnnrt. DPr~PmhPr 7 9fi5 (St. John's. 19f)S) :mel Felt ::mel 
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were men, contractors undertook to provide many of the tasks typically done by women. 
Company employees provided workers with the basic necessities while on site, including 
having their meals, and in some cases their laundry, prepared for them.75 At Churchill 
Falls and Come by Chance male workers initially provided these services. Men worked as 
kitchen staff, as cleaners, and in the laundry, but as each project progressed female 
workers took over these jobs, pruiicularly senring food and clearing tables. Feeding 
workers on these large-scale,projects was a complex task. At Churchill Falls, work in the 
main camp kitchen continued almost non-stop, employing thirty kitchen stafr.?6 Feeding 
workers at Come by Chance and Hibernia was somewhat easier in that they did not have 
the same problems with shipping in foodstuffs as did Churchill Falls. The sheer numbers 
of workers at Hibemia, however, made keeping them fed a difficult task. Hibernia's 
dining hall served 1 000 at a sitting,_ and had two servings an hour during breakfast and 
dinner periods. 77 
Site Newspapers 
75 Workers at Churchill Falis, for instance, were responsible for their personal laundry vvith 
washers and dryers in every bunkhouse, but the centrallaw1dry washed sheeo:s and biankets. 
"White !'I S thP. nriv~n snow.' ' rh7J.rr.h ill Fnlls N P.WS . 10 Fehm:::~rv 19fiR . 
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To build a sense of connmmity among workers in camp and on site, both the 
Churchill Falls and Hibernia construction sites started "community" newspapers. CFLCo 
published Churchill Falls News every two weeks. At the time of the first issue there were 
745 workers and supervisors on site, 30 accompanied by their families. By 1970 the 
Churchill Falls News had a press nm of 10,200 copies, 6000 distributed to workers on 
site. In June 1994 the first issue of Hibernia News was published jointly by the Hibernia 
Management Development ~ompany (lllviDC) and publisher Robinson-Blackmore.78 
The paper was designed to provide the 3000 workers on site and others interested in the 
project with up-to-date infonnation. The HMDC also viewed the paper as a good way to 
communicate its policies and programs to its workforce. Site newspapers were used to 
create support for company objectives, to build a sense of teamwork among the disparate 
trades on site, and to help workers "buy-in" to company safety and efficiency programs. 
As construction sites were made up of multiple contractors, site papers also gave the 
owner or general contractor a forum to discuss the project as a vthoie and to try and build 
loyalty to the project, not just the individual subcontractor. 
Papers were also used to help convince workers that the company cared about 
their needs. It did this by reporting on the milestones in workers' home lives, including 
marriages and births on site. Several articles in both newspapers stressed the company's 
loyalty to workers and their families. Throughout the Churchill Falls News, editors 
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for families. Each Christmas the paper devoted several pages to its annual Christmas 
party, complete with pictures of Santa handing out presents to the children on site. 79 
Every issue of the Churchill Falls News carried pictures of workers carrying out 
their work duties. Articles profiled workers on the Churchill Falls site, including one of a 
driver who picked up new arrivals at the airport and transported them to the site. The 
Churchill Falls News also announced the arrival of new women workers to the site.80 
Hibernia News highlighted £¥iicles on individual workers and their accomplishments both 
on the job and on the playing field. Articles in the Hibernia News also reminded workers 
of the company's loyalty to its workers including one article praising the company's rolt: 
in helping a labourer injured on site come back to work after his injury. Other articles told 
workers how, with hard work, they could move up the ladder, including an article on a 
female painter promoted to foreman. Other articles in the paper focused on how the 
project provided an opportunity for many ex-Newfoundlanders, forced to move to Ontario 
and Alberta for work, to return home.81 
Hibernia News also included features on constmction techniques, explained the 
often complicated work procedures, and offered safety tips to workers. Many of the 
ruticles in the Churchill Falls News dealt with safety issues, including article on the cost 
of carelessness, slips and falls, and making a safety resolution for New Years. In its first 
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1ssue, Hibernia News attempted to g1ve workers a sense of pride in what they had 
accomplished to date. Other articles spelled out the rules and regulations on site, 
including the site's policy for maintaining law and order. The paper also attempted to put 
a face to its safety department, regularly introducing safety managers to workers. New 
safety initiatives were also introduced to workers through the newspaper, including the 
training programs and the safety incentive program. 82 
Recreation Programs 
Companies believed that they could help control workers' off time &.!d help 
reduce the stress on the stmounding communities by providing activities for workers in 
their leisure time. Providing an increasing array of entertainment, leisure, and educational 
activities became increasingly common on remote sites after Vlorld War ll.83 Employers 
used sports and other recreation programs as a means to help create a disciplined and 
committed workforce, on and off the job. Sports were also seen as a way to build 
teamwork between workers and to keep them busy during their down time. While 
workers on industrial construction projects only had a limited amount of free time as 
many worked extremely long hours, employers quickly realized that employees were less 
82 See issues of the Churchill Falls News, 2 December 1967, 16 December 1967, and 30 
Decemher 1 C)()7 _ See for instance the nrticle on thermal arc snravinP" as well ::JS art·icles on 
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likely to end up in trouble if their downtime could be monitored by the company.84 Sports 
leagues, hunting and curling competitions were company-sponsored at Churchill Falls, 
while softball teams were the norm at Hibernia. 
Recreation programs were seen as a way to reach out to both workers and their 
families. By keeping workers' wives and kids occupied, employers hoped to increase 
families' identification with the project and to reassure workers that their families were 
kept occupied while they worked their long hours. For workers recreational programs 
were seen as a way to build friendships, relieve monotony, and help improve their mental 
and physical attitudes. 85 Companies that offered a wide variety of these programs gained 
a good reputation among workers. Recreational facilities at Churchill Falls included a 
gymnasium, curling rink, bowling alley and an indoor swimming pool, in addition to a 
community library. Cmling was very popular among workers and the site newspaper 
regularly reported on the winners of bonspiel tolli---naments.86 Outdoor amenities included 
a ski-hill, cross-country ski trails, playground, and a baseball diamond. Sports programs 
at Churchill Falls began in earnest in 1967 with the creation of hockey, curling and other 
team sports for workers. Many subcontractors fielded their own sports teams; workers 
interested more in intramural play organized others. 
For workers who wanted social activities but were not into organized sports, the 
recreation centre offered swimming and classes in self-defence. Other workers played 
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holiday while most workers returned to their hometowns, the company offered sports and 
games programs for those left on site. Programs included dart and pools championships, 
broom ball and hockey tournaments. The company also offered several recreational 
activities geared towards the women on site, particularly the ones not employed outside 
the household. CFLCo funded an Arts and Crafts Club and provided it with an old 
contractor's building to offer its classes. It also purchased the kilns, potter's wheel, and 
looms necessary to get the crafts club started. Women were offered day and night courses 
in pottery, metal enamelling, copper tooling, leathercraft, weaving, and macrame. For 
those women not interested in crafts, the site also offered bridge and cribbage groups. 87 
To help improve workers' education, the local school offered adult education 
night courses at both the elementary level (grades 1-7) and at the advanced level (8-1 0). 
In addition, the school offered workers advanced English, science and math courses. 88 
Several workers attended night classes to complete i'.igh school, including a security 
guard from Bell Island with grade 8 education. Other workers wanted to upgrade their 
high school marks before taking trade or technical school courses. 89 Hibernia also 
provided a wide array of recreational activities to its workers. Leisure activities at 
Hibernia included a tavern, swimming pool, weight room, games room, library, television 
rooms and a softball diamond, and pictures in the Hibernia News showed workers 
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relaxing by playing horseshoes, pinball and soaking in the hot tub. Hibernia also put a 
strong emphasis on team sports and had regular softball and hockey toumaments.90 
Conclusions 
When construction workers joined the forefront of Newfoundland's 
modernization programs, they became pmty to both its benefits and its drawbacks. 
Benefits included relatively high wages and the provision of corporate welfare programs 
on many of the larger projects. Drawbacks included poor weather, long hours of work, 
• 
seasonal unemployment, isolation from friends and family, and dirty, often dangerous 
work. Other factors such as high unemployment levels and a lack of other job options, 
government promotion of construction, and the increasing provision of training programs 
also made many workers tum to construction. 
Unlike workers at Churchill Falls and Hibernia, there were few incentives offered 
by employers at the Come by Chance site. From the planning stage on, Churchill Falls 
planned its tO\\'ll site to attract and maintain a stable \vorkforce included good quality 
housing, a wide selection of sports and recreation programs, and a sense of community. 
Workers at Churchill Falls were offered regular t1ips home to visit their families and 
other incentives. This is in direct contrast to Come by Chance where liltle of 
management's attention appears to have gone into keeping their workforce content. It is 
interesting that the two projects offering a wide variety of corporate welfare programs 
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for the labour strife at Come by Chance, the lack of recreation programs and a site 
newspaper was indicative of a project where workers did not feel that the company cared 
about their needs. 
This chapter revels a perennial problem with construction labour and constmction 
unions not just in Newfoundland but often found in regions with low industrialization. 
'vVith the tight labour market common to mega-project developments, labour's power 
increases and constmction unions manage to press their advantage. Typically this 
translates into jurisdiction and wage and benefit advantages, not long-term advantages. 
Rarely does this lead to increasing their long-tem1 organizaiional integrity such as 
providing hiring halls, union security, province-wide bargaining, legal protection against 
double breasting or employment security. As soon as the mega-projects are over, 
employers press their adva11tage and not only are wage gains lost but often the 
organizational integrity of the u...'1ion is damaged. While it is easy to say that constmction 
unions should fight for broader goals than compensation, the problem is exacerbated by 
employers and the government. 
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Chapter 5: Workers Respond to Modernization 
Introduction 
Newfoundland's industrial construction workers have responded to modemization 
and their new work environments in both collective and individual ways. Collective 
actions such as strikes are generally acts committed for the perceived benefit of a group of 
people, based on an idea of what is fair. Strikes are part of a rather limited array of 
options open to workers attempting to forge a decent place for themselves in society.1 
Strikes are not a new phenomenon, they have existed in the transition to industrialism, in 
the system of "free competition", and in corporate capitalism. While each stage of 
economic development has its own pattems of acc]lmulation, and uses its own ignition to 
start strikes, many of the reasons remain strikingly similar. Underlying causes include 
trade cycles -- such as a depression -- or political events, while more immediate causes 
include such things as the piecemeal forms of pressure applied by employers attempting 
to escape falling profit margins, technological advances, resistance to wage increases, 
overall control over the workplace, or by workers trying to improve their living 
standards.2 Strikes occur in industries of all sorts, including those whose production 
increases without tec:h.nological or organizational cha..'1ge and those who have undergone 
rapid technological change. After technical or organizational changes both management 
and labour are forced to adapt their relationship, with the adjustment rarely smooth as the 
1 Workers also responded to poor conditions with high levels of absenteeism and worker ,__ 
turnover, slowdowns and lowered productivity. Some workers chose to unite into political or 
social organizations, forming mutual aid societies or unions. More individual protests have taken 
the form of disobeying company rules including taking longer lunches hours, slacking oft~ 
pranks, and fighting. For more on this see chapter eight. 
2 E. J. Hobsbawm, "Economic Fluctuations and Some Social Movements since 1800," in 
Labouring Men: Studies in the History of Labour (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), 
139-40. 
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new pattern of industrial relations replaces the old. Strikes occur in industries that are 
static or expanding, changing technologically or not, as a result of short or long-term 
cyclical factors, in essence anywhere, anytime. 3 
On large scale construction proj~cts workers have responded to modernization by 
pushing the boundaries of management's rules, leaving jobs they were dissatisfied with, 
turning to unionization, and striking. \\'orkers at the Corne by Chance refinery project, for 
instance, repeatedly turned to the strike. Workers struck for reasons both internal (shop 
floor, union-worker, and union-management relationships) and external (economic and 
political) to their workplace. This chapter examines both the micro level of labour 
relations at Churchill Falls and Come by Chance and the macro level of strike patterns in 
Newfoundland in an attempt to discern why labour relations were relatively peaceful at 
one project and anything but at the other.4 
Workers have always been an unknown variable in labour relations. \Vhile 
governments established rules governing labour relations, and employers set up elaborate 
plans to control their workforces, there were never guarantees that workers would foilow 
either set of regulations. Workers brought their own priorities to each job, ones that had 
the potential to diverge quite widely from their employers. Workers' priorities included 
improving their income levels, controlling the rate of production as much as possible, and 
ensuring that they were treated with a level of respect and fairness. When workers ' 
3 There are two different strike propensity theories, strikes as mistakes and strikes as collective 
voice. See John Godard, Industrial Relations: The Economy and Society (Toronto: McGraw-Hill 
Ryerson, 1994). 
4 Labour relations at Hibernia are covered in chapters six and seven. 
136 
interests differed from their employers' attempts to maximize production and profits, 
conflict often resulted. 5 
Post-Confederation Labour Relations in Newfoundland 
The provincial government has played a myriad of roles in Newfoundland's 
economic development. Both the federal and provincial governments were crucial to the 
creation of the labour relations climate, largely through their promotion of capital 
accumulation. Governments have attempted to foster capital accumulation in Canada in 
four main ways: by creating a favourable fiscal climate, by underwriting the private risks 
of production, by creating capitalist labour markets, and by providing technical 
infrastructure. Governments affect both the macro and micro-economic situations through 
taxation, trade and regulation policies as well as through active labour market policies. 
There are four main elements to labour-market policy: actions to improve the way the 
labour market functions including job placement services, vocational counselling, 
collecting and disseminating labour-market information; actions to influence the supply 
of labour including mobility assistance, job training, and basic skills development; 
measures to influence the demand for labour including direct job creation projects, wage 
recruitment subsidies; and, finally, provisions of unemployment benefits and other social 
services for the jobless.6 When deemed necessary, both levels of govern.rnent were willing 
to use their powers to ensure minimal interruptions to the capitalist system. Provincial a.TJ.d 
federal governments were also responsible for regulating labour standards including 
5 Craig Heron, Worldng in Steel: the Early Years in Canada, 1883-1935 (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, 19 88), 112. 
6 Leo Panitch, "The Role and Nature of the Canadian State," in Panitch, ed., The Canadian Stare: 
Political Economy and Political Power (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977) and 
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conditions and environment of work, the minimum wage, hours of work, vacations, and 
occupational health and safety.7 While it is difficult for the same government to further 
two such disparate goals, promoter and regulator, the Newfoundland government has 
managed to marry the two by establishing the bare minimum of regulations in areas which 
were seen to threaten economic development. In other areas deemed less threatening the 
government has paid more attention to regulation. 
Newfoundland joined Canada in 1949. By then private sector workers across 
Canada had the legal right to organize, to bargain collectively, and to strike under the 
Industrial Relations Disputes Investigation Act and its provincial equivalents. During the 
1950s collective bargaining across Canada became more routine, with unions in the post-
war era opting to compromise with employers, focus on issues like wages and benefits, 
and accept that working within the capitalist system entailed certain concessions on their 
part.8 One such concession was their "agreement" to act in an "appropriate" manner, which 
in mainland Canada essentialiy meant a purge of communists and i...'l Canada and 
Newfoundland meant putting economic development at the forefront. 
·with Confederation, Newfoundland adopted a labour relations system patterned 
on the Canadian model.9 Under premier Joseph Smallwood, organized labour had an 
assigned role in economic development. Labour's role was to organize a.'ld operate within 
a limited sphere. The govem..rnent was willing to tolerate unions that would work within 
Stephen McBride, Not Working: State, Unemployment. and Neo-Conservatism in Canada 
(Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1992), chapter 5. 
7 For more on this, see Judy Fudge and Eric Tucker, "Law, Industrial Relations, and the State," 
Labour/Le Travail, 46 (Fall2000), 251-306. 
8 Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz, The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms: From Consent to 
Coercion Revisited (Toronto: Garamond Press, 1988), 21-22. 
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the system for increased benefits but those which threatened economic development were 
unacceptable. 10 Rules of collective bargaining were defined in Newfoundland's Labour 
Relations Act (LRA), passed in 1950. It committed public policy to collective bargaining, 
including the duty to bargain in good faith, and regulated unfair labour practices and 
industrial conflict. Collective agreements were binding on both parties and had to contain 
a proviso for arbitration in case of a stalemate. The Labour Relations Act also provided 
for government intervention if collective bargaining procedures were ineffective, 
including conciliation services or the appointment of an arbitration board.11 In many 
regards Newfoundland simply adopted legislation created for mainland Canada. Many 
Newfoundlanders were engaged in the fishery for their livelihood, but the new legislation 
9 Andrew Luchak and Morgan Cooper, "Industrial Relations in Newfoundland and Labrador," in 
M. Thompson and J. Rose, eds. Regionalism in Canadian Tndustrial Relations (forthcoming), 4. 
10 Richard Gwyn, Smallwood: the Unlikely Revolutionary (Toronto: McClelland and Steward, 
1972, 2nd edition), 199-205. Smallwood had a youthful flirtation with socialism and experience as 
a labour organizer. His first Cabinet included former president ofthe Newfoundland Federation 
of Labour Charlie Ballam as Labour Minister. Harold Horwood, an organizer with the 
Labourers' and General Workers' Protective Union, was also a member of the government. 
Smallwood appointed an Advisory Committee to recommend new labour legislation. The 
Committee was comprised of union representatives and one lawyer. Not surprisingly, it 
responded with draft legislation that included Labour Relations, Minimum Wage, and Workers 
Compensation Acts. Maxwell Cohen, Report of the Royal Commission on Labour Legislation in 
Nev,found!and and Labrador (St. John's: Royal Commission on Labour Legislation, 1971), 61-
69. 
11 To mediate and adjudicate disputes, a La.bour Relations Board (LRB) was set up. The Labour 
Relations Board had the power to inquire into disputes, and if necessary to set the terms of a first 
collective agreement. The Labour Relations Board also examined disputes under the Public 
Service Collective Bargaining Act, the Fishing, Teachers, Intems and Occupational Health and 
Safety Acts when each was passed. Canada, Labour Legislation in the Past Decade (Ottawa: 
Queen's Printer, 1961), 3; and Newfoundland, An Act Respecting the Right of Emplcryees to 
Organize and Providing for i'vfediation and Conciliation of Industrial Disputes (St. John's: 
Queen's Printer, 1950); and Newfoundland, "The Labour Relations Act," Revised Statutes of 
Newfoundland 1970, vol. 5 (St. John's: Queen's Pinter, 1970). 
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did not cover fishers, who were deemed independent, nor were their collective 
organizations considered trade unions. 12 
Under the Labour Relations Act, strikes became standardized, complete with a set 
of operating procedures. Strikes were to operate following a strict protocol, with the rules 
set down by the government. The government had the power to declare a strike illegal and 
to appoint conciliators. Strikes were only considered lawful once the compulsory 
conciliation procedures laid down in the Labour Relations Act were exhausted. Strikes for 
\ 
recognition, strikes attempting to pressure secondary employers, strikes designed to force 
an employer to accept the union's interpretation of the agreement, strikes to protest 
management's rights, and political strikes were deemed illegal by the government. No 
strikes could legally occur while a coll~::clive agreement was in place. Non-unionized 
workers could not legally strike until a union obtained bargaining rights and exhausted 
conciliation mechanisms. 
In some industries uruons wielded a significant amount of power, including 
railway, mining and construction but how much power generally depended on economic 
forttmes. Construction unions have been powerful for several reasons: the seasonal 
nature of their work gave employers an added incentive to have their negotiations 
completed prior to the start of construction season; constmction projects have been one of 
the bell-weathers of the economy, when construction starts are up, the economy is 
generally rebounding; constmction boasts a high level of skilled workers who are often 
able to exert more power over employers as they are not as easy to replace as unskilled or 
semi-skilled operatives. In other industries, strikes were carefully timed to take 
12 Cohen, Report of the Royal Commission on Labour Legislation in Newfoundland .. . , 98. 
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advantage of employment and market conditions. When labour was scarce strikes 
appeared to be more successful. 
Strikes in Newfoundland 
Strike levels remained relatively low during the 1950s. 13 Few new industries were 
organized and the Smallwood government was seen as relatively friendly to labour. The 
relative labour tranquillity <;>f the 1950s was shattered 31 December 1958 when loggers 
represented by the International Woodworkers of America (I\V A) launched strike action 
against the Anglo-Newfoundland Development Corporation (AND). For the first five 
weeks the strike was largely peaceful. After Smallwood attacked the IW A in a radio 
address, recommended the fonnation of a new government-led union, promised loggers 
welfare if they left the IW A, and passed emergency laws decetiifying the union, the strike 
htmed violent. Smallwood opposed the IW A as he saw it as a threat to his leadership, 
especially in the wake of IW A speeches talking of the need for a new social and political 
order (for instance a new government) in Newfoundla.'ld. ¥l:'1en 200 loggers and their 
families gathered in Badger, blocking the road, Smallwood increased the number of 
police officers in the area. On 10 March 1959 members of the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (RCMP) and Royal Newfoundland Constabulary (Ri~C) clashed with striking 
loggers, a clash that resulted in the death of a RNC constable. ·vlith the death, the 
Smallwood-led Newfoundland Brotherhood of Woodworkers negotiated a settlement 
13 During the 1950s, 53 strikes were recorded, involving 16,317 vvorkers, and 331,528 person 
days lost. Michelle McBride, "An Examination of Economic Development and its Consequences: 
Strikes in Newfoundland, 1949-1999," Presented to the Atlantic Canada Studies Conference, 
Halifax, May 2000. 
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with AND ending the strike. 14 After the strike, Smallwood asked union leaders to sever 
all connections with national and international unions, especially with the CLC. He also 
encouraged unions to come directly to him with their concerns, bypassing the Federation 
of Labour, which had spoken out against him during the strike. The Federation retaliated 
by forming its own political party, the Newfoundland Democratic Party and running 
candidates in the 1960 election. While it failed to win any seats, the NDP's political 
challenge forced Smallwood to repeal emergency legislation passed during the strike. 
' 
Strikes remained rare through most of the 1960s, in part due to the uncertainty of 
striking while Smallwood remained in power. With high employment levels in the late 
1960s strikes began to increase, as did wage demands. There were 64 strikes, with 15,064 
workers, and 328,830 person days lost in the 1960s. The 1960s also saw the early stages 
of organizing in the public sector, with small groups of hospital and town council workers 
achieving wage increases and improved working conditions. These small victories 
spurred the leader of the Newfoundland Government Employees Association (NGEA), 
Bill Noseworthy, to approach the government about transforming the NGEA from an 
association to a union. The government opposed the idea until a series of protest marches 
and threats to strike convinced the new premier (Fra..'lk. Moores) to pass the Public Service 
(Collective Bargaining) Act in 1973.15 
14 The new settlement met the terms originally asked for by the IW A. For more on the strike see 
H. Landon Ladd, "The Newfoundland Loggers Strike of 1959," in Gregory Kealey and W.J.C. 
Cherwinski, eds., Lectures in Canadian Labour and Working Class History (St. John's: Canadian 
Committee on Labour History, 1985), and Jerry Lembcke and William Tattam, One Union in 
Wood (New York: International Publishers, 1984). 
15 NGEA became NAPE in 1973. While allowing public sector collective bargaining, the Act also 
established government' s right to control who could strike and to legislate an immediate end to 
any strike if deemed in the public's best interests. Separate statutes for health care workers, 
school teachers, police officers and fire fighters were passed in the early 1970s. Wage increases 
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Churchill Falls 
Churchill Falls began construction during this period of relatively few strikes. 
Workers at Churchill Falls turned to the strike only infrequently. This was quite typical of 
Newfoundland in the mid- to late- 1960s when strikes were infrequent and wildcat strikes 
almost unheard of. 16 One factor which helped prevent strikes at Churchill Falls was the 
' 
general economic conditions at the time of the project. At the start of the project, many 
Newfoundlanders were anxious to find employment. When they found jobs, workers were 
less likely to strike and risk unemployment again. While there was growth in construction 
in the mid-1960s, unemployment levels remained high until the late 1960s. 
Several other factors helped influence the relatively low strike rate at Churchill 
Falls. First, the government helped smooth labour relations hy according Churchill Falls 
special project status under an amendment to the Labour Relations Act. A special project 
of 20 per cent in some blue collar collective agreements in the 1970s convinced many "white 
collar" workers of the benefits of unionization. Bill Gillespie, A Class Act: an Illustrated History 
of the Labour Movement in Newfoundland and Labrador (St. John's: Newfoundland and 
Labrador Federation of Labour, 1986), 116-122. 
16 An exception was the non-unionized Bay d'Espoir hydro project which had three strikes in 
1965 and 1966. Workers at Bay d 'Espoir complained of not receiving an expected raise, a 
geographical double standard in paying wages, and overcrowded bunkhouses. Evening Telegram, 
3 September 1965; CNSA, collection 075, file 3.23.001. Letter to Smallwood, 8 September 1965. 
Two strikes occurred in October 1965, both over changes to shift assignments. A third stJike over 
wages occurred in March 1966. With the increase in labour dismptions, the company wondered 
if there was union activity going on in the background. For more on Bay d'Espoir, see Canada, 
Department of Labour, Strikes and Lockouts in Canada, 1965-1966; and CNSA, Collection 075 
(Smallwood Papers), file 3.23.001 including Notes taken by Assistant Deputy Minister of Labour 
during phone conversation with Harold Lundrigan, 15 October 1965; Report of Interview with 
Arthur Lundrigan, Foundation-Lundrigan Joint Venture, Bay d'Epoir, no date; Report of 
Meetings held with contractors and representatives at Bay d'Espoir, 1 November 1965; and letter 
from G.P. Hobbs, Chair, Newfoundland Light and Power Commission, to A.A. Fuller, project 
manager, 21 October 1965 and response, 26 October 1965. 
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was defined as "an undertaking for the construction of works for the development of a 
natural resource or for the establishment of a primary industry which is planned to require 
a construction period exceeding three years" and hence was given special treatment under 
the Act to ensure it greater labour relations stability. 17 Special project agreements were 
desirable for lengthy construction projects, especially those in remote or under-developed 
areas (Churchill Falls was both), because the master agreement provided a method for 
stabilizing labour condition~, providing a guarantee of minimum hours, and fixing wage 
rates at a level that would attract trades workers but not unduly upset the rest of the 
construction industry. Special project agreements shared similar characteristics, including 
uniform hiring procedures and wage scales. Under special project legislation, strikes were 
banned for the life of the project. In the case of Churchill Falls neither employers nor the 
provincial government wanted any labour strife, internal or external to the project, to halt 
progress. 18 
Several on-site factors also influenced the relative labour peace at Churchill Falls. 
Learning the lessons of the Bay d'Espoir project, the Churchill Falls Labrador 
Corporation (CFLCo) was willing to negotiate a master collective agreement to ensure 
labour peace. High rates of non-residential construction growth across Canada in the mid-
1960s influenced their decision as they worried they would not be able to import in the 
17 Special project status also acknowledged that pre-project collective agreements were 
enforceable despite their negotiation while there were no employees in the bargaining unit. 
Newfoundland and Labrador, Revised Statutes of Newfoundland 1970, volume 5 (St. John's: 
Queen's Printer, 1970), 2983-3028. 
18 Early special project agreements were used on BC Hydro projects from the late 1950s to the 
1970s, Alberta's Syncrude project, Ontario's Weiland Canal project, the Halifax Imperial Oil 
refinery, and the Montreal Expo 1967 instaliations. CLFCo, Churchill Falls Power Project 
Master Labour Agreement, 7-8. 
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required skilled workers without a collective agreement.19 The collective agreement 
established sta.••1dardized working conditions, uniform hiring procedures, wage rates and 
fringe benefits, and set out procedures to deal with grievances and jurisdictional disputes 
and covered the life of the project, from 1967 to 1975. Under the agreement, management 
was given the right to hire workers from any source - no union hiring - but workers had 
to join the appropriate union within 15 days as a condition of employment. Management 
retained the right to determine the qualifications of employees, to transfer, promote and 
• 
demote, and to discipline and discharge workers. Management also kept the right to 
determine the methods of performing and the scheduling of work. 
Contractors were represented by the Churchill Falls Power Project Contractors' 
Association, while workers were represented by the Churchill Falls Power Project Allied 
Construction Council, a super-union made up of eight construction unions and the 
Teamsters and Hotel and Restaurant \Vorkers Union. Individual unions and contractors 
ceded to their Council and Association the right to conduct collective bargaining and to 
settle any labour disputes that arose. CFLCo was willing to bargain with construction 
unions as it was worried that the United Steelworkers, considered to be more militant, 
would organize the site. The United Steelworkers Union launched its first on-site 
organizing campaign in the spring of 1967 but its application for certification was 
rejected by the Labour Relations Board when it was kamed the Local had not received its 
charter yet. 
19 From 1964-1966 Canadian non-residential construction grew at an annual .rate of just under 20 
per cent. By 1966 many trades faced shortages of skilled construction workers across Canada. 
Average Canadian unemployment was only 3.6 per cent in 1966, with no measurable 
unemployment in many of the trades, including electricians, pipefitters, iromvorkers and 
boilennakers. CFLCo, Churchill Falls Power Project Master Labour Agreement, 1. 
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Pre-project planning and a master labour agreement covering all workers on site 
went a long way to helping ensure labour peace on site.20 By setting out pre-project 
agreements, labour unrest often experienced in the organizing stage could be avoided, 
procedures to handle jurisdictional disputes and grievances would already be in place, and 
access to experienced and skilled trade workers could be enhanced. Towards this end, 
project managers hired full-time labour relations personnel to anticipate and avoid labour 
' 
shortages and other labour problems. Under the agreement, jurisdictional disputes, seen as 
one of the potential trouble spots, were to be referred to the international building trades 
unions' National Joint Board in Washington, DC. While work was under dispute, 
construction was to continue by the assigned group. Setting out wage increases and 
regulating camp conditions also helped prevent labour disruptions.21 
Formal labour relations on site remained good, which CFLCo attributed to the 
agreement covering all workers and contractors on site, to regular wage increases 
20 One unanticipated result of the agreement was the added power it gave to international unions. 
During the 1960s many electricians, painters and labourers in Newfoundland broke away from 
their international unions and formed an "independent" union. To get work on the Churchill Falls 
project, however, the breakaway labourers' union had tore-affiliate with the Labourers ' 
International Union or risk being left out of the project. Provincial Archives ofNewfoundland 
and Labrador (PA[~L), MG 668 (Ne\vfoundland Federation of Labour papers), Correspondence, 
box 4. Letter from William Dodge, executive vice-president, CLC, to Joseph Connolly, general 
organizer, UAPP, 24 February 1964; Letters from Cyril Strong to J. Mackenzie, Director of 
Organizing for the CLC, 4 December and 19 December 1968. 
21 The contract laid out the basics of camp living, including how often the bed sheets were to be 
changed (every week), the provision of flush toilets, and the prohibition of double tier beds. It 
also established rate increases for all the unions on site at 15 cents an hour, applied t\.vice a year 
from 1968 to 1970, with a 10 cent an hour minimum increase applied semi-annually for the 
remainder of the project. In August 1970 an additional annual adjustment was provided for, to 
match the basic hourly rate increases of workers i.n similar job descriptions in ten Canadian cities 
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(averaging 11 per cent per year), and prompt grievance settlement.22 Few incidents 
maned the labour peace. One exception was a dispute in July 1970 between survey 
workers, mostly instrument and rod workers, working for Foundation-Lundrigan. The 
workers wanted Memorial Day (1 July in Newfoundland) observed as a holiday or double 
time wage rates as other contractors were offering. Foundation-Lundrigan refused a.11d 
told the men to report to work. After the 22 workers observed the holiday anyway, 
nineteen were sent back to their original jobs, but three were ordered to work with one of 
\ 
the labour gangs, which the workers viewed as selective pu..'lishment. When the other 
workers heard about the treatment, they refused to work unless their fellow workers were 
returned to survey work. The contractor toid the workers either to report to work or 
collect their wages. The men collected their wages and left the site.23 
The strength of the union vis-a-vis management also influenced dispute 
settlements. Sam Whalen, business agent for the International Association of Structural 
and Ornamental Ironworkers a.11d part-time business agent for the United Association of 
Plumbers and Pipefitters, recalled that during the first year on site, "some of the 
contractors who were here tested the unions pretty thoroughly to see if we really could 
look after the men. They found out we could and did." He claimed the unions never had 
any serious trouble but were tested on almost a daily basis.24 Contractors often pushed the 
boundaries of the contract to see if the union would force them to stick to it. Workers' 
geographic isolation may also have played a role in limiting the number of strikes. Not 
22 CFLCo, "Churchill Falls Power Development Management and Construction Equipment," 5. 
23 
"Labour dispute at Churchill," Evening Telegram, 17 July 1970. 
:!
4 
"Meet Sam Whalen," Churchill Falls News, 13 February 1971. 
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having an independent community - the site was a company town - diminished potential 
community support for any actions that would harm the project.25 
Labour Relations at the Come by Chance Refinen' 
Unlike Churchill Falls, Come by Chance did not have a peaceful labour relations 
climate. At Come by Chance, workers' protests most often took the form of wildcat 
strikes where workers downed their tools and walked off the job. \.Yorkers at Come by 
Chance were only the first in a long line of workers to tum to the strike in the 1970s. The 
1970s saw a huge jump in numbers of strikes (439), strikers (110,444), and person days 
lost (2,0 18,448). In the early 1970s collective bargaining was extended for the first time 
to fish harvesters and public sector workers in Newfoundland. Fish harvesters and 
processors were given the right to engage in collective bargaining in 1971 under the 
Fishing Industry (Collective Bargaining) Act. This gave fish harvesters and processors 
the right to form unions and to strike if a collective agreement could not be reached. 
Recognition strikes quickly followed in Burgeo with plant workers in 1971-2, and with 
trawler workers in 1974. 
Public sector workers also began to be covered by collective bargaining rights 
under a series of legislative statutes in the early 1970s, with separate statutes for health 
care workers, school teachers, police officers and fire fighters. Doctors and interns were 
25 This goes against the Kerr-Siegel theory that workers living in one-industry towns with closely 
unified structures were more likely to strike. Those working in physically tough, casual or 
unskilled jobs were also viewed as more likely to strike. If the Kerr-Siegel hypothesis were 
correct, Churchill Falls with its isolation from other workers and few moderating influences in 
the community should have developed an "us versus them" mentality leading to regular strikes. 
\Vhile location and the rough and tumble nature of employment may be a factor in determining 
the propensity of some workers to strike, it is not a predominant influence and fails to explain 
why service workers or textile workers have high strike records. It also ignores that some 
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not given the same rights until 1984. While many public sector workers were initially 
wary of unions, this was not to last. With the benefits accruing to many blue collar 
workers in the 1970s, including wage increases on the 20 per cent level in some 
construction collective agreements, many newly organized "white collar" workers began 
to see the benefits of unionization. Initially public sector unions had problems adapting to 
their new workers - white collar and women - who had little experience with unions. 
Women were seen as a problem in the mid-1970s because they were thought to work for 
shorter periods than men, creating a higher labour turnover and not strongly supporting 
the union.26 In the early to mid-1970s nurses in Newfoundland overwhelmingly joined the 
Newfoundland Nurses Union, demanding better wages, working conditions and job 
. 27 
secunty. 
Newfoundland was not alone in seeing such a large jump in the numbers of strikes; 
. 
the 1970s were a particularly turbulent period for labour relations across Canada. Strikes 
in the 1970s reflected the volatile economic conditions - spiralling inflation and 
increasing oil prices. Strikes in Newfoundland in the 1970s largely matched the Canadian 
pattern, with fishing, mining construction, and woods industries particularly strike 
prone.28 In almost every year from 1969-1975 there was a major mining strike between 
the United Steelworkers of America and mines in Wabush, Buchans and Labrador City, 
the bulk over wages and benefits. ThL.-ty per cent of strikes in Newfoundland in the 
industries are more strike prone in one country than another and that there are wide variations of 
strikes within an industry. 
26 
"CUPE: a growing union," Decks Awash, 4, 3 (June 1975), 19-20. 
27 
"Unions' sophistication grows," Decks .Awash, 4, 3 (June 1975), 17. 
28 For more on Canadian strike patterns see Stuart Jamieson, Times ofTrouble: Labour Unrest 
and Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1900~1966 (Ottawa: Task Force on Labour Relations, 1968); 
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period were in the fishery, 24 per cent in mining, 13 per cent in construction, 9 per cent in 
1. 29 pub 1c sector. 
While Minister of Manpower Ed Maynard blamed some of the labour problems 
on the larger than normal numbers of contracts being negotiated, he emphasized that the 
majority of contracts were settled without strike or lockout. The unions ca.'lle in for some 
of the blame as "some local leaders are not as sophisticated in their thinking and outiook 
as they are in other places.", According to Maynard, new unions and new management 
generally made for rough negotiations as they lacked experience. Where industries had 
been unionized for a long time, such as the paper industry, Maynard found that "normally 
there is little trouble because they have gained the experience."30 During the early 
1970s officials ofthe Department of Labour decried the lack of knowledge by employers 
and employees of the Labour Relations Act and suggested that an educational campaign 
might help both sides understand their responsibilities and help decrease the number of 
strikes, especially illegal ones.31 Despite the soaring numbers of strikes and lockouts -
and the increase in demand for conciliators -- in the mid-1970s the Minister of Manpower 
was reluctant to increase its conciliation resources, stating that there was little point to 
creating a "huge bureaucracy for a peak demand five years from now, and then not use it 
for the next 15 years. "32 
In 1974 there were 187,000 workers in the workforce, of whom 50,000 were 
represented by 150 certified unions (26 per cent). Unionized labour in 1974 launched 88 
and Morley Gunderson, John Kervin and Frank Reid, ''Logit Estimates of Strike Incidence from 
Canadian Contract Data," Journal of Labour Economics, 42, 2 (1986), 257-76. 
29 The remaining 24 per cent were spread. across the rest of the occupations. 
30 
"Maynard blames inflation," Decks Awash, 4, 3 (June 1975), 24. 
31 
"Rules," Decks Awash, 4, 3 (June 1975), 11. 
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v.·ork stoppages, resulting in 89,000 person days lost. 16 of the work stoppages were 
deemed iegal (27,000 person days lost), while 72 were deemed illegal - not following 
established procedures and encompassing walkouts, wildcats, sit-downs, and study 
sessions. While legislation existed for prosecuting the organizers of illegal work 
stoppages, it was rarely used in the 1970s, in part because the Department was reluctant to 
lose their credibility by seemingly favouring.one side over the other. 33 
In the three year period when Come by Chance was built, construction was one of 
the most strike prone industries in Newfoundland's history, comprising 35 per cent of all 
strike hours lost, 84 per cent of all illegal strike hours lost, and 5 per cent of all legal 
strike hours lost.34 In 1971 construction made up 18 per cent of all person hours lost to 
strikes in Newfoundland, including 27 per cent of illegal strike hours. By the period of 
peak construction on site (1972) the percentage of total hours lost to strikes in 
construction was 13 per cent, with construction making up 61 per cent of all illegal strike 
hours. By 1973 construction strikes accounted for 67.5 per cent of all person hours lost to 
strikes in Newfoundland, ru"ld 93 per cent of all illegal strike hours lost. As c.onfirmation 
that at Come by Chance wildcats had become the norm, less than one per cent of all legal 
strike hours lost were from construction. 
Constmction strikes were blamed on organization along trade lines and the large 
number of unions in the construction industry (13 unions). A Royal Commission 
established to investigate the high incidence of illegal work stoppages in Newfotmdland 
in the early 1970s found that work stoppages occwTed due to "distorted values and 
32 
"Maynard blames inflation," Decks Awash, 24. 
33 
"Illegal strikes take over," Decks Awash, 4, 3 (June 1975), 25. 
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attitudes in our industrial relations environment," a basic lack of respect for the law, a 
lack of trust and understanding between labour and management, a lack of 
communication, a lack of understanding of the collective bargaining system, inadequacies 
in the collective bargaining process, and issues relating to working in remote areas, 
international unions, jurisdictional disputes, political interference in hiring, and to the 
paying of welfare to strikers.35 Workers were viewed as having trouble adjusting to 
regulated industrial settin&s and as slow to cope with the accelerating industrialization, 
while employers were criticized for a strong anti-union stance, particularly in newly 
unionized areas.36 Delays in certification, conciliation, and grievance arbitration were also 
blamed for many of the strikes. 
Not surprisingly, the initial construction period (1971-1973) accounted for the 
majority of work stoppages at the refinery. In 1968 the provincial government appointed a 
royal commission to exan1ine Newfoundland's labour legislation. The government was 
motivated by several factors including a push by public sector workers and fishers, and a 
spate of new industrial projects on the horizon.37 Chair Maxwell Cohen investigated the 
34 Construction Study Group, Plarming Task Force, Govenunent of Newfoundland, Report on the 
Construction Industry (1973), 169. 
35 Edward Neary and Michael Harrington, Report of the Royal Commission on Illegal Work 
Stoppages (St. John's: Royal Commission, 1973), 12-25. 
36 The idea that workers were more likely to strike while adjusting to new industrial working 
conditions is one posited by Kerr. He argued that as workers made the transition to 
industrialization, striking was likely. He viewed these strikes as transitional and believed that as 
workers were socially integrated into the new system, industrial conflict would decrease. While 
there may be some merit to the idea that newly unionized workers are more prone to strikes, 
Kerr's modernization theory downplays workers' ability to strike as a means to express their 
dissatisfaction with their workplaces or the industrial relations system. 
37 The commission was initially chaired by Ivan Rand, known for his solution to the 1945 Ford 
strike in Windsor, Ontario whereby workers did not have to join a certified bargaining agent 
union but were required to pay union ques (the Rand Formula). Rand also chaired Ontario's 
Royal Commission on Trade Union and Employers' Association in 1968. After Rand's death in 
1969, Maxwell Cohen was appointed commissioner. Cohen was Dean ofFaculty of Law at 
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adequacy of existing labour legislation for both organized and unorganized workers, 
including fishing, forestry, mining, manufacturing and constmction case studies. 
Cohen found that labour legislation for the construction industry was inadequate 
to meet its changing needs. He found that few workers outside of the major urban areas 
(Corner Brook, Grand Falls and St. John's) were organized, and that where they were 
organized they often had only voluntary recognition, not actual certification. This meant 
that a large number of the construction workers turning up for Churchill Falls were 
' 
getting their first exposure to collective agreements. Within a few years, with aggressive 
organizing, building trades unions organized more a11d more sites. From 1969 to 1971, 
there was a 75 per cent increase in cases before the Labour Relations Board, much of it in 
construction. Cohen suggested establishing a distinct panel of the Labour Relations Board 
to handle construction certifications in a more timely manner. To cope with the special 
needs of the construction industry, particularly large projects, Cohen recommended 
creating special project legislation where all workers would belong to a cou.llcil of trade 
unions and all contractors to an employers council. This would ensure that the bargair...ing 
unit encompassed all jobs on site. Cohen also recommended multi-trades bargaining to 
"assure stability so that the project can proceed without fear of work stoppage."38 
McGill University. Cohen went on to have a distinguished career in civil righ~s and international 
law. See William Kaplan and Donald McRae, eds., Law, Policy and Internazional Justice: Essays 
in Honour of Maxwell Cohen (Montreal: MeGill-Queen's University Press, 1993). The Royal 
Commission was responsible for commissioning one ofNewfoundland's first labour histories, 
Rolfe Hattenhauer's A Brief Labour History of Newfoundland (St. Jolm's: Royal Commission on 
Labour Legislation in Newfoundland, 1970). Newfoundland was following the lead of Ontario, 
New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, British Columbia, Manitoba and the federal government in 
appointing a royal commission into labour relations. Ottawa appointed its own Task Force on 
Labour Relations (Woods report) in 1968. 
38 Cohen, Report of the Royal Commission on Labour Legislation in Nev.foundland ... , 429. 
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The timing of Come by Chance had a lot to do with the choice of the strike as 
favoured weapon. Refinery construction began in May 1971 as labour relations were 
becoming increasingly fractious. The Electric Reduction Company of Canada (ERCO), for 
instance, reported that in it had experienced more illegal work stoppages at its Long 
Harbour plant than at its other three Canadian plants.39 One newspaper article declared 1971 
a year of labour disputes without parallel. In almost every year from 1969-197 5 miners in 
W abush, Buchans and Lab~ador City struck over wages and benefits. Strikes were also 
underway at several of the province's other industrial projects, including fish workers at 
Bonavista Cold Storage and British Columbia Packers. Fish plant workers at Burgeo were 
on strike over union recognition for several month. Forty Bowater Power Co. workers, 
without a contact since December, also struck in this period, demanding a wage 
increase.40 In great part, workers' militancy was driven by wage increases lagging behind 
productivity gains. 
Strike activity generally mirrored the growth of trade unions; each period of new 
trade union gro\\rth appears to correspond to an increase in strikes. By the ti..'Tie 
constmction was started at Come by Cha..tJ.ce, Newfoundland's labour relations climate was 
undergoing dramatic changes. In the early 1970s collective bargaining was extended to 
fish harvesters and processors in Newfoundland. Workers were given the right to engage 
in collective bargaining in 1971 under the Fishing Industry (Collective Bargaining) Act. 
Tllis gave harvesters and processors the right to form unions and to sttike. Recognition 
39 Many workers moved between employment at the refinery and at the nearby Long Harbour 
phosporous plant (only 20 miles away). When workers struck at one, they often found 
employment at the other. 
40 Editorial, "Our Troubled Labour Scene," Daily News, 20 July 1971; "900 off jobs in strikes," 
ET, 2 Aprill973; and "Come by Chance Strike Ends," ET, 12 October 1971. 
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strikes quickly followed in Burgeo with plant workers in 1971-2, and with trawler 
workers in 1974.41 With these newly unionized workers, the identity of union members 
changed from largely blue-collar (construction and resource workers) to a mix of blue, 
pink and white-collar workers. Unionization rates went from 21.3 per cent of the labour 
foree in 1970 to 35.3 per cent in 1981, well ahead ofthe 26.7 per cent Canadian average. 
The high rate of unionization was also attributable to the large proportion of its labour 
force in traditionally heavily unionized sectors including mining, construction, 
' 
transportation, and, by the 1970s, the public sector. In 1965 Newfoundland's largest 
union was the carpenters, but by the mid-1980s the largest unions were fishermen 
(FF A W), public sector workers (Ni\PE, CUPE, PSAC), teachers' (NT A), and nurses 
Internal Problems at Come by Chance 
Strikes at Come by Chance were also influenced by several factors internal to the 
site. Many construction workers vie·wed themselves as transient workers, in construction 
41 The Burgeo strike was against Spenser Lake. Lake owned the fish plant, the only supermarket, 
the gas station, beauty parlour and was the town's mayor. Despite threats to seli the plant if 
workers unionized, workers voted in favour of the union in 1971. When Lake rejected all 
demands in negotiations, workers went on strike. Lake operated the plant with replacement 
workers. With an upcoming election workers pressured the government to intervene but the 
government did not intervene until workers destroyed several of Lake's commercial properties 
and Lake responded by welding the gates to the plant shut. Frank Moores promised if elected he 
would settle the dispute, even if it meant buying the plant. Gordon Inglis, More Than Just a 
Union: the Story of the NFFA WU (St. John's: Jesperson Press, 1985). 
42 In 1979, trawler and inshore fishery workers joined fish plant workers in organizi.'l.g the 
Fishermen Food and Allied Workers Union (FFAW). This increased the number of organized 
fish workers from 9-l 0,000 to 26,000 by 1981. Flexing their union muscles, inshore fisheries 
workers conducted an industry-wide strike in 1980. Membership in unions increased from the 
low 20,000s in the early 1960s to 75,000 by 1982. By the 1990s Newfoundland had the highest 
percentage of union density at 53 per cent, as compared to New Brunswick at 37 per cent, PEl at 
33 per cent, and Nova Scotia at 31 per cent. Newfoundland and Labrador, Employment and 
Unemployment in Ne>lfoundland: A Profiie (St. John's: Royal Commission on Employment and 
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to make as much money as possible in the shortest amount of time. This left them with 
little attachment to the job. \Vf'jle both construction workers and employers wanted to see 
the job done professionally, as construction workers were employed on short-term basis, 
workers had a vested interest in improving their pay cheques. Several strikes on site 
involved demands for higher wages, including a strike by fifteen insulators in September 
1972. The insulators were seeking higher wages and a new contract to replace the one that 
expired in May 1972. 'YVorkers also demanded increased travel and subsistence allowances. 
The insulators agreed to return to work when the matter was sent to arbitration.43 
Conversely, employers also had to contend with the emergence of a core of 
experienced construction workers who were starti..r1g to demanding more respect from 
their employers. When workers did not feel they were receiving the respect they were 
entitled to, they launched a series of strikes, some for higher wages, others for better 
treatment and working conditions. With the labour scarcity of the period, many unions 
were also able to exert more power than only a few years earlier. The relatively flush 
economic times of the early 1970s made many workers more willing to strike because 
they had "money in the bank" or were not worried about finding alternate employment. 
Many of the construction workers were relatively young with only limited family 
obligations. This allowed them to take more chances than when the labour market was 
tighter and they risked long-term unemployment by striking.44 
Unemployment, 1986), 7 and Kealey, The History and Structure of the New.f"oundland Labour 
Movement, 79-80. 
43 NAC, RG 27, vol. 3453, T3456, strike 72-345, 18 September 1972; CNSA, Collection 073, file 
011, Procon Progress Report, no. 22, 27 November 1972; and "More Labor Trouble for 
Refine1y," ET, 5 September 1972. 
44 My thinking on wildcat strikes in the early 1970s has benefited greatly from discussions with 
Sue Hmi and Herb Butt, a union representative at the Long Harbour plant during the early 1970s. 
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From 1971 to its completion in late 1973 29 work stoppages occurred at the Come 
by Chm1ce construction site, five in 1971, thirteen in 1972 <U!d eleven in 1973. In the three-
year period, Procon lost over 100,000 person hours of work, with subcontractors losing an 
additional 30,000 hours. The strikes were largely wildcats and the issues ranged from wages 
and jurisdictional lines to support for dismissed workers. The strikes involved almost all of 
the unions on site, and included Labourers, Carpenters, Pipefitters, Boilermakers, Electrical 
workers and Operating Engineers.45 Unlike Churchill Falls where special project legislation 
was put in place covering the entire workplace, work at Come By Chance started while the 
unions involved were still negotiating collective agreements. Not until late 1971 were 
various building trades unions granted certification. Attempts at a master labour agreement 
coveting all workers failed when two of the unions refused to sign the site agreement. 
Work was only underway for two weeks when the first pickets went up around the 
refinery site. Stiiking members of the International Brotherhood of Electiical \Yorkers 
(IBEW), local 2330, set up picket lines around Newfoundland as part of a province wide 
sttike in June 1971. The IBEW members were on strike against the Newfoundland and 
Labrador Construction Association over demands for union security and provincial 
jurisdiction. Thirty-six IBEW members were employed on site. The other 431 
construction workers on site refused to cross the picket line. The IBE\V later withdrew 
the picket to allow other workers to return to work, but electricians stayed off the job. 
45This data is compiled from Newfoundland, Department of Labour statistics, including Annual 
Reports, "Summary of Wildcat Work Stoppages," and "Legal Work Stoppages," for the years 
1971-1973. 
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Trying to bring public attention to the IBEW's complaints, the picket was timed to 
f h . . 46 coincide with a press tour o t e constructiOn s1te. 
Management's failure to execute a master agreement for the entire project was a 
sign of the communications failure on site. While most of the Building Trades Unions were 
covered by the Master Agreement, the Plumbers and Pipefitters and the Boilermakers, both 
crucial to the construction, were not.47 The Plumbers and Pipefitters Union argued that since 
it had not signed the site agreement, its workers were operating under their national 
contract. The national agreement provided greater benefits to the union than those available 
in the site contract.48 Under the national agreement, workers were entitled to Regatta day as 
a statutory holiday, something not offered under the site agreement. As Procon was a 
signatory to the plumbers' national agreement, the urlion expected Procon to stand by the 
national contract and pay the workers for the holiday. After trying to meet wit~ Procon to 
discuss the issue for over a month, 340 pipe fitters walked off the job in August 1972. \Vork 
continued on site by the remaining 1400 workers. Four days into the strike, Procon fired the 
strikers, 50 from the company's prefab plant in St. John's and 290 at the refinery site. 
46 
"Electricians Picket at Come by Chance," ET~ 2 June 1971. Attempts to mediate the dispute 
proved fruitless. Editorial, "Our Troubled Labour Scene," Daily News, 20 July 1971. In a letter 
to Steven Neary, acting Minister of Labour, the Construction Association chairman Donald 
Holden asked for the appointment of a, conciliation board and reminded Neary that the companies 
affected by the strike were large contributors to economic grovvth. Letter from Holden to Neary, 
29 July 1971, CNSA, Collection 073 (Crosbie Papers), file 3.07.035. On 20 July 1970 Holden 
wrote directly to Smallwood, predicting that without government intervention in the strike, 17 
major projects would be shut down across the project, leaving 4600 workers unemployed and 
f
7
otentially delaying an additional19 projects. Evening Telegram, 3 June 1971. 
The Labour Agreement between Procon Inc. and the Building and Construction Trades Council 
of Newfoundland and Labrador included the Carpenters (UBCJA), Heat and Frost Insulators, 
Electrical Workers (IBEW), International Association of Iron Workers, Labourers, Operating 
~ngineers (IUOE), Painters, Sheet Metal Workers, and Transport and Allied Workers. 
"Refinery Pipefitters take Regatta holiday," ET, 3 August 1972; "Union backs employees on 
Regatta holiday," ET, 5 August 1972 and ''No chance of Procon pulling out - White," ET, 9 
158 
Workers were rehired one week later after Procon and the United Association of Plumbers 
and Pipefitters agreed that the workers would work under the terms of the union's national 
agreement. 
The International Boilermakers Union also refused to sign the site master contract. 
In November 1971 eighty boilermakers walked off the job to protest the lay-offs of eleven 
workers. The eleven workers were laid off for refusing to unload a vessel at the wharf. 
They were protesting a travelling clause in their agreement. The Boilern1akers were 
' 
covered under a national agreement. The striking workers were ordered back to work by 
their union which warned workers if they failed to obey they would face fmes, 
suspensions, and possible termination. Workers returned to work 16 November 1971 after 
Horton Steel, responsible for erecting the storage tanks, informed workers they had until 
Monday to return to work or be fired. 49 
In March 1973 the lack of a master contract again plagued the site when Procon's 
new contract with the Plumbers and Pipefitters gave them wage increases that Procon was 
unwilling to offer to other workers on site. Not surprisingly, 978 carpenters, millwrights, 
labourers, teamsters, and operating engineers walked o±I the job when Procon refused to 
extend the raise to the other unions on site. The Pipefitters were granted an increase of one 
dollar an hour, from $4.90 to $6 an hour. Under their separate contract the pipefitters also 
worked a different shift schedule of eight hour days, five days a week. After a \Veek of 
unfruitful meetings bef:\.veen Procon, the unions, and govemment officials, it took a court 
August 1972; "Procon fires striking workers," ET, 12 August 1972; and "Pipefitters Returning to 
Refinery Project," ET, 18 August 1972. 
49 The Boilermakers contract was negotiated by the conh·actors association and the union, not 
with individual employers. NAC, RG 27;vol. 3615, T3453, strike 71-446. NAC, RG 27, vol. 
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. t"on to end picketing of the site by the four unions involved. The court injunction did 
inJUUC 1 
d the strike. When workers arrived for work on 3 April 1973, they found the picket not en 
. ow manned by the ffiEW, one of the unions not previously involved and therefore not 
Jme n 
included in the injunction. 5° 
Frequent inter-union battles and jurisdictional disputes also plagued the site. Part of 
this stemmed from the fact that little pre-operation time was spent on planning how to 
distribute the work. Given the temporary nature of constmction projects each union wanted 
to obtain as many of the jobs as possible for its workers. Moreover, jurisdiction was based 
on precedent; therefore giving up a job now could affect obtaining work in the future. In 
November 1972 90 ironworkers went on strike alleging that pipefitters were carrying out 
duties normally performed by ironworkers.51 In August 1971 395 employees walked off 
the job in support of a grievance filed by twelve former employees of Lundrigan's. The 
labourers, who had been laid off for lack of work, launched a grievance that their jobs had 
actually been filled with other labourers. Workers returned to work after the company 
assured them that the workers had not been replaced; the other workers had been 
3615, T3453, strike 71-446, 6 November 1971; Pat Doyle, "Union Warns Workers," ET, 10 
November 1971; and "Come by Chance Strike Ends," ET, 16 November 1971. 
so CNSA, Collection 073, file 012, Progress Report, 4 April 1973; NAC, RG 27, val. 3620, 
T3457, strike 73-137, Report on Industrial Dispute Commencement, Statement by Procon, 17 
April 1973; "Another Strike at Refinery Site," ET, 22 March 1973; "Talks today on refinery 
strike," ET, 27 March 1973; and "Court injunction issued against strikers," ET, 31 March 1973; 
~~nd "Wildcat continues at Come by Chance," ET, 3 April 1973. 
Ironworkers were served with an injunction to stop picketing the same day. A joint jurisdictional 
board had been set up by the Newfoundland Building Trades Council and the provincial 
Department of Labour to deal with construction labour disputes, but in this case the workers chose 
to strike instead. In the wake of the strike, Ironworker business agent, William Woodford, 
~ernanded the labour minister investigate the rash of strikes. Woodford claimed Come by Chance 
Sa~ more strikes "than there has been in Newfoundland in the past 25 years." "Come by Chance 
S~nke Ends," ET, 28 November 1972; and "Union wants Investigation of Strikes at Refinery 
Ite," ET, 30 November 1972. 
160 
transferred between subcontractors.52 Other workers protested the use of non-unionized 
workers on site. Eighty electricians struck in October 1972 after learning that non-unionized 
workers were constructing a power line to the site for Chico Construction Company, under 
subcontract to the Newfoundland and Labrador Power Commission. After 1200 workers 
refused to cross the electricians' picket line, the project was brought to a standstill, ending 
only with a court injunction. In September and October 1971 65 boilermakers at Come by 
Chance went on a week long stJ:ike to protest the hiring of boilermakers from the 
mainland. 53 
Another reason workers adopted their down-their-tools attitudes, however, was the 
extremely slow pace of arbitration hearings. Workers' spontaneous walkouts were an 
indication of their frustration level with both unions and management for faiii..'lg to enact a 
speedy arbitration system. After watching mMy grievances falter before reaching t.l}e 
arbitration stage and others languish once they got there, many workers simply took matters 
into their own hands by walking off the job. In November 1972, for instance, pipefitters 
walked off the job to protest the firing of twelve fellow union members. Other unions on 
site respected the unmaihJ.ed pickets, closing the site for two days until the dispute was 
settled. The pipefitters agreed to return to work and to file a grievance over the firings. 54 
52 NAC, RG 27 (Strikes and Lockout files), vol. 3614, T3454, strike 71-318, Lundrigan's Ltd, 
Come by Chance, 4 August 1971; and "Wildcat walkout ends at refinery," ET, 4 August 1971 . 
53 
"Electricians Strike at Come by Chance," ET, 30 October 1972; and "Injunction Halts 
Picketing at Come by Chance Refinery,'~ ET, 1 November 1972. 
54 
"Come by Chance Project Shut Down," ET, 16 November 1972; "Strike Ends at Come by 
Chance," ET, 18 November 1972. 
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Procon's refusal to maintain an on-site labour relations specialist also caused 
considerable problems.55 Many of the wildcats might have been avoided had there been 
someone on site with the power to address problems as they arose. One hundred and fifty 
boilermakers walked off the job in October 1972 after workers learned that management 
had carried out union work after workers were sent home due to bad weather. The union 
complained that under its contract, supervisors were only permitted to assist their workers, 
not to do regular work. Subcontractor Horton Steel agreed they were wrong to allow the 
supervisors to complete the work and promised it would not happen again. It is likely that 
had a union shop steward been on site at the time, the illegal strike could have been avoided. 
Workers were compensated with a full day's pay plus two day's boarding costs. The 
supervisors' work was scrapped and redone by the boilermakers. 56 
Another factor which helped determine how workers would respond was their 
relationship with supervisors. Circumstances which under one supervisor could lead to a 
walkout, under another would be settled with a conversation. In April 1972 233 
boilermakers went on strike for four days to protest dissatisfaction vvith a foreman on site. 57 
Recognizing its ovvn field staff were prui of tlJ.e problem, Procon reorganized their field 
55 
Several strike propensity theorists have argued that the likelihood of striking is related to the 
quality of the industrial relations system in place. Green (1991), for instance, found that where 
good industrial relations policies, practices and procedures exist, strikes are less likely to occur. 
Green's work builds on the Mayo approach to Heman Resources management which argues that 
effective labour management communication is critical to preventing strikes. Poor 
communications, however, fail to explain what makes some industries more strike prone than 
others. And while poor communications are likely to exacerbate situations, they are unlikely to 
be a Primary cause of strikes. Blaming poor communications is confusing the instrument of 
~~nflict with its cause. 
1 
NAC, RG 27, vol. 3453, T3456, strike 72-554; and "Another strike at refinery," ET, 4 October 
5{
72; and "Come by Chance Strike Settled," ET, 6 October 1972. 
19NAC, RG 27, vol. 3616, strike 72-132, Work Stoppage Preliminary Advice Report, 15 April 72; and "Come by Chance Strike Expected to End Today," ET, 15 April 1972. 
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truction supervisory personnel in August and September 1972 which the company cons 
noted resulted in a noticeable change in construction workers' work attitude.58 Procon 
replaced its general construction superintendent and several other top ranking persmmel on 
site. A Procon spokesperson denied that personnel changes were a direct result of labour 
instability, claiming instead that "a reorganization such as this is normal practice with large 
corporations such as Procon." Sources claimed othernise, arguing the iabuur unrest was the 
root cause of the shake-up.59 A March 1973 progress report noted that construction 
progress was much improved and that there had been a noticeable improvement in the 
attitudes of both workers and supervisors but again warned that: 
we continue to be very concerned about Procon's field management on this 
project ... We continue to remain concemed about: a) Procon's inability to 
maintain proper labour relations with the various craft unions both at field 
and management levels; b) lack of supervision and scheduling by Pro con 
with their subcontractors; c) lack of day planning and co-ordination of 
Procon work forces; d) Inefficient handling of materials arriving at 
jobsite ... ; e) inefficient utilization of construction equipment.60 
September' s progress report, however, noted that "the month of August saw a 
marked change in the attitude of ~he entire Procon construction forces. This change is 
attributed directly to Procon's reorganization of its top supervisory personnel of the first of 
August. Mr. Ray Freeman, General Construction Superintendent for Procon, Great Britain, 
was brought in as Project Construction Superintendent. .. With the settlement of the 
Pipefitters dispute, it is anticipated that the month of September will show some real 
Improvement in progress." Field supervisory changes vvere also expected to help improve 
58 
CNSA, Collection 073, file 009, Newfoundland Refining Company Progress Report, 22 
September 1972. 
59 "C 
orne by Chance Construction Chief, other top Personnei to be Replaced," ET, 5 August 
1972. 
60 
CNSA, Collection 073 , file 012, Progress Report, 4 April1973. 
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workers morale and to correspondingly increase production.61 Given that many of the 
strikes were wildcats- that is without the union's support or consent- the unions must also 
take their share of the blan1e for poor labour relations on site. When contractors sign 
contracts with unions, it is under the assumption that unions will be able to control their 
workforces. This was not always the case at Come by Cha.11ce. It is important to note, 
however, that not all wildcat strikes occurred \Vithout the union leadership's support. Whiie 
union leaders often had to denounce wildcat strikes in public, in private many leaders 
supported, and made usc of, the wildcats. 
Workers also walked off the job to protest poor working and living conditions. On 
15 September 1971 fourteen ironworkers walked off the job to protest conditions in the 
newly opened bunkhouses. The men were u.n~h.appy over the bunkhouse conditions, 
demanding instead a return to the travel allowance workers had received prior to the 
bunkhouse opening. Within hours of the walkout Procon obtained an injunction from the 
Newfoundland Supreme Court ordering the workers back to work, but the workers 
refused to obey. The Ironworkers Union did not sanction the strike, and its representative, 
W.B. Woodford, publicly attempted to convince the striking ironworkers to return to 
work. Five hundred other construction workers refused to cross the picket line. The 
ironworkers returned to work two days later after the company promised to look iilto its 
concerns over housing conditions.62 
In June 1972 eighty operating engineers walked off the job to protest poor working 
conditions, resulting in the site being closed for six days. Operating Engineers operated 
6! 
CNSA, Collection 073, file 009, Progress Report, 22 September 1972, 9. 
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cranes and mobile equipment. As their strike paralyzed the project- construction was at the 
stage where heavy pipes were being lifted into place, a task which necessitated the operating 
engineers - Procon shut down the site. All 1500 workers were laid off. Despite being asked 
to return to work by their union, the operating engineers remained off the job. Workers had 
previously tried to meet with Procon officials to discuss working conditions but found 
management unavailable. Procon's labour relations manager, Tim Shea, did meet with 
striking workers but refused to discuss working conditions until workers ended their illegal 
walkout and returned to work. After six days the Operating Engineers returned to work. 63 
A lack of respect was one issue that was stressed during strikes at Come by 
Chance. Workers, for instance, were unhappy with comments by John Shaheen clai:nling 
labourers were deliberately ''trying to do a stretch-out job" on the project. Shaheen reported 
that "when we demanded we get a day's work for a day's pay that's when the trouble 
started." 64 Many strikes began after management attempted to increase control over 
workers or to enforce what workers considered unfair mles. By 20 July 1972 four of the 
unions (boilermakers, pipefitters, ironworkers, and elecnicians) on site, representing half of 
the workers, walked off the job after forty men were fired for exceeding their 10 minute 
coffee break. Workers had taken their afternoon coffee break in the lunchroom, several 
minutes walk from their work site as it was quite cold outside. Under their contract workers 
62 When the bunkhouses opened on 13 September 1971, Procon discontinued the allowance and 
offered housing on site. "Walkout Halts Work at Come by Chance Refinery," ET, 15 September 
1971; and "Picketers at Corrie by Chance," ET, 16 September 1971. 
63 NAC, RG 27, vol. 3618, T3455, 72-256, Work Stoppage, Preliminary Advice Record, 4 July 
1972; CNSA, Collection 073, file 8.07.017. Newfoundland Refining Company Ltd., Summary 
Progress Report, no. 19, 18 July 1972; "1500 off job at Come by Chance," ET, 30 June 1972; and 
"Work to Resume at Oil Refinery," ET, 4 July 1972. 
c 
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were to take coffee breaks at their work stations unless the weather was bad. When the 
workers were fired, over 1100 workers walked out in protest. Project manager Robin 
Lillibridge claimed that some of the workers were on break for nearly half an hour and that 
if every worker on site did the same thing nearly 2000 person hours would be lost every day. 
After a week on strike Procon flew in Tim Shea, an industrial relations officer from 
Chicago, to meet with the unions involved. The company was worried that that strike, and 
another one by operating engineers on 26-27 July, had badly hampered progress on the job, 
time that could only be made up if strikes ended.65 
When management unilaterally changed shift schedules - which it had the right to 
do under its contract- cutting workers' hours, workers again dovvned their tools. Upset over 
low productivity rates, in July Procon had atmotmced all overtime work was discontinued 
and a straight 40 hour work week initiated. Procon claimed to be making the move due to 
workers' low productivity rates. Workers responded with a series of walkouts, including a 
strike by Operating Engineers which resulted in 542 construction workers not reporting for 
work for t\vo days. Vlhile strikes continued to occur, Procon saw enough of an improvement 
that in October 1972 it again instituted a 48 hour work week. 66 
\Yorkers also protested what they considered too many rules and too much 
supervision in the camp. On 8 January 1972 25 pipefitters walked off the job after eight 
64 By trouble, Shaheen was referring to the large numbers of strikes that dominated the construction 
project. "Labor Ills at Come by Chance Hurting Planned Nova Scotia Refinery," ET, 27 July 
1973. 
65 NAC, RG 27, vol. 3614, T3456, 72-298, 26 July 1972; "Four Unions on strike at Come by 
Chance," ET, 20 July 1972; "Workers Still Out at Come by Chance Project," ET, 21 July 1972; 
"Come by Chance Workers Still off the Job," £7: 22 July 1972; and CNSA, Collection 073, file 
8.07.017. Newfoundland Refining Company, Summary Progress Report no. 20, 17 August 1972. 
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workers were fired for drinking in violation of camp rules. Three hundred and sixty seven 
workers respected the picket line. The workers fired for drinking were not rehired despite 
the wildcat strike. Workers launched two one-day protests in March 1972, one ofwhich was 
over the company's decision to suspend work due to bad weather and involved 700 
workers. \Vith no apparent end to strikes on site, the premier appointed Eric Martin to act as 
a liaison between the company, unions, and the government. 67 
In September 1972 representatives from the Provincial Building Company, NRC, 
Procon, and Jacobs Engineering met with the Newfmmdland government to discuss the 
spate of strikes on site. After detailing the recent strikes, Procon asked the government for 
assistance in dealing with the strikes, to which the government officials responded that 
Procon had to exhaust all avenues open to it under the law before the government could 
intervene. Premier Frank Moores did speak out against wildcat strikes. He called t.t,.e strikes 
"Irresponsible .. . we can't condone illegal acts." Moores was worried that progress at the 
refinery, at a critical stage, was being held up by the strikes.68 
Bell Island Liberall\.1HA Steve Neary blamed the "labour war" on site on workers 
from outside the province being paid more than Newfow1dlanders. Neary claimed 
employees from outside the province received a cheque sent to their homes in addition to 
66 CNSA, Collection 073, file 008, Progress Repmt no. 19, 25 August 1972; NAC, RG 27, vol. 
3453, T3456, strike 72-560, 28 July 1972; and CNSA, Collection 073, file 009, Progress Repott 
21, 26 October 1972. 
67 Martin was a defeated PC candidate in the riding of Trinity North. NAC, RG 27, val. 3615, 
T3454, strike 72-567, 9 January 1972; "Work Returns to Norn1al at Come by Chance Refinery," 
ET, 11 January 1972; and "Government Holding Talks on Come by Chance Strike," ET, 24 
March 1972. 
68 CNSA, Collection 073, file 008, Progress Report, 22 September 1972. Moores was reacting to 
the announcement that 92 crane operators and survey engineers were on a wildcat strike on the 
site. Boilermakers and iro1;1workers had just returned from a strike a week earlier when the crane 
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their standard pay, something which later proved to be unsubstantiated. As the strikes 
dragged on Procon warned that unless workers returned to work and labour troubles 
stopped, the project would miss its year-end completion date.69 The IBEW agreed to return 
to work on 7 April 1973 after Procon agreed to meetings to discuss problems at the 
refinery.70 When those meetings proved fruitless 848 electricians, operating engineers, 
teamsters, millwrights and labourers again walked off the job resulting in Procon's closing 
the site. Workers returned on the 25th April after a series of meetings between the Premier 
and Procon and the Premier and the Building Trades Council resulted in a new contract 
with increased wages, improved vacation· and subsistence allowances. All workers received 
a base increase of 15 per cent, a vacation pay increase from two to eight per cent, and a 
guarantee that all overtime work be paid at double time rates based on a fifty hour work 
week. Workers who lived within 35 miles of the site were to receive subsistence of $4 per 
day, while those living farther received $8 per day or free room and board in the camp.71 
Just as it looked like the construction project was settling down, John Shaheen 
warned that labour problems at Come by Chance had made it difficult for Shaheen 
Natural Resources to reach an agreement with contractors for a refmery in Nova Scotia. 
Shaheen went on to state that before the now planned second refinery began construction 
he wouid be demanding a government and union guarantee of no work stoppages.72 ln the 
wake of the U.S. energy crisis in February 1973, premier Frank Moores had am1ounced an 
operators walked off the job, according to Procon due to internal problems within the union. 
~~Labor Problems Continue at Come by Chance Project," ET, 27 July 1972. 
"'Labor War' at Refinery?" ET, 4 April 1973; and "Procon, Crosbie warn that wildcat strike 
j~ill nullify year-end completion target," ET, 5 April1973. 
The IBEW was facing internal problems during this period as insulators broke away to form a 
;~cal of the International Association ofHeat and Frost Insulators and Asbestos Workers. 
NAC, RG 27, Strikes and Lockouts Files, vol. 3620, T3457, strike 73-137. 
..... 
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agreement for a second oil refinery at Come by Chance. The new 300,000 barrel-a-day 
refinery was to be built and operated by John Shaheen. Unlike the first refinery which was 
heavily dependent on government funding, the government's only investment in the 
second refinery was a loan guarantee. The new deal also altered the original refinery's 
financing, relieving the provincial government from much of its tinancial obligations if 
the refinery failed, something that proved a blessing in the mid-1970s when the refinery 
declared bankruptcy.73 The second refinery was never built. 
Conclusions 
Strikes occur for a variety of reasons, from larger socio-economic policies to wage 
disputes. \Vhat factors made Churchill Falls relatively strike free compared to Come by 
Chance? What changed between the late 1960s and the early 1970s to make union leaders 
unwilling or unable to keep their members withjn legal bounds? While poor 
communications and an uncaring employer are easy answers, it is important to examine 
the different socio-economic factors at each site. By the time of Come by Chance, a 
strike wave dominated much of the Canadian landscape. Workers militancy was fueled by 
heavy-handed legislation, wage increases lagging behind productivity gains, automation 
(rail and post office), the demands of public sector workers to unionize, and the success 
achieved by other striking workers. 
Strikes at Come by Chance kept recurring for several main reasons. Strikes were 
an effective way to focus attention on the problems of the workplace. New problems 'Nere 
steadily created on site and by modernization. i\s James Cronin stated "Workers strike 
72 
"Sh aheen wants assurances of no work stoppages in second oil refinery," ET~ 4 August 1973. 
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because striking works and because they have grievances."74 Making the decision to 
strike was not an easy one for workers; possible job loss -- either through being made 
redundant or being fired -- and almost certain financial hardship follow a sttike. So why 
did the workers continuously turn to the sttike as their weapon of choice? Strikes served 
as a means of communication between workers and their employers. Repeatedly workers 
and unions on site complained that they were unable to meet with managers to discuss 
concerns or that when they met with managers their grievances were not addressed. 
Striking was one of the few ways workers at Come by Chance had of attracting their 
employer's attention. Rather than defensive action, these strikes offered workers a sense 
of collective identity, gave them a voice, and allowed them to make demands of a system 
which was non11ally unresponsive to their needs. 
These sttikes offered workers leverage they would ordinarily not have. As a 
project with considerable government financial backing, Come by Chance was constantly 
under media attention. \Vorkers took advantage of the attention to put forth their own 
agenda, one that included higher wages, bet1er working conditions, and being treated with 
respect. While the walkouts occurred as spontaneous protests, other sttikes on site were 
more carefully planned. It is no surprise that the Come by Chance project led to a 
determination by government and industry that such a strike fraught project would never 
again occur. The next chapter examines the sleps taken by both govemment and 
management to counter the growing power of construction unions. 
73 
"US Energy Crisis, Government Loans Spark Second CBC Refinery," ET, 27 February 1973. 
74 James Cronin, Industrial Conflict in Modern Britain (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 5. 
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Chapter 6: Government and Management Respond 
-
Introduction 
In the aftermath of the Come by Chance project, the Newfoundland government 
was quick to react to the strikes which it viewed as a threat to its modernization 
program. 1 Come by Chance was only the first in a line of what would turn out to be a 
decade long strike wave.2 In the mid-1970s, st1ikes in Newfoundland gained momentum 
from one strike to the next, often taking on an insurgent quality. Four industlies 
accounted for 76 per cent of all strikes from the mid-1970s to 1983: the fisheries (30 per 
cent), mining (24 per cent), construction (13 per cent), and the public sector (9 per cent). 3 
In this "decade" of extraordinary strikes, Newfow1dland unions won the title of most 
militant in Canada, losing 42 days per member, followed by Quebec (36 days) and BC 
(30 days).4 
Newfoundland's strike wave was based not only on larger numbers than the 
previous years, but it also had broader scope and range, including a more varied cross 
section of the work force than other strike years. Vlhile previous strike waves varied in 
1 Shorter and Tilly defined strike waves as when the number of strikes and strikers in a given year 
exceeds by more than 50 per cent the mean of the previous five years, and has broader scope. 
Edward Shorter and Charles Tilly, Strikes in France 1830-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1974), 106-7. An international phenomenon, strike waves have been 
documented in France, Britain, Germany, the U.S., and Canada. See for instance, Wolfgang 
Mommsen and Hans-Gerhard Husung, eds., The Development of Trade Unionism in Great 
Britain and Germany, 1880-1914 (London: Allen & Unwin, 1985); P.K. Edwards, Strikes in the 
United States, 1881-1974 (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981); and Douglas Cruikshank and 
Gregory S. Kealey, "Strikes in Canada, 1891-1950," in Kealey, Workers and Canadian HistOty. 
2 James Cronin found that each wave generally represented a transition between different patterns 
of economic activity. This parallel movement of strikes suggests that historic factors common to 
different industries have to be examined, rather than the factors which make each industry unique. 
James Cronin, Industrial Conflict in Modern Britain (London: Croom Helm, 1979), 17. 
3 In the 1980s there were 211 strikes, involving 86,426 workers and resulting in 2,084,998 person 
days lost. In addition to the reduction in the number of strikes, the nature of strikes also changed 
as wildcat strikes dropped considerably. See appendix for strike database. 
4 Manitoba was the lowest at 12 strike days per union member. James Bagnall, "Now We're Tops 
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time and from one group of workers to another, they generally marked both qualitative 
and quantitative changes in the work force. These changes included expansions into new 
industries, new regions or new classes of workers, and coincided with the adoption of 
new policies or ideas. The strike wave in Newfoundland corresponded to an intense 
period of organizational change, when large numbers of new workers were unionized, 
including public sector and fisheries workers. Construction workers also began to push 
for more advances as their numbers grew dramatically with each new project in the 
1970s. Neither govemment nor industry was slow to react to workers' challenges, and 
particularly to the lessons of Come by Chance. In this chapter we examine employers' 
and the provincial government's reactions to the wave of militancy. The provincial 
government's responses included the appointment of royal commissions and advisory 
committees, back to work legislation, and wage restraints. Industry reacted by banding 
together to demand concessions from both government and unions. 
Initial Reactions 
The government's first response to the strikes was to appoint a royal commission. 
Federal and provincial governments had long used royal commissions as a way to cope vvith 
mounting labour pressures. The 1886 Royal Commission on the Relations of Labor and 
Capital was only the first in a line of such commissions, all called to answer the surge of 
working-class militancy. In his examination of the Royal Commission on Labor and Capital, 
Kealey found that royal commissions served a number of useful functions: they bought tin1e 
for the government "by placing a lengthy investigation in the way of labour's immediate 
legislative demands" and they stood as testimony of the government's interest in the 
in Strikes," Financial Post, 27 August 1983. 
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problems facing workers.5 Best of all they offered participants a sense that they were 
involved in the process without according them any additional power. Heron described how 
the 1919 Royal Conunission on Industrial Relations gave craft union leaders t.,_e mistaken 
belief"that someone was taking them seriously."6 They also allowed both sides to vent their 
frustrations without placing the government in a position where it had to follow any of the 
recommendations. Royal Commissions were also used to examine conditions in specific 
industries, such as the Royal Commission on Unrest in the Nova Scotia Steel Industry (New 
Glasgow, 1918), the Royal Commission on Industrial Relations established to exanline the 
cross country unrest in 1919, and numerous others.7 
Newfoundland appointed its own share of Royal Commissions including a Royal 
Commission on the Cost of Living in Newfoundland (1950), Royal Commission on Forestry 
(1955), Royal Commission on Unemployment (1958), and a Royal Com1nission to examine 
a labour dispute between Western Memorial Hospital and its Union (1963).8 In the late 
1960s, Newfoundland appointed a royal conin.1ission to examine labour relations, the Royal 
Commission on Labour Legislation, partially driven by the demand to extend colle·~tive 
5 For more on the use of royal commissions, see Gregory Kealey, ed., Canada Investigates 
Industrialism (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973) and Kealey, Toronto Workers 
Respond to Industrial Capitalism 1867-1892 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1980), 241. 
6 Craig Heron, The Canadian Labour Movement: A Short History (Toronto: Lorimer, 1996, 2nd 
edition), 54. 
7 
Heron, Working in Steel (Toronto: McClelland and StewaTI, 1988), 132. 
8 
Newfoundland, Report of the Royal Commission on the Cost ofLiving in Newfoundland (St. 
John's: Royal Commission on the Cost of Living in Newfoundland, 1950); Newfoundland, 
Report of the Royal Commission on Foresiry (St. John's: David R. Thistle Printer, 1955); 
Newfoundland, Report of the Royal Commission on Unemployment (St. John's: The Commission, 
1958); Newfoundland, Report of the Royal Commission appointed to enquire into the labour dispute 
benveen the Western Memorial Hospital Employees Local Union, no. 488, N. U.P.E. and the Western 
Memorial Hospital and into the possible consequences of granting the demands of the union (1963). 
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bargaining rights to public servants and fishers and by the idea that existing labour 
legislation was ill-equipped to deal with large scale industrial projects.9 
Only a few years later, during the worst of the Come by Chance strikes, the 
government appointed another royal commission to investigate wildcat strikes. Chaired by 
lawyer Edward Neary, the commission followed in the footsteps of the Vloods federal task 
force on labour relations. 10 The Neary commission was called to examine the dramatic 
increase in the number of work stoppages in Newfoundland from January 1971 to 
September 1973. The government was alarmed about the rise of "illegal" strikes, the sharp 
increase in the number of workers involved, and the impact of wildcat strikes on the 
economy, particularly the potential negative effect on Newfoundland's competitive 
position in domestic and foreign markets. t 1 Newfoundland was already disadvantaged, 
according to the government, given its geographic location, and needed to improve its 
labour relations climate to attract new industries. 12 
Neary set out to uncover the causes underlying the increase in work stoppages. He 
found seven main causes including "distorted values and attitudes in our industrial 
relations environment," a basic lack of respect for the law, a lack of trust between labour 
and management, a lack of communication, a lack of understanding of the collective 
bargaining system, and inadequacies in the collective bargaining process. 13 Nea..7 
9 Newfoundland, Report of the Royal Commission on Labour Legislation in Newfoundland and 
Labrador (St. John's 1972). For more on this, see chapter five. 
10 Stuart Jar.1ieson, Times of Trouble: Labour Unrest and Industrial Conflict in Canada, 1900-66 
(Ottawa: Task Force on Labour Relations, 1968). 
11 Any strikes that occurred outside the regulations in the Labour Relation Act were considered 
illegal. This included strikes while a contract was in effect. 
12 
The Department of Finance estimated lost labour income of $15,000,000 due to work stoppages 
from 1970-1974. Newfoundland, Report of the Royal Commission on Illegal Work Stoppages (St. 
Jolm's 1973), 7. Issued in September 1973. Hereafter referred to as Neary, Report of the Royal 
Commission. 
1 j 
· Many public and employer submissions to the Commissioner condemned the lawless attitude of 
--
174 
concluded that the social and economic background of Newfoundland had moulded the 
attitudes of many of its citizens in a manner unconducive to good labour relations, 
including their long history of self-employment, their unfamiliarity with industrial 
workplaces, and their lack of leadership qualities. He also recognized that with the 
relatively recent phenomenon of unions in Newfoundland, many workers were striving to 
catch up to their counter-parts in the rest of Canada and hence had high expectations of 
. . 14 
nsmgwages. 
Many of the submissions to the Neary Commission dealt specifically with Come by 
Chance. John Wiseman, business agent with local 904 of the International Union of 
Operating Engineers (IUOE), told the commission that "we are lucky to just have a 
withdrawal of services at Come by Chance and not a militant withdrawal of services." He 
claimed the "situation at Come by Chance is ugly and the workers have lost all trust in the 
company." Wiseman blamed many of the wildcats on Procon's failure to have someone on 
site to negotiate new contracts and settle grievances. Many union leaders feared the workers 
might react with violence ift~e company failed to live up to its promises again. Others were 
worried that the commission would iead to legislation decertifying unions undertaking 
wildcat strikes. Esau Thoms, an official with the Brotherhood of Railway, Airli."'le and 
Steamship Clerks, suggested that instead of wildcat strikes, union leaders contact their 
management counterpcuis to organize labour-management consultative committees. Many of 
those before the Commission recommended such joint union-management committees 
workers and called for harsher penalties and greater enforcement of the provisions of the Labour 
Relations Act. While legislation existed for prosecuting the organizers of illegal work stoppages 
(section 51 of the Labour Relations Act), it was rarely used in the 1970s, in part because the 
Department was reluctant to lose their credibility by seemingly favouring one side over the other. 
Under the Labour Relations Act the Minister of Manpower's approval was needed before anyone 
could be prosecuted for violating section 51. "lllegal Strikes Take Over," Decks Awash, 25 . 
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under the assumption that meeting on a regular basis would prevent the build-up of 
frustrations that led to wildcat strikes.15 
Neary made a series of recommendations to the three parties involved in labour 
relations (management, labour, and the government) to prevent future wildcat strikes. He 
recommended that management demonstrate greater concern for the rights and welfare of 
employees (including recognizing their rights to unionize), that management show more 
flexibility in interpreting collective agreements, that they train management personnel in 
collective bargaining, that they hire trained industrial relations personnel, and that they 
improve communications within their own ranks. Turning to labom, he recommended t.~at 
unions educate their members in all facets of labour relations, that muons ensure that 
grievances are taken to management in a timely fashion, and that unions listen to their 
members. Neary recommended that the government amend the Labour Relations Act to 
provide an officer with powers to enquire into work stoppages and determine their legality, 
to issue cease and desist orders to illegal stoppages, and to recommend prosecutions if either 
side failed to adhere to the cease and desist order. Neary also wanted it made illegal for a 
union to condone a wildcat strike. 
The commission made special recommendations for the construction industry, 
recognizing that many of the strikes involved workers in major cons"tmction projects. It 
acknowledged that construction unions were suffering from growing pains and that the 
construction industry was more susceptible to economic fluctuations than many other 
14 Neary, Report of the Royal Commission, 12-25. 
15 
"Six Submissions Prese.nted during First Day of Hearing into Strikes," ET, 18 April 1973; 
"Union Agent Launches Bitter Attack on Procon," ET, 18 Aprill973; "Unionist Fears Wildcat 
Strikes may Force Union Decertification," ET, 29 August 1973; and "Labor Officials to Meet 
Minister on Brief to Strike Commission," ET, 9 January 1973. The Federation of Labour 
recommended a speedier arbitration system and criticized the government for not enacting the Cohen 
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industries. In peak periods workers were in demand and employers were forced to 
compete for skilled labour. In slow periods, employers had more power over hiring as 
more skilled workers were unemployed. To cope with employment instability, Neary 
recommended that the government work with management and labour to develop a 
program whereby work was better planned for more continuous employment. He also 
recommended that successful construction projects be studied and their lessons learned, 
to help prevent further wildcats. 16 
Even before the Commission issued its report, the government acted on one of its 
recommendations and amended the Labour Relations Act to allow for area-wide employer 
certification in construction. This proved one of the only recommendations the government 
acted upon. Despite soaring numbers of strikes and the Neary Commission's finding that 
delays in ce1iification, conciliation, and grievance arbitration were to blame for many of 
the strikes, the Minister of Manpower was reluctant to increase its conciliation resources, 
stating he saw little point creating a "huge bureaucracy for a peak demand five years 
from now, and then not use it for the next 15 years."17 With few ne'l-v large-scale projects 
in sight the government did not see a pressing need for action. Instead, it relied upon 
rhetoric from its ministers. Minister of Manpower and Industrial Relations Joe Rousseau, 
Commission recommendations. "Federation Critical of Labor Relations Act," ET, 16 May 1973. 
16 In recommending area certification for a council of unions, Neary was following the example 
of Nova Scotia. Neary found that projects were more likely to succeed when all employers (and all 
unions) belonged to one contractors' association (or council of unions). One master contract 
including provisions for a full mark-up of work before the project started was also key to avoiding 
trouble, as were the use of a foreman's handbook setting out ~ruidelines in the handling of workers 
and weekly foremen's meetings to discuss problems. Successful collective agreements covered wage 
increases <m.d working conditions, dispute resolution mechanisms, and provided adequate industrial 
relations personnel to cope \Vith problems. Neary, Report of the Royal Commission, 70-1. 
17 
"Maynard Blames Jni1ation," Decks A wash, 24. 
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for instance, gave a speech in April 197 4 deploring the trend of "down tools, off-the-job" 
attitude prevalent on many projects. 
An Unstable Industry 
To understand the economic downturn that plagued the construction industry in 
the late 1970s and 1980s, it is necessary to first understand the somewhat uncharacteristic 
period of growth that ran from 1943 to the early 1970s. Commencing with the 
construction of military bases during V/orld War II, Newfoundland's industrial 
construction industry experienced rapid expansiOn. In addition to the tremendous 
spending brought about by Confederation with Canada (roads, schools, hospitals etc.), 
workers were also employed in the construction of the province's new industrial base 
(including hydro plants, manufacturing plants, and refineries). With the grov.rth, 
construction became the fourth largest sectoral employer in the 1950s, behind 
transportation, communication and utilities, and manufacturing and trade. 18 Each large-
scale project required a massive increase in the numbers of construction workers, who 
were then left unemployed at the completion of each project. 
Construction grew alongside the economy during the 1960s and early 1970s as the 
provincial and federal governments made a concerted effort to increase both the level and 
range of public goods and services. 19 Relative to the rest of Canada, construction in 
18 Manufacturing received an artificial boost from the inclusion of fisheries workers in the 
manufacturing category rather than as a separate subset. Canada as a whole experienced an 
increase in aggregate demand for housing, business, and social capital construction in the wake of 
World War II. A 1952 U.S. government rep011 warning of a potential shortage of raw resources 
helped fuel a construction boom in Canada. Major projects included highways (the Trans-
Canada), the St. Lawrence seaway, mines and smelrers, pipelines (Alberta), and hydro-electric 
installations. Frank Wildgen, "Economic Aspects: Work, Income and Cost Stabilization," in Carl 
Goldenberg and John Crispo, eds., Construction Labour Relations (Ottawa: CCA, 1968), 32. 
19 From 1961-1971 the total contribution of the construction industry to the gross domestic 
product (GDP) of Newfoundland grew from 11.3 per cent to 20.7 per cent. At its peak in 1971 
construction was the single largest contributor to the GDP. In Canada as a whole in 1971 
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Newfoundland had a higher dependency on provincial and federal government 
expenditures. The federal government funded many projects through the Department of 
Regional Economic Expansion (DREE), while the provincial government set up crown 
building corporations to finance many projects. By using crown corporations the 
. . ' 'd d . h k 20 provmc1a1 government av01 e paymg taxes on t e wor . 
With the larger industrial (Churchill Falls) and institutional projects 
(Confederation Building, Memorial University, and other large structures), many 
Canadian and U.S. firms became interested in bidding on Newfoundland jobs. As more 
firms bid on Newfoundla11d work, local firms had to use new technology or risk not being 
competitive.21 Across North A.-nerica in the 1960s and 1970s a few large firms dominated 
and won most of the contracts while a coterie of smaller firms led much more of a hand-
to-mouth existence, scrambling for small jobs and subcontracts. Given the cyclical 
fluctuations, many Newfoundland fim1s appeared and disappeared in rapid order. To 
cope with economies of scale, the construction industry undertook rapid mechanization 
from the 1950s to the early 1970s. To cover the rising costs of equipment purchases a11d 
higher wage costs, contractors put m higher bids on jobs resulting m a cost-push 
construction accounted for 6.4 per cent. GDP is the total gross value added by all productive 
enterprises in the economy. Statistics Canada, Construction in Canada, Catalogue 64-201 
(Ottawa 1971); Statistics Canada, Private and Public Investment in Canada, Catalogue 61-205 
(Ottawa 1971); Governmt:nt ofNewfoundland, Historical Statistics of Newfoundland and 
Labrador, October 1971, vol. 1 (1). 
2
° Crown corporations were used to build the Confederation building, Memorial University, 
hospitals in Grand Falls, Gander, and Bell Island, the Technical College, district vocational 
schools and other government buildings. The government also used crown corporations as a way 
to encourage projects such as the Marystown Shipyard and the Come by Chance refinery. Royal 
Commission on Economic Prospects ofNewfoun.dland and Labrador, Sector Study on the 
Construction Indus!;)! (St. John's 1967), VI-15. 
2 1 Teclmological advances included switching from concrete to brick and structural steel in the 
1950s, and then switching from brick and structural steel to pre-cast concrete. R. Hayward, 
"Construction Industry," in R.I. McAllister, ed., Newfoundland and Labrador, The First Fifteen 
Years of Confederation (St. John's: Dicks and Co., 1966), 152. 
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inflationary trend.22 From 1966 to 1971 the Newfoundland construction industry's gross 
value of output grew by 116 per cent, from $255,256,000 to $552,762,000. After that 
peak, construction activity declined by 13 per cent in 1972 and a further six per cent in 
1973.23 With the boom, construction unions were able to demand large wage increases 
from employers desperate for skilled workers. Many employers complained that the 
higher wages paid by outside contractors were being forced on local employers. 
Employers also complained about the union practice of "leap-fragging" where 
other trades used a stronger union's negotiated settlement to pressure employers for an 
equal settlement. 24 Individual contractors were often hard put to maintain solidarity as 
unions targeted contractors on tight schedules or larger budgets to sign the first 
agreements. The contractors' association worried that if one contractor signed a separate 
agreement it would set a precedent for the entire sector. 1'1 response, the Canadian 
Construction Association '(CCA) demanded that employer associations be accredited by 
the provincial government as the exclusive contractors bargaining agent. Employers 
believed that if bargaining was done on a multi-trade basis then they could counteract 
construction unions' increasing power. In a meeting with the CCA, Smallwood agreed 
22 Profit levels in the industry as a whole in the 1961-1971 period ranged from a high of 3.16 per 
cent in 1968 to a low of 1.89 per cent in 1970. This followed the Canadian trend where 
construction industry profits were falling from 3.1 in 1968 to 1.8 in 1970. Falling profit levels 
were due to invreased capital expenditures on machinery and equipment as well as large 
expenditures on equipment repairs because much of the "new" equipment was purchased used 
and necessitated frequent repairs. Govemmer.t of Newfoundland, Economic Geography of 
Newfoundland (St. John's 1974) and Statistics Canada, Corporation Financial Statistics , 
catalogue 61-207 (Ottawa 1971). 
23 Government of Newfoundland, Report on the Construction Industry (St. John 's: Construction 
Study Group, Planning Task Force, 1973), 9. 
24 For an examination of the way leapfrogging played out in the United States, see Steven G. 
Allen, "Developments in Collective Bargaining in Construction in the 1980s and 1990s," in Paula 
Voos, ed. , Contemporary Collective Bargaining in the Private Sector (Madison: Industrial 
Relations Research Association, 1994), 421. 
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that many of the wage increases won by construction unions in 1970 and 1971 were 
excessive and could have a disruptive inflationary effect on the whole economy.25 
With all the public and private spending, workers and employers alike began to 
view growth as the nonn. This began to end in the mid-1970s as an economic downturn 
struck the construction industry. By 1975, with most of the large-scale construction 
projects completed, the number of construction workers employed declined to levels not 
seen since the early 1950s. By the early 1980s, the Newfoundland construction industry 
was in a severe slump as construction sta..rts declined and contractors began demanding 
wage roll-backs. Unemployment was rife, even among trained workers. Neither labour 
nor contractors were prepared for the slowing of construction growth that occurred in the 
mid-to late-1970s. To cope ¥l ith increased competition for fewer jobs and with the need 
to cut costs to win bids, employers began to utilize a new arsenal of tactics, including 
using non-union labour, to abrogate workers' bargaining power. While in earlier periods 
the provincial government used infrastructure spending to help regulate overall economic 
activity, by the early 1980s high provincial debt, high interest rates, and a dearth of new 
federal-provincial agreements combined to create recessionary conditions.Z6 
25 In a sh·ike between local2330 of the IBEW and electrical contractors, one contractor 
complained ihat an offer of a 40 per cent wage increase was turned down by the province's 
electrical workers. The IBEW strike was not, however, just about wages. They were also 
demanding use of union hiring halls and a reduction in the number of apprentices per journeymen 
from a one on cne (apprentice) to a three (journeymen) to one ratio. CNSA, Collection 073 (John 
Crosbie Papers), file 3.07.035. NCLA file . Letter from Donald Holden to S.A. Neary, Acting 
Minister of Labour, 29 June 1971. Also see Joe Ashley, "Ashley . . . One," Free Press, 21 July 
1971; file 3.07.037. Robert Saunders, President CCA, Mid-Year Report, 31 August 1970; and 
Letter from RTC Stewart, CCA, to Smallwood, 6 May 1971 confirming Smallwood's views. 
26 Report on the Construction Industry, 111-112 and Decks Awash, 9, 3 (June 1980), 1. 
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Government and Capital on the Offensive 
The strike wave and high wage demands of the early 1970s seemed to many to be 
evidence of a serious labour problem. With rapidly rising inflation and other weaknesses 
in the Newfoundland and North American markets, employers and government looked 
for scape-goats on whom to blame the economic woes. Working people, especially 
unionized workers, were cast as the villain, with wages and social security programs 
(including Medicare) blamed for high inflation. Prime Minister Trudeau demanded 
workers "tighten their belts". Reversing the government's supposed stance of neutral 
arbiter of labour relations, in 1975 the federal government introduced compulsory wag·~ 
and price controls, followed in rapid succession by provincial programs. Wage controls 
were aimed at organized workers whose wages had sharply risen in the early 1970s, 
especially construction workers. Under the Anti-Inflation Board's watchful eye, wage 
increases were to be kept to 8, 6 and 4 per cent in each of the following th..ree years. In 
essence, workers and unions were stripped of the right to negotiate their own collective 
agreements as government programs mandated wage increases through Anti-Inflation 
Boards. ·while wage increases were controlled, attempts at price controls proved far less 
effective and company profits continued to rise.27 
While some blamed newly unionized workers or intransigent managers for the 
high numbers of strikes in the mid-1970s, Gerry Royce, a Memorial University 
economics professor, disagreed, explaining that "At the present time we are experiencing 
an abnormal number of strikes. The major reason for this is the world economy is going 
through a terrifically high rate of inflation, and what tends to happen in an inflationary 
27 D. Wolfe, ''The State and Economic Policy in Canada, 1968-1975," in Leo Panitch, ed., 171e 
Canadian State: Political Economy and Political Power (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
182 
period is that wages tend to lag behind prices and workers are always trying to catch up." 
Royce continued that "once inflation occurs, usually there is a wage push-off 
phenomenon in which workers are not only trying to catch up, but very often, they are 
anticipating future inflation as well. So they strike to get more. Once the strikes start, 
production is slowed down because businesses never know when there is going to be a 
strike." He blamed the inflationary spiral on the U.S. intervention in Vietnam where the 
government printed more money to pay for it, rather than raise taxes. 28 In contrast to 
employers, Royce saw the push for higher wages as a symptom of inflation, not the 
cause. Price stability was needed to quell unrest, argued Royce, something the 
government was unwilling to undertake as it meant considerable shmi-tenn 
unemployment. 29 
As double digit inflation returned in the late 1970s, workers again pressed their 
wage demands in hopes of keeping even with inflation. Deciding the policy ofKeynesian 
economics could not deal with the crisis, federal politicians turned to monetarism. 
Monetarists believed that if the government could keep the supply of money stable, 
allowing for some expansion for natural economic growih, than the market would solve 
inflation and unemployment problems. In general, monetarist government pushed for 
lower tax rates, reductions in money growth a.Tld inflation, and an end to exchange 
controls and wage-price guidelines.30 
1977), 228-251. 
28 
"Easy Economics," Decks Awash, 4, 3 (June 1975), 27. 
29 It is important to note, however, that many of the strikes at Come by Chance were not about 
wages and concerned internal problems on site, including problems with supervisors and 
jurisdictional disputes. It vvas often easier, however, to blame surface causes (such as wages) than 
to look for (or explain to the media) the u..'1derlying problems on site. 
3
° For more on monetarism see Thomas Mayer, .Monetarism and Macroeconomic Policy 
(Aldershot, England: E. Elgar 1990) and Leo Panitch and Donald Swartz, lhe Assault on Trade 
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With the change in policy, the federal government began reducing government 
spending, particularly on large-scale projects and social services. ·with drastic cuts to 
infrastructure spending, employment in construction nose dived. When federal wage 
restraint laws were re-implemented in 1982 (6 and 5), federal finance minister Marc 
Lalonde threatened to allow non-unionized contractors to bid on federal government 
projects if the construction industry did not follow wage guidelines.31 Lalonde's threat 
added fuel to an already simmering fire between the building trades unions (the 
Newfoundland and Labrador Building and Construction Trades Council) and the 
contractors' association (the Newfoundland Construction Labour Relations Association 
or NCLRA), as the NCLRA proclaimed that unions had priced themselves out of the 
market. Bill Alcock, director of labour relations with NCLRA, insisted that if tmion 
contractors wanted to win contracts, unions needed to provide concessions on contracts 
already in place. 
In the 1980s, both federal and provincial governments responded by attempting to 
underwrite investment by giving new subsidies to capital in the form of loans, grants, and 
tax concessions, rather than on reducing unemployment. Provincial government attempts 
to lure new businesses into the province angered unions. The NLCBTC resented the 
provincial government giving information on individual unions, rates of unionization, and 
overall union strength to Cumberland Farms while the company was preparing its bid to 
purchase the bankrupt Come by Chance refinery. 32 Government charges of quality 
Union Freedoms: From Wage Controls to Social Contract, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Garamond Press, 
1993). 
31 
Lalonde was reacting to a Nova Scotia plumber's settlement which saw an 11 per cent wage 
lllcrease. "Official Says Union Contractors could be Priced out of the Market," £7: July 1982. 
)J 
-"Government Provided Cumberland with information on Union Strength," Sunday Express, 
August 1986. 
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problems also infuriated the NLCBTC, including one statement that "few local welders 
are used to strict tolerance levels ... , local welders have been hampered by the fact that 
local training institutions have not kept abreast of technological changes ... [and a] lack of 
work in this category [pipefitting] has caused the trade to deteriorate in skills." In an open 
letter to the Premier the NLCBTC accused the Peckford government of "hav[ing] too 
many friends in the construction industry who want to get richer on the backs of 
Newfoundland workers ... " The letter denounced Peckford for shouting "theatrically at 
Ottawa, while whispering sweet nothings to Newfmmdland and foreign businessmen."33 
Relations between organized labour and the Peckford government (1979-1989) were 
troubled. Peckford was the first Newfoundland premier since 1959 to enact back-to-work 
legislation (used against hospital workers in 1981 and public sector workers in 1984).34 
The recession had serious implications for employment and income levels. In the 
winter of 1979, 75 per cent of carpenters were unemployed, many of whom had not 
worked enough in the peak season to collect unemployment insurance. 35 Despite high 
33 Ultimately, refinery operators opted to go non-union for the refit. "A Second Letter to Premier 
Peckford," ET, 28 February 1986. 
34 The Newfoundland government passed Bill 59, requiring public sector unions to designate up 
to 49 per cent of its members as essential workers, in 19 minutes. In response, NAPE President 
Fraser March took his members out on an illegal strike (without designating essential workers). 
Arrests ensued, including March and NDP leader Peter Fenwick. Evolving into a flash point of 
protest against both levels of the government, the strike assumed national significance and the 
provincial government was forced to make amendments to Bill 59. After suffering setbacks in the 
1985 election the Peckford government attempted to placate labour by amending the Labour 
Relations Act to allow the imposition of an initial collective agreement. Leo Panitch and Donald 
Swartz, The Assault on Trade Union Freedoms: From Consent to Coercion Revisited (Toronto: 
Garamond Press, 1988), 86-88; Bob Levin, "Days of Crisis," MacLean's 14 Apri11986, 15-18. 
35 
"Smoother Sawing for Carpenters," Decks Awash, 9, 3 (June 1980), 8; Newfoundland, 
Employment and Unemployment in Newfoundland: a Profile (St. John's: Royal Com.mission on 
Employment and Unemployment, 1986), 41. Newfoundland's blue collar workers faced much 
higher unemployment rates than their Canadian counterparts, at 20.4 per cent compared to 7.4 per 
cent in Canada as a whole, while service worker unemployment rates were 16.7 per cent in 
Newfoundland, 8.1 per cent in Canada. Transportation accounted for 15 per cent ofthe 
unemployed, construction 28 per cent, processing 19 per cent, primary manufacturing 19.8 per 
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w1employment levels, a major building trades strike shut down much of the construction 
industry in 1980 which led the NLBCTC and the NCLRA to discuss voluntary multi-
trade bargaining. Under multi-trade bargaining, the NLBCTC was to negotiate with the 
NCLRA, and, after reaching an agreement, the individual trades were to take the 
agreement back to their membership. While multi-trade bargaining was relatively 
successful in both 1981 and 1982, the NLBCTC was reluctant to see it made mandatory. 
A combination of economic crisis and technological changes in the construction 
industry contributed to close to one in ten full-time positions being lost between 1980 and 
1981, a number much higher during the off season. In 1981 construction unemployment 
hovered around 50 per cent in many trades, with a high of 70-80 per cent in some trades. 
Mine closures and layoffs of paper and fish plant workers added to high levels of 
unemployment as competition for jobs in construction increased. In 1982 official 
construction unemployment rates were 44 per cent, the highest to date in the province. 
This was not a short-term problem. In 1985 the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and 
Joiners estimated ca..pentry unemployment at 75 per cent.36 Employment levels were 
slow to improve. In 1986 Haig Young, the Minister of Public Works, corr1mented that 
only public sector initiatives were keeping the construction industry alive. Newfoundland 
was not alone in facing high construction unemployment, which limited construction 
cent, and service 16.7 per cent. 
36 In January 1986 the Canada Employment and Imnugration Commission listed 32,002 
Newfoundland construction workers as unemployed. Dorothy Anger, Carmelita McGrath, and 
Sandy Pottle, Women and Work in Newfoundland (St. Jot..n's: Royal Commission on 
Employment and Unemployment, 1986), 23. See also Fred Bowdring, Business Mar..ager, 
NLBCTC, "Council Concerned with Jobsite Conditions," ET, 24 March 1983; Patricia Lush, 
"Construction Industry is Anticipating Average Jobless rate of 16% This Year," Globe and Mail, 
23 March 1982; and "Brief Submitted to Advisory Cornmittee to deal with Construction Labour 
Relation Climate in this Province," Submitted by UBCJA, loca1579, 1985. 
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workers from moving outside the province for work. Those who were working were 
employed on a few large projects.37 
The Newfoundland construction industry was not alone in facing an economic 
downturn. Across Canada, national unemployment rates for construction hovered arotmd 
20 per cent with Statistics Canada reporting that unionized wage rates in construction 
only rose by 2.4 per cent in 1985, the smallest rate in over 25 years. Given that inflation 
rose by four per cent, unionized construction workers faced a loss of 1.6 per cent in real 
wages. The limited number of new projects led to fierce competition bet\veen contractors 
and calls for wage roll-backs. In the mid-1980s, many contractors began hiring non-union 
labour or hiring union workers willing to work for less than scale. 38 This led to a 
tremendous growth in non-union contractors who were able not only to pay their 
employees less but also had the added flexibility of being able to assign workers to jobs 
outside their formal job classification or to assign semi- or unskilled workers work 
traditionally done by skilled workers. Carpenters' local 905 president Cyril Trokc warned 
that such double breasting was increasing at an alarming rate and that it was difficult to 
control as contractors simply changed their names from project to project, leaving behind 
any collective bargaining obligations when one project ended. According to Troke, as one 
37 Some workers were employed on the Hinds Lake hydro project, the MUN library, a Comer 
Brook housing project, or the St. John' s taxation and telephone building projects. "Public Sector 
Initiative Keeping Construction Alive, says Public Works Minister," ET, 6 January 1986. 
38 While many authors claimed that rising cost differentials made union construction less 
competitive, work by Steven Allen on the constmction industry contradicts this. Allen found that 
the reasons for declining unionization in the construction industry in the U.S. rest not with the 
argument that unions are less competitive (with wage or productivity differentials) but with 
judicial and NLRB decisions wl1ich facilitated double breasting and management's desire to use 
non-union contractors. Allen, "Developments in Collective Bargaining in Construction in the 
1980s and 1990s," 411-445. This is an area that wan·ants further research in Newfoundland. 
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contractor went with double breasting, it had a snowball effect as others followed suit to 
. . 39 
remain compehhve. 
A Glimmer of Hope 
In 1985 the Newfmmdland construction industry received a boost it had long 
anticipated. After years of jurisdictional wrangling including a Supreme Court case, 
Brian Mulroney and Brian Peckford signed the Atlantic Accord. The Accord divided 
jurisdictional powers for the offshore between the two levels of government and opened 
the door to developing the Hibernia offshore oilfield. The announcement that the oil 
industry was going to proceed with a Gravity Based System (GBS) for Hibernia largely 
built in Newfoundland was music to the ears of constmction workers and contractors 
across the province. With the project imminent, the government convened a Construction 
Industry Advisory Committee to examine the "problems associated with the construction 
industry in the Province of Newfoundland," and to ensure "adequate structures are in 
place to provide a stable Constmction Labour Relations climate in the province." Chaired 
by lawyer Gordon Easton, other committee members included United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters and Joiners representative Gonzo Gillingham and executive director of the 
Newfoundland Construction Labour Relations Association Bill Alcock. The government 
wanted the report to address indushy problems so that Newfotmdland companies could 
become more competitive for oil-related work. Throughout the report, much like the 
earlier Neary report, the Come by Chance project symbolized what was to be avoided.40 
39 
"Practice of Double Breasting under Fire at Labor Hearings," ET, 17 October 1985; and 
UBCJA, local579, "Brief Submitted to Advisor; Committee to deal with Construction Labour 
Relation Climate in this Province," 1985. See also "No Member Control Means no Stability, says 
NCLRA Head," ET, March 1987 which discusses the NLCA agreement to ban double breasting, 
!n agreement many of its contractors ignored. 
"Labor Minister to Meet with Advisory Committee," ET, 11 October 1985 and Easton, .RCIAC, 
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The Construction Advisory committee report recommended that the Hibernia 
construction site be declared a Special Project under the Labour Relations Act with an 
employers' council and a bargaining cou.TJ.c.il of the building trades unions responsible for 
negotiations, along the lines of the Churchill Falls project. It also recommended that the 
government introduce legislation requiring a system of multi-trade bargaining for industrial 
and commercial construction and that the industry as a whole commit to a five-year no 
strike, no lockout agreement. In addition, it recommended requiring employers use mark-up 
and pre-job conferences prior to the commencement of major jobs, that the government 
appoint a jurisdictional umpire under the Labour Relations Board, and that employers use 
more composite crews to avoid jurisdictional disputes. 
To cope with double-breasting, the Constmction Industry Advisory Committee 
recommended that a minimum wage be set for all trades workers in the industrial 
construction industry and that the Labour Relations Board be given the power to determine 
any question arising that relates to the commercial and industrial sector of the construction 
industry.4 ' The Newfoundland and Labrador Construction Association disagreed with a 
standard wage approach, arguing that "standardized wage policies are dangerous, short 
sighted, and merely a tinkering with market forces which most authorities agree cannot be 
approached other than by a complete overhaul of our political, social, and economic 
system.'.42 An international joint labour-management committee also met to deal with the 
issue of double breasting and recolTh.!lended that workers seek less money and fewer 
benefits to help stem the rapid growth of non-union contractors.43 While the document 
8-26. Easton was later to become the chair of the Newfmmdland Labour Relations Board. 
41 Easton, RCL4C, 59-63. 
42 
"Practice of Double Breasting under Fire at Labor Hearings," ET, 17 October 1985. 
43 
"Construction Workers take a Beating at the Bargaining Table," ET, 25 January 1986. Western 
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was endorsed by both the Canadian and International executive boards of the fifteen 
international building trades unions and the Canadian Construction Association, some 
union leaders worried that advocating contract concessions might undercut labour's 
bargaining ability.44 Gonzo Gillingham, representative of the United Brotherhood of 
Carpenters and Joiners, disagreed, arguing that recent concessionary contracts had 
allowed unions to recapture a large per cent of jobs. He claimed that "right now [January 
1986], 75 per cent of heavy construction is union. A year or a year and a half ago, that 
was not the case - it was about 30 per cent. "45 As unions competed with each other and 
with non-union contractors for work, frequent mark-up and jurisdictional disputes 
resulted, as did inter-union rivalries.46 
Following the Construction Industry Advisory Committee recommendations, the 
NCLRA and NLBCTC began negotiations for a two-year multi-trade bargaining 
agreement. When bargaining looked unfruitful, the Minister of Labour appointed a 
mediator whose subsequent report set out a blueprint for overhauling labour relations in 
the construction industry. A mediation report by Leslie Harris found intractable problems 
Canada and Newfoundland fared far worse than other parts of the country as both their 
construction industries sank into depression. James McCambly, president of the Canadian 
Federation of Labor reported that in some areas of Newfoundland and Alberta construction 
unemployment was at 80 per cent. 
44 
"Construction Union Officials Rapped for Supporting Document," ET, 6 November 1985. U.S. 
building trades union officials had already stated their willingness to grant wage and other 
concessions in hopes of curbing non-union growth. 
45 
"Commission says Drop in Union Membership more Severe in US," ET, 20 January 1986. 
46 In 1983, for instance, the Steelworkers accused the NLBCTC of stealing work at the IOC plant 
in Labrador City. After layoffs of its 0\1'11 members, Steel challenged the Building Trades 
contract which gave construction unions five weeks work refurbishing and rebuilding machinery 
on site. Press Release, NLBCTC, 12 April 1982. Problems between the Steelworkers and the 
building trades may also have been influenced by the 1982 breakaway ofbuilding trades unions 
from the Canadian Labour Congress. The CLC suspended the unions after they refused to remit 
their per capita dues. In response the unions left the CLC and created the Canadian Federation of 
Labour. Joseph Rose, "Some Notes on the Building Trades-Canadian Labour Congress Dispute," 
Industrial Relations, 22, 1 (Winter 1983), 87-93 . Gordon Easton, chair, Report of the 
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across the construction industry, that its structure was irrational, chaotic, and that it failed 
to served either employers or employees adequately.47 Harris viewed the root cause of the 
instability as the oversupply of trades workers and an undersupply of steady work which 
allowed non-union contractors to flourish. This forced employers under collective 
agreements to compete with non-union contractors who were not bound by either 
contractual or legislative obligations as only unioruzed employers were covered by the 
Labour Relations Act. With the oversupply of trades workers, unions became 
increasingly zealous at protecting their traditional areas of responsibility, leading to 
frequent jurisdictional disputes.48 
To cope with the inherent instability, Harris recommended an overhaul of the 
collective bargaining system, including creating a licensing system for all construction 
contractors. In addition, Harris wanted the NCLRA expanded to represent all licensed 
contractors and to bargain on an industry wide basis. Certification was one way to insure 
that workers were trained and qualified, and had health and safety education. 
Certification would also provide job security for bona fide construction workers and deter 
moonlighting. Harris believed that: 
the requirement that legitimate construction workers be registered as such 
would discourage individuals, many of them already fully-employed or 
committed to other industries, fields, or vocations, from casually entering 
the building and construction trades work force as moonlighters or in some 
other guises to exacerbate unemployment and to diminish cohesion among 
the legitimate building and construction trades. 49 
Construction Industry Advisory Committee (RCL4C) (St. John's 1986), 12. 
47 At the time Leslie Harris was president of Memorial University. 
48 
Leslie Harris, Report in the Matter of the Labour Relations Act (1977) and in the Matter of a 
Dispute Between the NCLRA and the NLBCTC (St. John's 1986). 
49 H . 
ams, Report in the Matter of the Labour Relations Act .. . 
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Harris also recommended that individual construction w1ions transfer authority 
for collective bargaining to the NLBCTC to allow for industry-wide bargaining. He also 
suggested the NCLRA and NLBCTC create a joint board of trustees to administer a new 
welfare and benefits plan. By adopting a formula similar to the Rand Formula, all 
employers, union or non-union, would contribute to the benefits plan. Harris also 
suggested that the government establish a minimwn wage for construction under the 
Labour Standards Act to help prevent non-union contractors from drastically undercutting 
union contractors. To help further stabilize wages, Harris advocated that the NCLRA and 
NLBCTC establish a joint committee to oversee wage rates. He also recommended 
establishing a mark-up system and developing a special tribunal to adjudicate 
jurisdictional disputes. Harris' final recommendation called on the building trades unions 
to organize non-union construction workers, thereby taking away the power of non-union 
contractors to undercut wa~e rates and destabilize the construction industry. 
To ensure labour peace while these changes were implemented, Harris asked that 
both sides negotiate collective agreements that would nm from 30 Ap1il 1986 to 30 April 
1988. In those agreements he asked both sides to commit to a no-strike, no lock-out 
clause. He also asked the NCLRA to commit to a policy of no more douhle-breasting and 
the NLBCTC to commit to wage increases of between no more than 5 to 10 per cent. 
Before the report was released, however, the Minister of Labour undennined the process 
by armouncing that the government had no intention of dealing with double breasting. 
With the expiry of the collective agreements, a bitter province-wide strike shut down the 
construction industry for five weeks in August 1988.50 In the aftermath of the strike, the 
NLBCTC and the NCLRA negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the 
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provincial government that all sides hoped would bring labour peace to the unionized 
construction industry. 
The MOU agreed to a no strike/no lockout clause in exchange for a ban on double 
breasting for a five year period and for a government commitment to legislate mandatory 
multi-trades bargaining. In lieu of striking, the parties asked for a Board to mediate any 
deadlocks. Mediation failure was to result in a case going to binding arbitration. Under 
the agreement, the parties involved agreed to do a feasibility study on the practicality of 
registering trades workers. The government initially agreed to revise the Labour 
Standards Act and to establish minimum wage levels for the industrial and commercial 
sector of the construction industry. In announcing the MOU, the Minister of Labour 
stated that "with the recent announcement of the Hibernia Agreement, it is more 
important than at any other time in our history that we create an atmosphere of 
confidence in labour relattons in this province."51 Unfortunately, the agreement was short-
lived. It failed when the government refused to meet its commitments of implementing 
amendments to the Industrial Standards Act and to introduce legislation banning double 
breasting. The govemment reneged after protests by non-union contractors. The death of 
the MOU added to the already acrimonious relationship between unions and contractors. 
A nine week strike resulted, with over 6000 construction workers out on a province-wide 
strike.52 
50 Press Release, Newfoundland and Labrador Federation of Labour, 22 August 1986. 
51 Ted Blanchard, Minister of Labour, "Statement," Week in Review, 29 July 1988. 
52 Non-union contractors claimed the issue was not double breasting but competition. Union and 
contractor associations wanted a minimum wage schedule for non-union construction workers 
that would equal 7 5 per cent of the total union compensation package; the cabinet approved a rate 
of roughly 50 per cent of the union rate. The deal ultimately failed when despite Labour Minister 
Ted Blanchard's support, other cabinet ministers refused to sign it. See "Non-Union Contractors 
Vow to Fight Labor Deal," ET, 10 August 1988; "Court Action to be Postponed," ET, 28 January 
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As industrial relations deteriorated, plans proceeded for the Hibernia project. In 
August 1988, the principal lead owner, Mobil Oil, asked each of the four companies 
bidding on the Hibernia project to prepare their own labour relations management plans, 
no longer confident that the government would solve the problems plaguing the 
constmction industry. All were worried about the current crisis in constmction, 
particularly what impact double breasting might have on the project. Each of the four 
contractors suggested the san1e remedy to the instability plaguing constmction in 
Newfoundland: that the project be declared a special project under the Labour Relations 
Act and that the project be unionized, by the building and construction unions. As a 
result, Mobil arranged a meeting in November 1988 between the four contractors and 
representatives ofthe AFL-CIO Building and Construction Trades Department. 
Before agreeing to a unionized site, the employers sought three commitments: that 
local unions act collectively in a council of unions; that parent international tmions be 
present at the negotiating table; and that the agreement be limited to the project only and 
not part of the larger province-wide agreement building trade unions had with the 
NCLRA. In response, the building trades unions created an Oil Development Council in 
December 1988, representing twelve constmction unions plus the Teamsters and the 
Hotel and Restaurant ·workers. While the local unions were initially leery of having the 
international unions at the table, they acceded. The third demand, to bargain away from 
the NCLRA, was a more difficult one as the Newfoundland goverP..ment had given the 
NCLRA exclusive bargaining rights for the Newfoundland construction industry. When 
1989; "Peckford Mum on Suggestion he is at Odds with Blanchard," ET, 16 September 1988. 
Lana Payne, "Construction Industry Contract talks 'in Limbo'," ET, 1 February 1989; Payne, 
"Construction Peace Pact is Dead," ET, 28 January 1989; Payne, "A Rocky Road to Labor Peace 
in Province's Construction Industry," ET, 8 December 1989. 
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the Hibernia Employers Association (HEA) convinced the NCLRA to giVe up those 
rights, it opened the door for negotiations to begin in earnest in February 1989. At the 
table were 29 union representatives (14 each from the local and the international unions 
plus Guy Dumoulin, the Canadian Executive Director of the American Federation of 
Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations Building and Construction Trades 
Department), James Kem1y for the HEA, and representatives from each of the four 
contractors still contending for the contract. 53 
' 
One early sticking point at the negotiations was the ODC's insistence on 
representing all workers on site. The Marine Workers' Union, which represented workers 
at the Marystown Shipyard, was also interested in representing workers on site. Given the 
potential for jurisdictional conflict, the ODC convinced the HEA it was safer to go with 
only one council of unions on site. Another sticking point arose when the ODC attempted 
to bring the 14 different union contracts in line with one another, particularly on issues 
such as the length and composition of the work week. On several occasions, both sides 
came close to walking a-\vay from the talks and, as Joln1 Crosbie relates, only Brian 
Mulroney's intervention put the talks back on track. In one instance, a conflict between 
newly elected Liberal premier Clyde Wells and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney over the 
Meech Lake Accord threatened to put an end to the negotiations when Quebec MPs 
threatened to block legislation providing the federal funding for Hibernia. 54 
53 1'1 preliminary meetings in January 1989 the HEA publicly committed itselftq going union. 
Gregory Kealey and Gene Long, Labour and Hibernia: Conflict Resolution at Bull Arm, 1990-
1992 (St. John's: ISER, 1993), 2-4. 
54 John C. Crosbie with Geoffrey Stevens, l'lo Holds Barred: My Life in Politics (Toronto: 
McClelland and Stewart, 1997), 435. Crosbie also takes credit for convincing Mulroney to buy 
part of Gulf Canada's stake in the project after Gulf withdrew in 1992. 
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Hibernia 
Given the overall size of the construction project and the limited deadline given 
for its completion, considerable importance was placed on labour relations at Hibernia. 
Both parties had a vested interest in havi..ng the project completed on time, on budget, and 
with harmonious labour relations. To this end, two things occurred. In July 1990, after 18 
months of negotiation, a comprehensive collective agreement was signed between the 
ODC and the HEA, and in September 1990 the site received Special Project designation 
under the Labour Relations Act. Within a week Hibernia Management Development 
Committee awarded the contract for site development. 55 
Project owners supported the project being unionized as the construction period 
was one time when the oil companies were vulnerable to delays and cost-overruns. 
During construction companies spent immense sums building an offshore drllling 
installation with little return on their investment. The amount of money being expended, 
and the relatively tight timeframe potentially gave workers increased power, as both sides 
knew how important it was for the companies to start recouping their construction costs. 
Hibernia's time frame was particularly ·vulnerable to delays as there was only a short 
window of opportunity when the rig could be towed to its offshore drilling location, and 
any delays meant that the project might be on hold for almost a year. 
The Hibernia Construction Project Agreement was . negotiated between the ODC 
representing 14 unions and the REA representing all contractors on site. The collective 
agreement incorporated many of the recommendations made by the various commissions. 
When the government failed to enact legislative changes, the HEA and ODC opted to add 
corn1·nission recommendations to the collective agreement. In almost every provision it is 
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clear that both sides were determined to avoid another labour relations disaster, 
particularly the frequent work stoppages and jurisdictional disputes that plagued the 
construction industry in the 1970s and 1980s. Several articles of the contract were key to 
labour relations on site, including articles which recognized the ODC as the sole 
bargaining agent and which guaranteed no slowdowns, strikes or lockouts for the length 
of the project. The agreement also laid out a fast-track grievance and arbitration system 
in an attempt to prevent small disagreements from escalating into major disputes.56 
' 
' To prevent jurisdictional disputes, a Jurisdictional Umpire was appointed. Mark-
up conferences had to be held before any work was started. For each new job all the 
unions on site received a notice of work details and t.~e initial union assignment. After the 
notice went out, a mark-up meeting \Vas held allowing unions to 'claim' work. Work was 
assigned by established practice. Jurisdictional disputes that were not resolved within 14 
. 
days were sent to an umpire. Unions had the right to appeal an umpire's ruling to the 
Impartial Jurisdictional Disputes Board of the Building and Construction Trades 
Department (AFL-CI0).57 Despite the mechanisms in place, on several occasions the 
ODC attempted to take mark-up grievances to arbitration. On one occasion, the Plumbers 
and Pipefitters filed a grievance after they claimed the contractor failed to follow mark-
up procedure. The arbitrator sent the case to the umpire after the HEA objected the 
55 Kealey and Long, Labour and Hibernia, 2-5. 
56 Under the three step grievance system, 'Norkers were given two days to take their complaint to 
the site representatives. Management was then given two days for initial response. If nothing was 
resolved, step two allotted the union business manager two days to file a grievance and gave the 
Principal Contractor an additional two days to respond. In step three ODC and HEA 
representatives were to meet in a final attempt to settle the grievance. Following that meeting 
either side had two days in which to file for arbitration. Once an arbitrator was appointed a 
hearing had to be held within five working days. Given the importance of the project, the 
govemment assigned four arbitrators to cover all Hibernia related arbitrations. Project Agreement 
between Hibernia Employers' Association Inc. and Newfoundland and Labrador Oil 
Developnzent Allied Trades Council for Hibernia Developmeni Project (July 1990), 10. 
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arbitrator could not hear a jurisdictional dispute.58 In another case, the ODC filed a 
grievance after they alleged no mark-up was held for a mandolite (fireproofing) pump 
job. The HEA maintained that as a mark-up issue it belonged before the umpire, but the 
ODC argued that as there had been no mark-up it could not be taken before the umpire. 
Arbitrator Alcock found that there was a mark-up, but no final work assignment. Hence, 
he ordered that the HEA complete the final work assignment after which, if the ODC was 
still unhappy, they could take the issue before the jurisdictional umpire. 59 
Labour relations on site were initially positive. Some problems, however, were 
evident quite early. At a meeting in August 1992 HEA executive director James Kenny 
spoke of problems on site. After a speech reminding the ODC of earlier co-operation, 
Kenny launched into an analysis of their current relationship, raising what he described as 
some "disturbing issues." Kenny reported that in "too many instances the business-like 
approach to problem resolution has disappeared. Common sense, courtesy and open 
dialogue have been replaced by common threats and intimidation and attempts at 
coercion." High levels of staff tumover on both the union and management sides were 
also seen as a problem. Kenny was also upset about the evolution of the site 
representative position. The HEA viewed the site representative as a problem solver but 
felt that it had recently changed into more of a walking steward role. 60 
57 Project Agreement, 10. 
58 See Govemment of Newfoundland, Department of Labour, Arbitration 94-139. 
59 In addition to these cases there were 13 more jurisdictional cases awaiting arbitration which 
were examined in a month of meetings between the ODC and the HEA in July 1995. These cases 
ranged from a tower crane installed without a mark-up and work performed by another trade to 
work performed by management. All thirteen cases were referred to the umpire. Review 
Committee Report betvveen Hibernia Employers' Association and Oil Development Council. 20 
July 1995. 
60 ODC files , box A-Z, File: ODC-HEA Joint Meetings. J.P. Kenny, HEA Executive Director, 
"Presentation to the ODC," 20 August 1992, 3, 11-13. 
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As the site became larger and costs increased, both parties became less willing to 
settle grievances informally. From 1994 on a lack of trust/co-operation developed. In 
May 1994 members of the ODC and HEA met at the St. John's Airport Inn to discuss the 
increasing numbers of grievances and arbitration issues. At the meeting Bill Parsons 
attempted to convince Kermy that the settling of individual grievances did not set 
precedents.61 To Derm Cain of the ODC Kermy appeared worried about making a 
misstep, choosing to let issues go to arbitration rather than set precedents via grievance 
resolution.62 By 1995 grievances and arbitrations were backed up considerably and an 
increasingly confrontational relationship was developing between the HEA and the ODC. 
The United Association of Plumbers and Pipefitters (UA) representative Cal Jones was 
barred from site by the HEA for "poor behaviour". 
At a joint ODC-HEA meeting in May 1995 both sides agreed labour relations on 
site were deteriorating, something HEA representative James Kenny blamed on the 
ODC's abuse of the arbitration system. Kenny complained that thorough investigations 
were not being done before cases were sent to arbitration. He was also unhappy that the 
ODC had gone to the government to complain about labour relations on site. ODC 
61 Kenny had taken a more active role on site after one of the on-site management representatives, 
Harold Mercer, left the site in a disagreement over restructuring in June 1994. Morale problems 
among managers led the GBS construction management team to hold a series of meetings to 
define its mission statement and get them to "opt" into the team. Meetings were held after many 
managers complained of too many meetings, too much paper work, late design changes, low 
morale, and undefined areas of responsibility. "GBS Management Team Buildir1g Session Held," 
Hibernia News, 27 July 1994, 1. 
62 Interview with Derm Cain, 17 September 1996. Meetings between the ODC and HEA in July 
1995 led to the establishment of a joint HEA -ODC committee comprised of three representatives 
from each side to discuss labour relations at the site. This committee was given a mandate to 
resolve all outstanding grievances and arbitrations. Unanimous decisions were binding a::1d final 
on all affected parties, however, if a unanimous decision was not reached then the grievance was 
sent back to normal arbitration procedure. While several grievances were setticd, neither side 
was pleased with the compromises. Review Committee Report between the Hibernia Employer's 
Association and the Oil Development Committee, 20 July 1995. 7-18. 
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president Derm Cain saw things differently, and blamed the HEA for problems. He stated 
that "Failure and unwillingness for the contractor and HEA to settle as quickly as 
possible and failure by the HEA to accept arbitrators' decisions are just a few of the 
problems for bogged down grievances and arbitrations."63 
The situation continued to deteriorate as the HEA refused to use one arbitrator 
and asked to have another removed for bias. By 1996, 42 cases were before the 
arbitrators with a further 56 settled (or dropped) in a month of meetings between the 
QDC and HEA to discuss arbitrations.64 While the construction project wrapped up in the 
spring of 1997, labour relations problems did not end. The ODC maintained that all 
construction work was not complete at the time of tow-out, and that unionized 
construction workers were guaranteed the work under the project agTeement. 
Arbitrations on that and other issues continued until late 1998. 
Conclusions 
Government and management used a wide variety of tactics to cope with labour 
relations problems in construction. Governments had at their disposal tools to regulate the 
marketplace. In the mid-1970s the Newfoundland government joined the federal program 
of wage and price controls in an attempt to help control inflation. When inflation 
returned, governments at both levels turned away from Keynesian responses to the crisis 
63 ODC files, box A-Z, tile: ODC Meetings. "Minutes- ODC Meeting," 23 May 1995 and Joint 
ODC-HEA-HMDC Meeting, 24-25 May 1995. 
64 In Arbitration 95-311, 17 April1995, Re: Violation of the Collective Agreement, the ODC 
charged that the REA's failure to choose arbitrator Dennis Browne in rotation was contrary to 
article 11.04 and exhibit 1 of the Collective Agreement. In Arbitration 96-063, Subject: 
Procedural Ruling, Reasonable Apprehension of Bias, 4 August 1996, the HEA asked for Dave 
Alcock to be removed after Jim Kenny of the HEA learned Alcock discussed work load problems 
with ODC lawyer Norm Whalen and Bill Parsons. The REA believed the unilateral discu~sions 
showed no regard for HEA concerns and asked Alcock to remoYe himself while the HEA brought 
a court application seeking his removal from ail current Hibernia cases. 
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wwards a tight money policy involving a reduction in workers' rights. GovelllL-nents also 
responded by turning to an old standby, the royal commission or investigative body. By 
appointing an investigative committee, the government looked like it was taking action 
even if it had no intention of following the committee's recommendations. Having a 
series of investigative committees allowed the public to feel the government was doing 
something and allowed the participants a :fonun for their complaints. Commissions also 
gave the government concrete suggestions on how to improve labour relations, should the 
government choose to implement them. Few of the construction industry reports were 
implemented in full, but some recommendations were included by the contractors fuJ.d 
unions in their collective agreements. 
By using special project designation the Hibernia project was able to overcome 
many of the flaws in the existing Labour Relations Act, an option not offered the earlier 
project. In both Hibernia's special project designation and its collective agreement, great 
care was taken by both sides to avoid repeating the problems of Come by Chance. T}1is 
was done through ensuring that all parties on site were signatories and bound to the 
collective agreement, something that did not happen at Come by Chance where two of 
the unions were not bound by the contract. Unlike the Come by Chance contract, the 
Hibernia contract included an article ban..lling strikes, slow-downs or lock-outs. The 
Come by Chance contract in comparison simply stated in its preamble that it was to both 
parties' mutual advantage to avoid strikes, work stoppages and delays. 
Employers had their own arsenal of responses to the union challenge of the early 
1970s. They pressured government for area-wide certification and for multi-trades 
bargaining. When the number of new projects slowed and contractors were struggling to 
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survive, many contractors turned to double-breasting and increasingly tight regulations .of 
their workforces. In the case of Hibernia's collective agreement, the HEA was given the 
power to make rules and regulations covering the work and campsite, something they 
were quick to do. The HEA regulated almost every aspect of life on the project, from 
banning alcohol on site to penalties for everything from insubordination to tardiness. 
Construction workers were quick to respond to the myriad of rules and regulations, not 
always behaving favourably. How workers responded to management attempts at control 
is the focus of the next chapter. 
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gtapter Seven: Fighting, Drinking, and Pilfering at Hiberni;! 
Introduction 
In much of the construction literature, construction workers were portrayed as a 
different breed of workers than mass production workers.1 In 1981 Herbert Appelbaum 
wrote that trends like Taylorism had not taken hold in the construction industry because 
its technology made these practices inappropriate. He maintained that the technological 
1 Works by Appelbaum and Riemer epitomize the literature on the culture of construction 
workers. Written by sociologists and anthropologists with a construction background, these books 
were billed as taking an "inside look into the work world of those who build our buildings."None 
took a historical approach, but instead offered a snapshot of the profession. Herbert Applebaum, 
Royal Blue: the Culture of Construction Workers (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981); 
Jeffrey Riemer, Hard Hats: the work world ofConstntctiorz Workers (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1979). See also Bob Reckman, "Carpentry: the Craft and Trade," in Case Studies on 
the Labor Process, edited by A. Zimbalist (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979); and Ma.rk 
Silver, Under Construction: Work and Alienation in the Building Trades (Albany: State 
University ofNew York, 1986). There are few books focusing on construction in Canada. 
Several Canadian historians have written books commissioned by individual unions. See Ian 
McKay, The Craft Transformed: An Essay on l11e Carpenters ofHalifa.;r, 1885-1985 (Halifax: 
Holdfast Press, 1985 ); Gerry Berkowski, Ed Reed, Nolan Reilly, and Doug Smith, eds., All That's 
Made of Wood: the Story of Local 343 U11ited Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners (Vhnnipeg: 
Manitoba Labour History Series, 1995); and Mark Leier and M.C. Wanior, Light at the End of 
the Tunnel: Thefirstforiy years, a history of the Tunnel and Rock Workers Union, local 168 
(Vancouver 1992). This is a trend dominam in the U.S. historiography as well, see Raymond 
Robertson, A Hist01y of the Iron Workers 1896-1996 (Washington 1996); Walter Gal ens on, The 
United Brotherhood of Carpenters: the First Hundred Years (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1983); and Grace Palladino, Dreams of Dignity, Workers of Vision (Washington: IDE W, 
1991). Few books have looked at Newfoundland's construction industry, one exception being 
Malcolm MacLeod, Peace of the Continent: The Impact of Second World War on Canadian and 
American Bases in Newfoundland (St. John's: Harry Cuff, 1986) which examines the construction 
of military bases in Newfoundland during World War II. This book focuses on the relationship 
between Canada, the U.S., and Newfoundland. Scattered mentions of construction projects lay in 
other books, including Phillip Smith, Brinco: the Story of Churchill Falls (Toronto: McClelland 
and Stewart, 1975). There are social, economic, and environmental impact assessments on both 
the Come by Chance and Hibernia projects, including Larry Felt and Roger Carter, "The Impact 
of Provincial Refinery Co. Oil Refinery at Come-by-Chance, Newfoundland upon its 
Environment," commissioned by Petro Canada (1980); Douglas Inkster, "Background Paper on 
the Potential of the Come by Chance Refinery to Contribute to the Economic Development of the 
Province," (Economic Recovery Commission, 1990); John McKnight, "The Political Economy of 
Environmental Regulatory Policy: the Case of Come by Chance," MA, MUN, 1996; James 
Locke, "Socio-Economic Impact Assessment Auditing: a Critique using the Case Study of the 
Hibernia Offshore Oil Development Project," MA, MUN, 1996; and Wade Locke and James 
Feehan, The Development of the Hibernia Offshore Field (St. John's: ISER, 1993). One exception 
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and social organization of the construction industry fostered a particular pattern of work 
behaviour, stressing the independence and autonomy of construction craftsmen, whom he 
viewed as controlling their own work process. Applebaum described the differences 
between construction workers and mass production workers: 
Unlike the factory worker, a building craftsman's job is neither narrowly 
defined nor performed under close supervision. The repetitive nature of 
manufacturing work is absent. Instructions are general, not specific... The 
men are given their work locations and operations and told what material 
and equipment are available. The organization of the tasks and how the 
work is to be performed is left to the craftsmen and their foremen. The 
craftsman is responsible for the layout of his work and completing it within 
a certain time. 2 
Work autonomy was not the only difference separating the construction worker from 
blue-collar workers in mass production. According to a Saskatchewan Conciliation 
Board hearing: 
The production rhythm in construction has to be totally different from that 
of manufach1ring where employees all work together on one location, at one 
time, in one integrated operation, mass producing goods which are sold for 
use elsewhere. The general contractor [did] some of the basic constmction 
work itself, but in most cases the general [contractor] will subcontract the 
skilled teclmical work (electrical, plumbing) to trade contractors .... 
Corresponding to each of these subcontractors are the several kinds of 
tradesmen who have the specialized skills that are required at different 
phases in the construction project. The normal pattem is for each firm to 
agree to have its supervisors and tradesmen and equipment at the job, at the 
right point in the construction schedule to perform their task. When they are 
finished, both contractors and tradesmen go their own separate ways, to 
perform the same kind of operations on different projects, at other sites and 
other new contracts.3 
is Greg Kealey and Gene Long, Labour and Hibernia: Conflict resolution at Bull Arm, 1990-
1992 (St. John's: ISER, 1993) which examines the first two years oflabour relations at Hibemia. 
2 Applebaum, Royal Blue, 21. What Applebaum failed to take into account is that construction is 
made up of workers of different skill and training levels. While workers with more training were 
able to exhibit some control over their rate of production, others were not. 
3 Gordon Easton, Chair, Report of the Construction Industry Advisory Committee (St. John's 
1986), 5-6. Hereafter Easton, RCIAC. Citing Saskatchewan, Report of the Board of Conciliation, 
4 October 1985. 
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Applebaum argued that the localized nature of the industry with its decentralized 
work processes, the unique structure of each building, the weather variability, the 
temporary duration of each project, and the organizational features of the industry, 
including the small size of most construction firms, the skilled workforce, and the 
strength of craft unions, resulted in increased independence and autonomy. Applebaum 
concluded that these variables, when combined, reduced the amount of control employers 
could impose. Construction workers' relative independence was a by-product of the 
autonomy and control of the work process maintained by skilled craftsmen, informal 
management administration, handicraft technology, hazardous working conditions, 
uncertainty, fairly high job satisfaction, and an occupational comrmmity which was 
displayed in a lifelong commitment to their crafts, a merging of work and non-work lives, 
and the identification of their self-image from their work.4 
According to many authors, the construction worker was able to perfonn a range 
of complex operations, while the assembly-line worker was viewed as a single-purpose 
tool.5 Another celebrated difference separating craft workers from assembly workers, at 
least in the days before Japanese teamwork was embraced in North American auto plants, 
was that craft workers embraced the team concept early on. vVork was done in teams or 
pairs, with every craftsman paired with an apprentice learning the trade. While some 
mass production companies have turned to 'team concepts', lean production and total 
quality management in the past decade, recent studies indicate that these are teams in 
name only and have acted simply to give management even more authority on where and 
4 Applebaum, Royal Blue ... , 13. 
5 Peter Dmcker, The New Society (New York: Harper, 1950), 172-3. 
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how to use workers. 6 In addition, construction work was seen as different from mass 
production work as construction workers had to continuously coordinate their work with 
other trades. Unlike assembly line workers, construction workers were thus able to 
perform a wide range of operations, allowed mastery over tools, and provided with a 
work environment that fostered cooperation. Or so claims the literature. 
If any of these precepts were true in earlier times, by the time of the Hibernia 
project, the myth of the independent craft worker working with his own tools at his O\Vn 
pace was long past. Construction workers who still held onto the idea of themselves as 
self-directing, independent crafts workers were in for a surprise when they reached 
Hibernia. The site's collective agreement put strict limitations on workers' abilities to 
assert their own needs; everything from behaviour at work to life in the camp was 
explicitly spelled out. While the majority of workers, skilled and unskilled, were happy to 
exchange their labour for a good pay check, a select few fou,'ld it difficult to folJow the 
rules covering their work and camp lives. This chapter examines the minority of workers 
who ran into difficulties at Hibernia and how they attempted to resist management's 
encroachment on their work and camp life. 7 
6 Tod Rutherford, "The Canadian Automobile Industry: Work Reorganization and Industrial 
Relations Change," in Employee Relations, 12, 2 (1990); and James Rinehart, Christopher 
Huxley, and David Robertson, "Worker Commitment and Labour Management Relations under 
Lean Production at CAl\11,'' Relations industrielle/Jndustrial Relations, 49, 4 (1994). 
7 The rules imposed at Hibernia were to control all workers on site, not just craft workers. 
Hibernia wages were higher than standard union wages in Newfoundland. Boilermakers started at 
$22.95 at Hibernia, $15-20 in other union environments, and $11 in non-union jobs. Labourers at 
Hibernia were paid a base rate of $18.46, non-union labourers anything from minimum wage up 
to $11 an hour. NLBCTC, "Typical Construction Wage Rates," 18 January 1995. ·while this 
chapter deals with disciplinary actions at Hibernia, it is important to note that Hibernia does not 
appear atypical from other constJ.uction projects. Unfortunately, disciplinary records no longer 
exist for Churchill Falls or Come by Chance preventing us from making comparisons. Churchill 
Falls, with its geographical isolation, likely had less pilfering while Come by Chance, with its 
poor labour relations, may have had more. 
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Work lives at Hibernia were highly regimented. Before workers picked up a tool 
they were subject to an orientation spelling out site rules. For those workers living on site 
there were also a set of rules that they had to adhere to, even when workers were "off'. 
Taken together, the mles covering work and camp life meant workers were tightly 
controlled every minute they were on site. The issue of workplace regulations first arose 
during the collective agreement negotiations when the Hibernia Employers Association 
(HEA), the umbrella group overseeing all contractors on site, insisted on setting rules and 
regulations covering both the work site (article 32.00 of the agreement) and the camp. 
Theft, drinking and drugs, and fighting were viewed as the three main sins on site, 
each carried the penalty of dismissal.8 Theft has traditionally been treated as among the 
most serious forms of employee misconduct that attract disciplinary action in Canada. 
Repeated arbitration cases have upheld the right of the employer to discharge an 
employee caught stealing on the first offence, particularly where allegations of theft were 
proven, when unauthorized possession of company property was demonstrated, or when 
an employee refused to provide information respecting thefts by fellow workers. 9 
Hibemia arbitrators agreed that firing may be an appropriate response for a first drug or 
alcohol offence. Arbitrator Leslie Harris argued that: 
the nature of the Hibernia project is such that all employment at the site is of 
relatively short duration. Workers come and go, sometimes after a few 
weeks, some after a few months, and some after a few years . . . There is no 
long term relationship between employer and employee. . .. further the 
project is on a critical path to completion within a na:..'TO\vly expandable time 
frame. Tasks must be completed on time. So much is dependent upon proper 
execution of every function, that the necessity for strictly enforced rules of 
behaviour and conduct is readily apparent. From the very outset of the 
8 Arbitration 95-039, Subject: Discharge, Arbih·ator: Leslie Harris, 17 February 1995, 11. 
Arbitration files are held by the Newfoundland Department of Environment and Labour. 
9 See Arbitrator Adams, Re: Phillips Cable Ltd., 6 LAC (2"d) 3 5, 197 4 cited in Arbitration 9 5-
039, Subject: Discharge, Arbitrator: Leslie Harris, 17 February 1995, 19. 
project it was made clear in orientation sessions and otherwise that 
substance abuse was not a type of conduct that could be condoned or 
permitted in any way. Nor, in the nature of the Hibernia experience could 
there be any time to consider long-term solutions through drug or alcohol 
rehabilitation programmes ... 10 
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Arbitrator Alcock agreed, arguing there was no opportunity for workers to establish "a 
bank of good conduct upon which they may draw to mitigate disciplinary sanctions. 
Neither is there opportunity to ensure adequate time for any kind of rehabilitation. 
Therefore the penalty of discharge may be justified more often on such ventures as the 
Hibernia project."11 
Theft and Pilfering 
The issue of theft or pilfering is a terrain that is hotly contested by employers and 
employees.12 As Rod Hay pointed out, "for an act to be seen as theft by all parties, there 
has to be a shared view of property rights. For the 'legal ovvner' any appropriation is 
theft, although some may be tolerated. For the person taking the object it will only be 
considered theft, if the 'legal' set of property rights is accepted." Hay noted that some 
acts of appropriation are seen as owing to the workers, so taking them is seen as part of 
the moral economy, if not the legal system. 13 Indeed, what constituted pilfering appears 
to differ by occupation. While the pilfering of small goods has a long tradition in many 
industries, in other occupations it was seen as stealing. As Leo Casey pointed out, while 
1
° Cited in Arbitration 96-086. Subject: Wrongful Dismissal, Arbitrator: D. Alcock, 30 September 
1996. 32. 
11 Arbitration 96-086, 32. 
12 My views on pilfering benefited from a discussion on H-Labor, a subset ofH-Net Humanities 
& Social Sciences OnLine. H-Labor is an interdisciplinary organization of scholars, students, 
librarians, and union members discussing workers and their unions. H-Labor is run by moderators 
Seth Wigderson (University ofMainc-Augusta) and Andrew Lee (Tamiment Library, New York 
University). See http://www.h-net.msu.edul~-labor. 
13 See Rod Hay, "Pilfering" post, H-Labor, 17 June 2001. http://h-net.msu.edu/cgi-
bin!logbrowse.pl?trx=lm&list=H-Labor. 
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rnany workers viewed pilfering from a private sector employer as acceptable, in the 
public and non-profit sector, such pilfering takes badly needed resources from an under-
ftmded system. 14 The distinction between what was considered acceptable and 
unacceptable pilfering also depended on the amount of goods taken and on whether the 
pilfering was for personal use or for profit. Many workers deemed pilfering out of 
necessity and for personal use as acceptable. 15 
In some industries, what is now considered pilfering was once part of a worker's 
entitlement. It is only more recently that these prerogatives have become crimes. For 
instance, historically in Britain's Southampton ship yards, workers were entitled to take 
home any piece of wood under two feet as a "perk."16 In a white-collar occupation 
pilfering encompassed everything from spending time on personal emails and searching 
the internet, to playing computer games. Selling A von or conducting a job search on 
company time were only two of the ways employees challenged employer control over 
their rates of production. Other "perks" such as taking office supplies home or making 
personal phone calls from work are not even questioned by many employers. In many 
offices a certain amount of latitude for non-work related activities is tolerated, depending 
on the amount of time workers allot to it. 17 Retail jobs were not a.s t1exible. One author 
reported that Wal-Mart informs its employees that any non-productive time spent by 
workers was viewed as stealing company time. 18 
14 For more on the differences between public and private sector thoughts on pilfering see Leo 
Casey, "Pilfering" post, H-Labor, 20 June 2001. 
15 Jeri Reed, "Pilfe:-ing" post, H-Labor, 17 June 2001. 
16 For more on the historical roots of how prerogatives became crimes, see David Montgomery, 
"f>ilfering" post, H-Labor, 18 June 2001. 
11 For more on white collar pilfering see Paul Mishler, "Pilfering" post, H-Labor, 21 June 2001. 
18 Barbara Ehrenreich, Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America (1'-l"ew York: 
Metropolitan Books, 2001). 
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An American blue collar craftsman (electrician), reported that pilfering was not 
uncommon. He found there was a vaguely definable, although elastic, moral standard 
towards pilfering among workers. According to him, most workers had little problem 
with taking small parts from the job site to do work at home, or, for instance, for an 
electrician to give a carpenter wire for a home renovation project. What was acceptable, 
however, varies by region. In some areas of the United States, it was common practice to 
give scrap wire and copper to apprentices, who were paid much lovver wages, while in 
other areas scrap was the prerogative of the foreman. This craftsman reported that while 
scrap and nuts and bolts were "open" to pilfering, to most workers, company tools were 
off-limit as without tools there was no work. The one exception was when pay cheques 
were not forthcoming, in which case many tools were "liberated". 19 
In some low-paying jobs workers viewed pilfering as a way to stretGh poor pay. 
As Jeri Reed pointed out many waitresses ate as many of their meals as possible at work 
(and fed their families there as well) in an attempt to supplement their income. In other 
industries, many workers believe their pilfering acquired legitimacy because of the size 
of profits made by employers, poor working conditions, or a particularly unpleasant 
supervisor. Studies of New York City dock workers found that many longshoremen 
justified their pilfering, often alcohol, foods, and tools, out of a sense of entitlen:1ent. 
"Snagging a bit extra as their due" was something researchers have also reported among 
street car conductors in Philadelphia and New York. Penalties, however, could be high if 
workers were caught pocketing fares, and company spies kept a careful watch.20 
19 Mike Wood, "Pilfeting" post, H-Labor, 17 June 2001. 
20 See posts by Jeri L. Reed, 15 June 2001; Steve Penfold, 17 June 2001 ; Colin Davis, 15 June 
2001; Rob Vaughan, 15 June 2001; Joshua Freeman, 19 June 2001 ; and David Montgomery, 
"Pilfering" post, H-Labor, 18 June 2001. 
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Pilfering at Hibernia 
Security personnel at the main gate were directed to carry out regular checks of 
vehicles entering the site, keeping a particular eye out for firearms and alcoholic 
beverages. Any vehicle found in possession of such goods was denied access to the site 
and written up. Security also made random checks of vehicles exiting the site. In a two-
hour period, between 12 and 50 checks would occur, depending on traffic. Security could 
only search vehicles and personal luggage with the permission of the worker involved; 
workers who did not agree were turned back from entering or exiting the site. In cases 
where workers refused to allow their cars to be searched, as long as the vehicle returned 
and allowed the search, they were treated as if the earlier incident had not occurred. This 
allowed workers trying to bring alcohol onto the site the option of driving away, leaving 
their beer behind, and returning to the site without penalty.21 
Workers acquiesced to the searches as a condition of their employment, but by 
early summer 1994 rumours were rife that security lacked the authority for their searches, 
particularly of workers' personal bags. Security reported that many workers were 
demanding warrants allowing them to conduct ihe searches. Some of the guards felt that 
there was a "conspiracy" among some workers to refuse the searches. After a series of 
incidents where workers refused to allow searches or show their identity cards when 
demanded, two notices were erected at the main gate in July 1994 stating that "removal 
of company prope1ty or food from the job site will resuh in disciplinary action including 
suspension of camp privileges," and "This is a controlled access site. Vehicles and 
contents are subject to security searches upon entry/exit. Persons refusing to consent to 
21 . 
See testimony of James Kenny, Arbitration 94-116, Subject: Discharge, Arbitrator: Leslie 
Barris, 24 November 1994, 4. 
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such search will be denied access to the site." Around the same time the signs went up 
(the HEA claimed the signs were already up, the workers and ODC denied they were in 
place yet), a vehicle carrying three workers was stopped exiting the site. When security 
asked to look in one of the worker's bags, the worker refused. The driver intervened and, 
when asked for his identity card, he too refused. After learning who the driver was 
through calling in the plate number to the RCMP, security wrote up both workers. 
Both workers received letters from PASSE's Labour Relations Division the next 
day, advising them that their access to the site was now denied as they had failed to 
comply with the search (as per the Collect~ve Agreement). Two weeks later the workers 
were both terminated for their absenteeism. Given that they were absent because the 
employer refused them access to the site, the workers grieved. The arbitrator agreed that 
while the employer had the right to deny them access to the site, it could not then fire 
them for absenteeism. He also found that the employer was not fairly applying its 
discharge rule as it had failed to punish all workers equally for refusing searches. Other 
workers who had refused searches had been treated much more leniently, some received 
no punishment at all. He felt that the employer could not choose to make an example out 
of two workers as a way to nip an incipient protest movement in the bud. The workers 
were subsequently allowed to return to their jcbs.22 To prevent further problems, the 
REA sent notices to workers with their paycheques spelling out the punishment for 
refusing to permit a search. 
22 Arbitration 94-116, Subject: Discharge, Arbitrator: Leslie Harris, 24 November 1994. 
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While the Hibernia project was anticipated to last seven years, many workers 
were only on site for a short period. Workers were hired for specific tasks and then laid 
off when the task was over. Some workers were later rehired as needed. When laid otT, 
maT\)' workers helped themselves to company property. One worker received a three 
week suspension for theft and was warned that any further incidents would result in 
termination. The site maintained a zero tolerance policy, but ln cases of minor theft by 
laid off workers, the employer listed them as no longer eligible for rehire.23 
As theft became more serious, company leniency, used against them in 
arbitrations, declined and the penalty for theft became automatic termination. A worker 
caught leaving the site with steel bolts, nuts and washers in his pocket, and hac;ksaw 
blades and heat shrink tubing handed the goods over to security and returned to camp. He 
was later fired. After being caught with gloves, safety glasses, and a respirator mask in 
his bag, another worker claimed that he did not know the equipment was in his bag as he 
left the site. Another worker was fired after being caught taking a raincoat, two vests and 
work gloves with him as he left the site. Yet another worker who was caught smuggling 
out welding mitts and four pairs of insulated work gloves, a grinder, grinding wheels, 
torch tips, and a box of fruit was also fired_ After asking if he was going to be fired, the 
worker admitted "I should not have taken them but every one down there was at it."24 
23 Theft from the camp was often treated with more leniency. One worker was given a $10 fine 
for using the camp facilities 'vVithout a meal ticket. In another instance two workers received 
warning letters for food removal, others were given two-month camp suspensions for the same 
offence. As theft from the camp worsened, one worker was fired after he was found with four 
packages of butter, three packages of cereal, an apple and an orange in his possession. As the 
worker was about to be laid off, the company listed him as ineligible for rehire. See ODC files, 
box: 1995 Grievances, file: Employee Reprimands Etc.; and box A-Z, "Meetings- Camp 
Committee," 30 May 1996. 
24 ODC files, box: 1995 Grievances, file: Employee Reprimands Etc. 
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On several occasions, in addition to firing the worker involved, the site brought in 
the RCMP to investigate the thefts. As the site had community status, the RCMP was 
responsible for policing on site. On at least one occasion, the RCMP was also called in 
when sabotage was suspected. Several incidents in one area had made the company 
suspicious that the incidents were not accidents. 25 In 1995 forty employees were 
discharged for theft and the HEA suspected there was an organized theft ring on site.26 In 
1995 40,000 rain suits were ordered for the site, 42,000 vests for the GBS site alone, 
while 15,000 tape measures and 23,000 pairs of gloves were ordered in one month alone. 
Ralph Emberley, labour relations manager on site, heard rumours that tools were being 
sold directly from tool cribs. To help cope with increasing theft, site security increased 
the number of foot and car patrols and attempted to check the majority of vehicles 
leaving the site. Attempts to introduce airport style metal detecting equipment failed, 
however, when it was realized that almost every employee on site wore steel tip boots. 
The HEA introduced additional security measures to help reduce opporttmities for 
theft, including the introduction of special laydown areas. Laydown areas were places 
where equipment and materials were stored under secure conditions, including locked 
gates and restricted key access. Only warehouse supervisors had keys to unlock the gates; 
if workers needed access they had to arrange it with the warehouse. Despite the 
precautions of secured areas, one worker was fired after security was infoLned by a guard 
25 Oil Development Council (ODC) Files, box A-Z, "Discipline File." The ODC is now defunct 
and its files are located in the basement of the Intemational Union of Operating Engineers 
building, Mount Pearl, Newfoundland. I thank Derm Cain for allowing me access to these files in 
March 2001. While the files contained detailed information about individual workers I have 
attempted to leave out any identifiers, including the date or location of the offence or the names 
of the workers involved unless they were already part of the public record. 
26 Arbitration 95-039, Subject: Discharge, Arbitrator: Leslie Harris, 17 February 1995. 
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at the Come by Chance refinery of a suspicious event at the scrap yard. 27 The security 
guard had noticed a lugger truck closely followed by a pick-up truck on the road to the 
scrap wood dump. Upon investigating, security found that the lugger truck had dumped 
47 sheets of new plywood, a welding machine, m1d 200' of welding cable. The truck 
driver, a teamster, claimed to have picked up the material from a bin in laydown area E, 
an area supposedly secured by two different security chains. As he had no authorization 
for the secure m·ea, and no key access, this aroused suspicion. While the worker claimed 
he had not looked inside the bin, workers generally checked the load to determine if it 
needed to go to the garbage or scrap dumps. The case against him worsened when the 
pickup truck following the lugger truck turned out to be driven by his cousin and another 
person from his home town. The two men in the pickup truck claimed no knowledge of 
the theft and claimed they were there to meet two women with whom they had set up a 
"date" at the Tanker Inn, a tavern in a nearby community. Being married men, the two 
men claimed to have chosen the Tanker Inn because of the anonymity a bar an hour and a 
half from home afforded them. Adding to the security's skepticism \Vas the two men's 
claims that they had not entered the Tanker Irm but had met the women in the parking lot 
and that the women had suggested meeting off the isolated access road for more privacy. 
Security did not believe the men's story. 
27 Initially workers could remove scrap wood from site for their own usage. To remove scrap 
wood, workers only needed to obtain a site removal permit. ·when it became clear that workers 
were using the scrap removal to hide the theft of unused materials, the perk was stopped. The 
HEAthen gave the contract to remove and dispose of scrap wood to a local man, who operated a 
scrap wood dump near Come by Chance. The deal was that he would get all scrap wood from the 
site to sell, but he was immediately to inform the site should any new materials turn up. Other 
scrap material was never under workers' purview to remove. Scrap steel, for instance, was sent to 
Newfoundland Steel in Argentia. To prevent theft, garbage and scrap materials were loaded into 
steel bins and taken either taken to the scrap dealers or to the dump in the case of garbage. 
Arbitration 95-039, Subject: Discharge, Arbitrator: Leslie Harris, 17 February 1995. 
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A second worker (a labourer) on the lugger truck was not suspected oftakir1g part 
in the theft but there was suspicion that the labourer's foreman might be involved. The 
labourer assigned to work the lugger truck had never worked on a lugger truck before and 
had no idea of the lugger truck procedures. The HEA argued that the choice of an 
inexperienced labourer was intended to minimize the risk. The labourer foreman was 
investigated by the RC1-1P and the HEA, but no charges or disciplinary action resulted.28 
Interestingly, the labourer foreman turned up in his own grievance a year later. In this 
case the labourer foreman was grieving his own firing for theft. In the lugger case, the 
teamster driving the truck was fired, and his grievance for wrongful dismissal rejected. 
To deal with the increasing theft problems, the manager of Metropol Security had 
turned to using undercover informants. One undercover informant told Metropol Security 
that the labourer foreman suspected in the lugger case had indeed been involved in the 
theft a year earlier and along with another worker was actively removing small tools from 
the site by carrying them out under his clothes. Based on the informant's testimcny, the 
Royal Ne\vfoundland Constabulary (RNC) searched the second worker's home and found 
site property for which he faced criminal charges. As the informant had heard that the 
labourer foreman had placed all his stolen goods at his father's house, the R.~C obtained 
a warrant for his father's house. At the house, they found a variety of hand and power 
tools, rain gear, and gloves valued at $2000, many of which bore the contractor serial 
number and other on-site identification. The foreman was fired but was reinstated after 
the arbitrator found that management had failed to conclusively link the worker to the 
stolen goods. 29 
28 
Arbitration 95-039, Subject: Discharge, Arbitrator: Leslie Harris, 17 February 1995. 
29 
Arbitration 96-073, Subject: Discharge, Arbitrator: Leslie Harris, 21 March 1996, 4-5. 
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Several other workers also grieved their firings. In the case of one catering worker 
(also the shop steward), who stole significant amounts of food from his employer, the 
HEA argued that the case was not one of pilferage but one of plunder. The worker was 
caught leaving the site with $80 worth of meats, frozen foods and other items (tea bags, 
fru.it, cleaner) stolen from the kitchen. When caught, the worker admitted he had stolen 
the items out of financial necessity (he had been laid off for a significant period and was 
behind on his mortgage and bill payments) for use in his own home. The worker had 
previously received a warning letter after being caught in the supervisor's office looking 
at time sheets in an attempt to determine if overtime was being handled fairly. The ODC 
asked the arbitrator to impose a lesser discipline as the worker acknowledged the theft, 
was remorseful, and had mitigating circumstances. As the theft was only the third which 
had resulted in discharge, the ODC also argued the worker did not know that a first 
offence would bring firing. According to the union, only later in the summer did notices 
make it clear that theft would result in firing. The arbitrator disagreed and the dismissal 
remained in effect. 30 
One worker who received a letter of discharge for theft claimed that a mistake 
was made. He was advised by management representative Ed Beresford to take it to his 
union representative. As the worker had little knowledge of the grievance system, he did 
not realize that a grievance had to be filed within two working days to be valid. 
Consequently, three working days passed before the grievance was filed. Information on 
the ODC and the grievance process was part of workers' orientation package, but many 
workers either did not read or remember the specifics. When the case went to arbitration, 
the HEA claimed the grievance was outside the time limits established by the collective 
30 The worker asked for a lesser sentence as he was the family breadwinner. 
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agreement. The arbitrator agreed but questioned "whether the employer should adhere so 
rigorously to the letter of the law and insist upon its pound of flesh."31 The employer 
refused to be lenient and the worker remained fired. 
Fighting, Drinking and Drugs 
Workers responded to the tight supervisory control by seeking an outlet for their 
energies. While the majority of workers were able to chatmel this energy into acceptable 
activities (soft-ball, pool, and other leisure activities), a minority turned to more 
unacceptable behaviours. One way workers helped alleviate boredom at work, and assert 
the masculine nature of construction, was through fighting. Two ironworkers were fired 
after one pushed the other into the Topsides Quay while working on the night shift. The 
workers had had an earlier disagreement that boiled over into fighting. After the union 
intervened on their behalf the men received two-week suspensions. Contractors then sent 
out a notice to all workers on site that fighti..'lg would result in termination. This notice, 
however, did not put an end to all fighting on site.32 
One of the largest contractors on site, P ASSB, stated that "Fighting, horseplay, 
practical jokes or othetwise interfering with other workers is prohibited." A labourer was 
fired after a verbal altercation with his shop steward accelerated into a physical fight. 
The worker had several prior run-ins over unauthorized use of the telephone during work 
hours and entering the administrative building without permission, resulting in verbal 
warnings. In November 1992 the cutting shop superintendent approached the 
maintenance supervisor about transferring this worker as he demonstrated little regard for 
other workers or equipment and showed a general lack of respect for authority. After 
31 Arbitration 96-080, Subject: Discharge, Arbitrator Leslie Harris. 13 August 1996. 
32 ODC files, box A-Z, "Incident Report," 19 June 1992. 
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discussing the problems with the union steward and the Labourers' business manager, all 
agreed that the worker would be laid off after the Christmas break and would not return 
to the cutting shop. After Christmas the worker was stationed in the paint and glass shop 
and told that one more complaint \vould result in his permanent dismissal from the site. 
In May 1994 the labourer approached his shop steward and a foreman on the bus 
to the site, annoyed that he had not been called in for ove1iime work over the weekend. 
Once on site the labourer grabbed the shop steward, pushed him against a wall and 
threatened to punch him. A few IPinutes later he challenged the shop steward and a 
PASSB foreman to continue the argument outside. As many of the worker's threats were 
to the personal safety of the shop steward and his family, the shop steward and foreman 
reported the incident to the labour relations department. Security and the RCMP were 
called in and the worker was charged with assault and fired. The worker grieved his 
firing, with the union asking instead for a suspension as the outburst was a "momentary" 
aberration. The arbitrator upheld the dismissal as the worker's aggressive behaviour 
continued for some time and he had several prior verbal warnings. The arbitrator also 
spoke of the need to deter any others from solving problems through fighting.33 
Insubordination was also treated seriously by employers. One employee who 
ignored his supervisor's orders was disciplined for insubordination and warned a second 
offence would result in his termination. Another worker charged with insubordination 
received a written warning. A shop steward was also given a written warning after 
33 Arbitration 94-096, 21 September 1994, Arbitrator: W. John Clarke. In November 1994, the 
ODC tried to refer the worker to the site for a position "vith NODECO but he was denied access 
by security. The ODC launched a grievance, claiming that under article 8 of the collective 
agreement the contractor had to use employees who were referred and met the qualifications. The 
grievance was rejected. Arbitration 94-138. Subject: Management rights and hiring practices. 30 
December 1994, Arbitrator: Wayne Thistle. 
...... 
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several workers complained of his smoking in the lunch room. As he was a shop steward, 
be was warned another incidence would result in his termination. Another worker 
received a written warning after his negative attitude towards the company, union, and 
fellow workers was deemed disruptive and non-productive. The worker was told the 
company would not tolerate such behaviour and that if his attitude did not improve he 
would be dismissed. 34 
Another employee accepted a layoff and agreed not to return to the manne 
division in lieu ofbeing fired after he was charged with insubordination. The worker was 
employed as a deckhand on the motor vessel (MIV) Garden City, despite possessing 
seaman's papers making him eligible for a much more senior position. On a particularly 
frustrating day, the worker got into a verbal altercation with the captain and left his 
duties. Upon realizing the seriousness of his actions, he apologized. Despite the apology, 
the captain wanted him fired. Intervention by HEA labour relations manager Ralph 
Emberley allowed the worker either to take another position or a layoff, making him ie-
eligible for a position outside the marine division where he was no longer allowed to 
work.35 
Another worker (a labourer) who was assigned to work in the marine division had 
several difficulties with the crew he was assigned to work with. The worker resented 
being asked to do routine seamen's work such as cleaning and general maintenance. On 
several occasions he took coffee breaks without authorization. After several instances of 
3~ See ODC files, box: 1995 Grievances, file: Employee Reprimands Etc. 
3
) Arbitration 96-031,29 April1996, Arbitrator: W. John Clarke. The worker chose to take a 
layoff as the other position offered was a four days, ten hours on shift instead of the seven on, 
seven off he had enjoyed in the marine division. Later, the worker attempted to return to the 
marine division but was refused by the REA. He found it difficult to return to the site anywhere 
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unexplained absenteeism and charges of having a disregard for the vessel's operation, the 
HEA issued him a letter of warning that any further offences would result in termination. 
Only a week later, and before the mailed warning even reached the worker's home, he 
was terminated. 
One complaint against the worker was that he was careless while positioning the 
winch operations of the crane, something the worker attributed to difficulty 
understanding the orders issued in a mix of Dutch and English over the radio. The more 
serious charge levelled against him was insubordination, in that he had repeatedly by-
passed the ship's chain of command, taking complaints directly to external authorities 
(including the Coast Guard) rather than to the captain. After an incident where the worker 
phoned the Coast Guard to complain about conditions on board, the worker was fired. 
This was not the first time the worker had gone to outside authorities, after witnessing a 
small amount of engine oil being washed off the deck, he went directly to the site 
pollution control authorities without discussing it first with the ship's officers.36 
This worker had had trouble since he started on board, including an incident 
where he left the vessel during working hours without explanation. He complained that 
many of the problems on board arose from the attitude of the Dutch crew towards 
else, given that he had unsuccessfully worked in the tool crib, and he had a height phobia vvhich 
made work on the GBS unlikely. 
36 Arbitration 96-072. Subject: Discharge, Arbitrator: Leslie Harris, 28 January 1996. His 
termination letter stated "Clearly we have tried our best to maintain your position on board, but to 
no avail. On 10/7/95 you failed to report to work. For the remainder of the week you refused to 
cooperate with your foreman when asked to do specific tasks. You continually complain that you 
are be[ing] poorly treated and that your foremen and the Dutch crew are mistreating you. The 
crew and management tell me that there is no basis for such complaints. You have arbitrarily 
contacted various external authorities indicating that you are be[ing] exposed to unsafe work 
conditions. They have advised us that you have provided them with no evidence of unsafe work 
conditions ... Anyway, this situation has got to the point where the management and crew have 
lost confidence in your participation as a crew member and frankly are concerned about your 
-
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Canadian workers, including regularly referring to them as "stupid Newfs". The worker 
was so upset with conditions on board he even quit, only to be asked back by HEA 
representative Adrian Coady as they were having difficulties with labour turnover at the 
time. The worker agreed to return to work but was several hours late for his first shift. 
This worker was not the only one who had problems on board. Two other Newfoundland 
workers (Operating Engineers) on the crew were also unhappy being assigned to tasks 
like rust chipping and painting and demanded to be transferred to other contractors. 
In the subsequent arbitration, it came out the worker had been complaining of 
poor working conditions on board the vessel for several months, to little avail. His 
complaints included unsafe scaffolding rigged for painting in the ship's hold, improperly 
ventilated paint fmnes, and a lack of adequate safety equipment. In cases of safety 
problems, workers were told to take the problem to the foreman in their area. The 
foreman had the responsibility of fixing the problem or referring it up the chain of 
command to a supervisor. If there was still no action, the foreman was directed to take 
the issue to his shop steward and to the ODC co-chair of the site safety committee. In the 
event that worker safety was endangered, the foreman had the right to issue a stop work 
order. While all workers on the GBS site were to hold five minute safety meetings at the 
start of each morning shift, a 15 minute weekly meeting, and a forty minute monthly 
meeting, no such meetings had been held on Taklift 7, the griever' s vessel.37 
'When the workers involved complained of problems with paint fumes, they were 
told by the Captain that he himself had painted in the hold without difficulty. The captain 
personal well being ... we now dismiss you for cause because you have made no effort to improve 
your conduct and work performance." Letter dated 14 July 1995 from Adrian Coady to \vorker. 
37 See testimony by Wayne Power, UA shop steward and co-chair of the site safety committee, 
cited in Arbitration 96-072. Subject: Discharge. Arbitrator: Leslie Ranis, 28 Januaf'J 1996, 19. 
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informed the workers that they did not have to return to the hold to paint until after a 
safety team (half management, half union representatives) conducted its inspection. The 
safety team found no serious violations but suggested if the workers were having 
difficulties that they wear protective masks which they then provided. The safety team 
also noted that the scaffolding used was inadequate, particularly the ladder which was too 
short. The labourer and hvo operating engineers repeatedly asked their foreman for 
proper breathing equipment, good gloves, safety shields, ear muffs and safety glasses, 
only to be told that "They won't give Harvey's Offshore [the contractor] anything."38 The 
worker's grievance was upheld; instead of termination he received a one-month 
suspension and a written letter of discipline. The arbitrator also suggested that he not be 
returned to this vessel and that the ODC and REA jointly attempt to place him elsewhere. 
Fighting and other problems were also treated seriousiy in the camp. Hibernia 
housed over 3000 workers in dormitory style accommodations. Camp life was monitored 
by a committee (made up of equal munbers of union and management representatives) 
with the power to discipline workers. Forty-seven rules were laid out to cover all manner 
of behaviour in the camp. Item 1.7 of the camp rules, for instance, stated that 
"Vandalism, fighting or violence of any sort, possession of fire arms or other dangerous 
weapons, persistent drunkermess and the possession, use or sale of illegal substances shall 
not be tolerated and shall be grounds for expulsion from the camp and tem1ination of 
employment." Rule 28, posted in recreation areas, each bunkhouse and in camp 
38 
Arbitration 96-072. Subject: Discharge. Arbitrator: Leslie Harris, 28 January 1996, 16. 
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orientation packages, stated that "the instigator of fighting or violence of any sort in any 
part of the camp will be subject to instant dismissal from the camp."39 
Rules also included co-operating with cleaning staff to keep rooms neat. No pets, 
electric kettles or irons, cooking, open flames or elements, preparing or storing of food 
was allowed in the rooms. Residents were also not allowed to make any alterations to the 
rooms, including putting up shelving, d...-iving nails i..TJ.to the wall, or hanging curtains. 
They were also not allowed to consume alcohol in their rooms; the only spot workers 
were allowed to drink on site was in the tavern. Drhlking in the camp could result in 
disciplinary action, including termination. Punishment for persistent drunkenness was 
dismissa1.40 In November 1991, the camp committee \Vorried about increased problems 
with alcohol consumption in the bunkhouses and in January 1992, they suspended a 
worker's camp privileges for one month after he was found breaking camp alcohol rules. 
After drinking most of a 40 ounce bottle of rye, he attacked another resident watching 
television in his room, causing considerable damage to his dental work. In its March 1995 
meeting the camp committee issued ten warnings for alcohol offences.41 
In a September 1996 meeting, the camp committee sent out several disciplinary 
letters, one for theft, one for drunkenness and harassment, another for an alcohol related 
incident, two for fighting, and one for smoking in bed. The resident disciplined for 
drunkenness and harassing another resident was relocated to another bunkhouse and 
warned any further problems would result in his loss of camp privileges. The resident 
39 One worker was expelled after striking a camp attendant in the dining hall after the attendant 
refused to serve his son. Non-employees needed special permission to eat in the dining hall. The 
worker's intoxication at the time did not help his case. Cited in Arbitration 94-096, 21 September 
1994, Arbitrator: W. Jol:>.n Clarke. 
40 ODC files, file: Hibemia Camp Committee, Camp Rules and Regulations, Required Reading 
for All Employees, Revised 21 August 1992. 
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involved in the alcohol related incident was suspended from camp for 21 days, while one 
of the fighters was evicted from camp and the other had to pay damage costs.42 Despite 
vandalism or tampering with fire detection equipment being a firing offence, Hibernia 
News reported smashed windows, destroyed bathrooms, walls kicked in, and vending 
machines broken by disgnmtled workers.43 
Possessing dmgs on site (at work or in the camp) was also a firing offence, as one 
worker who showed up for work after taking an illegal substance found out. Another 
worker who had been enjoying the St. John's nightlife, was in a car pulled over by site 
security and the RCMP as it reached the site the next morning. The RCMP was involved 
in a drug investigation against the driver of the car, another worker. All three workers in 
the car were searched. One worker voluntarily allowed the RCMP to search his hip pouch 
where they found three marijuana cigarettes. He was charged with drug possession by the 
RCMP and fired for violating the site's zero tolerance policy. The site's drug policy was 
spelled out in the orientation booklet, and posted at several points around the site. The 
policy stated that "The GMT [GBS Management Team] must, in order to deliver the 
platform as required, establish a strict code of conduct for the workplace so that 
employees will guide themselves properly. Such a code of conduct must recognize the 
short-term nature of the work a11d thereby correct offences swiftly, with fairness and 
consistency." Punishment for various offences was spelled out, including dismissal for 
possession and/or use of alcohol or illegal drugs on company property. The policy stated 
that only under extenuating circumstances might the GBS construction manager change a 
dismissal for drugs to an extended suspension. In this particular case the worker admitted 
41 ODC files, box A-Z, "Meetings - Camp Committee," 30 January 1992. 
42 ODC files, box A-Z, "Meetings- Camp Committee," 19 September 1996. 
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he was aware of the policy and knew of cases where employees were fired for possession 
of, or trafficking in, marijuana or other drugs.44 
Ralph Emberley stated that the circumstances surrounding the creation of the 
Hibernia Project, as well as tight time schedules and the overriding importance of 
workmanship upon which environmental safety, many lives, and the reputation of 
Newfoundland workers would depend, were such as to rule out any toleration of 
substance abuse. Despite the firings, drug dealing and dmg use remained sufficiently 
prevalent that management demanded "vigilance and uncompromising action" in every 
case. Drugs in the can1p were also a firing offence. Camp Rules 40.0 stated that "the 
possession or sale of unlawful drugs in camp is prohibited. Offenders shall be subject to 
immediate dismissal. "45 One worker was fired after a vial containing traces of drugs 
(hash oil) and drug paraphernalia (razor blades, balance scales) was found in his room. A 
grievance changed the terminology from fired to laid off with no possibility ofrehire.'~6 
Drinking on the job was also seen as a serious offence. At a meeting in October 
1993, the ODC reminded member unions of their responsibility for addressing drinking 
on the job with their workers. The ODC was worried that offenders vvcrc not being 
disciplined if their supervisors were in the bargaining unit.47 After one crane operator 
arrived for his shift drunk, he was advised by his supervisor to get a room on site and not 
drive home. Once the case was reviewed the worker was fired. Not all offences involving 
alcohol resulted in tiring. Another worker who showed up with alcohol on his breath was 
43 
"Letters to the Editor," Hibernia News, 10 August 1995. 
44 Arbitration 96-079. Subject: Discharge. Arbitrator: Leslie Harris, 18 June 1996; and D.A. 
'0' alters, GBS Construction Worker, GMT Workplace Policy Poster, May 1993. 
4
) Arbitration 96-079. Subject: Discharge. Arbitrator: Leslie Harris, 18 June 1996; and Hibernia 
Camp Committee, Camp Rules and Regulations, as n~vised 12 November 1992. 
46 ODC files, 1996 Grievances. 
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sent back to camp and given a five-day suspension.48 A third worker was suspended after 
showing up drunk and falling off the bus which was to take him to his work site. His 
union, the Operating Engineers, had to fight to convince management that this was an 
error in judgement in an otherwise good worker. Management ultimately decided on a 
two-week suspension but warned that they would strongly contest a worker's 
compensation claim should he put one in for an injury sustained in the fall. Another 
employee, who got into a fight after showing up for work dmn..~; received a two-week 
suspension because of his ptior excellent work record. Another worker who showed up to 
work too hung-over to properly perfonn his duties was given a one week suspension to 
"rethink" his future. He was told if he returned to work he must demonstrate changes in 
his performance. Another worker who had been employed on site but was since laid off 
was killed after a car he was in went into a guard rail on site. The resident he had been 
drinking with attempted unsuccessfully to rescue the man and was later fired for drinking 
in an unauthmized area on site. The union grieved and in the arbitration process the 
k . d 40 wor er was remstate . -
Pilfering Time/Efforts to Control the Rate of Production 
Under article 10.00 of the collective agreement, the ODC acknowledged that 
management had the exclusive right to: 
(a) operate and manage its business in all respects; 
(b) maintain order, discipline, and efficiency; 
(c) make and alter from time to time, rules and regulations to be observed 
by employees, provided such rules and regulations arc uniformly and 
fairly applied to all employees and are not in conflict with this 
Agreement; 
(d) direct the working force; 
47 ODC files, box: A-Z, file: ODC Minutes, ODC Meeting, 14 October 1993. 
43 See ODC files, box: 1995 Grievances, file: Employee R~primands Etc, 1 March 1996. 
49 ODC files, box: 1996 Grievances, Grievance 96-17. 
(e) determine job content, including methods, processes and means of 
production and handling; 
(f) fire, promote, demote, and lay offbecause oflack of work; 
(g) discipline, suspend and discharge any employee for just cause; however, 
any alleged wrongful dismissal, suspension or discharge will be subject 
to the grievance procedure in Article 11.00. 
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This section accorded to management full control over productivity rates, efficiency, 
discipline, and the regulations on site. The issue of who controlled the rate of production 
became a volatile one on site, leading to a wildcat strike in January 1995. The stJ.ike was 
over whether overtime was mandatory on site. Management believed that all overtime 
was mandatory. Workers were generally given two days notice for overtime shifts. In 
normal situations workers were glad to have the overtime. In mid-January, however, 
word reached management that there was something going on "on the shop floor" and 
that many electricians and pipefitters were unwilling to work overtime.50 Labour 
Relations officials told electrical, plumbing and pipefitting, and painting superintendents 
that they should work the shift and grieve the issue later. Despite being told that the work 
was not voiuntary, none of the sixty workers ordered to report for work showed up on the 
day in question (15 January), including the shop stewards. All sixty workers received a 
one-week suspension and a letter of discipline was placed on their files. One day later 
600 workers walked off the job in protest. 51 
50 Workers were upset by a scheduling change which substituted a five-day, eight-hour shift for 
their five-day, ten-hour shifts. Workers were particularly upset as the extra ten hours, 
implemented the prior fall, were paid at overtime rates. Workers instead asked for a four-day, 
ten- hour shift so that they could spend their days off with their families who often lived a 
considerable distance away. Some electrical workers were also upset that cheques handed out the 
day before Christmas were late with no apology. See letter from Wayne Woodford, Electrician 
shop steward, to Dave Hollett, 13 January 1995, cited in Arbitration 95-0054, 10. 
51 In a May 1994 case where labourers and scaffold workers refused overtime, workers were 
given a one-week suspension without pay. See Arbitration 95-054, Re: Group Grievance re: 
Suspension for Failing to Work Overtime, 28 April 1995, Arbitrator: W. John Clarke, 9. 
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The strike was publicly condemned by the ODC and lasted only a few hours 
before workers were ordered back to work by the Newfoundland Supreme Court. The 
Court ordered the ODC, its members, and workers to restrain from declaring, authorizing, 
counseling, aiding or engaging in any way, directly or indirectly, from bringing about an 
unlawful strike or a slowdown of services. 52 In the aftermath, the union was forced to 
negotiate with the employer to keep the workers from being fired. At meetings held in 
July 1995 to settle outstanding grievances plaguing the site, the HEA demanded the ODC 
pay $1.6 million in damages for the wildcat strike. In the end, the union agreed to pay a 
$20,000 penalty for not controlling its workers and apologized for 'allowing' the strike to 
happen: 
We acknowledge that the above captioned work stoppage was in 
contravention of Article 6 "Strikes and Lockouts" of the Collective 
Agreement. It was the responsibility of the ODC to prevent any strike. 
Despite this responsibility, a work stoppage occurred. 
The ODC does not engage in such activity and it will not engage in any such 
work stoppage against any employer under the Hibernia Project 
Agreement. .. We will undertake to inform each and every member involved 
in this stoppage of the Council's position as set forth herein. 53 
52 Cited in Arbitration 96-084, Subject: Activities of Union Steward, Arbitrator: Leslie Harris, 5 
September 1995, 6. See also "Hibernia Workers Stage Wildcat," E1~ 17 January 1995. There was 
a second short work stoppage on 26 January 1996 when several workers refused to continue their 
shifts after a co-worker suffered a head injury. Once satisfied that the conditions were safe the 
workers returned to work. "Short Lived Work Stoppage at Bull Arm," ET, 30 January 1996. In an 
arbitration over the suspensions, the arbitrator sided with management that it had the sole right to 
make changes to shifts, including overtime. The arbitrator upheld the one-week suspensions to all 
workers who refused the overtime. One shop steward's suspension was not upheld as he had 
designated another shop steward to work for him. Arbitrator Clark, Arbitration 95-0054. 
53 See Review Committee Report between Hibernia Employers' Association and Oil Development 
Council, 20 July 1995, 18 and Letter from Derm Cain to James Kenny, 02 November 1995. Cited 
in Arbitration 96-084, Subject: Activities of Union Steward, Arbitrator: Leslie Harris, 5 
September 1995, 7. While the ODC had to apologize for not controlling its members, it is 
important to note that not all "wildcat" strikes occur without union support. 
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At the same meetings, the ODC agreed to drop or settle many other outstanding 
grievances. It would appear that the ODC dropped grievances in exchange for a reduced 
settlement. 54 
Other Problems on Site 
Not long after the wildcat strike was settled but while the issue over who 
controlled the rate of production was still fresh, contractor PCL-Akerstord-Steen-Becker 
(PASSB) filed a grievance against the ODC over the activities of one of its shop 
' 
stewards. P ASSB and the HEA alleged that a shop steward with the International 
Association of Heat and Frost Insulators had counseled an apprentice to stop work. The 
apprentice involved was working without being assigned to a journey worker, a practice 
which the International union forbade. On several occasions mechanics with the union 
complained to the shop steward that apprentices were being used to do the work of full 
mechanics, without supervision. When questioned by the shop steward, the apprentice in 
question replied that he was working as his foreman had directed. Upon finding the 
apprentice again working alone, the shop steward warned the apprentice that by working 
alone he was in violation of his union's constitution, for which he could face sanctions. 
To be employed on site, workers had to belong to one of the international unions. Had 
sanctions been applied, the worker would have lost hjs urlion membership and his 
employment at Hibernia. The shop steward advised the apprentice to discuss the matter 
54 Revie>v Committee Report ... , 18. In many industries, employers used discipline cases to force 
union concessions on other issues. This posed a considerable problem at Hibernia where the 
union (ODC or the individual union) was frequently appealing to management to reduce the 
severity of a particular punishment. In one instance, a worker's termination was reduced to 
suspension after the ODC grieved it. Two workers who had written warnings of theft put on their 
files, successfully grieved the letters, had them removed, and received letters of apology from the 
company. ODC files, box: 1995 Grievances, file: Employee Reprimands Etc., and box: 1996 
Grievances, Grievance 96-36. 
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with his foreman and request an assignment where he would work with an experienced 
mechanic. The shop steward was acting on the advice of his Business Agent, James Pike, 
whose own access to the site had been barred when Jim Ketmy withdrew the passes of 
business agents to the site.55 
The apprentice took the shop steward's advice to mean to stop work inm1ediately 
and find the foreman, a task he claimed took two hours. Soon after, P ASSB filed a 
grievance against the shop steward. The shop steward denied telling the apprentice to 
\ 
stop work. Rather he claimed he told the apprentice to discuss the matter with his 
foreman. The REA charged that the shop steward had violated the collective agreement 
"in that he has been counselling employees under his jurisdiction, as a Steward, in a 
fashion which will restrict or limit productivity of such employees." The shop steward 
was issued a written warning for counselling employees under his jurisdiction to work in 
such a fashion that would restrict or limit productivity. P ASSB and the HEA also 
demanded that the union cease such behaviour and pay damages for the lost production 
time. The HEA also warned the ODC site representative that the shop ste\vard risked 
firing should another problem arise. 56 
55 In June 1995 Kenny also refused IBEW business agent Mike Power access to the site. Kenny 
had asked all local and international representatives to hand in their site identification cards and 
reminded them that entrance to the site was to be in accordance with section 9.02 of the collective 
agreement. Under this section all visitors to the site had to be approved for each site visit. 
Business managers could now only get on site with the permission of one of two senior 
management personnel. Ke:;1ny wamed that those not following the rules would be denied access 
to the site. Once on site business managers were to be escorted by the ODC Site Representative 
and/or one of the contractor's labour relations representatives. At a meeting in February 1996 
IDv:lDC General Manager Henk van Zante indicated that if there was considerable improvement 
in settling many of the grievances, he would discuss relaxing the site access policy. \Vhen there 
was little progress van Zante opted not to reopen the issue. See Arbitration 96-033. Subject: Site 
Access, Arbitrator: Dave Alcock, 3 May 1996 and ODC files, Letter from Kenny to Dan Whelan, 
24 January 1996. 
55 ODC files, box: 1995 Grievances, file: Employee Reprimands Etc. Letter from Roland 
LaBossiere, Labour Relations Manager to F. Keiley, Site Representative, re: PASSE Insulator. 
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The situation was eomplicated by the fact that the apprentice involved was the 
nephew of the foreman who was responsible for giving him his work assignments, and 
the son of a general foreman. The union admitted his referral to the site had been a 
patronage appointment. His fellow union members were not upset by his appointment to 
the site but they were upset that despite his lack of formal training and his limited 
experience his uncle was assigning him the work of a qualified mechanic. 57 When the 
shop steward approached the foreman to advise him that this was against union policy 
and that he could be charged by his International Union for a violation of the 
Constitution, the foreman walked away. 
When the grievance reached arbitration, the arbitrator agreed that the shop 
steward's actions were inappropriate. He suggested that instead of disrupting the 
workplace by placing the apprentice in an untenable situation (refuse work or be 
sanctioned), that the union should have either filed a grievance against the contractor for 
contravening the project agreement, or laid disciplinary charges against either the 
apprentice or the foreman if it was an internal union matter. The employer also came in 
for considerable criticism for treating the apprentice as a full-fledged mechanic, which 
the arbitrator saw as subverting the mutually agreed upon Apprenticeship Training 
Programme portion of the collective agreement. \Vhile the arbitrator recognized that this 
appeared to be a practice related only to one foreman, the apprentice's uncle, he noted 
that "foremen are themselves subject to direction and should, in any case, be cognizant of 
their responsibilities to honour commitments made by their employer. . . "58 
57 
Arbitration 96-084, Subject: Activities ofUnion Steward, Arbitrator: Leslie Harris, 5 
~eptember 1995, 9-10. First year insulators apprentices were normally used as general helpers. 
Arbitration 96-084. Subject: Activities ofUnion Steward, Arbitrator: Leslie Harris, 5 
September 1995, 20. 
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This particular shop steward later turned up in two other grievances, one of which 
concerned his discharge. In one instance he was disciplined, his second letter of warning, 
for leaving his position without proper authorization. The employer claimed that the shop 
steward was frequently absent from his job, including leaving his post to eat in the 
cafeteria while on the night shift. In September 1996, he was fired after again leaving his 
position without informing his supervisor. After claiming he was at an ODC meeting, the 
union launched a grievance charging the employer with discriminating against a shop 
. 
steward. At arbitration, the punishment was reduced to a two-week suspension after the 
worker agreed not to become a shop steward again. 59 
Controlling the rate of production, including which workers worked when• and 
where, was important to employers. Workers were not allowed to switch shifts and those 
caught doing so were given written warnings. Workers, who regularly phoned in sick or 
who failed to show up for their shifts, received a warning and on the second offence were 
fired. One worker, who was suspected of sleeping on the job, was suspended for two 
weeks after threatening his supervisor not to report him.6° For over an hour the worker 
could not be found, raising fears that he might have been disoriented between the skirts of 
the base raft. As a search party was being organized, the worker came out from under the 
forms, whereupon his foreman accused him of sleeping on the job. \Vhile the labourer 
was initially abusive, given his clea.11 record and his apology, he received a four-month 
suspension and a two-month probation. Another worker was fired after workers 
59 Arbitration 96-143. Subject: Discrimination of [name deleted], Insulator/PASSE. Arbitrator: 
W. John Clarke, 20 November 1996. 
60 See ODC files, box: 1995 Grievances, file: Employee Reprimands Etc. 
233 
complained that he had fallen asleep in his tmck during loading, but after the employer 
learned that he had sleep apnea, a medical condition, he was rehired.6 i 
Another worker, a pump operator with the Bricklayers and Allied Craft Workers 
union, was fired after being caught sleeping on a particularly hot day. As a pump operator 
engaged in applying mandolite, a fire retardant, the worker was responsible for keeping 
the pump and hoses clean a.r1d operational and for any masking tape application, chipping 
or clearing away that needed to be done. ·when ambient conditions prevented the plmlp's 
use, the worker claimed he had been told by his working foreman that he was "to make 
himself scarce" so that any "big shots" would not see him standing idly by. On the day in 
question poor conditions prevented the pump's use. When the worker was assigned no 
alternative work, he climbed nearby scaffolding to stay out of other workers' way in the 
cramped quarters until he was needed. Not long after, his supervisor caught him lying 
down with his feet hanging over the scaffolding, breathing deeply and not responding to 
prodding. The supervisor had him wTitten up for sleeping on the job, for whic.h he was 
dismissed. At his arbitration hearing, the worker denied he was sleeping, claiming instead 
that he was simply trying to escape from the heat, halogen lights and hot steel in the area 
and to keep out of the way. 
According to Roland LaBossiere, a boiletmaker tumed labour relations manager 
with the Topsides Hook-up Team (TliT), sleepin.g on the job was considered gross 
misconduct on most constmction projects with the common penalty of dismissal. 
Canadian jurisprudence also established sleeping on the job as a gross dereliction of duty, 
in part because of the danger to the worker and their co-workers. There was some 
61 Cited in Arbitration 96-086. Subject: Wrongful Dismissal. Arbitrator: D. Alcock, 30 September 
1996, 26, 29-30. 
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question in the case noted above about whether the firing was part of a wider problem 
between the painters (the two supervisors were painters) and bricklayers. The work was 
originally assigned to the painters but, after the bricklayers questioned the mark-up, the 
jurisdictional umpire awarded it to the bricklayers. There was also some question as to 
whether the firing was part of an ongoing harassment campaign by one of the supervisors 
who regularly asked the worker how many "stamps" he had now, and warned the worker, 
who had a history of unemployment, that he would be returning to social assistance again 
soon. The worker did not dispute he was tired on that shift. He had taken off the previous 
two days to work a booth at the St. John's Regatta, and had only had two to three hours 
of sleep before arriving on site. While denying he was asleep, the worker claimed he did 
not know that sleeping on the job was grounds for dismissal. As the employer did not 
prove the employee was asleep on the job, or derelict in his duties, the arbitrator allowed 
the grievance and the worker was re-instated.62 
One worker was fired after he not only fell asleep on the job but was also 
insubordinate upon being caught. The worker involved was a shop steward and a past 
president of the International Association of Heat and Frost Insulators. The shop steward 
had been issued an employee reprimand for tardiness on 3 July 1996. This was his second 
letter of reprimand; earlier he had been suspended for four days for being absent from his 
position without informing his supervisor. After complaining, he succeeded in having the 
suspension lifted. Only four days later the shop steward was again in trouble after the 
PASSB Insulator Foreman observed the worker sleeping. The worker had been assigned 
to insulate a pipe above floor level on a mezzanine in the Utility Shaft. ·when the foreman 
came upon him, he was lying motionless, stretched out fully, his hand underneath his 
62 Arbitration 96-069. Subject: Dismissal. Arbitrator: W. John Clarke, 26 September 1996. 
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head, with his eyes closed. The foreman stood three or four feet away from the worker 
and watched him for five minutes until the worker awoke at the sound of another worker. 
Initially the foreman was unsure whether or not to report the incident as the worker 
involved was his shop steward, a person with considerable power in the union. After 
discussing the issue with his superintendent, he was told to write up the worker for 
. h . b 63 sleepmg on t e JO . 
After fill ing out the Reprimand Book, the foreman asked the shop steward to sign 
the reprimand. According to the foreman, the worker denied he had been sleeping, 
refused to sign the reprimand, and threw the book across the room. He also tl:Ireatened the 
foreman, warning him not to step out of line, and stated that he would get him for this. 
After that meeting, the worker demanded to talk to a safety representative as he now 
claimed it had been unsafe for him to work alone. When the worker showed up for his 
next shift he was fired. After he received his letter of tem1ination, the worker attempted 
to convince his supervisor to rescind the discipline and accused him of firing him for 
personal reasons. The worker later showed his termination letter, complete with 
derogatory comments about the foreman and supervisor involved, to several workers on 
site, including allowing it to be photocopied and passed around. 64 He grieved his firing 
but given his past wamings, the evidence that he was asleep, and his conduct in the wake 
of the incident, the arbitrator upheld it. 
Workers were also threatened with dismissal if they were late on more than one 
occasion. One worker was written up after he showed up an hour after his shift stru.-ted. 
As the worker had only been on the crew for two days, the captain of the motor vessel 
63 Arbitration 96-086. Subject: Wrongful Dismissal, Arbitrator: D. Alcock, 30 September 1996. 
64 Arbitration 96-086. Subject: Wrongful Dismissal, Arbitrator: D. Alcock, 30 September 1996. 
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(MJV) where he was assigned was worried about his behaviour. When the worker showed 
up, he was warned that the captain had spoken to the Marine Services Assistant Manager 
about him and had been told that the worker was frequently late. The captain warned him 
he would be written up if this behaviour continued. The worker, a shop steward, claimed 
that the letter amounted to discrimination against a shop steward and grieved it. He 
claimed other workers who were late received a verbal waming.65 In 1993 the GBS 
Construction Manager developed a written policy explaining the penalties for being late, 
with a warning on first offence and dismissal on second offence. Under extenuating 
circumstances the GBS Construction Manager could modify a dismissal to an extended 
suspension. All discipline letters were recorded in an REA database. From 1991 to 1996 
NODECO employees alone accounted for 25 pages of disciplines, covering 1039 
workers, including 179 for being late. Each worker was identified by name, employee 
number, and discipline infraction. Fourteen workers had more than one reprimand for 
absenteeism, some of whom had been dismissed while others received two-week 
suspensions. 66 
Tight supervisory control also included a computer estimating system, which 
determined the am.ount of time needed to complete a job. After it took insulators thirteen 
hours to insulate and clad a line that the computer had estimated would take five and a 
half hours, the workers involved were warned that if their productivity did not increase 
they would be disciplined. The workers, all of whom had good records, grieved the 
warning, insisted the computer had failed to take into account the adjacent beam and 
65 
Arbitration 96-092. Subject: Discrimination Against a Shop Steward. Arbitrator: Wayne 
Thistle, 16 October 1996,25. As the grievance was filed outside time limits, the arbitrator ruled 
he could not hear it and the letter of discipline stayed on file. 
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subsequent material application complications. They also argued that increasing 
productivity through intimidation would only lead to a deterioration of workmanship. The 
company agreed to remove the letters if their work remained good. 67 
Upset over the number of workers leaving long term positions with one contractor 
to take positions with other contractors (on or off site), in 1991 the HEA and ODC 
developed a policy to prevent workers from jumping from contractor to contractor to 
capitalize on overtime.68 From the individual contractor's perspective, they were 
spending considerable time and money training workers who then left to take advantage 
of better overtime or shift scheduling opportunities elsewhere. The ODC was upset with 
the policy of workers jumping from a long-tem1 to a short-term position with overlime as 
the Union had to fill the long-term positions they left, often with non-members or permit 
holders from outside the jurisdiction. Initially the Liaison Committee, with equal 
representatives from the HEA and ODC, introduced a Site termination/quit policy which 
introduced a 30 day waiting period before an employee could be rehired with another 
contractor. Many workers were quitting jobs at Hibernia to take a temporary job at the 
Come by Chance refinery during its annual maintenance. They would work at Come by 
Chance until the overtime ended and then attempt to get rehired at Hibernia. When it 
66 
See testimony by Rosemary Miller, Secretary with HEA, cited in Arbitration 96-092. Subject: 
~iscrimination Against a Shop Steward. Arbitrator: Wayne Thistle, 16 October 1996, 11. 
o. ODC files, box: 1996 Grievances, Grievance 96-60. Letter from Insulator Joumeyman to J. 
Evans, Construction Superintendent, 21 March 1996. 
68 
Moving from job to job on site was one way workers on the earlier Churchill Falls project 
attempted to improve their conditions of work or pay. Workers at Come by Chance also moved 
from contractor to contractor in search of overtime. When the Stephenville Linerboard project 
?ffered scheduled overtime, many workers left the Come by Chance project to take advantage of 
It. CNSA, John Crosbie Collection (Collection 073), 8.07.017. Newfoundland Refining Company 
Ltd. , Summar; Progress Report no. 19, covering 1 May-31 May 1972. 
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became clear that the 30 day policy was not acting as a disincentive to workers, in 1994 
the policy was changed to a six month layoff between quitting and rehire. 
Once payroll was notified a worker had quit, they informed the Labour Relations 
department, who then compiled a termination list. That list was then sent to security and 
any workers named on the list would then be denied access to the site. The 
termination/quit policy was grieved when a worker who was officially on sick leave took 
a position with another contractor without waiting the six-month period.69 It subsequently 
came out that the worker had asked for sick leave to visit a specialist in Ontario which he 
failed to do, and took employment with an employer in PEl without quitting his P ASSB 
job. After his employment in PEl \vas up, and he was informed he had been terminated 
from PASSB for abusing the sick leave system, he took a position with Cahill State, 
another contractor on site. When the REA found out, the worker was let go from his 
position with Cahill as he was not yet eligible for rehire.70 If the employer, union, and 
contractors involved (current and future) were agreeable, the six-month rehire rule could 
be put aside, but in the grievor's case, there was no request for an exception. In fact, his 
previous employer (P ASSB) had no idea he was again on site. 
Conclusions 
It would be naive to assume that problems like drinking, fighting, sleeping on the 
job, and absenteeism were unique to the Hibewia project. To a certain extent these 
factors plague every work site. On the Hibernia site, where the government, employer 
69 
7 
Arbitration 96-112. Subject: Wrongful Dismissal. Arbitrator: Clarke, 31 December 1996. OG. tven the tight time frame of the Hibernia project, there was no employer provision for sick 
leave. Being on sick leave meant that the employee was considered temporarily off work and was 
txpected to return once doctor's clearance was given. Employees on sick leave received no 
compensation, other than pay due to them for their earlier work. Once employees quit the project 
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and contractors, and unions all agreed that the Hibernia project would be a no-strike, no 
lockout project, workers' options for exerting their own power were limited. When 
workers attempted to launch a wildcat strike - the method which construction workers 
had used on the Come by Chance project- 60 workers were suspended and the union \vas 
forced to pay a $20,000 fine for failing to control its workers. Attempts by workers to 
control their production rates were also closely monitored. Each job was measured in the 
computer for how long it should take. Workers who did not meet the computer's time 
frame were threatened with disciplinary action. Each time workers entered and left the 
site, their cars were liable to be searched for unauthorized removal of goods. Drinking, 
long a fixture in many construction workers' lives, was closely regulated, only to be done 
in the tavern, only for a three-hour period each night, and only beer and wine were 
available. Their entire lives on the construction site and in the work camp were rule 
bound. There were rules governing their workplace conduct and their camp conduct, and 
even establishing what time they ate their meals. It is not surprising that a small minority 
of workers responded with drinking, fighting and pilfering. 
they were eligible for demobilization pay so long as the layoff was for lack of work, a lump sum 
dependent on the distance they had to travel to reach the site. 
Chapter Eight: It's a Man's World 
-
Introduction 
It is in the spmt of freedom and fair play - the hallmark of the union 
movement - that the construction unions are taking the initiative to assist 
women to become part of the . building trades industry. Trades have 
traditionally been acknowledged to be the domain of man. Women were not 
considered nor even thought capable of performing the work. And women, 
for their part, were not perceived as wanting such a life and perhaps for 
many of them that was true. However, society has grown more open to 
finding new solutions to old problems and indeed to accepting a 
restructming of the social norms. Women have directed their ambitions to 
new and challenging areas ... The ODC is working with ·wiTT [Women in 
Trades and Technology] to conceive a comprehensive program geared to the 
introduction and apprenticeship of women into the construction industry. 1 
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With these words in the early 1990s Newfoundland's building trades unions officially 
welcomed women into the construction industry. The welcome was long overdue in many 
women's eyes. Unforhmately, it also appeared to be relatively short-lived. By the late 
1990s 10,708 people were employed in Newfoundland's construction industry, the 
construction workforce remained overwhelmingly male at 98.9 per cent? This chapter 
examines the gendered nature of constmction in Newfoundland, examining how the 
social constructs of masculinity and femininity established specific jobs as male and 
female. It looks at the experiences of women in traditionally female jobs on construction 
sites and examines the pioneering women construction workers. 
1 ODC files, Box - ODCCG Training Group, Equity File. WITT is an education and advocacy 
group dedicated to promoting and assisting in the recruitment, training and retention of women in 
trades, technology, operations and blue collar work. WITT has been active in Canada since the 
late 1970s. 
2 
"Case Study: Construction Sector in Newfoundland," in Canadian Labour and Business Centre, 
Proceedings: Regional Seminar on the Changing Workplace (St. John's, 9-10 February 2000), 5. 
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Masculinity and the Concept of Skill 
Waged work is "sharply differentiated along sexual lines. Few occupations 
remain entirely the preserve of either men or women, but most male workers are 
employed in jobs where the ·workforce is at least ninety per cent male, while most women 
workers work in jobs that are at least seventy per cent female.' '3 Phillips and Taylor 
argued that "far from being an objective economic fact, skill is often an ideological 
category imposed on certain types of work by virtue of the sex and power of the workers 
who perform it."4 Typically, women's work (both paid and u..11paid) was characterized as 
unskilled, with women generally shunted into jobs that are lower paid. Historically, many 
unions viewed women and unskilled workers as a threat not only to wages but also to 
their status. Many unions were organized to fmther men's needs with unions initiating 
benefits that favoured long-service workers and bargaining strategies. These strategies 
entrenched existing wage structures and job segregation. 5 
Assumptions over what constituted skilled and unskilled work have been 
fundamental to workplace divisions of labour. The concept of skill, what it is, how it is 
defined, and by whom, is one that is socially constructed.6 Historically, women were 
3 Anne Phillips and Barbara Taylor, "Sex and Skill: Notes towards a Feminist Economics," 
Feminist Review, 6 (1979-1980), 9. 
4 Phillips and Taylor, "Sex and Skill," 79-88. 
5 Employers supported this as it provided them with a cheap labour pool. See Julie White, Sisters 
and Solidarity: Women and Unions in Canada (1993), chapter 1; Ar..ne Forrest, "Women and 
Industrial Relations Theory: No Room in the Discourse," Relations Industrielle/Industrial 
Relations (Rl!IR), 48, 3 (1993) and Forrest, "The Industrial Relations Significance ofUnpaid 
Work," Labour!Le Travail, 42 (Fall 1996). Forrest found that when women's needs were 
consonant with male workers they were seen as genderless, but if their needs were defined as 
'women's issues ' (maternity leave, employment equity, childcare) then they fell outside the 
industrial relations system. 
6 Jane Gaskell, "Conceptions of Skill and the Work of Women: Some Historical and Political 
Issues," in Michele Barrett and Roberta Hami lton, eds., The Politics ofDiversity: Feminism, 
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rarely considered skilled workers. In part this was because the definition of skill was a 
political process in which collective organizations, including unions, sought to buttress 
the power of their workers at the cost of others. Jane Gaskell argued that assumptions 
over what constituted skilled and unskilled work were fundamental not only to the 
workplace division of labour but also to ideological divisions within the working class. 
Her research fou.'1d that the work that \vomen have traditionally done was deemed inferior 
because women did it. Gaskell blamed this on the fact that historically women have not 
been represented by strong collective organizations, and have been denied access to 
apprenticeship programs (with the exception ofhair dressing and cooking). 
Skill in working-class occupations has typically been identified with long 
apprenticeships. Apprenticeships have served to limit the labour supply, to stop wages 
from being undercut by non-union members, and to enhance journeymen's status and 
skill.7 For many years, unions monopolized many training programs and chose to admit 
based on sex. Opening construction apprentice8hips to women, for instance, was quite 
difficult. In her examination of the International Brotherhood of Electrical v,r orkers, 
Grace Palladino described how: 
because constmction work required physical strength as well as technical 
skill and knowledge, neither contractors nor the unions themselves saw any 
good reason to train females who, they believed, could not be counted on 
to cany their own tools and equipment and who would undoubtedly waste 
their training by dropping out as soon as they were mani.ed. Worse yet, in 
their view, women would be taking jobs that rightly belonged to family 
men.8 
Marxism and Nationalism (London: Verso Books, 1986), 361; and Cynthia Cockburn, "The 
~aterial ofMale Power," Feminist Review, 9 (1981), 41-58. 
8 Gaskell, "Conceptions of Skill and the Work of Women." 
Grace Palladino, Dreams of Dignity, Workers of Vision: A History of the International 
Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (Washington, DC: lBEW, 1991), 250. Discriminatory training 
programs or domestic responsibilities were not the only reasons women's work was defined as 
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Even when women were admitted into skilled trades, they nearly always found 
themselves in the lovver paying jobs. 
Men have been privileged not just through their roles in unions but also through 
both relative strength and frulliliarity with tools and machinery. As Cockburn 
demonstrated, men were able to appropriate muscle, capability, tools and machinery that 
they have used as an important source of women's subordination. Technology has long 
been a "masculine" domain, with women given only limited access, and generally only to 
specific areas. Men have generally been both the designers and the users of technological 
processes and productive machinery.9 This has meant that equipment was designed for 
the average male worker, and was hence often too big for smaller women workers. Tr..is is 
in contrast to many other industries where the introduction of new technology has 
prompted the entry of women into what were previously defined as male occupations. 10 
Recruitment practices of contractors and unions have also privileged construction 
as a male domain. The social construction of the building trades worker as male and the 
clerical worker (one of the main jobs women occupied on major construction sites) as 
female were not just constructs of training, but were part of the accepted societal images 
unskilled. If training and childcare were all that were needed, as women have increased their 
training and have provided childcare for their children, discrimination should diminish. 
~For more on the gendered nature of technology see Ava Baron, cd., Work Engendered: Toward 
a Nev.; History of American Labor (Ithaca 1991) and Cockburn, "The Material of Male Power,'' 
54-55. Cockburn concluded that by appropriating physical and mental properties and technical 
hardware, male printers assigned themselves at the top of the skilled hierarchy and assigned 
women engaged in printing as subordinate. For a Canadian example, see Christina Burr, 
Spreading the Light: Work and Labour Reform in late Nineteenth-Century Toronto (Toronto: 
~niversity of Toronto Press, 1999). 
Cockburn, "The Material ofMale Power," 41-58; Graham Lowe, "Mechanization, 
Feminization, and Managerial Control in the Early Twentieth-Century Canadian Office," in 
Craig Heron and Robeti Storey, eds., On the Job: Confronting the Labour Process in Canada 
~Montreal: MeGill-Queen's Press, 1986), 177-209; and Mercedes Steedmen, "Skill and Gender 
In the Canadian Clothing Industry, 1890-1940," in Heron and Storey, On the Job, 152-176. 
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surrounding gender identities. 11 In a special issue on construction, the Newfoundland 
periodical Decks Awash recognized that the stereotypes of construction workers as "big, 
burly brutes and of union organizers as heavyweight wrestlers still persist." While the 
magazine acknowledged that construction workers in the 1980s were well-trained and 
articulate, it continued to perpetuate the gender identification of men with construction. 12 
One author described how men's "physical strength and their ability to face danger" also 
helped shape a sense of male superiority over women. She found that while male 
academics and other workers have had to acknowledge a woman could beat them in an 
exam or perform a work task faster, construction workers never had to "pit their strength 
and daring against women." Given this, she argued that women's entrance into 
construction proved even more traumatic to male construction workers' self-image than 
would have been the case in other industries. 13 
Concepts of Masculinitv 
A masculine environment permeated both the town and construction site at 
Churchill Falls. A visit to Churchill Falls in the late 1960s revealed a predominantly male 
workforce, something only marginally changed in the 1990s. In their workday most 
11 By gender I mean the network of beliefs, personality traits, attitudes, feelings, values, 
behaviours and activities that differentiate men and women. I see gender as a social construct 
rather than a biological one. Socially and historically-constructed gender roles designated 
activities as those appropriate for men and those appropriate for women, with men's activities 
generally ranked higher on the scale than women's. I borrow this definition from Sue Skipton, 
"Collective Bargaining and Pay Equity: A Study of Pay Equity Bargaining in Two Canadian 
~rovinces," PhD, University of Warwick, 1995, 22. 
13 "The Men and Their Unions," Decks Awash, 9, 3 (June 1980). Note the article title. 
M. Burgmann, "Revolution and Machismo: Women in the New South Wales Builders 
Labourers' Federation, 1961-1975," in E. Windshuttle, ed., Women, Class and History: Feminist 
Perspectives on Australia 1788-1978 (Melbourne: Fontana Collins, 1980), 453-92. For more on 
this seeM. Donaldson, Time of Our Lives (Sydney, Aus: Allen and Unwin, 1991); and Rosemary 
Pringle and Anne Winning, "Building Strategies: Equal Opportunity in the Construction 
Industry," Gender, Work and Organization, 5, 4 (October 1998), 220-229. 
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workers would not encotmter women unless they had to visit the construction offices 
where women worked as telephone, telex and computer operators, and as clerical staff. 
During the four year construction project (1967-1971), a masculine culture dominated 
Churchill Falls, a culture that pervaded both work and home lives, The masculine culture 
had implications for both work and home life; however, only the paid work world will be 
explored here. 
One way construction workers identified their occupation as masculine was 
through occupational socialization, the process whereby a new recruit becomes a regular 
member of the occupational group, learns and internalizes necessary skills and 
techniques, and is accepted by regular members and in tum identifies with that group. 14 
Both the explicit mastery of skills and the demonstration of implicit qualities expected 
from existing group members - including having the right tools, dress, and jargon -
played a role in the transformation of a recruit in the socialization process. Male 
camaraderie, based on shared experiences and relationships, was reinforced by the 
dangerous nature of the job and by the absence of women.15 
The constructs of femininity and masculinity on the Churchill Falls project led to 
ma.11y male construction workers fashioning their identity around not only their 
breadwinner status but also around their occupation. 16 Many construction workers used 
14 
15 
Everett C. Hughes, The Sociological Eye: Selected Papers (Hawthorne, NY: Aldine, 1971). 
A worker' s tools (if used, condition kept in) indicate his or her level of experience and skill. 
The hard hat is another item that indicates occupational status, with the colours, insignias, the 
newness, all conveying information about the worker. Herbert Applebaum, Royal Blue: the 
Culture of Construction Workers. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981, 24. Even the 
?onding experiences construction workers have traditionally been drawn to have been masculine 
:~ nature, including playing baseball and drinking. 
As Iacovetta pointed out "As a relational construct, masculinity, like femininity, is forged in 
Particular contexts and by the critical forces, including class, race-ethnicity, state power, 
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the dangerous nature of their work as the departure point bet\.veen them and the white-
collar workers on the project and felt that they were entitled to respect based on their 
capacity to endure dangerous working conditions. The nature of work at Churchill Falls, 
similar to other single industry towns that paid high wages and offered employment in 
"dangerous" occupations, contributed to its image as a 'man's town'. Only workers 
employed on site (or their families) were allowed to live within the town site. Male 
workers on site earned relatively high wages, enough to support a family. Women 
workers were not as fortunate. As fewer job opportunities were open to women, women 
workers were concentrated in retail, clerical and service positions which paid far less than 
construction jobs. Low wages made it difficult for women to be the sole support for their 
f: '1' 17 am11es. 
At least two different masculinities were at play at Churchill Falls. One was built 
around the rugged construction labourer. A second was built around technical 
competency, the skilled technical worker who used his brain to solve problems. Both 
these images were regularly portrayed in the Churchill Falls News. One prevailing image 
patriarchy, and ideology, that shape such contexts." Franca Iacovetta, "Defending Honour, 
Demanding Respect: Manly Discourse and Gendered Practice in Two Construction Strikes, 
Toronto, 1960-1," inK. McPherson, C. Morgan, and N. Forestell, eds., Gendered Pasts: 
Historical Essays in Femininity and Masculinity in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 
1999), 199. See also Albert Mills, "Cockpits, Hangars, Boys and Galleys: Corporate 
Masculinities and the Development of British Airways," Gender, Work and Organization, 5, 3 
(July 1998), 172-88; R.W. Connell, Gender and Power (Oxford 1987); and D.L. Collinson and J. 
Beam, "Naming Men as Men: Implications for Work, Organization and Management," Gender, 
~ark and Organization, 1, 1 (1994), 2-22. 
For more on the idea of a 'man's town' see Jennifer Keck and Mary Powell, "Women Into 
Mining Jobs at Inca: Challenging the Gender Division of Labour," Paper presented to Women of 
Steel: Mining Their History, 2 October 1999, Sudbury, Ontario; and Meg Luxton, More Than a 
Labour of Love: Three Generations of Women's Work in the Home (Toronto: Women's 
Educational Press, 1980). For a comparison with Sudbury, see Keck and Powell "Working at 
Inco: Women in a Downsizing Male Industry," in M. Kechnie and M. Reitsma-Street, eds., 
Changing Lives: Women and the Northern Experience (Toronto: Dundum Press, 1996). 
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of working-class masculinity featured dominance over nature; in almost every Issue 
workers were shown "conquering" the wilderness, blasting into the rock face, building 
dikes, or astride heavy equipment.18 Middle-class workers were also pictured, but using 
their brain power. For instance, the cover of the 30 June 1973 issue contains a picture of a 
computer technician superimposed over a P-2000 computer unit. Another picture shows a 
foreman at the control console of the compressed air equipment used to power the 
d . . 19 undergroun excavatmg eqmpment. 
At Churchill Falls' start, thirty families lived in the temporary town site. Most 
were families of managers or supervisors, the camp doctor or school teacher. Once the 
town site was built, more women came to Churchill Falls, either as wives, daughters or 
workers in their own rig.~t. Employment on the project, however, was ovenvhelmingly 
male. The few women who worked outside the home were employed in areas of typically 
described as women's work. Their jobs included waitresses, bank tellers, nurses, teachers, 
secretaries, and retail workers. Many of the jobs women engaged in for wages were 
extensions of the roles they played in the home. While women entered the paid labour 
force in record numbers in the 1960s and 1970s, women in Newfoundland were less 
likely to be found in the paid workforce than any other Canadian province. 
Women in Churchill Falls were responsible for the bnmt of unpaid household 
duties, including child-care, cooking, and cleaning, in essence the 1NOrk that reproduced 
labour on a daily basis for capitalism. Those men who did not have wives or daughters to 
care for their needs lived in bunkhouses. The company initially hired male workers to 
18 See Churchill Falls News, 16 November 1968 for its photo of workers on an "elevator" 
descending to the underground construction site. See also the 14 December 1968 issue for a 
photo demonstrating how to use a new drill to bore into the rock face. 
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provide food, laundry and other services to workers in the bunkhouses, work typically 
done by women. In part this was because of Churchill Falls' isolation. Few construction 
workers brought their wives or daughters. A year into the project, employers began 
advertising for women workers to come to Churchill Falls. 
The jobs women took, even the choice to work outside the home, were contingent 
on their responsibilities, the division of labour within the home, their age, marital status, 
level of education, and place of residence. Under the breadwinner ideology prevalent in 
the 1960s, available jobs generally went to men. In a single resource town like Churchill 
Falls, the lack of economic diversity and alternative employment worked against 
women's employment. ·women who bore the bnmt of reproducing labour power and 
family subsistence also had little opportunity to work outside the home for wages. Those 
who did work outside the home often did not find their household duties lessened, 
creating a double workday. Women also faced other structural problems in taking waged 
employment including industrial and occupational segregation and unequal pay.20 
Table 8-1: Newfoundland Women in the Labour Force 
at the time of Churchill Falls 
Year Labour Number of Number of % of \Vomen in Total 
Force Women Men Workforce 
1951 106,411 17,027 89,384 16 
1961 112,310 23,608 88,702 21 
1971 147,990 40,815 107,175 27 
Sgurce: Statistics Canada, Census o[.Canada 1971 (Ottawa 1971). 
19 
1 Churchill Falls News, 7 February 1970. 
- 0 s 
. ee Dorothy Anger, Carmelita McGrath, and Sandy Pottle, Women and Work in Newf oundland 
(St. John's: Royal Commission on Employment and Unemployment, 1986); Luxton, lvfore Than 
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As can be seen from Table 1, women's workforce participation rose from 16 per 
cent in 1951 to 27 per cent in 1971. Their jobs, however, remained in areas dominated by 
women. Over 80 per cent of women wage earners in Newfoundland worked in six 
occupations in 1971: clerical (24.8 per cent), service (19 per cent), sales (12.9), health 
care (10.8), education (10.3 per cent), and food processing (3.7 per cent). While these 
figures demonstrated changes from women's paid employment in 1951, they showed little 
change in women moving into non-traditional areas such as constmction. In 1971, of the 
15,040 construction workers in Newfotmdland only 75 were women? 1 As 
Newfoundland' s technical and vocational colleges, especially their apprenticeship 
programs, were male dominated, it is not surprising that so few women entered 
constmction. In 1963-4, out of the 344 students registered at the College of Trades and 
Technology, 319 were male (93 per cent). Women's participation rates rose to 15 per 
cent (345 women out of 2044 students) by 1967, the start of Churchill Falls. The majority 
of these women, however, were enrolled in clerical and business administration courses.22 
Many reasons accounted for women's low participation in non-traditional training 
programs. In addition to the labour market stmctures, social attitudes prescribed what 
a Labour of Love; and Linda Kealey, Factor's Affecting Women's Labour Force Pai'ticipation 
~St. John's: Royal Commission on Employment and Unemployment, 1986), 25. 
1 
In 1951 women were employed in the service industry (33 per cent), commercial enterprises 
(17.5 per cent), clerical (17.4), professional (15.5 per cent), managerial or proprietary (6.5 per 
cent), and manufacturing (5.5 per cent). Statistics Canada, "Numerical and Per:.:entage 
Distribution of the Labour Force, 14 years of Age and Over, by Occupation Group and Sex, for 
Newfoundland and St. John's, 1945 and 1951 Censuses," 1951 Census ofCanuda (Ottawa 1951), 
98-1951-M4, Table 13.1 and "Labour Force 15 Years and Over, by Detailed Occupation and Sex, 
For Canada and Pro·vinces," 1971 Census ofCanuda (Ottawa 1971), Table 2-1 and Table 2. 94-
717. 
u . 
Provincial Archives ofNewfoundland anJ Labrador (PAl';L.), Department of Career 
Development Files, GN66-2-E, 7-5-6-2, volume XX. Trade, College and District Trade Schools-
Vocational. "Enrolment- COTT." 
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constituted "women's work." Women's jobs reflected their "natural roles" in the home: 
working as caregivers (nurses, teachers, child care providers), domestic servants, 
waitresses, and secretaries.Z3 
The majority of women employed at Churchill Falls for wages were single.24 
Many of the single women came to the project as part of family units. After graduating 
with a Bachelor of Science in home economics, one woman opted to move to the site with 
her father, employed as site representative for the provincial Department of Labrador 
Affairs. In June 1968 she took a position as clerk typist with the ba..'1k, and quickly moved 
up to work as a teller, a position fom1erly filled by male workers. Her sister quickly 
followed her to the :site, taking up a position with the local school to teach grade three.Z5 
Other women arrived without family ties, including Rosamund Watts. Watts worked as a 
Rl~ on the site after graduating from the Grace Hospital in St. John's and working in 
small clinics in Sioux Lookout and Labrador City (for the Iron Ore Company). \Vatts' 
23 See Nancy Forestell, "The Miner's Wife: Working-Class Femininity in a Masculine Context, 
1920-1950," in McPherson, et. al., Gendered Pasts, 139-157; Patricia Cmmelly, Last Hired, First 
Fired: Women and the Canadian Work Force (Toronto 1978); Connelly and Martha MacDonald, 
"Women's Work: Domestic and Wage Labour in a Nova Scotia Community," Studies in Political 
Economy, 10 (1983), 45-72; Joy Parr, The Gender of Breadwinners (Toronto 1990); and Joan 
Sangster, Earning Resp ect: 17ze Lives of Working Women in Small-Town Ontario, 1920-1960 
(Toronto 1995). On women's roles in Newfoundland see .Marilyn Porter, "She Was Skipper of 
the Shore Crew," Labour/Le Travail, 15 (1986), 105-23 and Jane Nadel-Klein and Donna Lee 
Davis, To Work and to Weep: Women in Fishing Economies (St. Jol>.n's 1988). 
24 
This fits with the provincial statistics. In 197 6, single women in Newfoundland had a labour 
force participation rate of 42.2 per cent, married women 21.3 per cent, widowed women 12.1 per 
cent, and divorced women 48.1 per cent. Statistics Canada, "Labour Force Activity," 1976 
~ens-us of Canada, volume 5, 94-804. Tables 10-1 and 11-1. 
Churchill Falls News, 8 June 1968. Women made up the majority of elementary school 
teachers in Newfoundland, \Vith a ratio ofthree to one (3055 women to 915 men) in 1971. 
Statistics Canada, "Labour Force 15 Years and Over, by Detailed Occupation and Sex," 1971 
Census, Table 2-3. 
251 
previous experience prepared her for Churchill Falls' isolation; she nevertheless looked 
forward to having the companionship of other single women.26 
As the project grew, women were also hired as keypunch operators and to work in 
the mess area as servers. Churchill Falls News reported that the new mess hall was 
bringing two new innovations to the site, "girls, and the use of identification cards. These 
are actually separate items, but you are bound to notice both." The paper commented "So 
how's that? A new mess hall with more room and a pretty gal to look at."27 Women at the 
mess hall were referred to as "Bona Vista Belles" after caterer Bona Vista Food Services, 
with the paper reporting that the "Belles" helped make life a "little brighter". Several of 
the women had worked at other major construction projects. Marge Paquette, for instance, 
was a veteran of construction projects at Elliott Lake, Blind River, and \Vawa, Ontario 
and Chutes-des-Passes, Quebec. Paquette worked as the supervisor in the Main Camp 
mess hall. Her responsibilities included supervising the 27 "girls" who served the food 
and cleaned tables.28 One of the first women servers, 19 year old Effie Fancy, arrived in 
August 1968 from Gander where she had been working in the kitchen at the sanatorium 
when she heard on the radio that young women were being recruited for Churchill Falls. 
Many women who came to work at Churchill Falls were lookiilg for higher wages 
and an adventure. It was, however, not always an easy adjustment. One woman reported 
that stepping off the plane into a camp with 2000 men was a bit intimidating. Churchill 
Falls News reported that many of the "girls" faced adjustments over not being able to buy 
:~::Meet Miss Watts," Churchill Falls News, 23 December 1967. 
28 G1rls and ID Cards," Churchill Falls News, 29 July 1968. 
Paquette was one of the 2,675 women employed in Newfoundland as food and beverage 
preparation and service workers. "Meet Marge Paquette," Churchill Falls News, 6 Ma:.ch 1971 
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nylon stockings. But the "girls"' good humour and the pace "swept away the gloom."29 
One woman recalled "the closer the plane came to Churchill Falls, the closer I came to 
bawling. From the plane window all I could see was rocks and caribou moss and scraggly 
trees and water. And when I got off the plane there was no one to meet me and I just 
followed the security fellow around like a puppy."30 This was a common sentiment. 
Another woman reported "when I got off the airplane I said to myself: 'My God, what 
have I done?' There was dust and black flies and mosquitoes, and everything looked so 
strange."31 Sent to work at the bank, Brenda Hoyles was only 19 when she arrived. By the 
end of her first year Hayles, however, was determined she would remain in Churchill 
Falls until she was forcibly removed. Hoyles had an older brother working on site, 
although because of shift schedules they rarely saw each other. Upon completing a 
commercial course at the Corner Brook Vocational School, Hayles landed a job with the 
Bank of Montreal in Deer Lake. After a year at the bank, Hoyles jumped at the opening 
at Churchill Falls.32 
Other women worked as secretaries, i..'1cluding HeH:ne Tiernan and Can11e1 Best. 
In addition to having taken secretarial courses, Tiernan had bachelor degrees in arts, 
music and teaching. Her first job on site \Vas as a secretarj for the Churchill Constructors 
Joint Venture from November 1968 to December 1969. After a break to teach, Tiernan 
and Statistics Canada, "Labour Force 15 Years and Over, by Detailed Occupation and Sex," 1971 
Census, Table 2-7. 
OQ 
-- "Meet Effie Fancy," Churchill Falls News, 21 Dec~mber 1968. 
30 "l\ .~ 
31 
1Vleet Brenda Hoyles," Churchill Falls News, 23 October 1971. 
3
, "Meet Carmel Best," Churchill Falls Nevvs, 18 March 1972. 
-"Meet Brenda Hoyles," Churchill Falls News. Women made up just under 50 per cent of 
service workers in Newfoundland, 7690 out of 16,245 workers. Women were more likely to be 
found in food and beverage preparation (2675), and in personal services (2895) while men were 
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returned to Churchill Falls in the spnng 1970.33 From Branch, Placentia East, Best 
worked as secretary to CFLCo's assistant general manager of operations. After attending 
secretarial school, Best worked at the St. John's sanatorium and at the Pepperell Air 
Force Base where she was married. After she was widowed Best returned to the 
workforce, first at the U.S. naval base in Argentia, then in the provincial House of 
Assembly.34 When Best mrived on site the project was still in its early phase, the town 
centre was not yet open, and the grocery store was in one of the trailers. The only 
recreation facilities open for women were the library and the theatre.35 In Februa..r;' 1970 a 
women's lounge was added, demonstrating the growing number of women on site. Open 
until 11: 15 pm, it o±Tered women a place to "entertain" their dates. No unescorted men 
were allO'.ved in. Facilities included a coin-operated record player, comfortable fumiture 
and a ping pong table.36 Having a special room set aside for women to entertain their 
dates demonstrated the patriarchal view many of the men - and the companies - had 
towards women on the site. In this view, women needed watching over. 
At least two of the women on site worked in what were normally construed as 
masculine jobs. Gita Moska was employed as a_n_ engineer, while Lucille McCullough 
was employed as a draftsman (according to the newspaper "surely not draftswoman"). 
Both Moska and McCullough were employed in the intake field office on Northern 
employed in protective services (3190). Statistics Canada, "Labour Force 15 Years and Over, by 
Detailed Occupation and Sex," 1971 Census, Table 2-7. 
33 "M. 
34 
Iss Adaptable," Churchill Falls News, 13 May 1972. 
Women were the majority of clerical workers in Newfoundland (9950 women to 6955 men) 
with women employed as stenographers (3565 women, 200 men), bookkeepers (2,835 women, 
1805 men), and data processors (255 women, 100 men), while men were employed in scheduling 
and distributing (140 women, 1810 m(:n). Statistics Canada, "Labour Force 15 Years and Over, 
b3 '/ Detailed Occupation and Sex," 1971 Census, Table 2-3 and 2-5. 
, "M 1 eet Carmel Best," Churchill Falls Nev.,·s, 18 March 1972. 
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Construction's east forebay dykes contract. A native of Czechoslovakia, Moska earned 
her civil engineering degree before travelling to Canada to join her boyfriend, also Czech, 
who was employed at Churchill Falls. Moska was soon hired as an assistant field 
engineer, and she married her boyfriend while on leave in Jtme 1970. Moska reported fe'.v 
problems from other workers despite working in an all male enviromnent. She seemed 
more worried about her English than over her status as the only \Voman. Moska's job 
description involved working on the calculation of quantities of dyke material placed, and 
calculating costs and estimates. 
McCullough, a Montreal native, received her training m drafting in civil and 
electrical engineering offices in England. She also followed her husband to the project. 
McCullough's job included translating the calculations done by Moska and others into 
cha1ts and graphs. She commented that "the men are courteous to you as a woman, but 
they treat you like a professional in your work. If you want me to sum up what it's like to 
be one of a few women working among a lot of men, I say it's wonderful."37 It is not 
surpnsmg that both women were originally from outside the provmce, Moska from 
Czechoslovakia, McCullough from Montreal. Few women fi·om Newfolmdland were 
trained for technical jobs. 
Churchill Falls Nevvs showed a clear division of labour between men's and 
women's roles on site. Women's roles were to build the social and family COITL.'Tiunities 
while men's roles were to carry out the physical constmction of the town and generating 
plant. Women's representations generally followed similar lines, "women as secretaries", 
"women as beauty contestants", "women as primary homemaker and caregiver". Several 
36 
"New Facilities," Churchill Falls News, 7 February 1970. 
255 
articles focused on women's efforts to fill their "spare time". The assumption was that 
married women did not work and had idle time on their hands. One article discussed the 
local arts and crafts club, an all-female enclave. The a1ticle began: "It's no problem for a 
guy to find a way to channel his energy at Churchill Falls. For openers he is probably 
using most of his head or back muscle to finish building the place, or to operate it." It 
continued "the gals of Churchill Falls are also quite disinclined to let their hours drift by 
without something productive to show for them." According to the paper, productive 
work for women was arts and crafts. Courses were offered in pottery, leathercraft, metal 
enamelling, copper tooling, weaving, macrame, and paper mach e. Women could also take 
lessons to learn to play bridge.38 
Other articles promoted the idea that a woman's job was to look pretty. The 
newspaper exhorted women to take part in the beauty pageants on site, including a teen 
pageant. The stated reason for holding the first "teen-queen" pageant was that the "girls" 
needed something "constmctive" to do in their spare time. Eleven young women took part 
in the pageant, a...J.d were judged on talent, personality, and appearance. The Churchill 
Falls News reported that while "beauty pageants and other assorted 'Miss' competitions 
may have wa.11ed with the advent of the women's lib movement, when the participants 
themselves decide to organize and stage the event, there really isn't much room for 
bickering."39 The "teen-queen" was not the only beauty pageant for women on site:. A 
beauty pageant was also attached to the annual Winter Carnival. 
37 
"The Soft Side of Construction," Churchill Falls News, 17 October 1970. 
38 
"Different Strokes," Churchill Falls News, 27 January 1973. 
39 
'"Teen-Queen' Chosen," Churchill Falls News, 16 June 1973. 
256 
Photos of the women in the Churchill Falls News all focused on their feminine 
qualities. Not surprisingly, all the pictures of women entering beauty contests showed the 
women as beauty objects. This contrasts with photos of men in the paper that typically 
portrayed men in the midst of being active, either at work or at leisure. While women's 
photos showed them sitting indoors around a table working on crafts, men were portrayed 
fishing, hunting, and playing hockey. One of the few photos showing women moving 
around has them admiring arts and crafts displays. Even those photos of women at work 
have the women sitting behind their desks posed for the camera. Male workers were 
portrayed next to their tools, generally outside, often in the midst of physically demanding 
tasks, and did not even seem aware their photos were being taken.40 
Despite the twenty plus years between the projects, the site newspaper Hibernia 
News continued to portray woman workers more in their traditional than their non-
traditional roles. While dozens of pictures portrayed male construction workers in their 
work environ.IH::nt, women were portrayed in their leisure activities. The only woman 
portrayed in a hard hat in the paper's first few months was federal rv1inister of Natural 
Resources, Anne McLellan, and then it was being led on a tour by a group of male 
workers.41 That 'Nomen construction workers were still the exception rather than the 
norm is made clear in an article entitled "Non-traditional roies nothing new for female 
iron worker" which explored one woman's career path from the Canadian Armed Forces 
Reserves to a security guard and finally iron worker. In it, and other articles, the female 
Worker was portrayed as an aberration in a male domain. 
40 
See for instance, Churchill Falls News, 27 JanuarJ 1973 and 30 June 1973 for its portrayal of 
Women compared to 6 March 1971 for its portrayal of men. 
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Hibernia News also commented on the arrival of the first female pipefitter 
apprentice in August 1994. She was also the only female pipefitter in Newfoundland then 
practising her trade.42 The paper also took note of Hibernia's first female "foreman". 
After a year working manning the fireproofing pump, a female worker was promoted to 
f.:1reman and placed in charge of sixteen male workers. As other women were promoted to 
"foremen", they too merited mention in the paper, unlike the promotions of their male 
counter-parts. One article c;ongratulated the female painting foreman for a job well done 
but had no similar words of praise for her male counterpart. Other articles focused on 
women's sex, rather than their skill, including an article entitled "Lady Welder not 
Carrying Torch." None of the paper's articles described male construction workers' sex 
h d. . h . k 4" w en 1scussmg t e1r wor . -
Equity Policies and their Implementation at Hibernia44 
In the mid- to late-1970s increasing nu.'Tlbers of women in the United States began 
looking at construction as an employment opportunity for the first time. In April 1978 
President Carter amended the Civil Rights Act to include affim1ative action. His 
administration also set up specific hiring goals and timetables for women to enter non-
41 Hibernia News (HN), 29 June 1994. For the more typical pictures of male construction \vorkers 
see HN, 13 July 1994. 
42 See "Non-traditional Roles Nothing New for Female Iron Worker," Hibernia News, 27 July 
1994 and "Like Father, Like Daughter," HN, 24 August 1994. The worker's father was also a 
pipefitter. He did not encourage her to become a pipefitter but stated ''it's nice to see girls 
working in the trade and proving they can do it." 
43 
"Female Foreman Excels in Painting Operation," Hibernia News, 8 March 1995; "Hibernia's 
First Female Foreman: Keeping One Step Ahead," Hlv, 19 October 1994; "PASSB Couple Draw 
Guidelines Between Home and Work," HN, 16 November 1994; and "Lady Welder Not Carrying 
Torch," HN, 24 August 1994. The PASSB foreman's husband was also a foreman at the 
warehouse. 
44 The following material has benefited from the Women in Trades and Technology (WITT) 
report on women's experiences at Hibernia, particularly from its interviews with tradeswomen. 
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traditional fields, including construction. With the introduction of affirmative action, U.S. 
contractors and w1ions scrambled to introduce women and minority groups into their 
training and employment programs. As women pioneers entered the U.S. construction 
industry, many Canadian women began pushing for admittance into the relatively high 
paying construction industry. As Canada introduced no similar affirmative action 
program, interested women had to apply their pressure directly on training schools, unions 
and contractors to allow them access to the construction industry.45 
By the early 1980s, a few pioneering women were starting to enter the 
Newfoundland construction industry, including Ivy Simms, the first woma.tl. to enter the 
manpower apprenticeship program in carpentry. Like many of the other Canadian 
pioneers, Simms was following in the footsteps of male family members when she 
entered the construction industry. 46 As late as the mid-1980s, however, societal attitudes 
against women working in non-traditional areas prevailed. In a study by Avebury 
Research (1986) exploring the views of women to non-traditional occupations, the 
authors concluded that women generally preferred jobs that were indoors, clean and 
comfortable.47 It is interesting how this phenomenon only occurs when discussing 
women; no one suggests that men who choose office jobs do not like to be dirty. 
--------------------------------------------------------------·---
WITI', Women, Employment Equity and the Hibernia Construction Project (St. John's: WITT, 
1996). 
45 . 
Palladmo, Dreams ofDignity, 250. 
46 
"Ivy Sirnms," Decks Awash, 9, 3 (June 1980), 52. The article starts off describing Ivy Simms' 
physical characteristics: "She's only 5 feet tall and 100 pounds, but Ivy Sinm1s can drive a nail 
with a single smooth stroke and chop a log in one powerful blo\v." Simms is the only one whose 
r,hysical characteristics and size were noted. 
Avebury Research & Consulting Ltd., Decade of Promise: an Assessment of Canadian 
Women's Status in Education, Training and Employment, 1976-1985 (Toronto: Canadian 
Congress for Learning Opportunities for Women, 1986). 
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A 1987 study on Newfoundland Apprenticeship Training found that while women 
were making progress in some non-traditional industries, construction and mechanical 
trades remained bastions of male workers.48 Newfoundland was not alone in this. 
Women's numbers in construction have remained low across Canada. Marjorie Griffin 
Cohen and Kate Braid found that even in the 1990s "Large--scale construction projects, 
even when they involve massive amounts of pubhc money have been notorious for the 
overwhelmingly 'white, male' face of the workforce."49 High unemployment rates in the 
Newfoundland industry throughout the 1980s made unions reluctant to train new 
construction workers, particularly women, as most preferred to save what jobs existed for 
male workers. Unions were also worried that a large influx o:f new constmction workers 
would drive down wages by flooding the market. 
Under the Atlantic Accord (1985) Newfoundland workers were given hiring and 
training preference for Hibernia work. No mention was made, however, of implementing 
affirmative action hiring practices despite recommendations from the Provincial Advisory 
Council on the Status ofvVomen.50 Nor was there mention of such programs in the 1990 
Hibernia Const:-uction Project Agreement. The major contractor on site, Newfoundland 
48 R. Crocker, Newfoundland Apprenticeship Training Study Final Report (St. John ' s 1987), 44. 
49 Cohen and Braid's work examines an exception to this pattern, the 1990s BC Island Highway 
project where employment equity was built into the project agreement. Hiring provisions 
mandated the hiring of women, disabled, aboriginal, and local workers. Participation rates by 
total hours worked for women and aboriginal workers went from zero to 6.5 per cent for women 
and 7.5 per cent for Aboriginals over the life of the project. Marjorie Griffith Cohen and Kate 
Braid, ''Training and Equity Initiatives on the British Columbia Island highway Project: A Model 
of Large-Scale Construction Project," The Labour Education and Training Research Network, 
~:/ lwww. yorku.ca/research/ crws/network/ english/ cohen -braid-e.htrn. 
"Women's Council Calls for Mandatory Affinnative Action for Hibernia Oil Development," 
ET, 20 Januaty 1986. Ann Bell recognized that "the only way women will have equal opportunity 
for employment is if it is a definite requirement." Bell also dismissed the idea that women were 
not interested in working offshore. She stated that "women have to eat the same as men do. Not 
every woman wants to go offshore but neither does every man . . . " 
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Offshore Development Constructors (NODECO), did have an equitable hiring policy in 
its Environmental Protection Plan; however, in the new Site Environmental Plan which 
covered both the GBS and Topsides work the equitable hiring policy was excluded. Only 
one contractor on site, Metropol Security, was legally required to implement employment 
equity as a signatory under the Federal Contractors Program. 51 Neither the HMDC nor the 
provincial government required contractors to provide for equity hiring as part of the 
tendering process. 52 
In 1991, the ODC encouraged qualified women to apply for employment at 
Hibernia and hired an equity promotion co-ordinator. It claimed to be actively seeking 
female welders, painters, and sand-blowers for the project. The equity co-ordinator 
obtained graduation lists from colleges and training institutes so she could personally 
make contact with women workers. However, the equity co-ordinator stressed that 
Hibemia's was an equity promotion platform and not affirmative action. There were no 
percentages or quotas on hiring women. Women were told they would still have to go 
through the seniority system and that hiring was up to the local unions. 53 
In its equity statement, the ODC recogriized that women have historically been 
disadvantaged in trades because most women did not have access to the same kinds of 
activities as men in the formative years, including access to math and science, familiarity 
51 WITT, Women, Employment Equity ... , 7. 
52 The Hibernia Management and Development Company (HMDC), agreed to Newfoundland 
hiring preferences in exchange for federal and provincial government financial support, 
including. a cornmitment to pay 25 per cent of constmction costs to a maximum of $1.04 billion 
and to provide loan guarantees for 40 per cent of those costs to a total of $1.66 billion. In 
Febmary 1992 the federal government also became a direct partner, acquiring 8.5 per cent of 
Gulf Canada Resource's share after Gulf pulled out of the project. 
53 Brian Jones, "Hibernia Unions seeking Qualified Female Workers," ET. 29 September 1991; 
and Beth Gorman, "Hibernia Work keeps Woman off Welfare," ET, 6 October 1991. 
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with tools, or familiarity with the nomenclature. To overcome these factors the ODC 
suggested setting up a six-month course introducing women to four trades, followed by a 
nine-month pre-employment course and apprenticeship in a trade.54 The program was to 
train two groups of sixteen women per year, one group each for six months. After more 
than 300 women applied, the ODC suggested the course run for a period of five years. 55 
LJ. April 1993 the Oil Development Council's training coordinating group (ODCCG) 
asked local colleges to put together a proposal for a four-week equity rebar training 
comse capable of training 50 women. It also requested proposals for a two-week 
apprenticeship rebar training course for 150 potential workers at Hibernia. 56 
Despite the ODCCG's efforts, many women complained that they were prevented 
from taking many of the necessary training courses to be eligible for employment and that 
those women who had taken the courses were among the last to get hired. 57 By May 1995 
350 women had applied for construction trades training. Of the 3127 seats available, 
however, only 102 women received training, accessing only 168 of the seats. SR As of July 
54 Derm Cain, president of the ODC, wrote to Employment and hnmigration Canada to address 
the question of employment equity. He stated that because of the high skill requirements 
necessary for the project, most women were not in a position to qualify for the current training 
initiatives, as they did not have journey status. Cain felt that this was quite unfortunate as many 
of the women applicants displayed high levels of interest. To solve the problem the ODC 
decided to pursue the entry of women in trades as a separate program. Cain detailed how the 
ODC Communications and Equity Coordinator was working with the local WITT group to put 
together a plan of action to train women at the entry through to journey level status. ODC files, 
box: ODCCG Files. Letter from Cain to Rick Fifield, Employment and Immigration Canada, 23 
~arch 1993. 
56 ODC files, box: ODCCG Training, Equity File, "Equity Statement." 
ODe files, box: ODCCG Training. ODCCG, Request for Equity - Rebar Training Proposals, 2 
April 1993 57 - • 
Deana Stokes Sullivan, "Gender not Factor in Hiring, say Officials," ET, 23 November 1993; 
~nd Stokes Sullivan, "Tradeswomen Claim discrimination," ET, 16 November 1993. 
In Many of the women took more than one course, for instance, apprentice rebar and then rebar. 
fonnation from the Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, Department of Employment 
and Labour Relations, July 1995. 
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1994 of the 102 women who had received training, only 36 were hired on site. Women 
received training in both traditional and non-traditional fields, with 53 women trained as 
camp attendants/food service workers, 48 in apprentice rebar, 48 in rebar, 11 as 
painter/blaster/fireproofers, 5 to work in the warehouse, and 1 each trained in concrete, 
diving, and structural welding. Sixteen women were hired for rebar work, seven as camp 
attendants/food service workers, five for the warehouse, five as painters/blasters, and one 
each in concrete, diving, and warehousing. By the project's end, over 1900 trainees 
. 
received employment at Hibernia, of whom only 65 were women, a total of3 per cent. 59 
In August 1993 several women, who had taken Hibernia training and had early 
application dates, grew tired of watching men with equal or less qualifications get hired 
and met to discuss what they saw as unfair hiring. Several women trained in cage 
manufacturing were told they had to wait for jobs in cage manufacturing before they 
could be hired while the men in training with them were hired on in different job 
capacities. One woman stated "I perceived cage manufacturing to be segregation because 
it seemed like they made it a 'female's job' ... "60 After complaints to 'Nomen in Trades 
and Technology, in September 1993 WITT representative Brenda Grzetic met with 
members of the Hibernia Employers' Association (HEA) to ask the HEA to ensure that 
women who performed well in the training courses would be hired. At the meeting 
Grzetic used the examples of several women with high training scores to demonstrate the 
issue of unfair hiring practices. The HEA was hostile to the presentation and later wrote 
59 ODC Files, Box: ODCCG files, Equity Update, ODCCG Training Update, July 1994; WITT, 
Women, Employment Equity ... , 16; Deana Stokes Sullivan, "Report ' Sad Reflection' of Reality 
for Women Working on Hibernia," ET, 9 August 1996, and Stokes Sullivan and John Tompkins, 
"Hibernia not without Harassment ofWorrien," 7 August 1996. 
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to WITT demanding to know how it had obtained much of its information, particularly its 
access to students' test scores. WITT executive director Cindy King responded that all the 
data on training was obtained through the provincial government or from the women in 
. . 61 
trammg. 
Women's late start dates gave them lower senimity and made many ineligible for 
further training that would have ensured them more work.62 Most trades' enhancement 
courses were reserved for workers with prior experience or joumeyman status and few 
women had the necessary work experience to meet the requirements. One woman 
commented that "they know they're cutting out the women by having it set up this 
way."63 Several women were told that their late call-up dates were determined randomly 
as initially the union put the names in a hat for work on site. One woman complained: 
We had to wait and wait and then we started to realize that women weren't 
going like the men ... When I first applied to the ODCCG I had three years 
of experience and by the time I got there I had reached journey level. I saw 
the men go there and I knew that some of them ·weren't senior union 
members. I knew they had done the training when I did it. I knew that some 
of the men who were called to work had no experience whatsoever ... I also 
saw how guys pressured the union to be referred to the site, then when we 
pressured them, it tumed into something ugly... I really didn't think we 
would be treated so unfairiy. 
Women later learned that they had been put on a separate hiring list, a female hiring list, 
which they believed was only used once all workers on the standard list had been hired. 
60 WI TT, Women, Employment Equity .. . , 21. It is interesting to note that cage manufacturing was 
~topped from the project plans a short time later in 1994. 
ODC files, box: ODCCG files. Letter from WITT Director Cindy King to Jim Kenney, 
Executive Director REA 28 September 1993 6J ' ' • 6~ WITT, Women, Employment Equity ... , 18. 
WITT, Women, Employment Equity ... , 22. 
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The union claimed it placed the women on a separate hiring list to help implement 
L "t 64 ernp1oymenL eqm y. 
By November 1993 the women trained as cage manufacturers were joined by a 
group of women rebar apprentices who filed complaints with the Human Rights 
Commission alleging discrimination in hiring by all parties involved.65 Meetings with the 
premier and the Minister of Employment and Labour Relations offered the women little 
hope. In April 1994 the Deprutment of Employment and Labour Relations concluded that 
the hiring procedures were fair and reasonable and that adequate attempts had been made 
to train and recruit women. According to the government, the women were not being 
hired because of their lack of qualifications compared to male workers and their late 
application dates. The report angered many of the women trainees, particularly those with 
extensive backgrounds in welding, concrete reinforcement, steel inspection and other 
construction related occupations. 66 
Women's Work Roles at Hibernia 
Women made up less than 4 per cent of workers at Hibernia, with the majority 
employed in traditional women's work roles. In April 1995 235 women were employed at 
Hibernia, 201 of them in union positions, and 34 in non-unionized positions. Three main 
6-1 
65 
WlTT, Women, Employment Equity ... , 20. 
66 
Stokes Sullivan, "Tradeswomen Claim Discrimination," ET, 16 November 1993. 
Government of Newfoundland and Labrador, "Investigative Summary: Complaints Received 
Regarding Hibernia Referral and Hiring Procedures Related To Women" (St. John' s 1994); and 
Frangos, Gardias, and Hookey, "Response to the Findings of the Investigation into Women's 
Concerns about Hiring Practices on the Hibernia Construction Project," unpublished report, St. 
John's, 1994. 
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employers accounted for just under 90 per cent of Hibernia's unionized workforce 
(PASSB, NO DECO and Major Offshore Catering) at its peak level of operation. P ASSB 
employed 847 workers, 19 of whom were women (2 per cent). Those 19 women were 
predominantly in secretarial and catering positions, with only one-third in non-traditional 
jobs. Major Offshore Catering employed 161 people, 70 ofwhom were women (43 per 
cent). Due to the nature of the work, providing catering and camp attendants, almost all 
of the women were traditionally employed. The third employer, NODECO employed the 
largest number of workers, 2187, 90 of whom were women (4 per cent). Of those 90 
women, 31 were employed in non-traditional work while the other 59 were clerical 
workers.67 Those working in areas dominated by women reported high satisfaction with 
their jobs. One woman reported "it's been nothing but a positive expetience for me ... It 
was a truly remarkable experience to have that many people working so close together 
and have so few problems given the size of the project."68 Women's experiences, 
however, differed depending on their jobs. \Vomen construction workers noted pervasive 
harassment, including the general attitude that women did not belong in constTuction.69 
To cope with harassment, the ODC introduced its Discrimination and Harassment 
Policy in May 1992. ODC policies applied to all union members on site. The ODC 
defined harassment as any improper conduct or behaviour that included but was not 
67 
Hibernia Construction Sites Environmental Management Committee, "Socio-Economic 
~eview of the Hibernia Development Project," January-June 1995. 10-12. 
69 WITT, Women, Employment Equity .. . , 11-12. 
WITT, Women, Employment Equity ... , 11-15,26-31. WITT sent out questionnaires to the 236 
women employed on site, and received replies from 72 women (31 per cent), including 64 
unionized and 8 non-unionized workers. 42 of the women were in administrative/clerical 
Positions, while 13 were in construction, 9 in support services, and 8 in management. 29 women 
also gave permission to be interviewed (15 were administrative/clerical workers, 9 in 
construction, 5 in support services, and 1 in management). 
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limited to coercion, intimidation, blackmail, ridicule, or sexual harassment that denied an 
individual dignity or respect. Sexual harassment was further defined as any tmwelcome 
conduct, sexual advances, or requests for sexual favours. The ODC considered it 
discrimination or harassment if a person reasonably ought to have known that his/her 
behaviour constituted harassment. Improper conduct included verbal remarks, jokes or 
innuendoes, physical touching or leering, inappropriate cartoons or pictures, and breach 
of confidentiality, for instance, disclosure of an i..'1dividual's medical condition without 
the consent ofthe employee concerned.70 
The ODC's harassment policy required the harassed worker make their 
disapproval knmvn to the individual whose conduct was in question, keep a written 
record of incidents, check with co-workers about similar incidents, and report incidents to 
their designated representatives. Foremen, shop stewards, site representatives, and 
business managers were all told to be available to discuss harassment or discrimination 
claims. Each complaint was to undergo a prompt investigation. Union representatives 
were reminded that information was confidential and that sanctions were only to be 
instituted once the claim was substantiated. Punishment for harassment ranged from a 
\vritten reprimand to dismissal from the union. Harassed workers were also told rhey had 
the right to report the case to the Hum~m Rights Commission, especially if tbey were 
considering leaving their position because of harassment. 
The HMDC and the major contractors on site developed a harassment policy and 
began instituting courses on sexual harassment in 1994, well into the project's 
construction. Maria Moran, the training and recruitment co-ordinator with the GBS 
70 ODC files, box: ODCCG Training. "Oil Development Council Discrimination and Harassment 
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Management Team (GMT), reported that Human Resources and Labour Relations had 
received six to eight complaints of sexual harassment in the pnor year. Under 
management's policy, workers were required to report sexual harassment to their 
department manager, superintendent, labour relations department or their union 
representative.71 Mora.YJ. reported that only in the past year (1994) had any complaints 
been received, which she attributed to the increasing numbers of women workers 
employed on site. She also noted that this was also the period when women were 
becoming more involved in non-traditional areas, although Moran did recognize that 
harassment claims were not isolated to constmction.72 
Women workers faced additional safety hazards due to harassment they faced on 
site or based on the work they were assigned. Few researchers have examined the health 
hazards to women in constmction, perhaps not surprisingly as in 1995 women still made 
up only 2.3 per cent of constmction workers in the United States. As more women 
entered constmction unions in the 1980s and 1990s, concerns began emerging over how 
gender related to health and safety. One study in the United States examined the primary 
health and safety hazards for all construction workers and then looked at the additional 
health and safety hazards affecting women.73 It found that women constmction workers 
faced additional health and safety issues in workplace culture (including anti-women 
~olicy," 25 March 1993. 
71 Harassment charges could be filed as a grievance. 
-"Program Aimed At Stamping Out Sexual Harassment Before it Starts," Hibernia News, 8 
~ebruary 1995. 
The study was undertaken by the Health and Safety for Women in Construction (HASWIC) 
~orking group which was under the Advisory Committee on Construction Safety and Health 
8
ACCSH), an advisory COIThllittee repmting to the U.S. Department of Labor, Occupational 
afety and Health Administration. HASWIC, "Women in the Construction Workplace: Providing 
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attitudes and discrimination based on sex), in the design of personal protective 
equipment, in the lack of sanitary facilities for women, in their different ergonomic needs, 
and in knowledge surrounding reproductive hazards. 
In recent years researchers have recognized that sexual harassment is an 
occupational health and safety hazard. In a National Institute for Occupational Safety and 
Health (NIOSH) study, sexual harassment was an important predictor for lower job 
satisfaction, more psychological and physiological symptoms, and more on-the-job 
injuries.74 Hostile environments, including sexual harassment, created health and safety 
issues on several levels, including leading to chronic stress and distractions which could 
result in injuries not just to female workers but to others around her. Another study found 
that the behaviour of those in authmity, including foremen and union representatives and 
supervisors and other contractor representatives, set the tone and example for workers on 
site, and had the potential to strongly affect women trades workers' health and safety.75 
On her flrst day at Hibemia, one woman reported that her supervisor "got really upset 
with me. I thought that he was going to come across the desk at me. I drew back. He 
asked me 'Who in the hell did I think I was to go out there thinking I could tell them 
where I was going to work?' He went on and on and I couldn't get a word in. He really 
frightened me."75 
Equitable Safety and Health Protection," an unpublished working paper of the OSHA, February 
}996, 1. Copy from the CP\VR, Washington, DC. 
·~ p 
aula Arab, "Sexual Harassment Ruled Workplace Safety Hazard," ET, 23 August 1997; L.M. 
Goldenhar, J.J Hurrell, N. Swanson, A Ruder, and J. Deddens, "Affects of on the Job 
Harassment: Outcomes for Women Construction Workers," Preliminary Survey Findings 
;resented at APA-CDC Conference on Women's Health, Washington, September 1996. 
Susan Eisenberg, We'll Call You if We Need You: Experiences of Women Working 
~onstruction (Ithaca: ILR Press, 1998), 70. 
WITT, Women, Employment Equity ... , 34. 
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\Vomen working in non-traditional jobs at Stelco (Hamilton) and Inco (Sudbury) 
reported negative reactions from some supervisors and co-workers to them taking away 
men's jobs.77 An !nco employee remembered being asked "What do you think you're 
doing here any\vays? This is no place for a woman. This is a man's job. Don't you know 
you're taking away a man's job? A man has to support his family."78 At Stelco one 
employee talked about an initiation only new female workers were put through, "We'd go 
out there, and there's like ten males, two women, and we're shovelling, and sometimes 
you'd be trying to shovel through about two feet of coke off a track. It's a little hard to 
get your shovel in, and it takes a while to really know how to do it. And you'd look up 
and there'd be about twenty guys lookin' like they'd never seen a shovel, never seen a 
human being in their life before, just laughing and pointing and staring."79 At Hibemia, 
female tradesworkers reported being discriminated against based on their sex. A female 
rebar worker reported that the older men "felt that the heavy work was for them and the 
[light] work was for me ... Even from the first they were ignoring me, avoiding me when 
it came to this work. Another reported that " .. . they watched me really closely for the first 
six weeks. Everyone else was [in another area] but I was doing all those little jobs like 
cleaning ... At one point the boys actually called me Molly [Molly Maid]." The situation 
was quite visible as was evidenced when a clerical worker reported that "although efforts 
77 
" According to Livingstone and Mangan, the Hamilton steei industry - Stelco and Dofasco -
has long been widely regarded to be one of the strongest preserves of traditional white working-
class masculine identity and opposition to women trying to do a 'man'sjob' ." D.W. Livingston 
~r;;; J.M. Mangan, eds., Recast Dreams: Class and Gender Consciousness in Steeltown (Toronto 
78 J arar~ond Press, 1996), 5. 
Ed en11~fer Penney, Hard Earned Wages: Women Fighting for Better Work (Toronto: Women's 
79 ;catiOnal Press, 1983), 16. 
enney, Hard Earned Wages, 16. 
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are made to make it appear differently," she felt "that on many levels the mentality is that 
women don't belong in construction."80 
In a group interview with female Stelco workers, the question of why women 
faced such hostility from male workers was explored. One woman argued that hostility 
was bred from women being more short-term employees, "The guys give up and stay 
forever. And give it their whole body. Their body rots." Another woman added, "Which 
is one of the reasons the guys are hostile towards us. It's dirty. It's got terrible shifts and 
' 
terrible time off. So you do this and what do you get in return? You get not a great wage, 
but a relatively better wage. You do that basically because you're supporting a fa.'llily . .. 
Then you see a woman coming in. And you realize that she can work. And that breaks 
up that whole thing. It throws a rock into that whole circle that you've got going. Every 
morning you say to yourself, 'I can't stand this job, but I gotta go in, 'cause I gotta 
support the wife and kids.' Well, if the wife can work," then it destroys the whole 
argument. So we are a tremendous threat to that." These women argued that both male 
vvorkers and their wives \.'.'ere threatened by females working in non-traditional jobs 
because they challenged the male breadwinner ideology, and its central precept that a 
\.\'Oman's role is in the home.81 
Only 6 per cent of the women interviewed on their job experiences at Hibernia 
reported they felt unsafe in their workplace; however, when office workers were excluded 
the number rose to 15 per cent. Women's experiences at Hibernia '.vere dependent on the 
behaviour of the male workers immediately around them, including their foremen and 
supervisors. While most women reported few problems, others reported co-workers and 
80 WITT, Women, Employment Equity ... , 28. 
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foremen who expressed the belief that women did not belong in non-traditional 
construction jobs. When other workers, or the union or contractor, did not intervene to 
stop harassment, many women construction workers took this as a sign that the harasser 
was acting for the greater majority.82 
When asked about the most negative health and safety exposures in their daily 
environments, 33 per cent of interviewed women workers at Hibernia reported drafts and 
cold as being a problem, 29 per cent reported stressful work and noise as a problem, 21 
\ 
per cent worried about poor ventilation, 17 per cent reported fear of working at such 
heights, 15 per cent complained of the heavy physical work load, 14 per cent complained 
of poor workplace design, while 11 per cent complained of the effects of working with 
vibrating tools and the remaining 11 per cent worried about working with flammable or 
hazardous chemicals.83 Several female construction workers reported that their Hibernia-
related training was deficient as "safety was not given any priority."84 Thirty per cent of 
interviewed women construction workers reported having seen one or more accidents 
while working on site. Thirty-three per cent reported having seen at least one near miss, 
adding to their own health and safety fears. 
Much like female construction workers interviewed in other studies, several 
women at Hibernia found they were placed in dangerous situations by male co-wo1;kers or 
supervisors and that their physical strength was under "test". One iromvorker reported 
being forced by her foreman to iift reinforcing bars heavier than her body weight with few 
81 See Livingston and Mangan, Recast Dreams and Penney, Hard Earned Wages, 217··8. 
82 For more on this idea, see Eisenberg, We'll Call You if We Need You , 77. 
83 WTTT, Women, Emplo.vment Equity .. :, 33. Several women reported more than one health and 
safety concern, hence the total does not add up to 100 per cent. 
84 WITT, Women, Employment Equity ... , 17. 
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breaks between lifts. She felt this was an attempt to "break her" and show her that women 
could not handle vertical bars. She told interviewers that "When I was . on the bars I 
worked really hard . . . My arms would be vibrating from the work, they'd be literally 
moving on their own so at times I wouldn't even eat my lunch because my arms would be 
moving so much ... I said [to my foreman] that I was scared that I might drop the bar and 
hit somebody with it."85 When her harassment became intolerable she returned to the 
dorm without permission, ca)lsing her site supervisor to dismiss her. She \Vas sent for a 
disciplinary hearing the next day. With the support of the union, the dismissal was 
changed to a suspension. A second woman quit the project after being assigned to lift 
vertical bars for ten nights in a row. Another woman was issued a letter of warning after 
she left her shift without permission and failed to report for her next shift.86 It is 
surprising that working under conditions like these more workers were not injured. vVhile 
these women could have been quite badly injured on the job, none of the Hibernia trades 
women mentioned the malicious attempts to injure found in one U.S. study of female 
construction workers. Women trades workers interviewed by Susan Eisenberg reporled 
such things as having circuits turned back on while trimming electrical receptacles in one 
instance and someone tying ground wires into a hot wire in a second instance - one 
assumes to show women that constmction was a male domain.87 
After being injured while catching rebar being fed through the wall, one \.Yoman 
ironworker at Hibernia reported a disturbing lack of attention was being paid to injured 
85 WITT, Women, Employment Equity ... , 35. 
86 ODC files, box: 1995 Grievances, file: Employee Reprimands etc. 
r.? Susan Eisenberg, "Still Building the Foundation: Women in the Construction Trades,'' 
WorkingUSA (May-June 1998), 23. For other stories on the experiences of women in 
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workers. While catching the 300-pound rebar, the worker experienced pain in her right 
shoulder, radiating through her arm and fingers to the extent where she could no longer 
move her ann. After getting permission from her foreman, she walked to the First Aid 
Station for medical treatment. Despite difficulties carrying her tool belt given her injured 
ann, no one accompanied her to the First Aid Station or back to the site to inform her 
foreman she was off work for the remainder of the shift. When the ironworker returned 
to work - in a sling and under doctor ordered modified duties -- she fow1d her foreman 
unhappy over her inability to function fully. He assigned her to picking up caps on the 
icewall, something that involved her climbing ladders and carrying a garbage bag with the 
use of one hand. On her next shift, the foreman assigned her to helping the crew lift rebar 
during which time she lost her balance and fell against the vertical bars, striking her 
injured shoulder. 
After confronting her foreman over the dangerous work assignments, the 
ironworker rep01ted that the foreman demanded that she be 100 per cent for the next shift. 
The worker responded that she was medically incapable of giving 100 per cent and asked 
to be removed from that particular foreman's shift as he was asking her to perform unsafe 
work. After the confrontation, the ironworker finished out her shift and approached her 
union representative for help in dealing with the situation. Back in the camp, eating 
dinner, a safety officer questioned her on the accident and its aftcm1ath. Feeling besieged 
in the camp and at work, and feeling she needed a second medical opinion, the 
Ironworker reported in sick for her next few shifts and left the site for St. John's where 
her doctor recommended she start physical therapy. This worker had worked as an 
construction see Eisenberg, We 'I! Call )JOU If We Need You: Experiences of Women Working 
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apprentice ironworker on site for two years at the time of the accident and had prior 
construction experience as a concrete inspector and as a laboratory inspector in road 
constmction. When asked why she had not refused the assignment lifting rebar when she 
was already injured or reported the accident to the Occupational Health and Safety 
Committee representatives on site, the worker replied that she was not aware of the 
Health and Safety Committee, had never seen minutes of their meetings, nor been told of 
the representatives while seeking medical treatment. She also reported that she was afraid 
that if she had refused to climb the ladder that her foreman would reprimand or dismiss 
h . 88 her from t e s1te. 
Other women complained not so much of unsafe treatment specifically but of 
gender discrimination which had the potential to create an unsafe working environment. 
Many female construction workers felt that some of their co-workers were either over-
pr8tective of a female tradesman and did not allow her heavy work or were dismissive of 
her ability to complete the work. Those women that couid complete the work were seen 
as "exceptions". One woman complained that the crew of mostly older men she •vas 
placed with would not allow her to do heavy work, despite her having the same training 
as the other workers. She reported that when she attempted to do heavy work she was 
pushed away. For this particular woman, gender discrimination became mingled with 
sexual discrimination when one of the cre·w began asking her explicit sexual questions 
during hmch. The foreman present did nothing to stop the behaviour. After a 
~~nstr~tction (Ithaca: lLR Press, 1998). 
fhe Ironworker later asked Bill Parsons to facilitate a meeting with the Director of 
Occupational Health and Safety Bmce Rodgers to launch an investigation into the events that 
occurred after she was injured. See file on [name deleted], Factual Events pertaining to [name 
deleted], Ironworker, Local 764, GBS, 2 1 June 1995. File at NLBCTC office, St. John's. 
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confrontation with one worker, she left the site to meet with the labour relations 
representative and her supervisor to ask to be placed with a new crew. Her request was 
denied and she was sent back to her crew, returning her to an atmosphere in which safety 
. d 89 
was compromise . 
The above worker was not the only one who complained about only being given 
light work. One woman rebar worker reported that "I had to fight for my work. I found 
myself always given the easy work. The other men would call out to [the guys] to come 
and do something ... to help. They refused to bring me in. If I went over to help with the 
heavy work, they would immediately know somehow that it was my hands in there. They 
would say 'get your hands out of there, you're going to hurt yourself!"' The woman also 
remembered one worker screaming at her "if the rebar falls on your toes, you're going to 
break .your toes," to vvhich she replied "listen, I'm wearing steel toed boots just like 
you ... " She found that eventually she just couldn't handle it from the crew anymore. 
Another woman construction worker remembered being told by her supervisor that he 
was going to have to be harder to her than the "guys" so that the male workers did not 
think he was playing favourites. When she asked why he couldn't treat everyone equally, 
he replied, "I've got to treat you harder, look at you, you don't look like a man."90 This 
attitude was not uncommon in the construction industry. As Rosemary Pringle and .. ~.1me 
Winning found in Australia, "the building industry, as one of the last male bastions, has 
seen a significant de~rree of resistance to concepts such as 'gender equity' and 'affirmative 
action'· .. with men either taking the stand that women are not equal physically or that if 
89WI 
so W TT, Women, Employment Equit" .. . , 30. ITT ·.r 
'Women, Employment Equity ... , 31. 
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they want equal opportunity they must demonstrate that they can do everything in the very 
same way that a man does on the building site."91 
WITT found that 31 per cent of women respondents were sexually harassed at 
Hibernia, including 50 per cent of the women construction workers. While most of the 
women reported that they were harassed only occasionally, 4 per cent of those 
interviewed reported that they were sexually harassed at least once a week or on most 
days. Many women reported that while they had worked with men in the past, they were 
not prepared for the nasty sexual comments made by some of the men.92 In one instance, 
two residents who had been drinking accosted a female cafeteria worker demanding a 
kiss. When she refused one of the residents grabbed her before a male catering employee 
intervened. One of the men was given a letter of reprimand; the other had his camp 
privileges revoked for 30 days, as it was his second offence. Another male worker was 
disciplined twice in one year for sexual harassment, in his case indecent exposure. For his 
first offence he was suspended from work and lost his camp privileges for one week. 
After the second offence the worker lost his camp p1ivileges indefmitely and was warned 
that any further problems would result in his being terminated.93 A clerical worker was 
pleased that while initially she received a lot of "nasty sexual comments" that the site had 
"done very well in coming out with pamphlets and training" which reduced harassment.94 
A female rebar worker reported a good working relationship with her male 
colleagues. Her job consisted more of the fabrication ofrebar but she was also involved in 
91 R 
osemary Pringle and Anne Winning, "Building Strategies: Equal Opportunity in the 
~onstruction Industry," Gender, Work and Organization, 5, 4 (October 1998), 220. 
93 WITT, Women, Employment Equi~y ... , 26. boS~e ODC ~les, box A-Z. Meetings - Camp Committee, 8 July 1992 and 24 February 1994; and 
x. 1995 Gnevances, file: Employee Reprimands Etc. 
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placing steel on the GBS, one area where women reported harassment. She commented 
that "Overall, I would say, 99 per cent of the men here are great, especially when they get 
to know you, get to know you as a person and that you are alright." She found that "When 
I first went into the shop they really wouldn't do anything. They tried to hold back from 
swearing and certain kinds of jokes and stuff like that. But they got used to me and found 
I wasn't too uptight and now they are more relaxed, but they still watch what they say. I 
kind of like it because it shows respect."95 One wonders if her experience would have 
been so positive if she had complained about the jokes, as did some of the other workers. 
The first female pipelitting apprentice on site also reported no problems working with an 
all-male crew but with her father, also a pipefitter on site, watching out for her she had 
protection many of the other women workers lacked. 96 
One problem with site harassment policies was that many of the sexual 
harassment claims were launched by one union member against a fellow union member. 
This put the union in the unenviable position ofhaving to try and meet the needs ofboth 
the perpetrator and the person harassed. Harassment was less complicated when it ca.rne 
from someone outside the union. When asked if lhey thought a harassment complaint 
would be resolved to their satisfaction, most women construction workers felt it would 
not. One woman reported that '\vomen report incidents and they were disciplined 
themselves because of it ... I would be very wary of reporting an incident on site." Many 
94 'N ~'T' , 
95 I1 •, nomen, Employment Equity . . . , 26. 
96 ::N?n-traditional Roles Nothing New for Female Iron Worker," Hibernia News, 27 July 1994. 
" Like Father Like Daughter," Hibernia l.feH;s, 24 August 1994, 1. Her father reported that 
e_verything they say to her comes back to me one way or the other. She's getting along well 
With the boys and seems to be doing 'vvell herself ... " 
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of the women interviewed by ·wiTT were nervous of reporting incidents as "the nature of 
the work and the camp and how quickly things travel, there are a lot of repercussions that 
can happen that will make just living and working there much more challenging and 
difficult if you were to take things the formal route." While clerical workers were more 
likely to believe their harassment complaints would be resolved to their satisfaction. 
While many workers found their unions helpful, some women workers found that 
they were prevented from trying to use internal channels to achieve changes. One woman 
reported that there were regular meetings with her local union president but that he did 
not tolerate dissent. She reported that "you can speak but you may as well not, because 
you want the floor to open right after you speak because that's how embarrassed he'll 
make you feel." She found her muon president very intimidating especially when he went 
on about how good everything was and how much the union was doing for its members. 
A clerical worker told how she and other workers had attempted to institute changes, but 
were generally outvoted by the male members of the union. Clerical workers were in a 
union that included crane operators (the ~1JOE), something that became a problem when it 
C<:une to paying union dues. Despite making considerably less, clerical workers paid the 
same deductions. When they attempted to have their dues reduced the male ( cra..r1c 
operator) workers outvoted them. A third wJrker talked about how her union was 
reluctant to do anything to help individual women members. She found that she had to 
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pressure her shop steward to get his help in becoming a full union member. She had 
doubts that any issue related to gender would be adequately dealt with by her union.97 
Several women also complained of harassment and safety issues in the camp. As 
incentives for employees to stay within the camp, the HEA provided a tavern, health 
clinic, swimming pool, sauna, whirlpool, weight room, games room, TV rooms, a soft-
ball diamond, recreational pJ;ograrnming and religious services, all on site. Women were 
housed in all-female dorms or in trailers, each with their own room but with communal 
washroom facilities. Despite the conveniences, many women found the camp a 
threatening environment. While fifty-one per cent of women respondents reported they 
were happy with the camp, others complained they did not feel safe. Several women 
asked for female security guards and maintenance women to oversee the women's dorms. 
One woman complained of mwing into the male security on the way to the washroom in 
her pajamas while others complained of male security doing room checks \Vithout 
knocking first. Several women also expressed concern over walking il:om the parking lot 
to the bunkhouses at night. After the camp committee received complaints about shift 
\vorkers walking to the parking lot at the end of their shift, security walked them to their 
vehicles. 98 
When asked by WITT if they had any advice for new female employees, many 
women reported that dangers were not just from men, but also from other women. Many 
97 WITT, Women, Employment Equity ... , 36-37. 
98 WITT, Women, Employment Equity ... , 41-2; ODC files, box A-Z, Meetings- Camp 
Committee, 26 March 1996, 25 1v1ay 1995, 24 August 1994 and 1 R December 1991. 
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warned women to be conservative, watch their backs, dress appropriately, and to avoid 
the tavern unless with a group. Others talked of the need to keep friends to a minimum 
and to avoid gossip sessions. One woman worker reported that a female co-worker who 
wanted her job began spreading rumours around the camp area about her, rumours that 
quickly spread. After informal complaints to the ODC site representative, the victim was 
moved to another women's trailer but after the rumours follmYed her there she 
approached the HMDC about living offsite but they refused. Upon learning the details of 
her situation, they recommended she report the harassment to her union. When she went 
to the ODC for support, she was disappointed when they told her that she was part of a 
family and that everyone needed to get along. Many women wamed of the camp rumour 
mill, one woman suggesting women not have any male :fiiends, as the camp gossips 
would tum it into an affair. 99 
Women also complained of the predominantly male culture found in the camp. 
One woman commented on the need for a vvomen's only place, one where "we're not 
monitored by 2,000 men constantly. The effect is a fishbmvl. Every~Vhere you go 
someone is watching you ... I'd love to go swimming but I'm not going to go over there 
with a bunch of men staring at me. I don't want. .. to be put on display."100 Another 
women noted that "When there are only one or two women and a hundred men it's very 
intimidating," a statement referring specifically to the use of recreational facilities but 
also apt to desc1ibe life on the site. Other women complained of the long walk in the 
kitchen where 1500 men were all staring and making comments about the women. She 
99WTT 
l T, Women, Employment Equity ... , 27, 39. 
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stated "at least 60 per cent of the men do make comments and even after three years I find 
it difficult to go into the kitchen . .. I'm not just speaking for myself. I know a lot of the 
girls who won't go to eat in the kitchen until one of us gets off and can go with her ... "101 
Another woman talked about the problems of entering the dining hall, which she 
described as: 
one of the most daunting experiences I've ever had ... you're walking in 
there with generally a thousand men sitting there and you have to walk up to 
line up and I was always very aware that probably twenty of [them] were 
watching you walk ... It's like the longest mile ... you could hear the cover 
being placed on the plate just so they could have a good gander. I used to 
say 'my God, where do they come from,' I mean, they haven't been locked 
up for the last six months and haven't seen a woman for six months. I think 
it's constmction mentality; all of a sudden they start thinking like Tarzan.102 
This constmction site mentality was a very masculine mentality, a mentality in which 
women were not always welcome, particularly women working in non-traditional areas. 
Women employed several strategies to cope with living and working in a.'l 
overwhelmingly male dominated space. Many women kept their doors open in their off 
hours so that they could gather around and talk. Over these evenings, women attempted 
to figure out how to do things differently, how to approach situations, and ho•v to 
strategize. In one insta.11ce, the women discussed whether or not to go to a harasser's 
supervisor, whether that would do any good, arid what consequences that action would 
have. The women also discussed what effect their complaints would have on other 
Women trying to get work at Hibernia. Other women read, listened to music or watched 
television in their rooms to relax. It is clear that the women's dorm was a place of refuge. 
ICO 
101 WITT, Women, Employment Equity ... , 44. 
WITT, Women, Employment Equity ... , 26. 
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A common complaint, however, was women had no common area to meet in. Other 
residents complained of men (or in some cases women) staying in women's bunkhouses. 
Two residents were given a 30 day camp suspension for having their boyfriends (also 
workers on site) spend the night; two others were given warning letters. Many women 
complained that some men were even living with their girlfriends in the woman's 
room.
103 
Conclusions 
As Newfoundland has modernized, women's roles on construction sites have 
undergone significant changes from the 1960s to the 1990s. On the earlier projects in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s, women were largely engaged in traditional paid employment 
- clerical/office, nursing, teaching, and retail - or in meeting the needs u[ wage workers 
in the home. In the mid-1970s women slowly begar1 entering non-traditional jobs in the 
construction field, bolstered in part by the example of U.S. pioneers operating under 
affinnative action programs. \Vh.ile women were still more likely to be found in 
traditional occupations on construction sites in the 1990s, dozens ofwomen also achieved 
gains unheard of twenty years before. In addition to becoming apprentices in construction 
trades, a few women also achieved "foreman" status and managed male workers. All was 
not easy for women in non-traditional jobs at Hibernia, and many women complained of 
sexual and other forms of harassment. Despite the problems with Hibernia, it served as a 
stepping stone into a previously unobtainable industry. With the end of construction, and 
a retum to high levels of construction unemployment, many women who had managed to 
102 WITT, Women, Employment Equity .. ·., 45. 
103 ODC files, box A-Z, Meetings - Camp Committee, 26 March 1996, 25 May 1995 and WITT, 
Women, Employment Equity ... , 28, 42. 
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gain a toehold in the construction industry found themselves on the outside once again. 
New construction projects have not included affirmative action programs and the mosl 
recent offshore oil construction project - Terra Nova - did not provide the same level of 
employment as Hibernia. 
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Chapter Nine: The Costs of Industrial Coustruction: 
Occupational Health aud Safety in Newfoundland1 
-
Under the best of conditions construction is a high-risk industry. In the United 
States only mining (26.8 deaths per 100,000 workers) and agriculture (22.8 per 100,000) 
ranked higher than construction in work-related deaths by industry in 1996. Construction 
workers faced a work-related death from injury rate of 13.9 per 100,000.2 In 
Newfotmdland in 1996 11,036 construction workers suffered lost time accidents, with 
nine fatalities as a result of work-related injuries. The Newfoundland and Labrador 
Building and Construction Trades Council (NLBCTC) reported that for .every serious or 
disabling injury there were 1 0 minor injuries, 30 property damage accidents, and 600 
ineidents with no visible injury or damage, yet each having the capacity to produce 
serious injury or damage.3 In the rush to modemizc, several construction workers paid the 
ultimate price while on the job. In trying to construct Churchill Falls, Come by Chance, 
and Hibemia many workers were injured and some have lost their lives.4 
1 My thoughts on occupational health and safety benefited from a trip to the Center for the 
Protection of Workers' Rights (CPWR) in Washington, DC. The CPWR is the research mm of 
the AFL-CIO's Building and Construction Trades Department. This trip was made possible by a 
doctoral grant from the Institute of Social and Economic Research. 
2 
This rate showed considerable variation among trades, with ironworkers facing the highest death 
rates at 96.5 deaths per 100,000, followed by labourers at 42.7, roofers at 37.2, electrical workers 
and operating engineers at 19.8 per 100,000. Plumbers were much lower at 7.8 per 100,000 
\~orkers. The ironworker rate was the highest of any single occupation. More labourers were 
killed at work than ironworkers as labourers greatly outnumbered ironworkers in the labour force. 
U.S. figures from CPWR, The Construction Chart Book: The U.S. Construction Indust;y and its 
~o~kers (Washington: CPWR, 1998), 31-2. 
Hazardous Workplace- Exercise Due Diligence," Safe Times, 1, 1 (Winter 1999), 6, and 
Presentation by Bill Parsons, Executive Director NLCBTC to Employers' Council Spring 1998 
Conference, St. John's, 23 April1998. Safe Times is the journal of the Newfoundland and 
~abrador Construction Safety Association. 
~nlike Churchill Falls where accident reports survived in the archives and Hibernia wh~re the 
Unton maintained safety records, little information has survived on occupational health and safety 
Practices at Come by Chance. 
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The dangerous nature of industrial construction was compounded by the 
additional health and safety risks which accompanied the often isolated workplaces, 
extended periods away from family and friend support networks, shift work, and long 
hours. Workers on remote sites were particularly vulnerable to pressure to increase 
production as living in work camps, most without family, left the workers with limited 
social networks.5 Other factors such as washing up facilities at remote sites also affected 
health and safety as workers who failed to wash up before coffee or meals potentially 
inhaled toxic substances from their own hands into the food as well as inhaled toxic 
substances from the nearby work sites. 6 Construction workers, pruiicularly on lru·ge-scale, 
live-in projects, also faced particular problems based on the overtly masculine identity of 
their occupation. Rugged masculinity has the potential to breed a disregard for health and 
safety rules seen as either "unmanly" or unnecessary. As Craig Heron found for 
steelworkers "ever-present danger could breed fear in some steelworkers, but for many, it 
posed the challenge to prove their manhood. Among the committed men in the industry, 
there was (and still is) a .masculine pride in their ability to face the gates of hel1."7 For 
many construction workers building something out of the wilderness and conquering 
nature fostered their masculinity. 
Several factors influenced constmction occupational health and safety, including 
environmental and organizational factors and health and safety practices. Environmental 
factors include government regulations, economic conditions, social conditions, industry 
5 James L. Weeks, "Health and Safety Hazards in the Construction Industry," in Encyclopaedia of 
Occupational Health and Safety, 93-5. 
6 Weeks, "Health and Safety Hazards in the Construction Industry," in Encyclopaedia of 
Occupational Health and Safety, 93-7. 
7 Heron, Working in Steel, 50. 
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and geographic location. 8 Organizational factors vary from administrative type, 
philosophy, the nature of organization, and the kind of work, to employee characteristics. 
Health and safety practices range from adequate training and education, safety 
communications, incentives for health and safety, disciplinary rules and policies, to safety 
planning and programs.9 Contractors could use engineering controls, environmental 
controls, or provide personal protection gear to maintain a safe work site. Engineering 
controls included substituting a less hazardous material or altering the process causing the 
hazards while environmental controls included using exhaust ventilation systems to 
capture fumes and dust. Personal protection gear, including hard hats and respirators, 
was generally used when engineering and environmental controls were too costly. 10 This 
chapter examines occupational health and safety on the Newfoundland industrial 
construction industry from the 1960s to the 1990s, focusing on Churchill Falls and 
Hibernia. 
8 Who was in charge of occupational health and safety can be a cmcial element in its success. 
Work on the British and Ne,Nfoundland offshore oil industry has begun to address these issues. 
Charles Woolfson, John Foster, and Matthias Beck, Paying for the Piper: Capitai and Labour in 
Britain's Offshore Oil Industry (London: Mansell, 1996); Sue Hart, "Safety and Industrial 
Relations in the Newfoundland Offshore Oil Industry Since the Ocean Ranger Disaster in 1982, " 
New Solutions: A Journal of Environmental and Occupational Health Policy, 10, 1-2 (2000), 
117 -165); and Robert Nishman, "Through the Portlights of the Ocean Ranger: Federalism, 
Energy, and the American Development of the Canadian Eastem Offshore, 1955-1985," MA 
thesis, Queen's University, 1991. There is also a growing body of historical work on Ontario's 
occupational health and safety from the legislative perspective. See Eric Tucker, Administering 
Danger in the Workplace: the Law and Politics of Occupational Healih and Safety Regulation in 
Ontario, 1850-1914 (Toronto: UTP, 1990); Michael Piva, "The Workmen's Compensation 
Movement in Ontario," Ontario Histmy, 67 (1975); and Vivienne Walters, "Occupational Health 
and Safety Legislation in Ontario," Canadian Review of Socio!ogy and Anthropology, 20 (1983); 
Lorna Hurl, "Restricting Child Factory Labour in Late Nineteenth Century Ontario," Labour!Le 
[ravaif (LILT), 21 (1988). 
TSudhir K. Saha, "Assuring Workplace Health and Safety: A Study," Paper presented to 
~ewfoundland and Labrador Employers' Council Conference, St. John's, April 1998. 
~ersonal protection puts the onus for safety on the individual worker. Workers needed to be 
tramed in the use of personal protection to be effective, and the equipment must be fitted to each 
Worker. 
-
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Occupational Health and Safety at Churchill Falls 
Construction workers, especially on Churchill Falls, were drawn from a wide 
variety of backgrounds. Only a fraction of those at Churchill Falls had worked on 
industrial construction projects previously. This had the potential of increasing accidents, 
as new workers were often unfamiliar with the hazards in construction. Many 
construction projects, including Churchill Falls, also faced weather extremes and work 
that was carried out in inclement weather and at night. To help mitigate risks, CFLCo and 
the main contractor Acres Canadian Betchel (ACB) maintained full-time safety 
engineers, a fire department and underground rescue teams. While the owner and main 
contractor both tried to promote a safety culture, including safety tips in the local 
newspaper, the large number of subcontractors on site made it difficult to ensure a safe 
work environment was maintained. For many subcontractors and ultimately for the 
contractor, the priority was on finishing on schedule and on budget. 11 
Accidents were a regular occurrence, especially in the project's early years. The 
site's highest accident rates were in 1968. In response, ACB augmented its field accident 
prevention program in 1969. CFLCo held eleven safety meetings in 1969, including three 
on site, while ACB held additional safety programs for its subcontractors. Accidents 
resulting in lost time dropped by 30.4 per cent, down from 46 per million person hours 
worked in 1968 to 32 accidents per million in 1969. Improved lost time rates were 
achieved despite a doubling in person hours from 5 million to 10 million. Despite the 
Improvements, fatalities remained high. In 1969 there were eight fatalities on site, two 
caused by electrocution, one due to a vehicle falling off the Lake Orma Bridge, and the 
other five were traffic fatalities, three due tc collisions. Another fatality occurred on 26 
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August 1970 when an earth-moving machine struck Joseph Crawley. The week prior to 
the fatality, the government safety inspector temporarily shut down part of the site when 
he found 18 men working too close to dynamite charges. Work resumed after the 
dynamite exploded. In addition to the fatalities there were several fires in 1969, including 
one which resulted in the loss of the Bridge Camp cookhouse and subsequently to a 
revi~w of fire policies.12 Many workers faced additional safety risks due to the nature of 
their jobs. Electrocution, for instar1ce, was a risk facing electricians and labourers at much 
higher rates than other workers. On 26 June 1969 8.!1 electrical worker climbed a 35-foot 
pole to measure the conduit distance. According to the safety report out of"carelessness", 
due perhaps to fatigue or a lack of training, he ended up placing his belt around the pole 
instead of between the transformer and the pole. When the metal buckle touched the 
transformer line he suffered an electrical shock and burns to his hands and his body. He 
was off work for a month recuperating. 13 
Churchill Falls combined both mining and construction, including blastin.g into 
the rock face followed by the hauling, loading, and dumping of rock, activities which had 
the potential to lead several occupational illnesses. The highest exposure to industrial 
diseases in construction comes from jobs with high exposure to chipping, hammering, 
drilling, crushing, loading, hauling or dumping rock; from blasting concrete or masonry; 
using silica sand; and sawing, drilling, hammering, grinding concrete or masonry. 14 
11 CFLCo, The Churchill Falls Power Development j\1anagement and Construction Equipment, 5. 
12 See "Fatal Accident Didn't Cause Shutdown," ET, 26 August 1970 and NAC, MG 28, III, 73, 
volume 40, 400.015. CFLCo files. Construction Report for 1969, 1-4 for accident reports . 
13 NAC, MG 28, III, 73, volume 71, file 8. CFLCo files. Safety Accident and Fire Reports, Report 
of Accident, 26 July 1969. 
14 Unlike accidents, which received considerable attention, if only after they happened, little 
attention was paid to construction's industrial diseases. Michael Quinlan, "The Toll from Toil 
Does Matter: Occupational Health and Labour History," Labour History, 73 (November 1997), 
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Construction workers' exposure to hazards differed dependent on their trade, their work 
site, and their location. Several illnesses have been linked to construction work including 
silicosis (sand blasters, tunnel builders, and rock drill operators); asbestosis (insulation 
workers, steam pipe fitters, and demolition workers); bronchitis (welders); and 
neurological disorders {painters). From Vvorld War II until the 1970s, construction 
workers were exposed to high asbestos levels in fireproofing, roofing, flooring, pipe and 
boiler insulation, and cement sheet products. Since the mid-1970s workers have been 
involved in asbestos removal, now known to cause asbestosis, lung cancer, and 
mesothelioma (cancer of the chest or abdominal cavity lining). 15 Exposme to any one 
hazard was generally intermittent but recurrent and included primary hazards from their 
own jobs and bystander hazards from nearby areas. 
In their attempts to dynamite rock face, many workers were injured. In August 
1969 a worker drilled into a loaded hole to try and remove an obstacle preventing the 
dynamite from going all the way into the hole. The drilling ended up causing the 
dynamite already in the hole to explode, propelling shrapnel into the three workers. The 
dynamiter ended up with lacerations in both feet, a broken heel, and a puncture wound in 
10. Tracking occupational illnesses is difficult. Construction workers are highly mobile, moving 
from job to job, employer to employer, and across Canada and the U.S. in search of work. 
Frequent job turnover made it necessary for workers to remake safe working relationships on 
each project. As many construction workers took other employment during slack periods, it was 
difficult for workers to demonstrate that their exposure came from their construction 
employment. The subcontracting system also made it increasingly difficult to assign liability to 
any one employer. Weeks, "Health and Safety Hazards in the Construction h1dustrj," in 
fncyclopaedia of Occupational Health and Safety, 93-2. 
5 
Weeks, "Health and Safety Hazards in the Construction Industry," 93-3 and CP\VR, The 
Constntction Chart Book, 44. For more on occupational diseases see Elliot Leyton, Dying Hard: 
the Ravages of Industrial Carnage (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975, reprinted 1988); 
Rick Ren ... ,ie, "The Historical Origins of an Industrial Disaster: Mining, Working Conditions, and 
Government Policy in St. Lawrence, Newfoundland 1933-1939," Paper delivered to the Canadian 
Historical Conference, Congress of Social Sciences and Humanities, Sherbrooke, June 1999; and 
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his left flank. The second worker suffered a compound fracture of his right knee, a 
fractured left heel, and lacerations to his foot and forearm. The airtrack operator 
fractured his leg above the ankle. Ironically, in May 1969 a safety supervisor was injured 
in an explosion that embedded a 3-inch nail into his calf and embedded another nail into 
the thigh of the assistant safety supervisor. The explosion occurred when the two men 
were trying to dispose of old powder by bufl1ing it. 16 
Underground constmction brought with it its own health and safety risks. 
Tunnelling and laying pipes for sewers, electrical conduits and telephone lines were part 
of everyday life at Churchill Falls. One miner, Anthony Tapp from the Gaspe, suffered 
bruises and contusions after a cave-in at Churchill Falls. Another worker, an experienced 
miner, was struck by loose rock which knocked him onto a platform below. He suffered a 
spinal injury, a broken shoulder, broken ribs, a severe contusion to his arm, a blocked 
artery and severe lacerations on his legs. He was immediately flown to St. John's. 17 
Underground construction also brought with it exposure to occupational hazards, 
crystalline silica dust, cement dust, noise, vibration, diesel engine exhaust, chemical 
vapours and oxygen-deficient atmospheres.18 To deal with the dust, workers would often 
go for a quick coffee break. While photos from the Churchill Falls News and from the 
archives show workers wearing hard hats, none of the pictures, even those of miners, 
Robert Storey and Wayne Lewchuk, "From Dust to DUST to Dust: Asbestos and the Struggle for 
~lorkcr Health and Safety at Bendix Automotive," LILT, 45 (Spring 2000), 103-140. 
NAC, MG 28, III, 73, ve-l. 71, file 8. CFLCo files . Safety Accident and Fire Reports, Report of 
;;.ccident, 12 May 1969. 
, N:'-C, MG 28, III, 73, vol. 71, file 8. CFLCo files. Safety Accident and Fire Reports. Report of 
f;ccident, 14 July 1970 and 31 January 1969. 
0 
Bohuslav Malek, "Health Risks of Underground Construction Work," in Encyclopaedia of 
ccupational Health and Safety, 93-8. 
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show workers wearing dust masks or ventilation equipment. 19 Before employees started 
work, each had a pre-employment medical examination, with particular attention paid to 
occupational diseases and injuries. Screening out workers with medical conditions was 
one of the ways management dealt with occupational hazards. 
Many of the injuries at Churchill Falls came from the equipment and tools that 
workers used daily. Workers at Churchill Falls worked with hand, power and pneumatic 
tools in the course of their workday.20 Each class of tools brought with it its own safety 
hazards. Hand tools, for instance, brought with them the hazard of the worker being 
struck by a piece of the material being worked on, including eye injuries. Accidents 
involving equipment were generally from accidental start-ups and losing one's balance 
during use. For instance, one worker was seriously injured when he attempted to repair a 
bulldozer. The heavy-duty mechanic sat on the bulldozer track as he attempted to fix the 
connection across the starter circuit. The buildozer started in reverse, trapping Raymond 
White between the track and the frame. V/hite was carried along the track tmder the 
bulldozer's fender before being thrown clear. His supervisor climbed on the moving 
dozer and turned it off. White suffered multiple leg fractures and was expected to lose 
both legs above the knees. As his prognosis was poor, his wife was flown in from Comer 
Brook, and a surgeon was brought in from Goose Bay.21 
As construction mecha11ized, it has become increasingly no1sy. Noise was 
particularly dangerous to workers' health and safety as in addition to the potentially 
serious hearing problems, it aiso impaired workers' abilities to communicate. Hearing 
19 
"How's Business, Mr. Scarabelli," Churchill Falls News, 20 September 1969 and NAC, 
Churchill Falls Collection, 1984-246, photographic collection. 
20 Scott Schneider, "Tools," in Encyclopaedia of Occupational Health and Safety, 93-33. 
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loss also increased the risk of other injuries, for example, when a worker could not hear 
approaching vehicles or warning signals. Engines on the countless cranes and vehicles on 
site, continuous winches, power tools, and explosives all added to the noise level at 
Churchill Falls. On 24 October 1969 an employee was seriously injured as he repaired 
the conveyor system. ·while Andre Gagnon was inspecting the conveyor belt the auger 
was started and his arm was cut off to six inches below his shoulder. Excessive noise in 
the area prevented Gagnon from hearing the all-clear order and the foreman had failed to 
ensure Gagnon was clear of the machinery. Fortunately for Gagnon a quick thinking 
employee applied a tourniquet to his shoulder and he was airlifted to hospitaL Gagnon 
had only been working on the site for three months at the time of the accident but had 
been a millwright for 15 years. The accident report blamed workers' looser safety 
standards after lunch for the incident.22 In this case rather than putting in machine guards 
to prevent this type of accident, the worker and working conditions - noise - were 
blamed. 
Less than a week later there was another accident involving a conveyor belt. A 
foreman-rigger, Marcel Fournier, suffered a compound fracture and lacerations that left 
his left arm practically severed. Fournier had attempted to remove a soil build-up on the 
conveyor belt by hitting it with his hammer. The hammer got caught between the roller 
and the belt taking Fournier's hand in with it. Another employee immediately stopped 
the conveyor. Fournie:c's ann was amputated below the elbow and he was sent to a 
Montreal hospital to be closer to his family. The contractor later recommended that 
;-----------------------
A N~c, 1->1G 28, Ill, 73, vol. 71, file 8. CFLCo files. Safety Accident and Fire Reports, Report of 
"' cctdent, 20 October 1969. 
~ N~c, MG 28, Ill, 73, vol. 71, file 8. CFLCo files. Safety Accident and Fire Reports, Report of 
cctdent, 24 October 1969 and CPWR, The Construction Chart Book, 40. 
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repairs only be done once the machinery was turned off. On 7 August 1970 an oiler for 
contractor FolliJ.dation-Lundrigans was oiling the rear of a backhoe when he knelt on the 
counterweight. When the backhoe swtmg around it crushed his foot. Despite wearing 
safety boots [lis right foot was amputated. 23 
Many of the accidents were on the project's 300 miles of roads. On 9 June 1969 
the Northem Express bus carrying five passengers a..'1d bus driver Eugene Lalonde ran 
into a washout on Main Road. Unable to stop, the bus crashed, leaving the driver with a 
fractured humerus (shoulder), broken nose and contusions. None of the passengers were 
hurt. Management blamed speed and carelessness for the accident. 24 On 8 September 
1970 a belly dump driver for Mannix, Henry Pynn, attempted to pass a water truck. As 
he started to pass the water truck he saw oncoming traffic and drove the truck off the 
road, jumping clear before it crashed. Pynn suffered a severe head laceration and chest 
pains. On 18 October 1970 m.·o trucks collided, with one ofthe drivers suffering a broken 
leg and other minor injuries. 
In a one-week period in 1970 for which the accident reports have survived intact, 
several accidents caused lost time. The first reported accident involved carpenter Fraser 
House who was struck by a piece of pipe that fractured his rib. House's injury was the 
result of a blasting accident which hurled a 300 pound rock 110 feet in the air before it 
crashed through the wall of the carpentry shop, knocking over a pipe which struck House. 
House was off work two days with the injury. Another worker, serviceman L. Aubuchon 
injured his back while lifting a heater from his pick-up truck on 17 October. Also on 17 
23 NAC, MG 28, ill, 73, vol. 71, file 8. CFLCo files. Safety Accident and Fire Reports, Report of 
Accident, 7 August 1970. 
24 NAC, MG 28, III, 73, vol. 71, file 8. CFLCo files. Safety Accident and Fire Reports, Report of 
Accident, 9 June 1969. 
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October a labourer crushed his index finger when he caught it in the handle of a concrete 
bucket. On 19 October there were two reported accidents, jackhammer operator Harland 
Blackmore was struck in the head by a bucket of concrete, and welder Joesph Boivin had 
the tip of his thumb amputated while he was working on a bulldozer. Carpenter Thomas 
Conner complained of chest pain after being struck by rebar on 20 October. On the 21 
October, labourer H. Hoban fell into one of the penstock tunnels, severely lacerating his 
rectum. Welder David Bray received welding flash in both eyes when he welded a part on 
22 October without proper eye gear. Other injuries on 22 October included a labourer 
who stepped on a nail, a carpenter who was struck in the eye by a wedge, a loader 
operator who fractured his ankle after he fell off his loader, and a serviceman whose leg 
was crushed between two oil dmms.25 
Shift work and regularly scheduled overtime also had implications for 
occupational health and safety at Churchill Falls. \Vork weeks were 54 hours a \Veek until 
30 June 1970 when, as the project switched gears, hours dropped to 48 per week. 
Workers worked a variety of rotations to make up their 54 hours, most commonly a nine-
hour day, six days a week. 26 Extended workdays, including the 10-12 hour shifts 
regularly \Vorked at Churchill Falls, allowed employers more efficient usage of 
equipment and facilities, but also increased health and safeiy 1isks. Research into the 
offshore oil industry has lin.."l(ed. higher accident rates with both total hours worked in a 
25 
NAC, MG 28, III, 73, vol. 71, file 8. CFLCo files. Safety Accident and Fire Repm1s. 
~1emorandum, 15 October 1970 and Weekly Lost Time Accident Summary, 24 October 1970. 
Sunday and holiday work was paid a premium of twice basic pay. Any time over 54 hours was 
Paid at 1.5 times basic pay. Shift differentials for evening shifts were 20 cents an hour and an 
additional underground allowance was paid to all workers except miners working underground in 
~e ~eriod prior to the completion of concreting or rock-bolting. CfLCo, Churchill Falis Power 
ro;ect Collective Agreement, 30 October 1967, 21-22. 
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day and weeks on rotation. 27 This has potential implications for work sites like Churchill 
Falls where workers worked regular overtime shifts in addition to working six days a 
week, many for the length of the project. While the labour and management system and 
the safety culture on the site also influenced safety, it is likely that as workers became 
overtired or overexerted that their accident rates increased. 
In early projects such as Churchill Falls the frontier nature of construction, 
particularly in remote areas was stressed as the reason behind the industry's reputation 
for being a dangerous occupation. On more remote projects, some accidents were viewed 
as the cost of doing business. Many of the accidents at Churchill Falls could have been 
prevented had workers received more adequate safety training, particularly new workers, 
and had management ensured safety regulations were followed. Guards on the 
equipment, for instance, would have prevented several of the serious accidents. Few of 
these changes were put into place prior to the start of the next major construction project, 
the Come by Chance oil refinery. 
Occupational Health and Safety at Come bv Chance 
As refinery construction began, John Lawrence, director of safety with the Workmen's 
Compensation Board (WCB) accused the province's construction industry of indifference 
and complacency towards industrial accidents. While construction had the highest 
accident rate of any industry in Newfoundland, the WCB saw little indication that 
contractors were interested in improving their safety record. LawTence was upset that 
27 See for instance, A. Alvarez, Offshore (Boston 1986), 28; and Mark Shrimpton and Keith 
Storey, Long Distance Commuting: Mining and Hydrocarbon Industry Management Issues (St. 
Jolm's: ISER 1991), 11. See also Shrimpton and Storey, Social. Psychosocial and Cultural 
Aspects of Health and Safety in the Offshore Oil Industry (St. John's: ISER, 1993), Shrimpton 
and Storey, Work-related Stress in the Newfoundland Offshore Oil Indusny (St. John's: ISER, 
296 
most contractors did not even attend the Newfoundland Industrial Association and 
W km , c . 1 . 28 or en s ompensatwn annua meetmgs. 
Given the poor labour relations climate at Come by Chance, it is not surprising 
that several of the strikes listed unsafe working conditions as their cause. Complaints 
about bunkhouse conditions were given added urgency on 25 December 1970 when a fire 
broke out in one of the bunkhouse trailers. Blamed on careless use of a cigarette, the fire 
caused considerable damage to the trailer and injured one fire fighter. In July 1973 Brian 
Beresford was killed after fire ravaged the bunkhouse he was sleeping in early Stmday 
morning. Beresford, an electrical apprentice, had worked on site for less than a month 
before he was killed. Other workers were fortunate that the fire occurred over a .long 
weekend, as only ten out of the eighty men normally resident in the bunkhouse were there 
when the fire broke out. The other nine workers escaped the burning bunkhouse with the 
aid of the on-site fire department. 
The barracks Beresford slept in was completely levelled in the fire; two nearby 
bunkhouses were also damaged. In the aftermath of the fire several workers claimed fire 
protection devices in the bunkhouses were inadequate, including missing and broken fire 
extinguishers. Several workers complained the bunkhouses were firetraps, including one 
worker who stated "Take that fire the other night. The whole place went up in less than a 
minute. One of the boys had to race the fire down the ha11."29 Members of the plumbers 
and pipefitters, boilennakers and ironworkers unions joined elect1icians in \-valking off 
the job the day after the fire to protest safety conditions in the bunkhouses. All but the 
1991), and Shrimpton and Storey, Workers in Remote Areas: the Petroleum, Mining and Forestry 
Industries (Geneva: International Labour Organization, 1995). 
28 
"Construction Industry Accused of Indifference Towards Accidents," ET, 17 May 1971, 12. 
29 
"Fire Commissioner Probing Fatal Fire at Refinery Site," ET, 10 July 1973. 
297 
electricians returned to work the following day; the electricians returned the day after. 
While no cause was given, the fire commissioner ordered that a night watchman be 
stationed in each bunkhouse from 10 p.m. to 8 am. The watchmen were required to punch 
time clocks at regular intervals to ensure they remained awake. The fire commissioner 
also recommended that automatic sprinklers be installed in each bunkhouse. 30 
Fires continued to piague Come by Chance. In November 1973 six workers were 
sent to hospital for burns after a leaking propane line caused a flash fire. According to a 
worker the fire began after propane leaked from a line connecting a lunchroom heater to 
the nearby propane tank. Vlhen one of the men lit a match to start the heater the resultant 
explosion injured six workers. The workers suffered bums to their faces and han,ds.31 
Fires were quite common on construction sites. A fire in December 1970 worried the 
Churchill Falls safety officer as it required using a crane to douse the fire. The firemen 
had great difficulty handling the high-pressure hoses on the frozen platform a.t 120 feet in 
the air in 20 degrees below Celsius weather. V/ater was brought from a tanker at the 
airport as all the water lines near the site had frozen. The safety offit:er be1ieved a heater 
being used to keep the freshly poured concrete from freezing set fire to a tarp before 
spreading. 32 
30 
"Work Resumes at Refinery ... but 300 stay off job," ET, 11 July 1973. Procon agreed to install 
additional fire lines and pumps but still faced questions as to why none of these pre(.;autions were 
taken prior to the fire. An editorial in the Evening Telegram demanded to knmv how the fire 
commissioner with only tv,:o inspectors and two stenographers could caw; out fire inspectiom. 
across the province. See "Night Watchmen Man Refinery Bunkhouses," ET, 12 July 1973 and 
"Reducing Fire Hazards," ET, 14 July 1973. To prevent fires at Hibemia, smoking in bed was not 
allowed. Several workers were suspended from camp for smoking in their rooms; one worker 
caught smoking in bed was evicted. Other workers were given suspensions from camp for bums 
to their bedding. For more on camp rules see chapter 7. 
31 
"Six Injured in Flash Fire at Come By Chance," ET, 24 November 1973. 
32 NAC, MG 28, ill, 73, volume 71, file 8. CFLCo files. Safety Accident and Fire Reports. Inter-
office memorandum, 25 December 1970 and Francis Hardy, "Cranes," in Encyclopaedia of 
Occupational Health and Safety, 93-39. 
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Occupational Health and Safetv Act 
In the late 1960s and early 1970s nickel miners in Sudbury, and uranium miners in Elliot 
Lake, Ontario called for occupational health and safety legislation. The upsurge of 
interest in occupational health and safety was tied in part to the development of a more 
militant labour movement and to the growth of an environmental movement in Canada. 
Canadian demands for improved occupational health and safety regulations were also 
influenced by the 1970 passage of the U.S. Occupational Health a..'ld Safety Act. In 1973 
Saskatchewan passed Canada's first occupational health and safety legislation. 
Newfotmdland introduced its first Occupational Health and Safety Act in 1978 after 
heightened publicity around an asbestos mining strike in Baie V erte. Baie V erte was one 
ofNewfoundland's first occupational health and safety strikes. Throughout th~ strike the 
union pressured the government to introduce an occupational health and safety act that 
\VOuld allow workers the right to monitor health and safety levels.33 Prior to the Act's 
passage, occupational health and safety for most workers, with the exception of miners, 
was under the \Vorkcrs' Compensation Act. ~.!finers, mill and smelter workers were 
covered under the Regulation of ]\;fines Act (1952) and the }.fines (Safety of Workmen) 
Regulations (1957).34 
33 Baie Verte workers went on strike after management refused to put its promises of a dust levd 
reduction into writing. High levels of asbestos-related disenses, including various cancers, 
asbestosis (scatTing of the lungs), and other respiratcr; illnesses, and the death of one worker, 
convinced the United Steelworkers that a clean up was necessary. Union officials had also 
recently learned that empioyer Johns-Manville was facing several lawsuits in the U.S. for 
withholding knowledge on the effects of asbestos exposure. Martin Sau..Tlders, Gerry Dwyer, and 
Jane Mercer, "Asbestos Miners at Baie Verte 1978," in Glmia Montero, We Stood Together: First 
Hand Accounts of Dramatic Events in Canada's Labour Past (Toronto 1979), 228, 233-4. 
34 Newfoundland and Labrador, 71ze Workmen's Co,.npensation Board Accident Prevention 
Regulations, 1969 (St. John's: Queen's Printer, 1969), 3; Newfoundland, The Regulations of 
Jldines Act, 1952 (St. John's: Queen's Printer, 1952) and The lvfines (Safety of Workmen) 
Regulations, 1957 (St. John's: Queen's Printer, 1957). Amendments were made in 1975 and 
1979. 
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The Act set up an occupational health and safety division in the Department of 
Labour. Employers were required to ensure the health, safety and welfare of workers 
while employees were required to take reasonable care to protect their own safety and 
that of other workers. Employers were also required to provide the necessary equipment, 
systems, and tools for a safe work site and to provide occupational health and safety 
training to both workers and their supervisors. Workers were responsible for using safety 
equipment. The Act also provided for committees to monitor the health and safety, to 
identify tmsafe working conditions, hear occupational health and safety complaints, and 
promote health and safety education programs (c23, s37). Committee meetings were to be 
held a minimum of once every three months during regular working hours. 35 
The Act gave health and safety officers the power to inspect workplaces without 
notice and to conduct investigations into any workplace illness or accident (c23, s24). 
Officers could also forbid the use of any tools or equipment that were not in safe 
operating conditions or did not meet regulatory sta.11dards (c23, s28). Health and safety 
officers also had the authmity to issue stop work orders. The new legislation also gave 
worker representatives the right to accompany health and safety inspectors during their 
inspections. Workers were also given the right to refuse unsafe work and to be informed 
of occupational hazards. The Department of Labour's division of occupational health and 
safety also established a medical registry for hazardous occupations. Workers m 
designated occupations were required to undergo medical examinations as requested.36 
35 Newfoundland and Labrador, Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1978 (St. John's: Queen's 
Printer, 1978), c23 sS-6. 
36 Newfoundland and Labrador, Occupational Health and Safety Regulations (St. John 's: Queen's 
Printer, 1979), 7-10, 13-6, 24-5 and An Act Respecting Occupational Health and Safety in the 
Province (Occupational Health and Safety Act), c28, s9, amended 1999. 
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Safety and Hibernia 
By Hibernia's start, safety was beginning to move beyond the "band-aid" approach, 
which dealt with accidents predominantly after the fact, to a more preventative program. 
Unlike Churchill Falls and Come by Chance which happened back to back, Hibernia 
occmTed two decades years later. In the intervening 20 years several unions pushed 
occupational health and safety at the bargairung table. 37 
At the start of construction, the Hibernia Management and Development 
Company (HMDC) released its overall safety policy which stated that complia..11ce with 
safety policy was a condition of employment. HMDC also required that every decision 
made on site consider safety along with techillcal, cost, quality and other 
considerations.38 In January 1991 the HEA (Hibernia Employers Association) set up a 
three-tier safety system made up of contractor committees, site specific committees, and 
the Bull Arm Constructiort Site Master Committee. Major contractors set up their own 
occupational health and safety committees. There were five site-specific committees, one 
each for the camp, drydock, back cove, topsides, and deep-water site. The site-specific 
committees were to meet a minimum of once a month. The Site Master Conm1ittee was 
set up as a resource to contractors and site committees and was to meet every three 
months. It had the responsibility of setting management safety policies. 39 
37 In the mid-1980s workers in Prince Albert, Saskatchewan (pulp and paper), Toronto (sewer 
workers), Oakville (autoworkers), and Brampton, Ontario (aircraft workers) staged wildcat strikes 
over unsafe working conditions. Heron, The Canadian Labour Movemeni, 149-51. 
38 ODC files, Safety File, B.D. Kimberlin, President, HMDC, "Safety Policy: A Message on 
Safety From the President," March 1992. 
39 ODC Files, box: A-Z, file: ODC Meetings. Occupational Health and Safety Committee-
PASSB, November 1992 and Letter from Terry O'Reilly (Hl\.IDC) to Dan \Ynalen and Len 
Dooley (ODC site reps) 10 January 1991. 
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Under the HMDC's safety policy, workers' were responsible for refusing tmsafe 
work and for speaking out when they witnessed unsafe acts. Line managers set safety 
goals, minimum safety standards, and were required to appraise each worker based on 
safety adherence. They were also expected to ensure that proper training, equipment, 
materials and safe work practices were in place. Through their safety policies, managers 
hoped for several outcomes. First they wanted to reduce the traditionally high rate of 
work place injuries in construction thereby lowering workers' compensation costs and 
reducing absenteeism due to injuries. Second, management wanted to increase 
productivity levels. Third, they wanted employees to take a greater role in ensuring their 
own safety and the safety of their fellow workers. Managers hoped that by creating safety 
committees and making each employee responsible for safety would help workers 
exercise discipline over their fellow workers' safety habits.40 
In the first year of operation there was considerable confusion over who was 
responsible for safety and the ODC and HEA corresponded regularly to detemline how 
often inspections should be done and who was responsible for canying them out. The 
ODC recommended committee members carry out weekly inspections of their work areas 
and be vested with the power to deal with any pressing issues. It also pressed for shmi 
"tool box" meetings at the start of each shift, and for a weekly 15-20 minute safety 
committee meeting to keep workers abreast of the dangers in their areas.41 
40 This is similar to wnat Heron found for steelworkers in the 1920s. Heron, Working in Steel, 
104-5. 
41 ODC Files, box: A-Z, Safety Committee File. Joint Occupational Health and Safety Meeting, 
11 December 1991; and file: ODC Meetings. Letter from Dan Whalen, Site Representative to 
Terry O'Reilly, HNIDC, 17 January 1992. 
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The ODC organized monthly supervisors' meetings to discuss serious incidents, 
to co-ordinate work between trades, and to post warning notices of dangerous work. The 
chair of the November 1992 meeting, Jim Wynne, expressed grave concerns about the 
number of near misses and accidents on site. Wynne blamed the high accident rate on a 
lack of safety awareness and poor worker safety attitudes. To reduce lost time accidents 
(LTAs), he stressed the importance of foreman in ensuring the safety of workers, 
ensuring rules and regulations were enforced, and correcting unsafe working conditions. 
Four main programs were put in place to increase safety awareness: new hire orientation, 
tailgate safety meetings, and supervisor and OHS committee meetings. Many union 
members were also concerned that the safety committees were not more informed ,and 
involved in accident reports. While an earlier supervisors' meeting introduced a 
disciplinary action system to deal with safety violations, it became clear that foremen 
were reluctant to issue safety violations. Many foremen worried that if they issued safety 
violations to workers of a different trade, it would cause friction between the trades.42 
Despite the importance placed on safety at Hibernia, it had both a higher incident 
(near miss) and higher lost time rate than the general construction industry. Hibernia's 
incident rate, for instance, was higher than the general construction industry's rate in 
every year but 1996. The early years were the most incident prone; in 1993, Hibernia's 
incident rate was double that ofthe industry (see table I). As a consequence, in early 1993 
a safety training blitz was undertaken to train all supervisory personnel in Line 
Management Safety Training. This program consisted of four training modules to give 
line management working knowledge of inspections, hazard recognition and control, job 
42 Even at Hibernia most of the foremen were just th::~t, men. ODC Files, box: A-Z, Safety 
Committee File. "Supervisors' Loss Control Monthly Meeting," 4 November 1992. 
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and task analysis, and accident investigation.43 In 1994 Hibernia's incident rate dropped 
to 9.63 per 100 workers, a figure still considerably higher than the industry average of 
6.86. In 1995 Hibernia's figure again dropped again, but it was not until 1996 that the 
project had a lower rate than the overall industry, which was likely due to a smaller, more 
experienced staff.44 
Table 9-1: Incidence Rate Per 100 Workers: Bull Arm and Industry a~. a Whole 
Bull Arm General Construction Industry 
1993 13.75 6.62 
1994 9.63 6.86 
1995 8.43 7.59 
1996 5.92 6.59 
Newfoundland, Department of Labour, Occupational Health and Safety Division. 
Hibernia made up a large proportion of the construction industry's lost time 
accidents. In 1993 Hibernia accounted for almost one-third of the industry's lost time 
accidents, a figure that rose to just under half of all LTAs in 1994 and 1995 before 
dropping back to one-third in 1996 (see table II). Workers at Hibernia were off work for 
an average of 5 weeks in 1993, a figure that rose to 15 weeks in 1994 before levelling off 
at 12 to 13 weeks in 1995 and 1996. While 5 weeks was much lower than the industry 
43 "W 
44 ork--place Safety," Hibernia News, 15 June 1994, 19. s·f Hibernia's wake, the construction incident rate dropped to 5.31 in 1997 and 5.36 in 1998. 
~~~~arsons, presentation to Employers' Council Spring 1998 Conference, St. John's, 23 April 
s· 8• Sue Hart, "Safety and Industrial Relations in the Newfoundland Offshore Oil Industry 
Olnce the Ocean Ranger Disaster in 1982," New Solutions: A Journal of Environmental and ccup · 
'fhi .atz~~wl Health. Policy, 10, 1-2 (2000), 137; and NLBCTC, "From the Box to Blue Sky 
G nking, Presentatwn to Securing Our Future Together: The Renewal Strategy for Jobs and 
rowth Fomm, St. John's, 11 January 2000. 
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average of 11 weeks, 15 weeks was higher than the 1994 average by three weeks, and 
higher than the 1995 average by two weeks.45 
Table 9-II: Construction Lost Time Accidents: Bull Arm and Overall Industry 
Year Bull Arm Construction 
Industry 
1993 178 623 
1994 356 764 
1995 395 817 
. 
1996 1263 631 
I 
Figures from Parsons, Presentatwn to the Employers' Council, Spnng 1998. 
Interviewed following the project's completion, Bill Parsons (president of the 
N""LBCTC) lamented that the ODC had not pushed for a more effective health and safety 
program from the outset.46 Parsons was unhappy with the HNIDC for introducing a new 
. 
safety incentive program in November 1994. For each week a team >vas without a 
medical lost time injury, each worker accrued a fi ve-dollar credit. ~vVith continued safe 
performances workers could redeem their rewards for products such as leather jackets. 
Wayne Pardy, who conducted health and safety training courses for the ODC, warned of 
the dangers of incentive programs, stating that incentive programs led to an 
underreporting of accidents, not necessarily fewer accidents. Rather than giving gifts for 
not having accidents, Pardy suggested the company to focus on accident prevention. 
Many union leaders agreed, worrying that offering prizes for accident free periods was 
causing considerable dysfunction in the safety system.47 
45 Parsons, Presentation to the Employers' Council, Spring 1998. 
46 Cited in Hart, "Safety and Industrial Relations," 137. 
47 
"GMT initiates General Safety Incentive Program," Hibernia News, 30 November 1994; ODC 
files, box A-Z, file: ODC Meetings. "Minules, ODC Meeting," 6 February 1996, Hotel 
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Parsons was also unhappy with the large number of contractors involved in the 
project, something which made it difficult to assign safety responsibility. As Hart pointed 
out "the diffusion of accountability and responsibility resulting from increasingly more 
complex operator--contractor relationships was identified as a significant problem by the 
Ocean Ranger Commission of Inquiry. At Bull Arm this had apparently resulted in low 
levels of commitment to safety."48 Parsons blamed this more on the nature of the 
offshore oil industry than the construction industry, stating that "they have no stake ... they 
just come in, get the work done at the lowest possible cost and move off."49 The shifting 
number of workers and contractors made communication difficult. 
To cope with the high accident rate, in June 1994 a new orientation focusing on 
safety was put into place. The safety program focused on new hires, as the possibility of a 
new employee having an accident in their first month of employment was thirty times 
greater than that of a two-year employee. 5° The Topsides Hook-Up safety manager stated, 
"the majority of accidents happen to new people on site. It has been proven in industry 
that apprentices usually get injured as opposed to jourm:ymen. You can sometL.'Ties 
attribute that to people being over eager in trying to assist and show that they k:novv 
something.''51 
Newfoundland and "Minutes, ODC Meeting," 8 July 1996, Terra Nova Lodge; and Letter from 
Pardy and Associates, Safety Management Training and Consulting to Derm Cain and Bill 
Parsons, Re: Health and Safety Committee representative training, 31 January 1996. For more on 
the problems ofunderreporting with safety incentive plans see Charles Woolfson, Jolm Foster, 
and Matthias Beck, Paying for the Piper (London: Mansell, 1996), 371-2. 
48 Hart, "Safety and Industrial Relations," 136-7. 
49 Hart, "Safety and Industrial Relations," 137, citing interview with Bill Parsons, President, NLBTC, 
21 July 1998.2. 
50 
"Workplace Safety," Hibernia News, 15 June 1994 and "GBS Safety Line," Hibernia News, 19 
October 1994. 
51 
"Topsides Hook-Up Team Improves Safety Record, Hibernia News, 14 June 1995. 
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To help meet safety challenges in 1995 the ODC asked the HEA and the 
government for an additional on-site safety representative. In their request to the HEA the 
ODC noted that in January, February and March 1995 there were 110 LTAs, which 
translated into 1.22 workers injured every day. This was up from 1994 when an average 
of one worker left the site injured per day. After consultations with the HEA, which 
opposed the idea, the Minister of Labour turned down the request, indicating that there 
was no need for an additional rcpresentative.52 Throughout 1995 the ODC complained 
that there still had not been any formal training for occupational health and safety 
committees on inspections or accident investigations and that the HEA/HMDC was 
negligent in its failure to share accident data. Under the OHS Act, any accident resulting 
in serious injury or death or with the potential to cause serious injury had to be repmied 
to both the assistant deputy minister (Occupational Health and Safety, Deprutment of 
Labour) and to on-site worker health and safety committees. Union representatives 
complained that this rarely occurred. 'Without access to investigation reports it was 
difficult fer health and safety c01mnittees to work towards accident prevention. In 1996 
the ODC implemented training on the Occupational Health and Safety Act for union 
representatives. Many of the representatives commented that this training should be 
required for all workers on site and was sometbng union leaders should have received at 
the start of the project. 53 
52 ODC files, box A-Z, file: ODC Meetings. ODC Summary, Joint ODC-HEA-HMDC Meeting, 24-
25 May 1995, 6-7 and Joint ODC-HEA-HMDC Meeting, 15 June 1995. The ODC met with Tom 
Murphy, Rex Gibbons and Joe O'Neill to discuss safety concerns, productivity and labour 
relations on site. 
53 ODC files, Letter from Pardy and Associates, Safety Management Training and Consulting to 
Derm Cain and Bill Parsons, Re: Health and Safety Committee representative training, 31 
January 1996. 
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hl its Annual Report, the Workplace Health, Safety and Compensation 
Commission reported that construction workers were most likely to suffer from back 
injuries, followed by wrist and hand injuries, neck and shoulder injuries, and knee and 
ankle injuries. 54 In every year of Hibernia construction, lost time injuries involving the 
lumbar spine far outnumbered other lost time accidents. This is not surprising as over 50 
per cent of all Newfoundland construction injuries involved back injuries, most caused by 
overexertion from lifting and falls. Management treated the risk of falls quite seriously, 
especially after two workers were killed in the early years of the site.55 In May 1992 a 
sheet metal worker fell to a lower level and in September 1993 a labourer fell from 
scaffolding. Two ironworkers were fued after they failed to meet the compar1y' s fall 
protection policy, endangering their lives. After the union intervened, the workers were 
54 A painter with PASSB, for instance, was off work for over 46 weeks after he fell injuring his 
knee. In 1992 10 workers reported LT As from walking or climbing, six from working with 
structural metal bars, and three from working \vith pipefitting valves. In 1993 50 workers 
reported LTAs from working with structural metal bars, 31 from \valking or climbing, and 14 
from laying flooring. In 1994 89 workers reported lost time accidents from worlcing with 
structural metal bars, 69 fw m walking and climbing, and 17 from machine related injuries. Jn 
1995 95 workers reported lost time accidents while walking or climbing, 75 from working with 
structural metal bars, and 16 from outdoor work. Worker 's Compensation Cormnission, Bull Arm 
Site Lost-Time Accident Statistics, 1992 to 1995. Of the overall Newfoundland construction 
LTAs, 28.9 per cent resulted from contact with stmctures and surfaces, 25.1 per cent resulted 
from striking or being struck by parts and materials, 20.5 per cent resulted from bodily motion 
(lifting, contact with objects, falls), and 5.9 per cent involved tools and equipment. See WHSCC, 
"General Characteristics ofL1jury," and "Incident Rate of Injury," Research Briefs; "Ten Year 
History: Rate Code 403"; and "Statistical Data Overview," Annual Report 2000 at 
www.whscc.nf.ca/pubs/publications.htm. The remaining 19.7 per cent were from other sources. 
55 The most common leading causes of death on U.S. constmction sites were falls (31 per cent), 
followed by transportation accidents (27 per cent), exposure (19 per cent), and contact with 
objects at .18 per cent. Ironworkers, roofers, and labourers faced far greater incidents of death by 
falls. Falls also accounted for a large proportion of time lost accidents. Figures do not include 
other category. CPWR, The Construction Chart Book, 31-2, 36. In 1992 there were 22 lumbar 
spine lost time accidents, 47 in 1993, 116 in 1994 and 113 in 1995. Newfoundland and Labrador, 
Worker's Compensation Co!Thl1ission, Bull Arm Site Lost-Time Accident Statistics, 1992 to 1995; 
and Hart, "Safety and L-,dustria1 Relations," 137. 
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given suspensions instead. 56 In one of the longest LTAs at 4 7 weeks, a boilermaker with 
NODECO suffered a spine injury after falling off one of the walkways. After falling from 
a ladder a NODECO boilermaker was off for 43 weeks with multiple injuries while a 
P ASSB labourer injured his lumbar spine and was off work for 45 weeks. One labourer, 
who slipped on the ice and fell off a fifteen foot embankment permanently injming his 
back, was pleased that PASSBand Workers Compensation retrained him for a job in the 
tool centre. P ASSB also allowed the worker to come back part time until he was capable 
of returning to full-time work. 57 Given the short-tem1 nature of the construction project, 
however, getting workers back to the site did not always work out. 
On the first full year of Hibernia, labourers had the highest rate of lost time 
accidents (18), followed by carpenters (10) and sheet metal workers (7). By 1993 
structural metal workers had the highest number of lost time accidents ( 48), followed by 
boilermakers (39), labourers (23), and carpenters (17). In 1994 boilermakers had the 
highest number of lost time accidents (105), follovved by labourers (92), carpenters (41) 
and welders (24). Structural metal workers saw a reduction of their accident numbers to 
only 13. In 1995 labourers - the most populous group on site at peak construction - had 
the highest number of lost time accidents (139), followed by boilennakers (67), structural 
metal workers (42) and carpenters (23). Chefs fuJ.d cooks, material handlers, surveyors, 
cleaners, and other workers had among the lowest accident rates. 58 
56 ODC Files, Box: 1995 Grievances, "Employee Reprimands Etc." and Newfoundland, 
Department of Environment and Labour, Occupational Health and Safety Division. 
57 
"Loyalty and Cooperation Enabled Injured Workers to Return to Job," Hibernia News, 30 
November 1994. 
58 Newfoundland and Labrador, Worker' s Compensation Commission, Bull Arm Lost-Time 
Accident Statistics, 1992-1995. Smaller subcontractors Cahill State accounted for 3 LTAs, FGA 
Consulting Engineers 2, Freyssinet/DSI -JV 2 L T As, and Greens Service Station 1 LT A. WCC, 
Records of Fatalities and LTAs at Bull Arm, January-December 1995. As of July 1995 
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Many contractors attempted to keep safety at the forefront for their subcontractors 
and workers. In the wake of a significant increase in eye injuries, memos exhorted 
subcontractors and workers to remember that protective eye wear was mandatory. Other 
memos reminded subcontractors that they must report all chemical hazards to medical 
services and the Safety Department. Another reminder went out telling subcontractors not 
to leave loaded blasting holes unattended even if the holes were not primed. In a 
December 1991 safety meeting another blasting safety issue was raised as many workers 
were not clearing the area when blasting occurred. Other memos informed subcontractors 
that they were required to conduct incident investigations for all accidents, even minor 
ones. 
59 
A NODECO safety poster reminded workers to "Beware of Unguided Missiles." 
It asked what weighs 175 pounds and can go from zero to 55 kmJh in a tenth of a second: 
spinning, ricocheting and smashing through anything (and anyone) in its path? Answer: a 
compressed gas cylinder with a broken valve. To avoid missiles, workers were told to 
follow the instructions on the Material Safety Data Sheet for the safe storage, handling 
and use of compressed gas. Furthermore workers were advised to store cylinders in a well 
ventilated area, away from ignition sources, to secure cylinders upright, to keep the 
)l"ODECO had the highest number of workers on site at 2695 (2594 men, 101 women), followed 
by PASSB with 835 workers (802 men, 33 women), and Major Offshore Catering with 191 
workers (113 men, 78 women). NODECO employed operating engineers, stfuctural ironworkers, 
labourers, rebar workers, camp attendants/caterers, secretaries, and teamster/warehouse workers, 
among others while PASSB employed plurr..bers and pipefitters, painter/fireproofers, w·elders, 
sheetmetal workers, structural ironworkers, labourers, secretaries, caterers, and teamsters, and 
MOC employed cooks, catering staff, safety officers, clerical staff, bartenders, camp attendants, 
and general helpers. 
59 ODC Files, box: A-Z, file: ODC Meetings. "Memo," 17 October 1991, 24 September 1991, and 
29 July 1991; file: Safety Committee. Joint Occupational Health and Safety Meeting, 11 
December 1991; and File: ODC Meetings. Letter from Gerry Ford, Senior Safety Inspector, 
NODECO to all Subcontractors, Re: Accident/Incident Reporting, 4 November 1991 and Memo 
from M. Hennebert, NODECO Project Manager to All Subcontractors and NODECO Employees. 
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protective caps over the valve at all times, to transport cylinders in an upright position, 
d to not let grease or oil - even on workers' hands - near oxygen cylinder controls. an . 
.Another NODECO memorandum offered safety representatives show and tell safety tips 
to use when addressing workers. The tips ranged from having workers count off 60 
seconds and explain that in that period a full five quarts of blood are pumped through the 
body. Losing just one quart, which could take as little as fifteen seconds, could be fatal. 
This tip was to remind workers that quick action is a must when an accident victim is 
bleeding severely and to remind workers of the importance of first aid training. Another 
tip suggested bouncing a rubber ball and explaining that the human body, unlike the ball, 
does not bounce when it hits the ground. In a less graphic manner, workers were also 
warned about the health effects of noise and the importance of wearing hearing 
protection, and about the effects of dust and the need to wear purifying respirators.60 
Hibemia was equipped with a physician and a senior occupational health nurse on 
duty seven days a week, twelve hours a day. Two nurses also staffed the on-site medical 
clinic open Monday to Friday. Other RNs were spread around the site, ·with four at the 
GBS and one at Topsides. An emergency medical attendant was also on site, as was a 
first response tean1 of fifty workers trained in first aid. 1J. 1995 the site also added a fast 
marine rescue team to the topsides pier to deal with anyone who fell into the water. 
Volunteers staffed the marine unit with seven people on each shift trained to operate the 
rescue boat, to deal with first aid and hypothennia.61 
60 :------- ---
-r. ... ?~c files , NODECO File, Safety Department, Safety Reminder, "Beware of Unguided 
•vussi!es , 1 'i 0 b 
0 , - cto er 1991 and Safety Department, "Show-and-Tell Safety Talk Tips," 5 
bi :~ober 1991. 
Fast Marine Rescue Team Now on Duty at Topsides Pier," Hibernia News, 12 July 1995. 
--
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Workers were encouraged to report any safety problems to their foremen. 
Foremen were to solve the problems or refer them to their supervisors. If there was no 
action, the foreman was directed to take the issue to the area shop steward and to the 
ODC co-chair of the site safety committee. In the event that worker safety was 
endangered, a foreman had the authority to issue a stop work order. ·while all workers on 
the GBS site were to hold five minute safety meetings at the start of each shift, a 15 
minute weekly meeting, and a forty minute monthly meeting, one worker reported that no 
' 
meetings were held in the marine division. After receiving a safety complaint, a safety 
inspection team, including ODC and HEA representatives from the site safety committee, 
were sent out to investigate conditions. 62 
Workers at Hibernia received warnings for many safety violations. One worker 
was given a written reprimand for failing to wear safety glasses while cleaning the barge 
with a two-inch water hose. The incident was also cited as a safety violation as the job 
required two men to operate the hose under such water pressure and there was only one 
worker at the task. Two carpenters received safety citations after they were caught tying 
off their line without safety clips on either end. Another worker was suspended for three 
days after his supervisor deemed that he had put himself at risk of a fall over 3 metres by 
failing to use required safety restraints. 63 In several instances workers attempted to use 
safety violations as a way to negotiate disciplinary charges against them. One worker 
caught sleepir..g on the job warned his manager that he would be putting in a safety 
complaint. He claimed management should not have allowed him to work alone in the 
62 See testimony by Wayne Power, UA shop steward and co-chair of the site safety committee, 
cited in Arbitration 96-072. Subject: Discharge, Arbitrator: Leslie Harris, 28 January 1996, 19. 
63 ODC files, box: 1995 Grievances, file: Employee Reprimands etc. "Warning of Safety 
Violations," 9 March 1996 and 9 May 1996 and "Suspension," 5 March 1996. 
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first place, thereby trying to force his supervisor to trade off his violation (a firing 
offence) for one he claimed management had made.64 Another worker facing firing for 
fighting wondered if his firing was due to his habit of raising safety violations rather than 
to the incident in question. He repeatedly raised safety violations with his shop steward 
and the ODC, including reporting several close calls and an instance where the blast 
foreman put tape over a safety switch on the door so the operations would not shut dow11 
when someone opened the door. The worker also spoke up in safety meetings, reporting 
. 
alarm systems not working, tools left lying around the site and other violations.65 
In another case, a worker who had been fired blamed his dismissal on his constant 
complaints about safety violations. The worker, a labourer, employed in the marine 
division complained that language difficulties (a Dutch crew) made operating the 
positioning winches on the crane extremely dangerous. He also complained of being 
. 
forced to use unsafe scaffolding rigged for painting in the ship's hold, to paint in an 
improperly ventilated area, and of not being provided with adequate safety equipment. 
The safety team found no serious safety violations in its investigation but suggested that 
if the workers were having difficulties breathing in the hold, that they wear protective 
masks, which they then provided. The labourer and two operating engineers had 
repeatedly asked their foreman for proper breathing equipment, good gloves, safety 
shields, ear muffs a..'1d safety glasses, only to be told that "They won't give Hacvey's 
Offshore [the contractor] anything."66 
64 Arbitration 96-086. Subject: Wrongful Dismissal, Arbitrator: D. Alcock, 30 September 1996. 
65 Arbitration 94-096. Subject: Dismissal, .Arbitrator: W. John Clarke, 21 September 1994, 17. 
66 Arbitration 96-072. Subject: Discharge, Arbitrator: Leslie Harris, 28 January 1996, 16. 
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In 1993 Newfoundland lost time construction accidents cost $2,240,550, a figure 
that rose to $3,233,490 in 1994 before peaking at $3,858,707 in 1995, not coin<.:identally 
Hibernia's peak year of construction. Figures dropped to $3,796,011 in 1996 and 
dramatically declined to $1,162,028 in 1997, the year Hibernia wrapped up. Direct costs 
included medical costs and indemnity payments. This does not include indirect costs such 
as lost time by injured workers and others involved in accident follow-up (fellow 
workers, supervisors), damaged goods, clean-up times, schedule delays, training new 
employees, overhead costs, legal fees, and increased insurance costs. On average indirect 
costs exceeded direct costs at a 4:1 ratio.67 The British Health and Safety Executive 
(HSE) estimated that construction accident costs were equivalent to 8.5 per cent qf the 
tender price. 68 
While many industry stakeholders were quick to blame the accident rate on the 
high-risk nature of constiuction, training in occupational health and safety did not occur 
on a wide-spread basis tmtil the mid-1990s. In the mid-1990s labour wions and 
contractors increasingly began to recognize the need for more health and safety training 
and established the Construction Industry Forum, out of which sprang the Newfoundland 
and Labrador Construction Safety Association (NLCSA). The NLCSA took 
responsibility for developing health and safety stfu"'1dards for union and non-unionized 
construction. Starting in January 1999 the NLCSA's certificate of recognition program 
was mandatory for contractors bidding on government funded projects. 69 
67 Presentation by Parsons to Employers' Council Spring 1998 Conference, St. John's, 23 April 
1998. Figures from February 1998. 
68 Britain, Health and Safety Executive,. The Costs of Accidents at Work (London: ill1SO, 1993), 
cited in Woolfson et al., Paying for the Piper, 411. 
69 
"Case Study: Construction Sector in Newfoundland ... ," 5. 
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In January 1996 the NLBCTC, the NCLRA, several contractors associations 
(home builders, road builders, mechanical contractors), and several professional 
organizations (NOIA, Association of Professional Engineers, Association of Architects) 
submitted a joint proposal to the government requesting the creation of a Newfoundland 
and Labrador Constmction Safety Association (NLCSA). Stakeholders proposed an 
industry-funded association that would help bring about a culture shift in tr..inking about 
safety. The proposed association's goals were to reduce injuries and save lives, reduce 
' 
costs associated with workplace accidents, increase profits, maintain compliance with 
regulatory bodies, and establish ownership of Joss control programs. The joinl proposal 
developed when they did in part due to the recent decline in construction markets, 
increased threats of competition, particularly from the underground economy, high 
financing charges for equipment, lower profit margins, and increasing operating costs, 
. 
taxation, insurance, and legal costs. While stakeholders acknowiedged that there was 
little they could do about some of these fac.tors, they felt they could reduce workplace 
accidents and injuries. 
[n 1995 the construction industry owed $9,700,000 in direct assessment premiums 
to the Newfoundland ru.1d Labrador Compensation Commission.7° For each insured dollar 
in injury and illness costs (medical compensation costs), Derhorski Veritas Association 
(DV A), a leading health and safety risk assessment company, found that an additional S5 
- $50 of uninsured property damaged costs (da..'llage to buildings, tools, and equipment, 
70 Merit Contractors of Newfoundland and Labrador et. a!., "A Proposal to Establish a 
Newfoundland and Labrador Construction Safety Association," January 1996, 2-3. In June 1999 
the Workers' Compensation Commission was changed to the Workplace health, Safety and 
Compensation Commission (WHSCC). Newfoundland's compensation program determined its 
annual assessment rates by industry on the basis of present and future costs of the industry's past 
accident experience. 
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product delays, legal expenses, expenditure of emergency supplies, interim equipment 
rentals, and investigation time) was spent. Companies were also paying out another $1 -
$3 on lost time \vages, hiring and retraining of replacements, overtime, extra supervisory 
time, clerical time, decreased worker output upon return, and loss of business or 
goodwill. This meant that the 1995 construction industry figure of i.nsured costs (9.7 
million) would range from a true cost ofbetween $67.9 million to $494.7 million.71 Bill 
Parsons, president of the NLBCTC, fotmd the rates for the construction industry as a 
whole, not just Hibernia, were high, something he blamed on inadequate accident 
prevention programs, a lack of compliance and safety audits, and on the fact that for 
many the construction industry was an employer of 1 ast resort. 72 
To reduce costs brought about by a poor safety record, stakeholders recognized 
that they needed fundamentally to change the basic philosophy of how the constmction 
industry operated. They acknowledged that for health and safety programs to work, they 
must be developed by contractors and workers, and that regulatory bodies must recognize 
them. The proposal recommended following the safety program developed by the Alberta 
Constmction Safety Association and followed by the Nova Scotia Construction Safety 
Association to bring down accident rates. Alberta's pr·)gram consisted of an employer 
certification program including completion of four modules on safety basics/principles of 
loss control, safety auditing, leadership for safety excellence, and safety orientation. 
Certification required employers to demonstrate that staff were trained in \Vorkplace 
Hazard Materials Information Systems, First Aid, Transportation of Dangerous Goods, 
7 1 Frank Bird, Jr. and George L. Gennain, Loss Control Management- Practical Loss Control 
Leadership, cited in "A Proposal to Establish a Newfoundland and Labrador Construction Safety 
Association," 4. 
72 Presentation by Parsons to Employers' Counci1 Spring 1998 Conference. 
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Traffic Control, Confined Space Entry, Construction Safety Officer, and Trenching and 
Scaffolding. Once staff met all those requirements, employers had to pass a safety audit. 
To encourage Nova Scotian contractors to participate in the program, the Nova Scotia 
government required all firms bidding on government funded constmction projects to 
demonstrate that they had or were in the process of obtaining the certificate of 
recognition. Under the Newfoundland proposal, stakeholders asked for joint certification 
by the NLCSA and the Dep~ent of Employment and Labour Relations. By using the 
program already in place in Nova Scotia, contractors in Atlantic Canada hoped to benefit 
from a standardized safety training program. To pay for the NLCSA, stakeholders asked 
the Workers' Compensation Conmlission (later renamed the Workplace Health, Safety 
and Compensation Commission) to collect a 3.5 per cent levy on behalf of the NLCSA. 
The Newfoundland government agreed and created the NLCSA in November 
1996. The NLCSA's mandate was to provide proactive safety programs and services to 
the construction industry and to help build a healthy and profitable industry. Its aims 
were to reduce work-related injuries and fatalities, to reduce the financial and human 
costs associated with work-related accidents, to reduce workers' compensation 
assessment rates, to improve industry profits and efficiency, to provide awareness on 
health and safety regulations, to help companies manage effective loss control programs, 
and to assist members in dealing with sexual harassment in the workplace.73 When asked 
why safety training had recently become a high priority for the construction industry, the 
73 For more infom1ation on the NLCSA see W\vw.nlcsa.com. In adding a half-day sexual 
harassment component to its certificate of recognition training program, Newfoundland was 
following the iead of the Ontario Labour Relations Board which deemed sexual harassment as a 
health and safety issue. See NLCSA, Sq.fe Times, 1, 1 (Winter 1999), 1. Sexual harassment 
training included an understanding of what constitutes sexual harassment, guidelines for 
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president of McNamara Construction, one of the largest civil engineering construction 
firms in Newfoundland, replied that "unsafe working conditions are costly, and the price 
is paid with health, time, and money. "74 While the creation of the NLCSA is a positive 
sign, it is too early to tell what kind of impact the organization is having on accident rates 
in the province. 75 
In April 1999 the government amended the Occupational Health and Safety 
Regulations to address construction hazards which had resulted in serious injuries or 
fatalities. The first amendment required employers to sample air quality in confined 
spaces both before workers begin work and while work is being conducted. The second 
amendment required employers to provide automatic audible reverse warning devices for 
all powered mobile equipment and to ensure that mobile equipment is free of any 
U.t'1.secured material. The third amendment disallowed the use of safety belts for fall 
protection, instead requiring full body harnesses. Under the old legislation, experienced 
workers \Vere exempt from using fall protection systems; the new amendment, however, 
required all workers to wear fall protection systems.76 
Conclusions 
As construction workers have built Newfoundland and Labrador's industrial base, 
they have faced a wide variety of occupational health and safety risks, from workplace 
injuries to illnesses. ·while construction workers have had to climb scaffolding, use power 
developing policies and procedures for handling complaints and for conducting effective 
harassment investigations. 
7~ NLCSA. Safe Times, 1, 1 (Winter 1999), 1. 
70 The Workplace Health Safety and Compensation Commission reports that the number and 
duration of construction workplace inju~es increased significantly from 1998 to 2000, with many 
employers seeing an increase in their 2000 ar.sessment rates. See WHSCC, "General 
Construction,'' 2 at www.whscc.nf.ca/pubs/publications.htm. 
76 NLCSA, Safe Times, 1, 2 (Fall 1999), 1-2. 
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tools and other equipment, lift heavy objects such as rebar, and work at great heights or 
underground, most of these tasks can be accomplished relatively safely if workers are 
given proper equipment, training, and supervision. Since the 1960s occupational health 
and safety has become a topic of concern to workers, unions, and contractors. Safety 
programs in the 1990s were far more effective than those earlier programs. At Hibernia 
safety was made a part of the site even prior to the start of construction. Recognizing the 
high costs of an unsafe si~e, contractors attempted to make a safe work site a p1i01ity 
through training programs, active health and safety committees, and an identification of 
major hazards on site. Despite all these precautions, accidents still occurred, in part 
because of the shifting numbers of contractors on site at any given time and the constant 
turnover of workers. 
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Conclusion 
This thesis examined three of the larger construction projects in Newfoundland, 
the Churchill Falls hydroelectric generating station, the Come by Chance oil refinery, and 
the Hibernia offshore oil platform. I chose these three projects because the government 
accorded each a critical importance to the province's industrial development. In turn, 
each of the projects was promoted as the way to modernize. Exploiting Newfoundland 
and Labrador's water potential, "cheap power" from Churchill Falls was to create jobs, 
foster spin-off development, and to turn Newfoundland from a resource dependent 
economy to one based on secondary manufacturing. In the early 1970s, the provincial 
govemment switched its focus to creating a petrochemical industrial complex. The 
government hoped that the refinery would supply raw materials to the petrochemical 
complex, which would in tum manufacture finished products. In the 1980s and 1990s 
offshore oil was to be the engine of economic growth. With the creation of an offshore oil 
industry, the government envisioned becoming the Alberta of eastern Canada. While 
none of these projects has yet brought the desired results, each one created thousands of 
jobs in its construction phase and added a considerable boost to the province's economy. 
I chose to study the construction industry as it was a necessary precursor to any 
industrial development. Before a single manufacturing plant could be built, before roads 
could link the province, and before hydro-electric projects could provide the power 
necessary to attract outside industrialists, a construction workforce had to be put in place 
and taught the rhythms of industrial work. In the Newfoundland government's view, 
modernization was the key to a diversified economy. The government believed that by 
infusing the economy with capital, technology, entrepreneurial leadership, and the "right'' 
attitude, the province would creale a more diversified economy. 
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The government has played a central role in promoting industrialization in 
Newfoundland. My thesis demonstrated how and why the Newfoundland government 
encouraged and supported modernization between the 1960s and the 1990s. Choosing 
modernization (and industrialization) as its economic development path shaped the way 
the government dealt with many aspects of Newfoundland society. As Mi1iam Wright 
found, "In Newfoundland, the industrial vision of development shaped the way the 
people thought about the problems of the fishery and limited the range of solutions."' 
' 
While \Vright was talking about the fishery, her comments are appropriate for the 
govemment's land-based modernization programs as well. As my work demonstrated, 
modernization programs went far beyond the fisheries. 
My work is the first to study these three projects within the larger framework of 
the government's modernization progran1. While other works have studied 
. 
modernization, the literature has largely focused on the fisheries and the role of the 
government and local elites. In addition, my study is the first in the local historiography 
to single out these projects as important. \Vhile several authors have noted the projects, 
they have not recognized how central they were in previous govelT1..mental development 
agendas.2 Studying an individual project also makes it more difficult to discover the 
1 Miriam Wright, A Fishe1y for Modern Times: the State and the Industrialization of the 
JkwfoundlandFishery, 1934-1968(DonMills: Oxford, 2001), 156. 
2 Several authors have examined individual large-scale projects, including Come by Chance and 
Hibernia. These works, however, focused more on the political or environmental impacts of these 
projects than on the larger economic development framework. See, for instance, Jason Churchill, 
"Political Pragmatism and the Failure of Confederation: Newfoundland's Struggle to Develop its 
Hydro Resources in Labrador, 1952-1988," MA thesis, University of Ottawa, 1997, John 
McKnight, "The Political Economy of Environmental Regulatory Policy: the Case of Come By 
Chance," MA thesis, l\!IUN, 1996, and Susanne Ottenheimer, " 'Fish and Oil don't Mix': Power 
Relations at the Bull Arm Construction Site, Trinity Bay, Newfoundland," MA thesis, Mill\!", 
1993. 
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underlying economic development pattems. My work charts state support for 
modemization over a thirty year period and through several changes in govemment. 
While none of these modemization programs has succeeded in meeting its 
promised benefits, Newfoundland after 1997 is a much different place than 
Newfoundland in 1949. With industrial expansion, new forms of employment began to 
take shape. By the early 1980s Newfoundland's workforce more closely mirrored its 
provincial cotmterparts, es:recially those with strong resource sectors. Workers whose 
previous employment was in resource extraction such as fishing, logging, and mining 
found themselves employed on large-scale projects under new working conditions. 
Newfoundland's growing infrastructure and the bureaucracy needed to oversee it led to 
the development of a large service sector, including clerical and professional occupations. 
\Vomen workers largely staffed these new service positions. ·with the labour unrest of the 
. 
1970s, many previously unorganized workers entered unions, including public sector 
workers and workers involved in the fishery, both fish plant workers and deep-sea trawler 
crews. 
While my work focused on industrial construction in Newfoundland, many of my 
findings have broader applicability. Exploring how government plar1s to trigger economic 
development worked in practice is something much of the modemization literature 
ignores. Much of the Newfoundland historiography is dominated by the question of why 
the province failed to develop along the North American model. 3 Rather than debating 
the problematic conceptualization of modemization or starting from a negative position 
(why it did not develop on the North American model), my work examined what 
happened on the development that did occur. 
322 
My thesis describes what happened to workers when they were employed on these 
projects and how they responded to new work routines, employers, and conditions. Fe\\' 
workers accepted these conditions on the tem1s offered by employers, choosing to put 
forward their own demands, on wages, decent housing conditions, unionization, and 
numerous other issues. Much like the new labour historians of the late 1960s, my work 
wanted to explore the totality of workers experiences, at least on the work site. My work 
also attempted to put a human face on the wo rkers, by putting names to workers as much 
as was possible.4 In some ways my work followed conventional labour history or 
industrial relations writings, for instance, the chapter on strikes. Had this remained a 
more conventional labour history, it would have focused on an individual union (or 
ernployer), their organizing drives, and bargaining strategies. Much of the work on 
construction unions has done just that, focusing on the carpenters' or electricians' union 
over a one hun.dred year period. 5 
Construction workers' experiences were only unique in the continued instability 
of their employment. ln many other ways their experiences largely mirrored other 
resource workers and early factory workers. r-.fuch like Heron's steelworkers and 
3 See chapter one for the various explanations of Newfoundland's underdevelopment. 
4 In most instances if workers names were identified in the public r-=cord I •.1sed their names in my 
\VOrk. One exception to this was in the chapter on pilfering. Arbitration records are a matter of 
public record but given the nature of many of the offences and the recent nature of Hibemia, I 
chose not to apply any identifiers to the workers. 
5 See, for instance, Raymcnd Robertson, A History ofthe Iron Workers, 1896-1996 (Washington 
1996); Walter Galenson, The United Brotherhood a,( Carpenters: the First Hundred Years 
(Camb1idge: Harvard University Press, 1983); Grace Palladino, Dreams of Dignity, Workers of 
Vision: A History of the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers (Washington: IBEW, 
1991); Ian McKay, The Craft Transformed: An Essay on the Carpenters of Halifax, 1885-1985 
(Halifax: Holdfast Press, 1985); Gerry Berkowski, Ed Reed, Nolan Reilly, Doug Smith, eds., All 
That's Made of Wood: the story of Local 343 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners 
(Wirmipeg: MaEito'oa Labour History Series, 1995); and Ben Swankey, ed. , Building British 
Columbia: a History of Union Carpenters 1883-1978 (Vancouver: Carpenter Pensioners' 
Association, 1979). Much of the work was commissioned by the unions. 
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Radforth's bushworkers, construction workers in Newfoundland had to deal with new 
technology and skill requirements, a segmented labour market (skilled workers brought in 
from outside the province), tough measures to ensure maximum productivity, and a 
dangerous working environment. Establishing an industrial construction industry in 
Newfoundland was not easy. Owners and contractors building these large-scale projects 
had to contend with poor weather conditions, isolated work sites, a lack of available 
materials, and workers with little construction experience. To build such large-scale 
' 
projects required employers with access to large amounts of capital and able to withstand 
several years of spending prior to realizing a profit. These capitalists in tmn hired general 
contractors to oversee their projects and subcontractors to carry out the day-to-day work. 
The bidding system meant that subcontractors rareiy hired workers long-tem1 and were 
constantly forced to submit the lowest bids possible to win tenders. This resulted in 
. 
economic insecurity for most construction workers, forced to move between jobs and 
sub-contractors to make a living. To date little research has been done on what impact 
such economic insecurity has had on workers. While we .lr •. now that many workers moved 
between industries (often from the fisheries to construction) during economic clowntums, 
little historical research has been done on its impacts on workers. Another area requiring 
further research is the impact long periods of seasonal unemployment had on workers a.'1d 
their families. 
vVith these new industrial .projects, workers whose previous employment was in 
resource extraction, such as fishing, logging and mining, found themselves employed on 
large-scale projects under new working conditions. \¥orkers were drawn to construction 
by external factors such as high unemployment levels and a lack of other job options, 
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government promotion of construction, and the increasing provlSlon of construction 
training programs. While construction offered workers higher than average wages, it also 
meant significant periods of time away from their families and periods of seasonal and 
cyclical unemployment. Given the short-term, and often seasonal, nature of construction 
projects, employers had to find ways to attract workers. While skilled workers and 
supervisors were often reeruited from outside the province, other workers were recruited 
locally. Construction employers and contractors subsequently patched together an 
industrial management system somewhat reminiscent of woods workers and other remote 
workforces but specifically geared to meet the needs of industrial construction. 
Moulding the new workforce to achieve maximum productivity was a challenge 
for contractors. Employers alternated between incentives ("the carrot approach") and 
punishments ("the stick approach") to try to manage their workforces. To encourage 
workers to take jobs in industrial construction, a variety of welfare capitalism programs 
were implemented on many large-scale projects, including housing, sports and recreation 
programs, and company newspapers. Despite these incentives, workers brought their 
own priorities to each site, ones that had the potential to diverge quite widely fi"om those 
set by their employers. ·workers' priorities included improving or at minimum 
maintaining their income levels, controlling the rate of production as much as possible, 
and ensming that they were treated with a level of respect and fairness. When workers' 
interests differed from their employers' attemp!s to maximize production and profits, 
conflict often resulted. 
Conflict included everything from high turnover rates and absenteeism to 
Withdrawing labour. Striking has been one of the most prevalent forms of worker-
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management conflict in constluction and was one of the few ways workers at Come by 
Chance had of attracting their employer's attention. Repeatedly workers complained that 
they were unable to meet with managers to discuss concerns or that when they met with 
managers their grievances were not addressed. Rather than defensive or rear guard action, 
these strikes offered workers a sense of collective identity, gave them a voice, and 
allowed them to make demands of a system which was normally unresponsive to their 
needs. \Vork stoppages were a way for workers to redress the power imbalance in modem 
·industry, which puts most of the power in the hands of management. As a project with 
considerable government financial backing, Come by Chance was constantly under 
media attention. Workers took advantage of the media and government attention to put 
forth their own agenda, one that included higher wages, better working conditions, and 
being treated with respect. While the walkouts often occurred in the heat of the moment, 
as spontaneous protests, other on site strikes were more carefully planned and executed. 
Government and capitalists used a wide variety of tactics to cope with strikes in 
the 1970s. Governments responded by turning to an old standby, the royal commission or 
investigative body. By appointing an investigative committee, the government could be 
seen to be taking action even if it had no intention of fiJllowing the committee's 
recommendations. Having a series of investigative committees allowed the public to feel 
the government was doing something and allowed workers a forum for their complaints. 
Commissions also gave the government concrete suggestions on how to improve labour 
relations, should the government choose to implement them. The government 
implemented few of the reconm1endations, but some contractors and unions included 
them in their collective agreements. Governments also had at their disposal several tools 
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to regulate the marketplace. In the mid-1970s the Newfoundland government joined the 
federal program of wage and price controls in an attempt to help control inflation. When 
inflation returned, governments at both levels turned away from Keynesian responses to 
the crisis towards a tight money policy involving privatization, downsizing, and a 
reduction in workers' rights. With increasingly long unemployment lines, construction 
workers began to turn away from the strike. 
Employers had their own arsenal of tactics to the union challenge of the early 
1970s. They pressured government for area wide certification and for multi-trades 
bargaining. With the recession of the early 1980s, when the number of new projects 
slowed and contractors were struggling to sunrive, many contractors turned to double-
breasting and increasingly tight regulation of their workforces. By the start of Hibernia, 
employers, contractors, unions, and the government had all agreed that the site would 
employ a no-strike, no-lockout policy. When workers attempted to lmmch a \vildcat strike 
-the method which construction workers had used on the Come by Chance project- 60 
workers were suspended and the union was forced to pay a $20,000 fine for failing to 
control its workers. 
Hibernia's collective agreement put strict limitations on workers' abilities to 
assert their own needs; everything from behaviour at \Vork to life in the camp was 
explicitly spelled out. The HEA regulated almost every aspect of life on the project, from 
penalties for everything from insubordination to tardiness. Construction workers who 
held onto the idea of themselves as self-directing, independent workers were in :l:or a 
surprise as they reached Hibernia where all i..'1fractions were recorded in a da~abase. Each 
job was measured in the computer for how long it should take. Workers who did not meet 
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the computer's time frame were threatened with disciplinary action. Each time workers 
entered and left the site, their cars were liable to be searched for unauthorized removal of 
goods. Drinking, long a fixture in many construction workers' lives, was closely 
regulated, only to be done in the on-site tavern, only for a three-hour period each night, 
and only beer and wine were available. A select group of workers chose to risk their 
working relationship by turning to theft of company time and property. Pilfering is an 
area where relatively little research has been done. Considerable work remains to be done 
. 
examining the moral economy of pilfering and examining how pilfering differs by 
occupation. 
My work continues the recent trend in Newfoundland labour history of 
broadening out from institt!tionallabour histories and research on the fisheries. My work 
has benefited from work by Sutherland, Botting, and Rennie whose case studies (logging, 
mining and domestic service) have focused on the social and economic impacts of 
economic development.6 Labour history, both in Newfoundland and Canada, has largely 
ignored the constmction worker and expressed even less interest in women construction 
workers. While more and more works are examining the gendered nature of different 
occupations, few scholars have examined the overtly masculine nature of construction. 
By the time' of Hiberr.tia, women were slowly increasing their numbers in con.stmction. 
Women's roles on construction sites have undergone significant changes from the 1960s 
to the 1990s. On the earlier projects in the late 1960s and early 1970s, v;.romen were 
6 Dufferin Sutherland, "'We are only Loggers' : Loggers and the Struggle for Development in 
Newfoundland, 1929-1959," PhD thesis, Simon Fraser University, 1995; Ingrid Botting, 
'"Getting a Grand Falls Job': Migration, Labour Markets and Paid Domestic Work in the Pulp 
and Paper Town of Grand Falls, Newfoundland, 1905-1939," PhD thesis, MlJN, 2000; and Rick 
Rennie, "Mining and Industrial Disease in StLawrence, Newfoundland, 1921-1935," PhD thesis, 
l\1ill~, 2001. 
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largely engaged in traditional paid employment - clerical/office, nursing, teaching, and 
retail- or in meeting the needs of wage workers in the home. In the mid-1970s women 
slowly began entering non-traditional jobs in the c.onstruction field, bolstered in part by 
the example of U.S. pioneers operating under affirmative action programs. While women 
were still more likely to be found in traditional occupations on construction sites in the 
1990s, dozens of \Vomen also achieved gains unheard of twenty years before. In addition 
to becoming apprentices in, construction trades, a few women also achieved "foreman" 
status. All was not easy for women in non-traditional jobs on the Hibernia project, and 
many women complained of sexual and other forms of harassment. Despite the problems 
with Hibernia, it served as a stepping stone into a previously unobtainable industry. With 
the end of construction, many women who had managed to gain a toehold in the 
construction industry found themselv~s on the outside once again. New constmction 
projects have not included affirmative action programs and the most recent offshore oil 
construction project- Terra Nova - did not provide Hibernia's employment levels. 
As construction workers built Newfoundland and Labrador's industrial base, they 
faced a wide variety of occupational health and safety risks, from workplace injuries to 
illnesses. \Vhile constmction workers have had to climb scaffolding, use power tools and 
other equipment, lift heavy objects such as rebar, and work al: great heights or 
underground, most of these tasks can be accomplished relatively safely if workers arc 
given proper equipment, training, and supervision. Since the 1960s occupational health 
and safety has become a topic of increasing concern to workers, unions, and contractors. 
Safety programs in the 1990s were far more effective than those earlier programs and in 
the case of Hibernia safety was n1ade a part of the site even prior to the start of 
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construction. Recognizing the high costs of an unsafe site, contractors attempted to make 
a safe work site a priority through training programs, active health and safety committees, 
and an identification of major hazards on site. Despite all these precautions, accidents 
still occurred, in part because of the shifting numbers of contractors on site at any given 
time and the constant turnover of workers. 
To avoid repeating mistakes of the past, we need to think more critically about the 
path of economic development. Large-scale projects along the lines of Churchill Falls, 
Come by Chance and Hibemia have not been the panacea the government hoped for. 
Research such as mine offers some insight into earlier developments, what has succeeded 
and what has failed, and provides some guideposts for future projects. My research aiso 
shows that the choice of large scale projects was not "natural" but was rather a complex 
historical process involving the interaction of government, capital and workers. 
Newfoundland's economic development was also strongly influenced by the province's 
particular historical context, its entrance into Confederation (providing an influx of 
:fi.mds), its resource-rich status, its high unemployment levels, and the determination of its 
politicians. 
Many questions remain about what shape Newfoundland's industrial projects will 
take. \Vhile Hibernia was relatively successful, especially when compared to the earlier 
Come by Chance project, not all the participants were happy with its results. With the 
awarding of the Terra Nova floating production storage offloading (FPSO) vessel 
contract it became clear that contractors did not intend to follow the Hibernia model. 
TerTa Nova's labour reiations model followed more of a manufacturing style labour 
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agreement than a construction project.7 As such, the collective agreement included 
flexible work practices, a one union concept (of building trades tmions ), and insisted on 
local and international representation on the union executive. Rather than enhancing 
stability and productivity, the Terra Nova contract has resulted in challenges before the 
Labour Relations Board, work stoppages contrary to the no strike/no lockout 
commitment, lower than anticipated productivity rates, and wages significantly below 
those paid to Hibernia workers. 8 
PCL Industrial Constructors were awarded the principal contract for fabricating, 
assembling, and installing the topsides portion of the Terra Nova FPSO at the Bull Arm 
facility. In April 1997 PCL signed a collective agreement with the Newfoundland and 
Labrador International Building Trades Petroleum Developm~nt Association (PDA), the 
new super-union overseeing the project.9 In February 1998 Terra Nova 'vas granted 
Special Project status under the Labour Relations Act. Not all the unions were happy with 
PDA taking the lead in negotiations and signing the collective agreement. Both the 
International Union of Operating Engineers (local 904) and the Construction General 
Labourers, Rock and Tunnel \.Vorkers Union (local 1208) filed certification applications 
with the Labour Relations Board announcing their intentions to certify workers on the 
Terra Nova site. While their applications were eventually denied in January 1999, th~ 
applications created uncertainty on the project and created divisiveness among unions. 
7 Like Churchill Falls and Hibernia, Tena Nova was declared a special project under section 70 of 
the Labour Relations Act. Unlike Hibernia where the Gravity Based Structure and some of the 
modules for the topsides facilities were built on site, the floating production storage and 
offloading vessel used for the Tern Nova project was constructed in South Korea and shipped to 
the Bull i\rm to be mated with its module pieces (two built in Scotland, four at Bull Ann). 
8 For more on this see Morgan Cooper, Labour Relations Processes on Offshore Oil and Gas 
Fabrication and Construction Projects (St. John' s, 2001 ). Cooper was hired by the Minister of 
Environment and Labour to undertake this report. 
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Many of the umons were upset that the international representatives, and not local 
representatives, had taken the lead role in contract negotiations, particularly when the 
resulting collective agreement led to lower wages and other benefits as compared to 
Hibemia and to a blurring of trade lines. 10 
Despite the no-strike/no-lockout clause m the collective agreement, workers 
engaged in several work stoppages, including walkouts in March 1999 (368 hours) over a 
jurisdictional dispute, in July 1999 over travel allowances (8000 hours), in November 
1999 (2384 hours) and in June 1999, both over jurisdictional disputes (52,805 hours). 11 
Poor labour relations on site were attributable to several factors including worker 
dissatisfaction over wages. Workers were also upset over the lack of a travel allowance, 
and the absence of a jurisdictional dispute mechanism. Funher troubles developed out of 
PDA's inability to act effectively as a single union and its lack of measures for exerting 
control over its constituent members. Combined with PCL's attempts to manage labour 
relations from outside the province (shades of the Come by Chance project), and 
communications problems between PDA and PCL, labour relations were fractious. 12 
Terra Nova's labour relations problems and the government's intention to carry 
on with new large-scale projects (Voisey's Bay, the Lower Churchill, White Rose and 
9 PDA replaced the ODC as the super-union representing building trades unions. 
1
° Cooper, Labour Relations Processes .. . , 12. The contract had to be readjusted in April2000 to · 
cover hook-up of the FPSO. With the renegotiation, workers received a 10 per cent wage 
increase, an overtime rate increase from one and a half to double time, and an attendance bonus 
of five per cent of gross for workers who showed up for all scheduled time in a four week period. 
In exchange workers agreed to a six-day work week, working ten-hour days. 
11 Cooper, Labour Relations Processes ... , 26. 
12 Cooper, Labour Relations Processes ... , 15. One problem with wages was that the otiginal 
compensation package was based on inappropriate bench-marking in relation to local, regional, 
and national rates, resulting in lower rates. When the collective agreement was signed, economic 
conditions in Newfoundland were quite poor causing the PDA to agree to lower wage rates. With 
the economic upsurge by the start of the construction, many workers felt the wages were 
inadequate. 
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several other offshore oil and gas projects) led the government to establish a review of 
labour relations processes for major construction projects in September 2000. Chaired by 
Morgan Cooper, the report recommended that future large-scale projects provide for 
wages benchmarked to building trades rates, binding mechanisms for jurisdictional 
disputes, and flexible work practices. Whether or not these recommendations will be 
implemented (the first two were in place for Hibernia, the third was tried without success 
for Terra Nova) for future projects is at tllis point unclear. What is clear is that to mount a 
successful construction project additional factors must be addressed, including 
employment equity and occupational health and safety programs. It is also clear that the 
Newfoundland government needs to examine its development trajectory and to determine 
if large-scale projects are the method it wants to continue to follow. 
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Appendix 1: 
Major Construction Projects in Newfoundland and Labrador, 1950s-iOs 
Year Project Field 
1950-1966 Roads, 2090 miles new road Roads and Highways 
built, 859 miles road paved, 2125 
miles of road rebuilt 
1954 Grace Hospital enlarged Health 
1956 Thermal generating station, St. I Electrical power 
John's Harbour 
1958 Agnes Pratt facility opened as I Health 
boarding home 
---
1959 Carol Lake project Industrial 
1960 Nurses Residence added to Grace Health 
1961 New MUN campus opened Education 
---· 
1961-2 Central NF Hospital opened in Health 
GrandFalls 
1962 St. Clare's Hospital enlarged Health 
1962 W a bush Mines begin!' Industrial 
1963 Construction of 11 trade schools Education ! 
compl~ted 
1963 Rural electrification project Electric power 
begins 
1963 Add nurses residence to General Health 
Hospital 
1963-4 Old l\1lJN campus converted to Erlucation 
.. 
Coll~e ofFisheties 
1964 Bay d'Espoir power development Electric power 
begins 
1965 School of Nursing in Corner Health 
Brook I i 
1965 Bell Island hospital completed I Health 
I 
1965 Hoyles home completed Health 
1965 Trans Canada highway completed Roads and Highways 
1965 I MUN new construction - Education 
j education, chemistry/physics, 
TSC, residences, church colleges, i Marine Science research 
\ ! labora"':_Oii: all begun 
1966 ~project begins Industrial 
1966 Fort Pepperell hospita l Health 
refurbished 
1967 Churchill Falls project starts Electric power 
1967 St. Ciares Hospital enlarged Health 
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Year Project Field 
1968 Holyrood thermal generating Electric power 
station construction begins 
1969 Western Memorial Hospital (CB) Health 
expanded 
1970 St. John's arterial built Roads and Highways 
1970 Labrador Linerboard construction Industrial 
begins 
1971 CBC oil refinery begins Industlial 
construction 
1972-8 196 miles road built, 1318 miles Roads and Highways 
road rebuilt 
1973 Health Sciences construction Health 
com12lete 
1975 Hinds Lake hydroelectric project Electric power 
begins 
1976 Escascru retirement home started Health 
1979 Upper Salmon hydroelectric Electric 
power project begins 
Appendix 2: Churchill Falls Time Line 
1953: Incorporation of the British Newfotmdland Corporation (Brinco). 
30 June 1958: Incorporation of the Hamilton Falls Power Corporation. 
1 October 1965: The Hamilton Falls Power Corporation was renamed Churchill Falls 
(Labrador) Corporation (CFLCo ). 
13 October 1966: Signing of Letter of Intent for sale ofpower to Hydro-Quebec. 
Autumn 1967: Start of advance into rock towards area ofunderground powerhouse. 
August 1968: Powerhouse area reached. 
12 May 1969: Signing ofPower Contract with Hydro-Quebec. 
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13 May 1969: Closure of Churchill River's natural course at North Rapids and routing of 
river's flow through Lobstick control structure openings. 
15 fVIay 1969: Signing ofFirst Mortgage Bonds Purchase Agreement. 
July 1970: End of excavation work. 
1 July 1971: Official closing ofLobstick control structure gates to begin filling ofthe 
Smallwood Reservoir. 
6 December 1971: First commercial delivery of power produced by units one a11d t\vo. 
1 May 1972: Start of power delivery under Jong-tem1 contract with Hydro-Quebec. 
Summer 1972: Completion of units three and four. 
December 197 4: Completion of installation of all eleven units. 
1974: The Newfoundland Govemment bought controlling interest ofCF(L)Co. 
1975: Transfer ofNewfoundland Govemment's controlling interest to NewfOtmclland and 
Labrador Hydro Corporation. 
9 March 1998: Newfoundland Premier Brian Tobin and Quebec Premier Lucien 
Bouchard announced that Newfoundland and Labrador Hydro and Hydro-Quebec will 
commence formal negotiations to develop the Churchill River in Labrador, and related 
projects in Quebec. 
15 December 1998: A Memorandum Of Understanding (MOU) signed between Quebec 
and Newfoundlat"ld. Cancelled spring 2000 after Quebec withdrew from the deal. 
1963 
1965 
1967 
1973 
1977 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
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Appendix 3: Hibernia Developments, 1963-1995 
Federal Government gives out exploration pem1its for waters off 
Canadian East Coast. By 1965, 100 million acres granted for 
exploration. 
Mobil given exploration pem1it by Federal Government. 
Smallwood upset, claims offshore for Province. Province passes 
Petroleum & Natural Gas Act and issues own exploration permits. 
Seismic tests show large oil deposits. 
Supreme Court of Canada rules that British Columbia does not 
own sub-sea resources off its coast. 
Premier Frank Moores sets up Offshore Petroleum Industrial 
Advisory Council which does preliminary work into the 
requirements and consequences of offshore oil but is inactive by 
the mid-1970s. 
Provincial Government releases a "White Paper," later the Act 
Respecting Petroleum and Natural Gas, outlining policies 
regarding petroleum development and establishjng the Provincial 
claim to the offshore. Province establishes new crovvn corporation, 
Newfoundland a..'ld Labrador Petroleum Ltd. 
Hibernia P-15 discovery well d1illed by Chevron Canada. Stri..kes 
oil. Prime Minister Joe Clark promises Newfoundland that 
offshore resources will be treated as if they were onshore. 
Further drilling begins. Nine wells drilled to delineate Hibernia 
field between 1980-1984. 
Hibernia discovery announced. Provincial government sets up 
Offshore Petroleum Tmpac:t Committee. 
Federal government passes bill C-48m this bill specified a national 
energy policy and clearly stated the Federal Government's 
ownership of offshore resources. 
Ocean Ranger, the world's largest semi-submersible drill rig, 
capsizes and sinks in major winter storm, all 84 crew lost. 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
354 
Prime Minister Trudeau refers ownership of offshore resources to 
Supreme Court of Canada. Premier Peckford declares provincial 
day of mouming. 
Newfoundland refers case to Newfoundland Supreme Court which 
rules against Newfoundland's ownership claim. Supreme Court of 
Canada agrees to hear Federal claim. 
Supreme Court of Canada rules that subsea resources off the coast 
of Newfoundland and Labrador belong to Canada. 
Mobil Oil leads Hibernia partners in submitting Development Plan. 
Atlantic Accord signed. Long-term agreement between the Federal 
and Provincial governments on joint management of offshore 
development. 
Joint federal and provincial Hibernia Environmental Assessment 
Panel established to review Hibernia Development Project. 
The Provincial Cabinet exempts the Gravity Based System at the 
Hibernia site as exempt from EIS procedure. Construction to be 
controlled by an Environmental Protection Plan. 
Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board gives approval 
to both Hibernia Development Plan and Hibernia Benefits Plan, 
subject to a number of conditions. 
vVorld oil prices crash, delaying construction proposal. 
Pre-project employer-employee agreement to enable non-union 
companies to participate. Accept 5 year no strikes or lockouts. 
New negotiations start on project that now has $5.2 billion price-
tag. 
Government of Canada and Government of Newfoundland and 
Labrador sign the Hibernia Agreement. 
Government and industry (Mobil, Gulf, Chevron and PetroCanada) 
sign Statement of Principles. 
GBS site to be located in Great Mosquito Cove, Trinity Bay. 
Canada-Newfoundland Offshore Petroleum Board (CNOPB) 
issues Hibernia with 25 year production licence. 
--
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
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Offshore Development Act passed in Hose of Assembly. 
Sign Hibernia Agreement. Award contract to build GBS. 
Federal Government passes legislation guaranteeing $1 billion 
financing and a further $1.6 billion in loan guarantees to Hibernia 
project. 
Gulf Canada indicates plans to sell up to half its 25 per cent stake 
in Hibernia. 
Locals angered over jobs going to unions, threaten violence and to 
block roads into project. 
Bull Arm construction site completed. 
Lack of trained workers with engineering skills, may have to 
import workers from outside Canada. 
Gulf Canada withdraws from Hibemia Consortium, later absorbs 
$300 million loss on investment. 
Construction slows. 
GBS Dry dock completed. Commence GBS construction but put 
on hold. 
Gulfs share taken over by Murphy Oil (6.5 per cent), Mobil (5 per 
cent), Chevron (5 per cent) and the Federal Government (8.5 per 
cent). Ends speculation that project might be canceled. 
Update costs and reserves. Now 615 mbbls up from 525 mbbls in 
1990. Cost estimated at $15 billion, dcm.:n 21 per cent from 1990 
estimates. 
Module fabrications begin. 
Import iron workers from outside Newfoundland. 
90 complaints filed with Nfld Human Rights Comn::.ission over 
alleged job discrimination at Hibernia. 
Labour and management arguing over certification of draftpeople, 
go to court over whether or not Labour Relations Board bas 
jurisdiction over Hibernia. 
Pour concrete for GBS base raft structure . 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1999 
2015 
Annmmce $1 billion cost overrun. Platform to cost $5.8 billion 
and 2 tankers and oil storage terminal to cost $400 million. 
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HMDC transfers a contract from Marystown shipyard to Saint 
John, N.B. because doubtful Marystown can get the work done on 
time. 
GBS towed out to deep water construction site. 
First slipform operation completed. 
Illegal wildcat strike at Bull Arm site over overtime and work 
schedules by 400 P ASSB workers. Union pays fine of $20,000, 
several workers (rumoured as many as 65) suspended for one 
week. 
Module at Bull Ann completed, 2nd Module arrives from Italy. 
GBS complete, topsides complete. 
Record numbers of grievances being brought to arbitration. 
Petro-Canada sells 5 per cent of its stake in Hibernia to Norsk 
Hydro. 
GBS and Topsides mating completed in February. 
Christening ceremony on May 91h, featuring Chretien marked by 
fisheries protestors. 
Tow-out to Hibernia site to happen between May 23rd and early 
June depending on weather. Tow out to take 10 days to reach 
location. 
Fisheries protestors discussing floating blockade. 
First drilling to start: August, first oil to be struck in December. 
Plarined peak production of oil. 
Production ceases. 
Appendix 4: Strikes at Come by Chance 
.---: Union Start Date 
r.:--c---: ----,-·-----r---· 
Reason Industry Workers Employer I Return Number of POL Type of 
! to work Workers strike involved 
···-------· -·· 
Nr Refining USA 22/09/93 23/09/93 85 85 Illegal Worker suspension Man-petroleum Various 
Lundrigan's LIUNA 03/08/71 
1-:---c:----
04/08171 
r--·---
395 400 in support of 12 dismissed construction Labourers 
workers 
PI<)Cl)ll Various union, 08/01/72 09/01 /72 367 370 illegal Employees fired, construction Various 
(AFL-CIO/CLC and fighting/drinking in camp construction 
in d) 
-~ ··---- - - -·- - --·--···- .,..,--- ------ - - ------
Procon UAPP, Structural 01103/72 i0/03/72 700 5600iiliegal Employer decision to construction Pipefitters 
Iron Workers shut-down for bad 
E''" 
weather 
IBB ll /04/72 15/04/72 230 460 illegal Dispute over size of construction Stevedores 
stevedoring crew 
Procon Various unions 19/07/72 26/07/72 1100 4950 Dismissal of 40 workers construction Construction 
for coffee break violation crafts 
- ------·· ------------- . --
Pro con IUOE 26/07/72 28/07/72 542 1084 lllegal internal problem in IUOE construction Operating 
UAPP ·---- ---- . --
engineers 
f~con _ _ 08/08/72 18/08/72 350 3150 Illegal not reported constructiOn Pipefitters 
ocon IBB, SfVtWIA ___ 3011 0/72fo5/11172 ;-·--I30; 480 file gal not reported construction Boilermakers, 
I I sheetmetal 
Pro con UAPP 16/ 11 /72 2011 1172 350 1050 lllegal not reported construction Pioefitters 
·--- --·---··-
6780 
f------ ~V~rious Procon Various unions 13/04173 25/04173 848 return of workers construction 
(AFL-CIO/CLC and I 
In d) I 
Procon IBEW I 1/02/74 I2/02/74 130 130 Illegal not reported Electrical 
-· ----
PRC IBEW 15/08174 07/09/74 21 330 Legal Electrical 
Procon and IBEW 02/06171 12 3652 Illegal Elec on prov-wide construction Surveyors 
Subcontractors I'~ dispute, atfects site --- f--·7616 I pickets Procon and Ironworkers, 14/09171 Illegal camp accom and travel construction Various G::::··~ UBJCA, IUOE, allowance Teamsters, LIUNA, Rigger JBB, Welders 06110171 u i1on1 ss 2900 Illegal travel allowance, IBB not construction Boilermakers bcontractors signatory of agreement and welders 
Employer Union Start Date Return Number of PDL Type of Reason Industry Workers 
to work Workers strike involved 
Procon and IBB, UBJCA, 05/11171 20/11/71 185 8262 Illegal Want room and board or constnJction Boilt:Jmakers, 
Subcontractors IUOE, UAPP, allowance, IBB not other trades 
Teamsters, LIUNA signator 
Procon and UAPP, Ironworkers, 14/02/72 76 2936 Illegal shut-down for bad construction various 
Subcontractors LIUNA, weather 
Bci!ermuker, 
I UBCJA, IUOE 
Procon and IUOE I 28/06/72 30106172 22520 Illegal Worker fired for union construction IUOE 28, 29, Subcontractors activity all crafts 30th 
Procon and LIUNA, Teamsters, 03/08/71 15 2922 unemployed pickets construction various 
Subcontractor~: --~rv~~~---·- outside CBC t----- -· 
Procun TUOE () 1/06172 80 360 lllegal Not reported Construction Operating 
lProcon 
Engineers 
1138, UAPP, 01/06/72 800 4000 lllegal Not reported Construction Various 
Ironworkers 
·- -·-
Procon IUOE 01 /08/72 80 160 Illegal Not reported Construction Operating 
engineers 
Procon IBEW 01109172 15 90 Illegal Not reported Construction Electrical 
Procon Bridge and Iron 01111172 90 1350 Illegal Not reported Construction Iron workers 
Workers 
Apl!.endix 5: Strikes in Construction 
- ·-·- -Employer Place Union Start of Return #of Workers POL Type of strike Reason for strike 
Strike to work 
building trades St. John's Carpenters 31/08/49 23/10/49 600 10300 For new agreement 
contractor with higher wages 
Contractor Corner Brook UBCJA 16/06i51 19/06/51 36 70 for increased wages 
and reduced hr 60 to 
' 
54 week 
!Building Trades St. John's UBCJA 17/09/51 03/'10/51 600 6100 . rates of wages 
!Employers 
Assoc. 
Contractor Logy Bay Building 29/05/52 31/05/52 500 750 Wages 
c.nd Redcliffe Trades 
Fraser Brace N/a unorganized 30/05/52 wages 
Terminal 
Constructors 
Carpenters St. John's 25/03/54 19/04/54 60 1170 Protesting dismissal 4 
carpenters for 
insufficient cause r--E . . ·- ---·· NF ngmeenng Corner Brook UBCJA 14/04/54 28/04/54 75 860 Protesting employment 
and of mainland carpenters 
Construction 
Building Trades St. .John's Bricklayers 30/10/54 06/12/54 17 420 wages to prevailing 
Employers Union I rate Assn : 
Road Corner Brook Road 15/08/55 08/09/55 130 2600 union recognition, 
construction construction increased wages, 
workers workers reduced hrs. 
2160 -· ---· ·------labourers St. John's labourers ~ 3/08/56 28/08/56 175 For new agreement, 
wages, reduced hours 
jEmployer Place Union Start of Return #of Workers POL Type of strike Reason for strike 
Strike to work 
McNamara Gander lntern'l 17/09/57 23/09/57 125 625 working conditions and 
Construction Brotherhood layoff of some 
Co. of employees 
Teamsters .. . 
(AFL-
·----- -
g_!O/CLC) 
JAJones Stephenville IUOE, 10/03/58 14/03/58 375 1500 Bargaining rights 
Construction UBCJA, 
IBEW, 
IUBAC 
St. John's St. John's UBC,IA 18/08/58 21/08i58 120 300 Wages 
Building Trades 
Association 
Pentagon Carol Lake, Baie Comeau 05/09/60 07/09/60 400 1000 wages, hours 
Construction Lab Building 
Trades 
Council 
-- -- -
Pentagon Carol Lake, Baie Comeau 24/09/60 26/09/60 500 500 union recognition 
Construction Lab Building 
Trades 
Council 
Pentagon Carol Lake, Baie Comeau 20/10/60 22/10/60 500 750 return of workers 
Construction Lab Building 
Trades 
Council 
- ~--·· -·-··· 
GM Gest Lab City IBEW 16/02/63 21/02/63 104 420 .Wages 
Construction ! 
j Foundation- Bay d'Espoir Unorganized 14/10/65 18/10/65 575 990 Changes in swing shift 
Lundigran 
-------
every 2 weeks 
Foundation- Bay d'Espoir Unorganized 20/03/66 22/03/66 140 280 Wages 
Lundrigan 
-
Lundrigan's Ltd various Unorganized 14/07/66 15/07/66 225 230 wages, hours 
locations 
--
361 
~---------··- ··---
Stat1 of !Return r of Workers POL TvP.Ot strike I Reason for strike Employer Place Union 
Strike to work 
-- --------~--- ------- - --
Lundrigan's Ltd various Unorganized 14/09/66 19/09/66 300 900 wages, hours 
locations I 
- -- -·· 
Structural J23/08/67 Two Long 28/08/67 100 260 hiring workers from out 
Construction Harbour Iron Workers ! of province, 
contractors ! 
Construction UBCJA 10/04iG8 80 recognition, overtime, 
~actors 
-
holidays, vacation 
NLCA St. John's LIUNA, 05/04/"11 30/04/71 250 4500 not reported 
Bricklayers 
Electrical St. John's IBEW 13/04/7•1 17/08/71 200 17600 not reported 
Construction 
IAssoc 
Procon and esc IBEIJI/ 02/06/71 12 3652 !!legal Electricians on prov-
Subcontractors !(surveyors) wide strike 
Kingston Assoc Stephenville UAPP 09/06/71 09/08/71 200 8200 Wages 
C~nstru~tio!!._ _ _ 
McNamara St. John's IAMAW 21/06/71 06/07/71 125 1250 Wages 
Industries Ltd I 
Various Stephenville Boilermakers 29/06/71 02/07/71 225 300 Grievances over camp 
contractors , Ironworkers food and 
(AFL- accommodation 
CIO/CLC} 
McAlpine of NF Stephenville UBCJA 20/07/71 21/07/71 1044 1040 Wages 
1 
Lundrigan's Ltd esc LIUNA 03/08/71 04/08/71 395 400 in support of 12 
fprocon and 
dismissed workers 
CBC LIUNA, 03/08/7•1 15 2922 unemployed pickets 
!Subcontractors Teamsters, outside esc 
i Surveyors 
-----
- ·-
rProcon and esc Ironworkers, 14/09/71 131 7616 Illegal camp accommodations 
I Subcontractors UBJCA, and travel allowance 
IUOE, 
Teamsters, 
LIUNA, 
13l9.ger 
362 
Employer Place Union Start of Return #of Workers POL Type of strike Reason for strike 
Strike to work 
- ----- CBC IIBB, Welders !06/10/71 12/10/71 58 2900 Illegal travel allowance, IBB Procon and 
Subcontractors I not signatory of 
agreement 
Procon and CBC IBB, U8JCA, 05/11/71 20/11/71 185 8262 Illegal Want room and board 
Subcontractors IUOE, UAPP, or allowance, IBB not 
Teamsters, signator 
LIUNA 
Procon CBC various 08/01/72 09/01/72 367 370 Several employees 
unions fired for fighting and 
drinking in camp 
McAlpine Stephenville Various •12/01/72 13/01/72 300 300 not reported 
Construction unions 
McAlpine Steph~nville IUOE 07/02/72 09/02/72 68 206 Illegal overtime pay 
~onstruction 
------ - -·-·-·-·- ···-··-
14/02/72 l rocon and CBC LJAPP, 76 2936 Illegal Employer decision to 
Subcontractors Ironworkers, shut-down for bad 
LIUNA, weatt1er 
Boilermaker, 
UBC,JA, I 
IUOE --~1/cntn -·- --·---- . ..,.. Proem; CBC UAPP, 10/03/72 700 5600 illegal Employer decision to 
Structural !shut-down for bad 
r:·---·----·-
Iron Worke~§__ 
30!03172 
weather 
=t----McAlpine Stephenville UAPP 1•1/04/72 200j 1550 working conditions Construction i ,-. ----··---------'---- -----·--·-·--,-
Procon ! CBC EB 11/04/72 15/04/72 2301 460 illegal Dispute over size of tevedores} 
28/06/72130i06/72 
I stevedoring crew to be jUSed 1 22520 ~-Procon and CBC I!UOE Illegal I Worker fired for union 
Subcontractors fcUvity during working 
hrs 
-~ ···- --· ···-- - -·--- -----
Procon CBC Various 19/07/72 26/07/72 1100, 4950 Dismissal of 40 
unions I I ___ L __ _____ workers for coffee I j br~ak violation L 
363 
------ -
Employer Place Union Start of Return #of Workers POL Type of strike Reason for strike 
Strike to work 
- -------·- ---- -- --:-:-:-=:---·-- 1--------·-·· . --··------ . - - -··----------- - ---Procon CBC IUOE 26/07/72 28/07/72 542 1084,illegal internal problem in 
IUOE 
-- -----
Pro con CBC UAPP 08/08/72 18/08/72 350 3150 Illegal not reported 
-=-----·--Pro con CBC 188, SMWIA 3-0/10/12 05/~ 1/72 130 480 I !legal not reported 
-- ------- -- -- -·--- ---- -
Pro con CBC 1UAPP 16/11/72 20/11/72 350 1050 Illegal not reported 
- - - - · - -----
!Building Procon CBC 13/04/73 25/04/73 848 6780 return of workers 
trades 
--·- --- --------- !-2900 ,NCLRA SMWIA 07/0 'ii74 i ii02/74 116 Legal Not reported 
jMcNamara- - ---- - - 8L85 St. John's IAMAW 18/02/74 18/02/74 Illegal Not reported 1-~~-~~!!:!!.Ctio n I 
~_NCLRA UBCJA 22/04li4 25/04/74 35 30 Illegal ~ot reported 
------ -- ~-7/02i75 Becker St.john's IBEW 18/02/75 24 24 Illegal Not reported 
Mechanical 
Construction 
(Health 
18/03175r3io417t- --
~ci~_nce~l_ 
-- --Beck.ar St. John's UAPP 74 888 Illegal Not reported 
Mechanical 
Construction 
NCLRA various IUBAC 20/05/75 19/06/75 400 5600 Legal Wages 
locations 
-+-
AE Hickman Co St. John's LIUNA 10/06/75 13/06/75 21 63 illegal Not reported 
Lundrigans Ltd Corner Brook LIUNA 10/06/75 10/06/75 12 12 illegal Not reported 
~-
province UAPP 17/06/75 22/09/75 NCLRAand 900 57600.Legal not reported 
Mechanical wide 
Const Assn 
NCLRA Churchill IBEW 26i06/75 2:3/06/75 110 220 Suspension of 11 
Falls workers and lack of 
i17/11/75 
safety 
p:--- St. John's UUNA 20/11/75 58 174 Illegal Not reported lttS 
Engineering 
Construction 
Eastern Ltd I 
---- -- ~--,--.-=-Employer Place Union of Return # of Workers POL Type of strike Reason for strike 
.Stnke to work 
Collavino Holyrood Construction.T3o/06lf7 30/06/77 47 18 Illegal Not reported 
Brothers General I ----c=t----- --·-Construction Labourers 
Collavino Holyrood IAMAW, 101/07/77 05/07/77 t17 47 Illegal Not reported 
Brothers IAIW ~/04---construction ··----- -75 GBS Carbon ear UBCJA, 24/04/78 15 Illegal Not reported 
Construction 'Construction 
Co and General 
Labourers 
- - - -·--· ·-
NCLRA various IBPAT 19/06/78 30/06/78 200 1800 Legal wages 
locations 
Lundrigans Ltd Corner Brook LIUNA 10/07/78 10/07/78 50 25 Illegal Not reported 
NCLRA Eastern NF UBCJA 27/07/78 13/09/78 930 31620 Legal wages 
- ··-··--·--· 
NCLRA Corner Brook IBEW 14/0B/78 24/08/78 120 960 Legal not reported 
INCLRA N/a IBEW 24/0H/78 15/09/78 30 480 Legal Not reported 
------ ---·· · ····---~ -- --
Easteel and St. John's IAMAW 01/0fi/79 29/06/79 160 3200 Legal wages 
McNamara Ltd 
Lundigrans and St. John's building 06/06/'19. 07/06/79 100 100 Illegal Site picketed for using 
Easteel (Data trades steel from striking plant 
Centre) 
Construction Holyrood Building 19/06/79 20/06/79 240 240 Illegal jurisdictional dispute 
Contractors trades 
NCLRA St. John's IBEW [26/05/80 1'1/08/80 300 16500 Legal not reported 
NCLRA Various UAPP 104/06/HO 1'1/08/80 450 21600 Legal wages, union security 
locations 
-
NCLRA Various building 04/06/80 11/08/80 1480 71040 respectinn picket lines 
locations trades 
Pelleys Springdale IBEW 23/07/80 24/07/80 17 17 legal Not reported 
Enterprises (linesmen) f !Bakers 1Corner Brook IW.::W 23/07/80 26i08/80 432 legal Not reported 1 Construction I 
--·-·--
I linesmen) 
r- - -----· -- Union \Start of 1Return #of Workers P6L-1Type of strike ~ ~:_::on ~~- -strike l Employer Place 
u-BCJA -~~~J~81t work r---·-·-·- - --·· N/a 12 60 jlllegal protest hiring practices Dover 
Construction 
Ltd 
--,----- · -- - -·--·---· -- ----- - -------- - · 
Sintra-Viking Bay D'Espoir LIUNA, other 15/0J/a2 22/03/82 135 675 illegal Preferential hiring 
~~~~nt Pr~~ct trades 
-
-· 
NCLRA Province- UAPP •16/08/82 12/10/82 200 7833 legal Wages 
wide 
----
NCLRA Province- all trades 16/08/82 26/08/82 2500 18750 sympathy Respecting picket lines 
wide 
·-
NCLRA Province- UBCJA 27/08/82 12/10/82 18 555 legal Wages 
wide l(millwrigh& I 
NCLRA Various Iron Workers 20/09/82 12/10/82 300 1910 legal after reject contract 
locations offer 
--·--·-----·---ri--···-·------ -· Seaboard St. John's I UBCJA 10/06/83 13/06/83 66 33 illegal protest by laid-off 
Construction I 
206 1373 1 eg~----- workers McNamara- Cat Arm !UUNA 08/07/83 18/07/83 Wages 
Wimpey I(Hydro ~ Northern Joint Project) I ' I I Venture 
--···· 
--
NCLRA !province- all trades but 12/08/86 15/09/86 1800 414001Legal double breasting, 
wide IUBCJA wag_~ 
~r· Maritime Cartwright j iUOE ·---- ------- ---24/08/86 28/08/Ei6 40 1141Lega! wages nstruction 
15io 1is-rha7o 1ts?----· -- ···------ --------- ·--·--------------reo SL Jo~lron Workers 52 468 legal Working with non-
1
_G_onstruction union ~eoQ ie 
!NCLRA province all 22/01/87 23/01/87 1800 1800 illegal Protestin~J hiring 
I wide construction practice at CBC i 
i unions I Protesting ····-··- --------- --- ---·-- -- ----Elecklin Hope Brook LIUNA, IUOE 04/11/87 1•1/11/87 400 2000 illegal 
Construction I transportation 
---- 5T Walken Mount Pe8rl UBCJA 02/05/88108/12/88 749 Legal wages 
Enterprises I I 
Stokes ~John's UBCJA, 29/07/881 08}08/88 150 900 Illegal ------1jurisdictional dispute, 
j()() 
I - ····--· ·· - --- ------
ILIUi\jA 
I 
work ossignrnent I Management 
Ltd. 
~RA province- Iron Workers 17/07/89 27/09/89 200 10800 legal Wages 
wide 
-
NCLRA province- other trades 17/07/89 130 6690 legal Sympathy/ iron 
wide workers picket line 
-·-- ------IBEw 2010 7/89 I 05/09/89 --NCLRA province- 200 6200 legal Wages 
wide 
- - --571ib 3464 ··f---.-----------. ---- ··- - ----- ---NCLRA provmce- varrous 20!07 /89 05/09i89 legal hiring practices 
wide unions 
--
• " I A&P Greenspond LIUNA, IUOE 14/05/90 "18/0G/90 ILl 290 Legal Jurisdiction of work Construction 
Ltd w~1A-- -- · -------- ------------------- -------··· -· Stokes Devel St. John's 13/07/90 19/07/90 6 21 illegal Jurisdictional dispute 
Corp ~-
13/07/9"?5 ~7i90 Respecting picket lin1 Stokes Devel St. John's other 80 280 illegal 
Corp construction 
trades I I 
Rocca St. John's LIUNA I 05/08/91 ! 06/08/91 50 50 legal Subcontracting 
Construction I I 
Ltci (RCMP 
sol 600 lega,--- -lsubcontracting building} -------- -·--- -Rocca St. John's LIUNA 13/08/91 29/08/91 
Construction 
Ltd (RCMP I I 
building}_ ______ 
.,-,----- h---
-ngy-----lun:on-recognition ---Gildart lv1arystown LIUNA 29/08/91 04/09/91 
Construction 
(Offshore Steel 
Fabrication) 
-- f6J01t95 Hibernia Bull Arm ODC 16/0 "1/95 4001 142 illegal Sympathy 
Employers' 
As soc I i 
Bull Arm-- F'lJA = 12167/99 ,14/07/99 --------PCL Industrial 4001 571 illegal Not reported 
Constructors i 
---- - -
!Employer Place --[Union Start of Return # of Workers PoL- Type ofstrif<e I Reason for" 
Strike to work L- ----- ___ ,_ -------- --,-~ --rCL lnduslial Bull Arm IPDA 12/07/99 14/07/99 3001 214 illegal Not reported 
Constructions i 
------·-·- -----------
NCLRA St. John's J~"'!~-~--- 12/10/99 15/10/99 35 105 illegal Not reported 
Appendix 6: A Snapshot of Women ·workers at Hibernia 
April 1995: Employment by P ASSB, Nodeco and Offshore Catering examined. 
Combined make up 89 per cent of all unionized workers on site. Approximately 5 per 
cent were female, 95 per cent male. 
PASSB, 847 employed on site, 828 men, 19 women (2 per cent) 
368 
Job break down for women: 1 labourer, 12 secretaries, 1 caterer, 2 painters/fireproofers, l 
structural Ironworkers, 2 teamster/warehousers. 
Major Offshore Catering, 161 employees, 91 men, 70 women (43 per cent) 
1 second cook, 7 cierical, 1 safety, 4 bartenders, 1 head waiter, 41 camp attendants, 1 
head camp attendant, 9 general help, 2 sandvvich makers, 2 third cooks. 
NODECO, 2187 employees, 2097 men, 90 wcmen (4 per cent) 
7 structural workers, 5 labourers , 4 rebar workers, 9 camp attendants, 1 surveyor, 59 
secretaries, 5 teamster/warehouse 
Julv 1995: Nodeco, PASSBand Major Offshore Catering make up 88 per cent all 
unionized employees. Combined 6 per cent women. 
NODECO, 2695, 2594 men, 101 women (4 per cent) 
\Vomen: 2 operating engineers, 6 structural ironworkers, 8 labourers, l 7 rebar vvorkers, 9 
camp attendants/caterers, 3 Comm. Officers, 52 secretaries/clerks, 4 
teamster/warehousers. 
PASSB, 835, 802 male, 33 female (4 per cent) 
·women: 1 pipefitter, 2 welders, 1 sheetmetal worker, 2 labourers, 13 secretari es, 1 
caterer, 2 painterlfireproofe.rs, 9 structural ironworkers, 2 teamsters 
Major Offshore, 1919, 113 men, 78 women (41 per cent) 
Women: l second cook, 7 clerical, 1 safety officer, 4 bartenders, 1 head waiter, 53 camp 
attendants, 1 head camp attendant, 6 general helpers, 2 sandwich persons, 2 third cooks. 




